Dissenting report from Senator David Pocock
1.1Federal lobbying rules in Australia are broken and need urgent reform. Our weak and ineffective regulation of lobbyists, and a secretive system of allowing access to Parliament House, undermines public trust in our parliamentary institutions.
1.2When Australians think about lobbying, they see money buying influence and access. They see politicians prioritising vested interests over the public interest. Even when behaviour is not untoward, the perception alone is damaging to public trust in the Government, the Parliament, and the policy development process more broadly.
1.3The Committee's Report recognises the need for change in the regulation of lobbying at a federal level. Unfortunately, the Committee Report’s principal recommendation is for a review that just kicks the can down the road. The response to this inquiry shouldn’t be another inquiry, it should be real action to fix a broken system sitting at the heart of our democracy.
1.4The committee received nearly 350 submissions from experts, academics, civil society groups and interested members of the public. Submissions and the evidence provided by witnesses during the public hearing was of exceptionally high quality and cut across a broad range of perspectives and backgrounds.
1.5Evidence to the committee clearly identified issues, proposed simple and elegant solutions, and has laid the path to comprehensive reform to restore public trust in our federal parliamentary institutions.
1.6Lobbying reform has been the subject of significant advocacy from the crossbench in both houses of parliament. Indeed, Monique Ryan MP currently has a bill to reform the system in front of the House of Representatives.[1]
1.7We know the problems; the committee was given the solutions. It’s time to get on with the job of fixing the broken system that regulates the conduct and access of federal lobbyists.
1.8The committee heard substantial evidence that the Lobbying Code of Conduct falls well short of meeting its own objectives. The preamble to the Lobbying Code of Conduct states that the Code is:
intended to promote trust in the integrity of government processes and ensure that contact between lobbyists and Government representatives is conducted in accordance with public expectations of transparency, integrity and honesty.[2]
1.9Experts like Professor Twomey[3] and even professional lobbying firms like Hawker Britton gave evidence that the code has manifestly failed to achieve this objective.[4] The absence of a functional regime to regulate lobbying at a federal level is not new. Chapter 3 of the Committee's Report provides a good summary of the history of ineffective regulation in paragraphs 3.1 to 3.42.
1.10The delay in proper reform at a federal level is a problem and opportunity. A problem because the federal government, collecting 85% of tax revenue and making decisions that impact all Australians, is arguably the most powerful government in the country. An opportunity because the jurisdiction can look to the successes and failures of other jurisdictions to formulate a best-practice Lobbying Code of Conduct and that can restore public trust at pace.
1.11At the core of the Lobbying Code of Conduct lies a deliberately embedded corrosive oxymoron that undermines the entire regime. Only third-party lobbyists, organisations and individuals that lobby on behalf of others, are required to register as lobbyists.
1.12As a result, approximately 80 per cent of lobbyists are not subject to the Lobbying Code of Conduct and therefore operate without any oversight, restrictions, or transparency obligations.[5]
1.13It is absurd that ‘lobbyist’ as defined by the Code does not include lobbyists employed by companies like Santos, Glencore, Woodside, Sportsbet and McDonalds. In fact, it’s worse than absurd, it’s misleading. Members of the community expect lobbyists to be regulated and excluding whole categories of lobbyists can only be described as a major failure in Australian public policy.
1.14As noted in the Committee's report, most submitters and witnesses to this inquiry, including government relations firms Hawker Britton and Executive Counsel Australia, raised concerns that the definition of “a lobbyist” is too narrow.
1.15The only submitter to defend the current definition was the lobbyist for lobbyists, the Australian Professional Government Relations Association (APGRA).
1.16APGRA gave evidence that the current lobbying rules were fit-for-purpose. This is significantly undermined by the fact that the body has established a self-regulatory code to help build greater professional standards among in-house lobbyists, who aren’t captured by any codes of ethics or practice.
1.17Under the APGRA code, a serious breach of professional standards results in a lobbyist’s membership to their association being cancelled. Given membership is voluntary and that they only have approximately 25 in-house lobbyists as members, this is an utterly ineffective deterrent. It is not a serious alternative to a strong legislated code of conduct that promotes public trust and addresses unethical lobbying behaviour.
