9.1
This chapter outlines the committee’s conclusions and recommendations, drawing on the evidence outlined in previous chapters.
9.2
Australia’s engagement in, and withdrawal from Afghanistan, will continue to be analysed in the months and years to come. This report does not seek to provide a comprehensive history of these matters. Rather, it provides a
point-in-time assessment of some of the crucial elements of what has occurred, and outlines actions that the Australian Government can take now to assist the Afghan people, protect Australia’s national interests, and support Australian Defence Force (ADF) veterans who served in Afghanistan.
9.3
The committee has chosen to release this substantive interim report now, less than six months following the collapse of the former Afghan government, so that its recommendations can influence the ongoing efforts and decisions being taken by the Australian Government. This includes efforts being undertaken to bring Australian citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and visa applicants out of Afghanistan, as well as Australia’s decisions around further humanitarian visa and other responses to the crisis, and Australia’s ongoing engagement with Afghanistan.
9.4
Following the release of this report, the committee will assess in the coming months what further work it can usefully undertake in relation to these issues, and what areas of focus may be necessary for the committee’s final report.
Australia’s military, diplomatic and development engagement in Afghanistan
9.5
Australia’s military engagement in Afghanistan represents the longest conflict zone commitment since Federation. The committee thanks all those who were deployed to Afghanistan over Australia’s twenty years of engagement for their service, and acknowledges their achievements and commitment to improving the lives of Afghans. Importantly, the committee also wishes to honour the 41 soldiers who lost their lives whilst serving in Afghanistan and to those who returned with physical and mental injuries.
9.6
As well as its military contribution, Australia’s diplomatic and humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan during the last two decades has also been significant. The committee wishes to recognise the contribution made by Australian diplomatic and consular staff, other government personnel and humanitarian workers in Afghanistan. These individuals also faced significant risks in the course of their work, and have delivered significant outcomes for Australia and for the development of Afghanistan.
Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan
9.7
It was clear from the evidence received by the committee that Australia’s objectives shifted over the twenty-year period it was engaged in Afghanistan. The committee notes that conflicts, by nature, involve ever-evolving situations that necessitate the adjustment of objectives over time. Following the defeat of al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in March 2002, the mission required a shift to a combined effort of military, police and civilian assistance to help stabilise and prepare the Afghan government and its defence and security forces to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a training ground and operating base for international terrorists—which was in Australia’s national interest.
Assessing the achievement of Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan
9.8
The committee recognises that the assessment of what Australia achieved through its engagement in Afghanistan is open to debate and interpretation.
9.9
Many witnesses and submitters acknowledged the success of Australia’s initial objectives to drive al-Qaeda and Taliban forces out of Afghanistan and to destroy their bases. The valuable experience and expertise gained by the ADF through its engagement in Afghanistan was also noted. Additionally, the achievements of Australia’s development and humanitarian engagement in Afghanistan was also acknowledged as contributing to significant development gains for the Afghan people, in particular for women and girls.
9.10
However, the committee also received a range of criticisms of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, regarding whether the root cause of terrorism was ever adequately addressed, the perceived lack of clarity of objectives, the influence of the United States (US) on Australia’s decision-making, and the phenomenon of ‘mission creep’. Submitters also voiced concerns regarding the potential for Afghanistan to lose many of the development gains achieved through the 20 years of Australia’s engagement due to the resurgence of the Taliban. There were mixed opinions on the viability of establishing democracy in Afghanistan and its future prospects.
9.11
Australia’s two-decade engagement in Afghanistan can be characterised as a whole-of-government exercise which involved the ADF, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), as well as a number of Australian public service departments and agencies, operating in a highly complex environment. It has had an enduring impact on Australia’s ADF and veteran community, as well as on the Australian public at large.
9.12
In this context, the committee sees a formal review of lessons learned as a vital part of analysing Australia’s mission in Afghanistan and assisting in developing our ability to successfully coordinate whole-of-government responses in future conflicts. The committee notes that such a report was published by the Australian Civil-Military Centre in November 2016, which considered Australia’s mission from 2001 to 2014. A further analysis of Australia’s engagement from 2015 to 2021 would be a welcome complement to this work.
9.13
The committee recommends that an assessment of Australia’s whole-of-government mission in Afghanistan be commissioned and conducted by an appropriate entity, which follows an initial report on the 2001–2014 period which was released in November 2016.
Role of Australia’s alliance with the US in assessing objectives in Afghanistan
9.14
The committee received commentary on the value of the alliance between Australia and the US, while some questions were raised as to whether the right balance between meeting Australia’s sovereign national interests and maintaining the alliance for capability and security reasons was met during the Afghanistan engagement.
9.15
The committee considers that the US is a vital ally and friend of Australia with whom we share core interests including freedom, democracy and the rule of law. Australia’s alliance with the US is central to ensuring the peace and stability both in Australia’s immediate region, but also around the world, and the ANZUS Treaty underpins this important security relationship. Australia’s decision to assist the US-led response to the 9/11 terror attacks reflects the importance of the US as an ally to Australia, but also Australia’s commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security by denying Afghanistan as a safe haven for international terrorism, noting 22 Australians were killed in the 9/11 attacks.
9.16
The committee notes that Australia’s national interest was at the forefront of the decision to conduct military operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and must be at the forefront of Australia’s strategic thinking and decision-making.
Clear communication with the public and parliament
9.17
Some submitters expressed the view that there was a lack of clarity about the nature and intent of Australia’s objectives in Afghanistan, particularly over time, and called for more transparency when committing Australia to war as well as in reporting on the progress and future direction of conflicts in which Australia is involved. The committee notes that this would be possible where national security implications did not prevent doing so.
9.18
The committee acknowledges the gravity of committing Australia and its forces to conflict, and recognises the importance of parliamentary and public scrutiny which forms a key part in the ongoing assessment of Australia’s engagement in a conflict.
9.19
The committee notes that the issue of parliamentary approval of overseas service by members of the ADF was raised in the evidence received by the committee as part of this inquiry, and notes that the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee recently concluded an inquiry into the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Approval of Overseas Service) Bill 2020 with a report tabled in the Senate on 30 November 2021.
Assessing the costs of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan
9.20
The committee acknowledges the significant human cost of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan which included the loss of 41 Australian lives, and the suffering of many more who have returned home with mental and physical injuries.
9.21
Submitters also commented on the overall human cost to the Afghan people of the conflict, with estimates of over 47,000 Afghan civilians killed and many more wounded, as well as over 66,000 Afghan national military and police personnel killed. The committee notes that United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) attributes a majority of civilian casualties from 2009 to 2020 to Anti-Government Elements, often conducting deliberate attacks, with indiscriminate effects that led to significant civilian casualties. Others also noted the ongoing mental impact and trauma experienced by the Afghan people, as well as the humanitarian and economic crises they now face as a result of the Taliban takeover.
9.22
The evidence received by the committee in relation to the financial costs of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan was incomplete. Witnesses and submitters reported a range of estimates from $7.8 billion to $13.6 billion. The estimates are largely pieced together from the Department of Defence (Defence) annual reports, portfolio budget statements and some North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) figures. Defence reported to the committee that it spent $8.4 billion on Operations Slipper and Highroad between 2001 and 2021 and noted that this did not include other costs incurred on other operations in the Middle East, including in Iraq and in supporting its presence in the region. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) reported the operating cost of its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan from 2006 to 2021 cost approximately $566 million. The committee notes that it did not receive specific figures from the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) regarding the cost and projected future costs as a result of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan.
9.23
The committee considers that a formal breakdown of these costs provided publicly by the Australian Government would be beneficial in assisting further analysis of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan and assist in planning for future conflicts.
9.24
The committee recommends that the Australian Government publish, where there are no national security implications, a breakdown of the total cost of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan across each year of its engagement, as well as a breakdown of costs across departments. These figures should also include the costs incurred and estimated ongoing costs associated with services provided by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs supporting veterans who served in Afghanistan.
9.25
Some submissions provided perspectives on the impact that Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan had on its international reputation. Points of concern raised included: the perceived de-prioritisation of Australia’s immediate regional concerns in favour of engagement with the US alliance in the Middle East; criticisms relating to the number of humanitarian visas allocated and Australia’s responsibility to do more; as well as the impact of the ongoing investigation into alleged war crimes committed by Australian special forces in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2016, including the Government’s response to the investigation.
9.26
The committee notes the ongoing processes underway in relation to the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force’s (IGADF) Afghanistan Inquiry Report which investigated alleged war crimes. In response to that report, on 30 July 2021, Defence released a four-year reform plan to address the report’s allegations. The Office of the Special Investigator (OSI) is also continuing its investigations into potential criminal matters. It is important that the OSI is supported to continue its work as expeditiously as possible, given the changed security situation in Afghanistan. As these processes are ongoing, the committee has chosen not to focus extensively on these matters at this point in the inquiry.
The collapse of the Afghan government and Afghan National Army
9.27
The committee notes that the factors that contributed to the fall of the Afghan government and its forces will be an event that is debated, analysed and reflected on long into the future.
9.28
The committee received a range of explanations that canvassed a number of factors that led to the collapse of the Afghan government and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Some submitters identified that there were fundamental issues with the long-term viability of the Afghan government and the ANDSF to sustain itself without the ongoing support of allied forces.
9.29
The committee commends the efforts of the ADF to mentor and train the ANDSF as well as in the provision of protection for the military and civilian personnel who were involved in reconstruction activities. The committee also notes the important contribution by the AFP in mentoring, training and developing the Afghan National Police.
9.30
Other evidence received suggested that the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (the Doha agreement)—an agreement that was made between the US and the Taliban—delegitimised the Afghan government due to its exclusion, elevated the legitimacy of the Taliban and strengthened its forces.