1.18I respect the APGRA’s mission to drive better professional standards within their industry, but as a regulatory solution, their proposal is a dud.
1.19It’s also not a view shared by their own members, one of whom sat next to them at the witness table — Hawker Britton — and argued for greater transparency around sponsored passholders and a rethink of definitions to include all actors that seek to influence government and parliamentary decision-making.
1.20According to the submission made by Simon Banks, Managing Director of Hawker Britton:
Hawker Britton believes in the necessity of ensuring that individuals engaging in lobbying activities, irrespective of the business model of their organisation, are bound by the proposed Code of Conduct and transparency measures. Furthermore, we advocate for the codification and legislative establishment of the existing regulation of lobbyists.[6]
1.21This view is echoed by the Australia Institute:
…the false distinction between third-party and in-house lobbyists creates the largest loophole. The Australian Government Register of Lobbyists only records contracted, third-party lobbyists, allowing in-house lobbyists to operate without oversight. Any increased restrictions or transparency measures applied to the current register, without efforts to capture in-house lobbyists, would have limited effectiveness.[7]
1.22And the Centre for Public Integrity:
The way in which ‘lobbying’ and ‘lobbyist’ are currently defined under the Code restricts the Code’s application and undermines its effectiveness by capturing only communications made to a government representative in an effort to influence government decision-making. Instead, the definition of ‘lobbying’ should be broadened to include any attempt to influence the decision-making of parliamentarians.[8]
1.23At paragraphs 6.16 and 6.18 of the Committee's Report, the committee recommends that the definition of lobbyists under the Lobbying Code of Conduct be expanded to capture a broader range of actors and that a review should consider this.
1.24However, the Committee's report does not give sufficient weight to the evidence of submitters that in-house lobbyists should be included in an expanded definition of lobbyist. Instead at paragraph 6.12, it notes the Department’s justification for the exclusion of in-house lobbyists from the Code.
1.25There is great consensus, including among Committee members, that the definition of a lobbyist under the Lobbying Code of Conduct is too narrow and that it undermines the object of the Code. The definition should be expanded and must include in-house lobbyists.
1.26Regulations around ethics in this sector should be uniform, irrespective of the business model a lobbyist works within.
1.27The penalties for breaches of the Lobbying Code of Conduct are woefully inadequate. The most severe penalty that can be given for a serious breach is a three-month suspension from lobbying.
1.28This means that a lobbyist can still work in their practice and provide advice to their clients, they just can’t actually talk to a government representative for the duration of that period. In short, the most serious breach of the Code is punished by something akin to a holiday. It cannot be considered a substantial disincentive for breach.
1.29Worse, there is no penalty for an unregistered lobbyist such as an in-house lobbyist should they engage in conduct that would be considered a breach of the Code. This is captured neatly in the Australia Institute’s submission:
The system lacks oversight, the only sanction for violating the code of conduct is deregistration, and no penalty applies for lobbying while unregistered.[9]
1.30Appropriate penalties for breaches of the Code are crucial to ensuring lobbyists act with integrity, and do not act in a way that subverts the public interest. In other jurisdictions, there are civil and sometimes criminal penalties available to prevent inappropriate lobbying to discourage unethical behaviour.
1.31For penalties to match the seriousness of breaches the Lobbying Code of Conduct must be legislated. Recommendation 1 in the Committee's Report in relation to a further review includes consideration of legislating a Code of Conduct. Although a further review is not needed, acknowledgement of the need for a legislated code is welcome.
1.32However, it is disappointing that Recommendation 1 does not address the need for appropriate penalties to ensure there is an adequate disincentive for unethical behaviour by lobbyists.
1.33The substantive section of the Lobbying Code of Conduct is titled ‘Principles of Engagement with Government Representatives’. It is unclear why these principles do not apply to interactions between lobbyists and all parliamentarians and parliamentary staff. Throughout the inquiry, the Chair was often at pains to point out that the interactions between lobbyists and non-government MPs and senators should also be scrutinised, given every parliamentarian has influence in the political process.
1.34I completely agree and recommend further that the Lobbying Code of Conduct be broadened so that it applies to all interactions between lobbyists and MPs and senators, no matter their political affiliation.
1.35Paragraphs 5.25 to 5.29 of the Committee's Report outline convincing evidence from no fewer than nine submitters in favour of an independent regulator of the Lobbying Code of Conduct. No evidence is cited that contradicts the need for an independent regulator similar to those in New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia.
1.36The Attorney-General’s Department is not an appropriate regulator. Aproactive, powerful, independent regulator is needed to uphold public trust in our parliamentary institutions. As Associate Professor Yee-Fui Ng pointed out, “the mentality of a government department is quite different to that of an independent statutory regulator.”[10] The approach of government departments is to administer a scheme, rather than regulate a multi-billion dollar a year business dominated by sophisticated players with corporate backing.[11]
1.37During the public hearing, I asked the Attorney-General’s Department to provide the framework used to measure and report the success or failure of the Lobbying Code of Conduct. It is noteworthy here that a 2020 ANAO performance audit identified the absence of such a framework.
1.38The response was provided on notice. The Department told me that its performance targets are:
greater than 85% of new registrations being published within three weeks, and
greater than 85% of updates being published within five working days.
1.39Neither of these metrics have a substantial relationship with the objects of the Code. That is, “to ensure that contact between lobbyists and Government representatives is conducted in accordance with public expectations of transparency, integrity and honesty.”[12]The targets reveal a mentality within the Department focussed on process not outcome. Only an independent regulator will focus squarely on outcomes.
1.40The benefits of an independent regulator are clear in the experiences of other jurisdictions. Professor Yee-Fui Ng gave evidence that since the NSW Electoral Commission started administering that state’s lobbying scheme, there have been numerous enforcement actions to deregister lobbyists and additions to a watchlist.[13]
1.41Even an independent regulator may be ineffective if it is not properly resourced. An independent regulator would require far greater resources than the mediocre current resource allocation within the Department.
1.42In response to a written question on notice, the Attorney-General’s Department revealed that the Transparency Frameworks Section of the Attorney-General’s Department which administers the Lobbying Code of Conduct, has an average staffing of between 2.5 and 4 FTE. This is a remarkably small team to oversee a multi-billion dollar industry.
1.43Recommendation 1 of the Committee's Report states that a review should consider ‘the most appropriate body’ to administer the Lobbying Code of Conduct and the Lobbying Register. Implied in this recommendation is an acceptance that the Attorney-General’s Department is not an appropriate regulator. This is a step forward but it fails to clearly stipulate the imperative that the regulator must be independent.
1.44The evidence in favour of an independent regulator for the Register of Lobbyists and the Lobbying Code of Conduct is overwhelming and the change should be made as soon as reasonably practicable.
Recommendation 1
1.45The definition of lobbyist should be expanded so that all lobbyists, including in-house lobbyists, are on the Register of Lobbyists and subject to the Lobbying Code of Conduct.
Recommendation 2
1.46The Lobbying Code of Conduct should extend to include interactions between lobbyists and all parliamentarians.
Recommendation 3
1.47The Lobbying Code of Conduct must be legislated and include appropriate penalties for breaches.
Recommendation 4
1.48An independent regulator should be appointed and properly resourced to oversee the Lobbying Code of Conduct and Lobbyist Register.
1.49Access to Parliament House is a good thing. It is important for people to have the opportunity to advocate in the building, including the many NGOs and community groups that run with very meagre resourcing. I’m not advocating for lobbyists to be banned from the building, nor was this suggested in the evidence tendered to the inquiry.
1.50A pass sponsored by a parliamentarian provides immensely privileged access. Access that allows certain perspectives to be put forward to decision-makers in preference of others.