9.31
The committee notes that the intention of the Doha agreement was to reduce conflict and attempt to bring peace to Afghanistan. However, the Taliban did not honour their commitments under the Doha agreement which subverted plans for subsequent intra-Afghan peace negotiations and ultimately undermined the stability of the Afghan government.
9.32
Defence informed the committee that the speed of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in July and August 2021 took some parties by surprise, with all of the provincial capitals and major cities in Afghanistan falling under Taliban control within a period of less than a fortnight, from 6 August to 15 August 2021. While this view was shared by the majority of witnesses, several academics also expressed the view that the factors that led to the sudden collapse of the former Afghan government should have been better appreciated by coalition parties and led to different strategic decisions being taken during the withdrawal phase.
9.33
The role of Pakistan was also presented as an important factor in understanding the Taliban’s rise to power in the evidence received throughout the inquiry.
9.34
The committee acknowledges the important role that Pakistan will play as a regional actor in the crises facing Afghanistan. Australia, and the broader international community, will need to work cooperatively and productively with Pakistan to facilitate the evacuation of people wishing to leave Afghanistan, assisting the flow of humanitarian aid, and ultimately working towards the stability of the region.
9.35
The committee notes that witnesses also raised doubt about the capability of the Taliban to form government and to govern effectively, and others expressed hope about the ongoing presence and persistence of resistance within Afghanistan.
Australia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan
9.36
The committee took evidence from a range of sources on the military, diplomatic and humanitarian elements of Australia’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Closure of the Australian embassy in Kabul
9.37
The committee took detailed evidence from DFAT, Defence and the Department of Home Affairs (Home Affairs) about the decision to close the Australian embassy in Kabul in May 2021, and the impact this had on individuals and organisations in Afghanistan.
9.38
The closure of the embassy made consular assistance for Australians in Afghanistan significantly more difficult. It also complicated the process for Afghans with applications underway for Australian visas, including those in the Locally Engaged Employee (LEE) program. It also made Australia more reliant on other countries for on the ground information about events in Afghanistan as they were unfolding over subsequent months.
9.39
The committee accepts evidence from departmental officials that the security situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated by mid-2021 to the point where the security of the embassy was challenging to maintain under existing arrangements. Despite this, the committee notes the decision to close the Australian embassy was taken earlier than the embassies of other coalition partners such as the US and the United Kingdom (UK), which remained operational until August 2021.
9.40
The committee notes that the Government chose not to co-locate the Australian mission in Kabul with the embassies of other countries such as the US.
9.41
The embassy closed in May 2021 and the evacuation occurred in August 2021. It is impossible to determine the exact number of additional Australian visa holders and applicants that may have been able to leave the country successfully prior to August 2021, if Australia had maintained its diplomatic footprint in Kabul during June and July 2021. However, given the subsequent scramble to evacuate people from Afghanistan, Australia’s reduced in-country capacity during those two months may have played a role in the difficulties many people ultimately faced in attempting to leave Afghanistan.
Evacuation planning and operations following the fall of the Afghan government
9.42
Officials from Defence and DFAT outlined that a range of contingency planning options regarding the situation in Afghanistan were under review in the early part of 2021. Defence informed the committee that detailed planning for a non-combatant evacuation operation from Afghanistan then commenced in May 2021.
9.43
While the speed of the Taliban takeover was not widely anticipated by allied and NATO forces, the ability to assist Australian citizens, permanent residents and visa holders to leave Afghanistan in June and July 2021 was prejudiced. Would more visa holders have been expatriated had the embassy remained open? The committee notes that DFAT made clear and regular updates to its travel advice for citizens and permeant residents, including direct contact.
9.44
In July 2021, the Biden Administration announced that it would begin Operation Allied Refuge flights out of Afghanistan during the last week of July for US visa holders. Defence informed the committee that it was not asked for advice from the Australian Government, nor did it provide advice, on how Defence could assist the US operation, including to enable the inclusion of Australian citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and applicants in the program. While DFAT spoke with the US in mid-July about US evacuation planning, it would appear no effort was made to request or explore options for including Australians or coordinating efforts at that time.
9.45
In the committee’s view, not including Australian citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and applicants in the US operation in July 2021 was detrimental to Australia’s subsequent evacuation efforts. Relying on commercial flights during a period when coalition partners were actively establishing evacuation programs was short-sighted due to the escalating risks faced by Australian visa holders and applicants.
9.46
The committee also heard that legal and veterans’ groups in Australia advocating for the evacuation of at-risk Afghans, including locally engaged employees, were increasingly attempting to raise concerns with the Australian Government through early-to-mid 2021. Meaningful engagement with these groups during this time could have helped the Government assist more individuals to leave Afghanistan sooner. This would also have been beneficial to Australia’s subsequent evacuation efforts in August 2021.
Evacuation operation in August 2021
9.47
The committee recognises the immense and heroic efforts undertaken by Australian officials and ADF personnel to give effect to the airlift evacuation operations that took place from 18 to 26 August 2021 from Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) in Kabul, directly following the fall of Kabul to Taliban forces.