1.51The impact of this privilege is summarised by the Grattan Institute:
When certain interests get a lot more access to decision makers, there is a risk that policy gets skewed in their favour at the expense of public interest. Good policy depends on the best ideas prevailing, not simply the loudest voices… Transparency around lobbying activity can help level the playing field and protect the public interest. Greater public scrutiny might encourage policymakers to seek out a wider range of views. And it can alert under-represented groups to speak up when a particular policy issue is ‘live’.[14]
1.52Privileged access is not necessarily a problem where there is democratic accountability. However, in the absence of transparency it becomes a significant issue. As the Hon. John Hatzistergos put it:
...lobbyists provide an essential function to the operating of a democratic government, but the shrouding of it in secrecy has led to situations of distrust, and it permeates, I think, a lot of the anecdotal information and perceptions about lobbyists and the activities that they engage in.[15]
1.53It’s not for me to judge whether the decisions made by other Parliamentarians to sponsor passes are the right ones. We have a robust Parliament, and that is something that should be celebrated.
1.54However, the public should be given the opportunity to consider whether the decisions of their elected representatives and to whom they give sponsored passes are in the public interest. This can only be done if we allow transparency and public debate over whether access aligns with our values.
1.55This is not an unusual practice in an international context. In its submission, the Grattan Institute notes that the UK, the US, and New Zealand all publish lists of passholders.
1.56Paragraph 6.43 of the Committee's report finds that it should be for individual MPs and Senators to decide whether they make public the details of the lobbyists to whom they provide sponsored passes. This ignores the insight provided by the Chief Commissioner of the NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption. Secrecy is corrosive to public trust.
1.57The reason given for maintaining the shroud of secrecy around sponsored passes is that to do otherwise would restrict access to Parliament House and so damage democracy. This is deeply cynical. This committee has an opportunity to recommend measures to restore public trust and instead it claims democratic principle as the reason for secrecy. It is essentially a recommendation to do nothing, in spite of all the evidence tabled to this Committee that the secrecy is unfair and corrosive to a healthy democracy.
1.58It would continue a system where the public are prevented from holding their representatives accountable for the people they give privileged access to the people’s house to lobby for causes that may not be in the public interest. I can almost guarantee that if the list was public, Big Tobacco would be handing back their passes, because I doubt Australians would accept any of their representatives giving the tobacco industry a greater voice in Parliament than the average Australian.
1.59Recommendation 2 of the Committee’s report is welcome insofar as interoperability between the Lobbying Register and the system for registering sponsored passes. However, it does not go anywhere near far enough. The public deserves to know the name of the passholder, the passholder’s employer and the identity of the sponsoring parliamentarian.
1.60The committee received variations of the following as reasons not to allow transparency on details of sponsored passholders and I want to briefly address them in light of evidence tendered to the inquiry.
1.61I have no doubt that the vast majority of lobbyists in the building conduct themselves professionally and use their passes solely for the purpose of attending meetings booked in advance. But such behaviour is not universal.
1.62Sponsored passes provide more than the convenience of being able to walk unescorted between meetings. They provide opportunities to engineer chance meetings with Parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers. They allow passholders to knock on any door in Parliament and show up, unannounced to advocate for themselves or on behalf of the organisation or client they represent. The overwhelming majority of Australians will never have their voices heard in the Halls of Parliament in the way sponsored passholders do.
1.63Privacy policies are updated constantly, and no convincing evidence has been provided to the committee that the Privacy Act operates to prohibit the publication of details about sponsored passholders.
1.64It is clearly within the power of the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) to update its own Privacy Policy and the forms used for issuing sponsored passes in a way that allows information to be gathered from a sponsored passholder and for that information to be made public.
1.65However, DPS has claimed that the Privacy Act would prevent them from changing the policy, referring me to Privacy Principle 6 in the Act. What they neglect to mention is that Privacy Principle 6 also contains several exemptions that allow personal information to be disclosed if (among other things) people are told and consent to that information being disclosed.
1.66 I requested any advice sought or received by the Department of Parliamentary Services (DPS) in relation to the Privacy Act 1988, and the response was “Questions on Notice are for the provision of information, not requests for the provision of documents.” This answer is not satisfactory, as Questions on Notice routinely ask for provision of documents.
1.67I have no doubt that a move to greater transparency will require change management, but this should not be an insurmountable obstacle. Permission to publish details could easily form part of the application process and a process to gain consent from current sponsored passholders could likewise be undertaken.
1.68It is not hard to find out who has a pass to the building.
1.69Professor Anne Twomey gave convincing evidence dismissing the concern about any security risk posed by publicising the details of sponsored pass holder:
My observation is that, if that's a genuine concern, it's a genuine concern that would arise in relation to a plethora of other passes.