9.48
Around 200 personnel from DFAT, the ADF, Home Affairs and Australian Border Force were deployed to Kabul during the evacuation operation, supported by hundreds of other officials in Australia’s regional logistics hub in the United Arab Emirates, other regional posts, and in Australia.
9.49
Successfully evacuating 4,168 people from Kabul across 32 flights over this nine-day period, under significant pressure due to the situation on the ground at the airport, is a significant achievement. The committee expresses its gratitude to those involved in the evacuation effort.
9.50
The committee acknowledges the incredibly difficult circumstances faced by Australian citizens, permanent residents and visa holders attempting to access the Australian evacuation operation at the airport. The dangerous and chaotic nature of the environment surrounding Kabul airport during evacuation operations was highlighted in evidence to the committee, underscored ultimately by the horrific suicide attack on the airport that happened on 26 August, resulting in the death of 13 American service members, and the death and injury of dozens of Afghan people.
9.51
While the Australian efforts did manage to evacuate a large number of people, the committee also heard distressing evidence about those who attempted to access the evacuation mission but were unsuccessful. The committee heard from advocates who were working with Australian visa holders attempting to evacuate at HKIA, including individuals associated with the Australian embassy in Kabul, that were rejected entry to the airport by Australian personnel and were unable to secure passage on the Australian evacuation flights. These Afghan people still remain at high risk from Taliban reprisals in Afghanistan.
9.52
It is clear that the communications capacity between Australian authorities and those seeking to assist evacuees was extremely strained during the evacuation operations. The committee heard that despite the significant efforts of DFAT, Defence and Home Affairs staff, numerous 449 visa holders and visa applicants were unable to contact the relevant departments when they needed to. Improved communications protocols in evacuation settings are required to maximise the effectiveness of these efforts in future crises. Surge capacity staffing may need to be added to the communications and processing efforts during significant crisis efforts.
9.53
There is also a need for greater coordination during crisis events between government and other relevant stakeholders with links on the ground, such as NGOs, legal and advocacy groups working on behalf of individuals in country. It would appear that the Afghanistan evacuation could have reached a greater number of people if these groups had been engaged with more proactively by the Australian Government in the weeks and months leading up to the fall of Kabul. The committee notes that these groups continue to work extensively to assist people to leave Afghanistan and apply for visas.
9.54
Given the significance of the issues identified, the committee considers that an independent review of the Australian Government’s procedures for dealing with overseas crises is required.
9.55
This review should cover the arrangements under the Australian Government Plan for the Reception of Australian Citizens and Approved Foreign Nationals Evacuated from Overseas (AUSRECEPLAN), as well as the protocols and procedures used by Defence, DFAT and Home Affairs relating to communications, the issuance of emergency visas, staffing arrangements, and engagement between government and relevant stakeholder groups.
9.56
The committee recommends that the Australian Government commission an independent review into the operation of the Afghanistan evacuation effort to ensure that departmental practices and coordination are improved in future. This review should include consideration of:
the operation of the Australian Government Plan for the Reception of Australian Citizens and Approved Foreign Nationals Evacuated from Overseas (AUSRECEPLAN) and other relevant crisis management tools during the Afghanistan crisis, and whether amendments to these frameworks are required;
protocols for the issuance of short-term humanitarian visas during crisis situations;
the need for increased surge capacity staffing in relevant departments to assist in communications and visa processing during crisis situations; and
the development of formalised protocols for incorporating relevant stakeholder groups into government planning and evacuation processes (for example, legal and advocacy groups working with affected groups and individuals in country).
Number of people left behind in Afghanistan
9.57
It is unclear exactly how many people were left behind in Afghanistan following the Australian airlift evacuation operation that took place in August 2021.
9.58
The committee was encouraged to hear that, in addition to the 4,168 people evacuated during the airlift operation from 18–26 August, more than 1,700 additional people were able to leave Afghanistan and travel to Australia between the end of the airlift evacuations and 22 November 2021.
9.59
Home Affairs and DFAT did not have an estimate nor a precise figure for the number of Australian citizens, permanent residents and visa holders still remaining in Afghanistan.
9.60
The committee did receive some figures from the relevant departments that give some picture of the current situation:
DFAT informed the committee that 169 Australian citizens and permanent residents were registered on DFAT’s Consular and Crisis database in Afghanistan at 12 November 2021. The exact number of additional citizens and permanent residents who may still be in Afghanistan without having registered (or being able to register) with DFAT is unknown; and
Home Affairs informed the committee that as at 12 November, 2,086 individuals who had been issued subclass 449 visas during the evacuation had not arrived in Australia. It is unclear whether these visa holders remain in Afghanistan or elsewhere; and
Additionally, it is known that, as at 11 October, there were nearly 400 Afghan partner visa holders outside of Australia, as well as 7,500 Afghan partner visa applicants located outside Australia in mid-November 2021. Home Affairs was unable to confirm the number of individuals located in Afghanistan.