There are lots of people who hold parliamentary passes, be they staff members who just work in Parliament House and the Parliamentary Library, the cafeteria, the people who work for politicians, the ministerial advisers, and politicians themselves and their family members.
For the most part, the identity of these people are known. If someone was going to deliberately go around targeting people who have passes for the purposes of stealing or copying them then that's going to be a problem anyway. The mere fact that you've got some people on a register of lobbyists whose names are known is not actually going to really increase that risk; it's an existing risk.
There are already people who are known to have those passes. I don't think it exacerbates the problem in any way. To the extent that it's a problem, then Parliament House needs to deal with that problem across the board; it's not just a problem in relation to lobbyists.[16]
1.70The briefest Google or LinkedIn search using the term “press gallery” or “advisor to…” can show you pretty easily who has a pass.
1.71If all that is standing in the way of foreign interference is the supposedly secret identities of the 2000 lobbyists in the building, then someone needs to have another look at the risk assessment.
1.72It is important to note that the committee received no evidence from any security agency that raised any concern about the prospect of foreign interference should the details of sponsored passes be made public.
1.73This argument is highlighted in the Committee's report at section 6.41: “At the outset, therefore, the committee recognises the evidence from DPS that the sponsored pass, or ‘orange pass’, is not a lobbyist pass.”
1.74We know that not all sponsored passholders conduct lobbying activities, but we also know that the majority do.
1.75It seems obvious that if the Parliament was sufficiently motivated to allow the public some transparency around the sponsored pass system, then it could pick another colour for the lanyard and carve out the people who have a sponsored pass but who are not undertaking lobbying activities.
1.76I am supportive of Recommendation 3 of the Committee Report, the recommendation to restore unescorted day passes if the sponsored pass list is made public. Restoration of unescorted day passes does not lessen the urgent need to add transparency to sponsored passes. If the major parties decide to cherry pick this suggestion from the hearings, and not act on others like making the sponsored pass list public and publishing ministerial diaries, then this is a cynical move and may result in even less transparency.
1.77The rules should be made for the majority not the exception, and it is clear that specific arrangements could be made in the very limited number of special circumstances warranting this to protect particularly vulnerable visitor cohorts.
Recommendation 5
1.78Details of sponsored passes should be published, including the name of the passholder, the passholder’s employer and the identity of the sponsoring parliamentarian.
1.79Transparency on who has access to Parliament House must be complemented by transparency around who has access to Federal Government Ministers. Federal Government Ministers make decisions on behalf of all Australians, many of which have dramatic impacts on all of our lives. Australians deserve to know who influenced the decisions to invest in new AI or defence capability, to subsidise a new fossil fuel project or how they decide to regulate an industry like gambling.
1.80For better or worse, these decisions are often based to some extent on interactions between ministers and lobbyists. For the most part, this is for the better. Representatives of groups within our community should have the opportunity to make their case to elected Federal Government Ministers in a way that facilitates and promotes more informed decisions.
1.81At the very least, Australians deserve to know who has a seat at the table; who has a voice to power in the conversations that lead to important decisions being made.
1.82At pages 42 and 43, the Committee's Report outlines the substantial evidence provided to the committee in favour of publishing Ministerial diaries. This includes convincing evidence from no fewer than 13 submitters.[17]
1.83Of particular note is evidence from the NSW ICAC, which is summarised at paragraph 5.37 of the Committee's Report:
Ministerial diary disclosures can bolster transparency over the lobbying of ministers by providing a counter reference point for lobbying registers, allowing for a comparison of what is disclosed on both platforms.[18]
1.84Absent from the Committee's Report is the positive impact that increased transparency could have on increasing equity and diversity of views being heard by ministers. According to the Grattan Institute:
Publishing ministerial diaries would enable journalists and others to know who ministers are meeting – and, perhaps even more importantly, who they’re not meeting – which could encourage politicians to seek more diverse input.[19]
1.85The publication of Ministerial diaries has been previously advocated for by Senator Jacqui Lambie, former Senator Rex Patrick and most recently Monique Ryan MP. I acknowledge their strong and sustained advocacy on this point.