9.61
The committee understands that individuals continue to leave Afghanistan through a variety of means, and that it is not possible to keep track of the location of Australian visa holders and applicants overseas at all times. The committee notes that Home Affairs and DFAT did not present an estimate of how many people have been left behind in Afghanistan following Australia’s evacuation efforts.
9.62
The committee notes additional work will need to be done to establish the number and location of all relevant persons that may need to be evacuated by Australia and keep in touch with those granted visas.
9.63
The committee recommends that the Australian Government develop and implement more accurate measures and methodologies for assessing and keeping track of the number of Australian citizens, permanent residents, visa holders and visa applicants at risk during crisis situations overseas.
Use of temporary subclass 449 visas during the evacuation efforts
9.64
The committee notes the necessity of using temporary emergency humanitarian (subclass 449) visas during the evacuation operations from Kabul. This enabled 5,636 individuals to be granted visas to travel to Australia, of which 3,568 had successfully arrived in Australia as at 12 November 2021.
9.65
The use of subclass 449 visas has, however, created significant issues in relation to consistency and availability of visas during the evacuation efforts. Numerous stories have come to light of cases where the issuance of 449 visas has resulted in incomplete or confused outcomes, with potentially dire consequences for the individuals involved.
9.66
For example, the committee heard from one prominent NGO working in Afghanistan with strong links to Australia which sought visas for approximately 200 highly vulnerable individuals, predominantly women and children, and ultimately only received 449 visas for 17 of these individuals during the evacuation, with no explanation of why these visas had been granted while the remaining requested visas had not. As a result, the committee heard that approximately 180 highly vulnerable people were left in Afghanistan after the evacuation phase at significant risk of being targeted by the Taliban.
9.67
Other disturbing cases have emerged, including an interpreter who worked with Australian forces but was unable to access the Australian evacuation flights, and then after fleeing overland to Pakistan, had his immediate family members denied processing by the Australian embassy in Islamabad because his family members’ details had been mistakenly omitted from his initial 449 visa.
9.68
The committee recognises that Australian officials sought to, and did, issue a large number of subclass 449 visas in a short period of time to maximise the evacuation efforts. The committee considers that, in many cases, these issues could have been avoided if more work had been done earlier to identify and prioritise at risk individuals following the announcement of the ADF withdrawal from Afghanistan in April 2021.
9.69
Given the number of individuals associated with Australia still remaining at risk in Afghanistan, it is imperative that the Australian Government, in conjunction with relevant stakeholders, continue to make every possible effort to maximise the ability of people to leave the country and safely travel to Australia.
Issues relating to the Locally Engaged Employee program
9.70
The committee heard serious concerns about the way the Afghan LEE program was managed, both during the evacuation and withdrawal phase of Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, and in relation to broader issues identified around timeliness, communication to applicants and departmental resourcing.
Evacuation of Afghan LEE during Australia’s withdrawal
9.71
At the time of the evacuation operation in August 2021, there were around
425 Afghan LEE with visas or on-hand visa applications in Afghanistan. It is unclear how many of these individuals managed to secure places in the Australian evacuation effort to leave the country. What is clear is that a significant number of individuals who had worked in association with Australia during its engagement in Afghanistan and were ultimately unable to secure a visa during the Australian evacuation operation.
9.72
Tragically, there have now been reports that some of LEE applicants have been injured or killed by the Taliban, with others currently in hiding due to their association with Australia.
9.73
The committee was shown evidence that, in July 2021, Defence was still issuing rejection letters to LEE applicants due to technicalities (such as applicants not having applied within six months of ceasing employment) despite the dire security situation. As at 21 August 2021, the committee heard evidence that some LEE applications were rejected by DFAT due to its approach to the eligibility criteria relating to the private contractors, without any recourse for these at-risk individuals other than joining the general humanitarian visa application process.
9.74
It was not until 22 August 2021, five days into the Australian evacuation operation at HKIA, that the Government decided to consider emergency subclass 449 visas for those who had applied for the LEE program but were not certified. Because of these delays, many who were issued 449 visas were ultimately unable to access the Australian evacuation effort.
9.75
These issues resulted in the inevitable situation that a large number of individuals and their families remain in Afghanistan, at high risk of brutal reprisals from the Taliban because of their association with Australia.
9.76
For those associated with the LEE program who were issued subclass 449 visas but are still in Afghanistan, the Government delayed announcing extensions to the 499 visas, with extensions being announced on 18 November, the day before these visas were due to start expiring.
9.77
The committee notes that the Afghan LEE program is still ongoing, with Defence informing the committee that it was still processing 70 LEE certification applications as of late October 2021. It is imperative that LEE certifications and visa applications are finalised as quickly as possible, and viewed favourably given the likely impossibility that LEE will be able to remain safely in Afghanistan. There is no excuse for bureaucratic delays when lives are literally at stake.
9.78
Essential to the Australian ethos is loyalty to mates, exemplified by the shared sacrifice and mutual commitment of Australian diggers to each other at Gallipoli and in so many other contexts at home and distant from our shores. Australian policy makers need to keep true to that ideal, lived every day by the heroes who risk everything to defend us. There is an enduring duty of loyalty owed by Australia to the interpreters and other Afghans who risked their lives in the service of the ADF when they were in Afghanistan. That loyalty was shown by the brave Australian men and women who served in Afghanistan. It must be shown by the government that sent them there.
9.79
The question of how we treated those who risked all to help us in Afghanistan relates to who we are as Australians and what we value. We asked these people to stand in harm’s way with Australian personnel. We have left them standing in harm’s way. It is dishonourable. Offering sanctuary to those whose service to Australia imperiled their lives and the lives of their loved ones, and of course, after appropriate and rigorous security assessments, is well within the expectation of the Australian public.
9.80
Beyond the moral imperative, it is also in the vital national security interest of Australia. When we are called to serve in foreign lands in the future, Australian servicemen and women will no doubt call upon local help. A reputation for caring for those who were willing to help Australia will be of the most critical importance to helping Australia achieve its military goals and in keeping Australian safe from harm.
Broader issues identified with the LEE program
9.81
The committee also considers that the LEE program, more broadly, requires an urgent review to address a range of issues raised with the committee.
9.82
The committee heard that the LEE application process was unwieldy, difficult for applicants to understand (with more than 60 pages of documentation required to be completed across the application processes), and was made harder following the closure of the Kabul embassy in May 2021. Prospective applicants were not always given adequate information. Timeframes for providing certification by Defence and DFAT, and subsequent visa processing by Home Affairs, were excessive, with some individuals waiting several years to have their certification processed and visa granted, despite being at risk of harm in Afghanistan.
9.83
The use of screening tools in application processing has been questioned in evidence to the committee. While Home Affairs have stated that no inappropriate methodologies were utilised, this is difficult to reconcile with the evidence provided by other witnesses, and thus questions remain unanswered.
9.84
Record keeping relating to the scheme appears to be inadequate, with the relevant departments failing to keep a ‘master list’ of those with whom Australian forces worked in Afghanistan. While Defence maintained some employment records for those directly employed by Defence, it appears that little attempt was made to maintain adequate records for others who had worked alongside the ADF and who may subsequently have become eligible for the LEE program. There is a clear need for better record keeping relating to local nationals who provide assistance to Australia in areas of conflict and instability.
9.85
Inconsistencies between how Defence and DFAT applied eligibility criteria for the LEE scheme also needs to be analysed. The evidence shows that DFAT took a particular approach to the exclusions set out in the instrument that governed LEE certification, even in the leadup to the evacuation in August 2021. The relevant legislative instrument governing eligibility for the LEE program has also not been amended since 2012, despite it being the source of significant confusion about the operation of the scheme. A review of the LEE program should consider whether this instrument should be amended.
9.86
The committee heard that departmental resourcing for processing LEE certifications and visas was insufficient, and there was a decided lack of urgency in relation to what should have been a priority program. Instead of taking a proactive approach, for much of the program’s history the departments have been reactive and slow-moving in handling LEE claims. It was only in the leadup directly prior to evacuation efforts in August 2021 that departmental resourcing was belatedly increased to attempt to deal with the problems associated with the program.
9.87
The evidence before the committee was that requests from veterans and other representatives of LEE in Australia to meet with Ministers to discuss concerns and provide relevant information were largely ignored. If these groups had been listened to in early 2021 when the urgency of the situation for LEE in Afghanistan was already apparent, it would have been possible for a much higher number of at-risk individuals to be brought to safety in Australia. Communication protocols between applicants, government departments and stakeholders advocating for LEE staff must be improved.
9.88
Given the number and seriousness of the problems identified, an immediate and thorough review of the LEE program is required both to assist the existing Afghan cohort, and to ensure that in any future military engagements the process relating to locally engaged staff is much clearer and can be implemented expeditiously.
9.89
The committee recommends that the Australian Government extend all available effort to finalising certifications and visa applications for Afghan Locally Engaged Employees (LEE) and their families as quickly as possible, and extending assistance to those still eligible in Afghanistan to make their way to Australia.
9.90
The committee further recommends that the Australian Government commission a full and thorough review of the operation of the Afghan LEE program to analyse and appropriately address concerns raised in evidence to the committee and ensure that programs of this nature are improved.
Australia’s ongoing response to recent developments in Afghanistan
9.91
Now that Australian military and diplomatic personnel have withdrawn from Afghanistan, Australia must continue to support the Afghan people, both through humanitarian visa and support services here in Australia, and through ongoing engagement with Afghanistan itself, particularly in the delivery of humanitarian assistance on the ground.
Visa pathways and settlement arrangements for Afghan arrivals in Australia
9.92
Several issues require the action of government in relation to visa pathways and settlement arrangements for Afghan arrivals in Australia, and visa holders still remaining in Afghanistan.