1.86Despite the overwhelming evidence in favour of publishing Ministerial diaries, and an acknowledgement of the value that publishing diaries can provide, the Committee's Report fails to make any recommendation on this issue. At paragraphs 6.34 to 6.36, the rationale provided is that there are ‘several issues’ that would need more scrutiny before a recommendation can be made.
1.87On this issue it seems even a review is a step too far for the major parties, both of whom have called for greater transparency in opposition but dialled back their enthusiasm when in government. Transparency, accountability, and integrity should not be political lines used in opposition and discarded in government. The public takes a dim view of this duplicitous approach and the impact this has on public confidence harms our democracy.
1.88In many Australian jurisdictions, publishing of ministerial diaries is already standard practice. Ministerial diaries are currently being published in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, and the ACT.[20] That such disclosure is already happening in these jurisdictions without adverse consequence and with demonstrable benefit adds even more weight to the argument of adopting this practice at a federal government level.
1.89The committee heard convincing evidence from the NSW ICAC, the Grattan Institute, and the Australia Institute that a model in which diaries are published on a monthly basis should be preferred. The Hon. John Hatzistergos indicated that quarterly publishing of diaries in NSW resulted in reduced transparency. The Queensland model under which diaries are published monthly was seen as superior by witnesses and submitters.
1.90Publishing ministerial diaries, while potentially uncomfortable for parties of government, would be a powerful tool to guard against state capture, and expose any bias — conscious or otherwise — to listen to sections of the community that align with a political party and an unwillingness to consider a breadth of views.
1.91The reluctance to move towards this level of transparency, already operating successfully in state and territory jurisdictions and internationally, is out of line with community expectations and the evidence the committee heard.
Recommendation 6
1.92A model should be developed for monthly publication of Ministerial diaries. The starting point for design of that model should be the system currently in force in Queensland.
1.93The Committee's report raises the possibility of extending the publishing of diaries to Parliamentarians generally. This is strange for two reasons. First, it contradicts the justification for no recommendation on the publishing of Ministerial diaries. Second, it does not appear to be in response to any submission received by the committee or evidence given by a witness.
1.94In raising this issue, the Committee's Report states that Professor Twomey gave evidence that diary publication should be extended to all parliamentarians. Professor Twomey’s evidence was that:
…if it's a matter of ministers opening their diaries—as happens in New South Wales—for meetings and appointments, I can't see why backbenchers and the like shouldn't be open about those sorts of matters as well.[21]
1.95Evidence from Ms Griffiths, Deputy Program Director from the Grattan Institute was also instructive. She said:
I think the reason to start with ministerial diaries is that they're the most senior decision-makers and they have better resources for compiling and publishing this information on a regular basis and getting it out there in a timely manner et cetera. Ideally, all parliamentarians would publish their meetings. It's just a question of the resourcing capacity of crossbenchers and backbenchers to implement something like that, so I would say you start with ministerial diaries, you test the model, and you find out what level of resources it takes.[22]
1.96Publishing the diaries of all Parliamentarians may be a good idea, and I am certainly open to it. However, no evidence was provided to the committee on the potential benefits or costs of doing so. No doubt additional resources would need to be allocated to achieve this and it is unclear whether deployment of resources would represent good value for Australian taxpayers.
1.97During the public hearing, Senators raised concerns about the impact of changes to sponsored passes on whistleblowers. As I understand it, the concern is that publishing the identity of sponsored pass holders could reveal the identity of whistleblowers.
1.98This concern was roundly dismissed in evidence provided to the committee. As Professor Twomey put it, “...if you don't want an inference of your relationship with a particular lobbyist, then don't sponsor them for a pass.”[23] Professor Twomey went on to say:
If you are wandering around Parliament House, where there are a whole lot of people from different parties with different interests who will observe your movements in Parliament House, I think one should assume that you will be seen wandering around there with your orange pass and that it's quite possible that someone might mention it. If you were whistleblowing and wanting to do it confidentially, presumably you wouldn't do it in a public place—or a semi-public place—of that kind.[24]
1.99In early 2023, during a Senate Estimates hearing, I tabled documents I had obtained from a whistleblower. I would not have risked revealing that person’s identity by providing documentation of any kind to anyone. It is inconceivable that a whistleblower should be provided a sponsored pass to protect their identity. To do so would present an unacceptable risk that their identity would be revealed.