Subclass 449 visa holders remaining in Afghanistan
9.93
The committee notes that a cohort of individuals in Afghanistan who were issued with subclass 449 visas during the evacuation are not covered by the Minister’s 18 November announcement, and are now left in Afghanistan without an Australian visa. The committee urges the Government to assess this decision and reinstate subclass 449 visas for all individuals remaining outside of Australia who were initially issued these visas during the evacuation.
Australia’s humanitarian visa intake arising from the Afghanistan crisis
9.94
Afghanistan is facing an unprecedented humanitarian crisis with more than half a million Afghans having become internally displaced so far in 2021 as a result of the Taliban gaining ascendancy in the country. Many vulnerable groups in the country, including women and minority ethnic and religious groups, now face extreme threat.
9.95
The Australian Government announced in August 2021 that an initial
3,000 places have been allocated to Afghan nationals for humanitarian visas, from within the Government’s annual humanitarian intake cap of
13,750 places. This figure of 3,000 has repeatedly been described as ‘a floor, not a ceiling’, however the Government is still yet to make any further announcements about the allocation of additional humanitarian visas.
9.96
Furthermore, the committee heard that none of these 3,000 visas have yet been allocated with Home Affairs stating that it will likely take until the end of the year to certify the validity of applications that have been received, before final visa decisions start being made.
9.97
With over 100,000 individuals from Afghanistan now having applied for humanitarian visas in Australia and the situation in the country verging towards an economic and humanitarian catastrophe, it is incumbent on the Australian Government to act decisively in relation to these matters.
9.98
A wide range of submitters and witnesses called for the Australian Government to commit formally to a higher humanitarian visa intake for individuals affected by the Afghanistan crisis. Advocacy groups have called for a one-off additional intake of 20,000 humanitarian visa holders from Afghanistan, in addition to Australia’s existing annual cap of 13,750 places.
9.99
Other coalition partners have already announced significant humanitarian programs; for example, Canada has committed to taking 40,000 additional Afghan refugees, while the UK has announced a program for Afghan refugees with 5,000 initial places and up to 20,000 places over the longer term. The US is accepting 125,000 Afghan refugees in the 2021–22 fiscal year.
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Some submitters noted that Australia has responded to past humanitarian crises with additional one-off humanitarian visa places; for example, in 2015 an additional 12,000 places were made available for individuals affected by the crisis occurring in Syria and Iraq at that time.
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Given the scale of the crisis in Afghanistan, the history of Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan over a period of decades, and past precedent for Australia offering additional refugee places in response to crisis events, the committee considers that Australia should match its coalition partners in committing to a substantial intake of Afghan refugees. In the committee’s view, this would be a commensurate response to the crisis and Australia’s international standing as a country with a significant permanent humanitarian resettlement program. The committee notes that the Government can utilise the thousands of unallocated humanitarian places unused due to the COVID‑
19 pandemic for this purpose. The committee also believes that Australia should play a global leadership role in the resettlement of Afghan nationals given Australia’s role in the conflict and the scale of the humanitarian need.
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The committee recommends that the Australian Government work with coalition partners and international organisations to support the resettlement of Afghan nationals globally, with Australia making a contribution of places within the humanitarian, family, skilled and other permanent visa categories to help resettle those Afghan nationals displaced by the crisis.
Afghan temporary visa holders already in Australia
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A number of submitters and witnesses to the inquiry urged the Australian Government to grant pathways to permanent protection for refugees and asylum seekers from Afghanistan already living in Australia, and those in our immediate region. These requests included that the Government should:
provide pathways to permanent residency for Afghan nationals currently in Australia on Temporary Protection Visas (TPVs);
prioritise family reunification for Afghans in Australia who have been previously unable to sponsor family members to come to Australia due to their TPV status, or who have had their claims de-prioritised due to Ministerial directives;
immediately review the cases of Afghans whose applications for protection are currently before the Department, the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), given the changed security situation in Afghanistan; and
review policy decisions in relation to Afghan refugees currently located in Indonesia and Malaysia.
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The committee welcomes the Government’s assurances that Afghans currently in Australia will not be forced to return to Afghanistan while the security situation remains as it currently is. It is clear that with the Taliban in power, the calculus for many people ever being able to return safely to Afghanistan has changed irreversibly.
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In this context, the Government should work to abolish Temporary Protection Visas and prioritise family reunification in processing humanitarian visa applications from Afghanistan. Clear avenues for review should also be open for cases that are currently before the immigration authorities and the AAT, given the changed security circumstances and the inability of many to return.
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The committee recommends that, in light of the changed security circumstances in Afghanistan, the Australian Government review its policies for pathways to permanent protection visas for Afghan asylum seekers and refugees currently in Australia, and prioritise family reunification when processing humanitarian visa claims from Afghan nationals.
Settlement services for Afghan arrivals in Australia
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The committee welcomes the Government’s establishment in August 2021 of a Panel on Australia’s Resettlement of Afghan Nationals. The committee further welcomes the announcement on 14 October 2021, of an Afghan Settlement Support Package, worth $27.1 million over two years, to help recent evacuees from Afghanistan settle successfully into their new lives in Australia.
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It is critical that this funding is delivered promptly and in line with the real needs and priorities of the Afghan community in Australia. The Government should be open to increasing the level of funding support provided if necessary.
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In particular, the committee heard from legal groups and advocacy organisations undertaking crucial work to assist Afghan nationals to lodge visa applications and offer other assistance and support services to recent Afghan arrivals in Australia. It is critical that these organisations receive appropriate funding through the Government’s support package. Culturally appropriate and targeted mental health support programs were also highlighted as a key need of Afghan community in Australia, and need to be funded appropriately.
Ongoing engagement with Afghanistan
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The committee supports the close coordination with Australia’s partners and allies in relation to Australia’s engagement with Afghanistan. It is vital that the international community hold the Taliban to account for its commitments and actions, especially in the areas of safe passage, counterterrorism and human rights.
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The Australian Government should continue to use bilateral diplomatic channels and its voice at multilateral fora such as the UN to call for safe passage for Afghans seeking international protection and asylum, and protection for vulnerable groups including women and girls, children and ethnic and religious minorities. The Taliban must end its barbaric behaviour.
Humanitarian and development assistance
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The future for Afghanistan is uncertain and while the full impact of recent events is taking time to emerge, the current humanitarian outlook is dire. The rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is deeply concerning with the lives of many at risk. As the humanitarian need escalates this should be matched by a strong humanitarian and development response from the international community. It is important that governments, including Australia, take a principled humanitarian approach to providing urgent assistance to the Afghan people, cognisant of sanctions obligations, while developing a longer-term strategy for engagement.
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Noting that Afghanistan’s economy, health and education systems are almost entirely dependent on aid, the committee supports the Australian Government providing assistance to the Afghan people, particularly at-risk and vulnerable groups. Australia should continue to engage with Afghanistan and the international community to address the urgent humanitarian situation and to protect the significant development gains made over the last two decades.
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The committee notes that a generation of Afghans have grown up in a world where women and girls have access to education and employment opportunities and the ability to participate in public life. While this progress is at risk, Australia must work with the international community to protect the gains made.
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Australia has a long history of funding humanitarian and development programs in Afghanistan and the committee welcomes the Government’s recent funding announcements in this area. The committee supports DFAT continuing to ensure that Australia’s aid has had a focus on women and girls. It is important that as the crisis develops there is sufficient flexibility to ensure the Australian contribution is channelled effectively and appropriately to reach those in need and to also increase should the situation deteriorate further.
Delivery of humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan
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The committee acknowledges the need to be cautious of sanction regimes obligations in providing aid. It understands that in navigating the current circumstances that DFAT would rely on major trusted partners to ensure aid is getting to its intended destination.
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However, the committee heard of the important work of a number of NGOs and diaspora run charities with established track records providing assistance on the ground, particularly to areas which the larger aid organisations have trouble reaching.
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The committee also heard about the European Diaspora Emergency Action and Coordination (DEMAC) project which is an initiative to better coordinate diaspora organisations and the humanitarian system.
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The committee would like to see more done to foster further engagement with local NGOs and diaspora groups with established track records and robust accountability systems in place which can help facilitate the provision of aid to the local level and most vulnerable. The committee will be examining this issue further in its final report.
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The committee recommends that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and other Australian agencies providing development assistance foster further engagement with local NGOs and diaspora groups which can assist with the provision of aid to the local level and most vulnerable.
Assistance to ADF personnel and veterans
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The committee acknowledges the importance of providing ongoing support to veterans and their families, particularly at this time. Veterans have been affected not only by the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban and the effects of this on the Afghan people, but have also been concerned about, and some involved in, assisting those who worked alongside them as interpreters and security guards to leave.
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The committee was pleased to hear that, at the time of the Taliban takeover, relevant agencies were proactive in reaching out to advise affected veterans and families of services that are available.
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Importantly, the committee notes that these matters have had a backdrop of the lengthy IGADF Afghanistan inquiry report and now Office of the Special Investigator (OSI) which will address potential criminal matters raised in the IGADF report. In addition, the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide, which will focus on defence and veteran mental health, has now commenced public hearings. The lack of clarity about the evolving situation in Afghanistan along with the work of the OSI and Royal Commission outlined above highlight the importance of ensuring support for veterans and families is ongoing.
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The committee, however, has some concerns over the Government’s ability to follow through and provide appropriate ongoing support for veterans and their families. Accessing suitable support when needed has been an issue raised during this and other inquiries conducted by the committee. The Government’s reluctance to instigate the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide only adds to the committee’s concerns regarding the ability to ensure timely and ongoing support for veterans. Progress in this area will take time to assess which will likely to be outside the current timeline for this inquiry but the committee intends to follow up this matter during estimates hearings.
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The committee supports the work underway at the Australian War Memorial (AWM) to make the story of Afghanistan told at the AWM and recognition of service as broad and inclusive as possible.
Senator Kimberley Kitching
Chair