1.100Sponsored passes do nothing to protect whistleblowers and publicising the details of lobbyists that are sponsored pass holders presents no risk to whistleblowers.
1.101The fact that whistleblowers are approaching Parliamentarians and seeking the protection offered by parliamentary privilege reveals a gap in the federal integrity framework. Whistleblower laws are confusing and inconsistent and those looking to blow the whistle do not receive the support they need to reveal corruption and maladministration.
1.102Rather than a secretive and opaque system for sponsored passes, we need a Whistleblower Protection Authority to provide support and protection to whistleblowers. Alongside my colleagues in the House, Andrew Wilkie MP and Helen Haines MP, I will continue to call for the establishment of a Whistleblower Protection Authority.
1.103Where whistleblowers seek the protection that can be provided by parliamentary privilege, such an authority could provide support in interactions with Parliamentarians and ensure their identity is protected.
Recommendation 7
1.104Establish a Whistleblower Protection Authority to ensure that whistleblowers using parliamentary privilege are adequately protected.
Senator David Pocock
Participating Member
Independent Senator for the Australian Capital Territory
Footnotes
[1]See Lobbying (Improving Government Honesty and Trust) Bill 2023.
[2]Attorney-General’s Department, Lobbying Code of Conduct Preamble, 28 November 2019 (Accessed 6 May 2024).
[3]Professor Emerita Anne Twomey AO, Submission 5, p. 1
[4]Hawker Briton, Submission 4, p. 2.
[5]Associate Professor Yee-Fui Ng, Monash University, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 3.
[6]Hawker Briton, Submission 4, p. 2.
[7]The Australia Institute, Submission 16, p. 11.
[8]Centre for Public Integrity, Submission 18, p. 9.
[9]The Australia Institute, Submission 16, p. 11.
[10]Associate Professor Yee-Fui Ng, Monash University, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 4.
[11]Julian Fitzgerald, The Need for Transparency in Lobbying (Discussion Paper No 16/07, Democratic Audit of Australia, September 2007), p. 2.
[12]Attorney-General’s Department, Lobbying Code of Conduct Preamble, 28 November 2019 (Accessed 6 May 2024).
[13]Attorney-General’s Department, Lobbying Code of Conduct Preamble, 28 November 2019 (Accessed 6 May 2024).
[14]Grattan Institute, Submission 12, p. 4.
[15]The Hon. John Hatzistergos, NSW Independent Commission Against Corruption, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 41.
[16]Professor Anne Twomey, University of Sydney, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 3.
[17]Foundation for Alcohol Research and Education, Submission 30, p. 3; Brisbane Residents United, Submission 44, p. 4; Mr Graeme Booth, Submission 2, p. 2; Mr Laurence Comerford, Submission 306, p. 1; Mr Ruchira Abeyratna, Submission 6, p. 8; and Dr Richard Barnes, Submission 23, p. 2; The Australia Institute, Submission 16, p. 13; New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, Submission 32, p. 3; Associate Professor Yee-Fui Ng, Submission 1, p. 5; Centre for Public Integrity, Submission 18, pp. 9—10; Dr Monique Ryan MP, Submission 17, p. 2; Cancer Council Australia, Submission 27, p. 5; Our Democracy, Submission 47, p. 5.
[18]New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, Submission 32, p. 3.
[19]Grattan Institute, Submission 12, p. 1.
[20]Grattan Institute, Submission 12, p. 4.
[21]Professor Anne Twomey, University of Sydney, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 5.
[22]Kate Griffiths, Grattan Institute, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 14.
[23]Professor Anne Twomey, University of Sydney, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 5.
[24]Professor Anne Twomey, University of Sydney, Proof Committee Hansard, 8 April 2024, p. 5.
Inquiry into access to Australian Parliament House by lobbyists
Senate
House of Representatives
Get informed
Bills
Committees
Get involved
Visit Parliament
Website features
Parliamentary Departments