Chapter 4 - Beaudesert Rail
Background
4.1
The town of Beaudesert
in south east Queensland is
situated between, and is equidistant from, Brisbane
and the Gold Coast. Until the mid 1990s Queensland Rail operated a rail service
between Beaudesert and Bethania, 43 kilometres away on the Brisbane-Gold
Coast line. Queensland Rail ceased
to operate the line when an abattoir closed in the Beaudesert Shire and there
was no longer any freight to carry.
4.2
In 1997 local citizens formed the Beaudesert Shire
Railway Support Group Association Inc. (BSRSG) in an attempt to retain the
corridor and to reopen the line. The association unsuccessfully petitioned the
responsible minister in the state government to recommence a passenger service
to Beaudesert, with an occasional tourist steam train.[215] The association, again
unsuccessfully, applied in 1998 for a grant of $5 million from the Commonwealth
Government's Federation Cultural and Heritage Projects program.[216]
4.3
In March 2000, the association, trading as Beaudesert
Rail (BR), applied through the Gold Coast and Region Area Consultative
Committee (GCRACC) for a grant from the Regional Assistance Program, a
precursor of the RPP, for the development of a business and marketing plan for
BR to gain Queensland Transport accreditation as a railway manager-operator.[217] The GCRACC supported the application
and BR received a grant of $75,000 plus GST for that purpose.
4.4
In 2001 BR applied for, and received, a Commonwealth
Government grant of $5 million from the Centenary of Federation fund to develop
and operate a heritage railway from Bethania to Beaudesert. That grant enabled
BR to restore the track and other facilities, to purchase and restore rolling
stock and to begin operating as a tourist railway at the end of December 2002.
4.5
Early in December 2002, however, BR's management
committee was informed by its then general manager that it had a deficit of
$120,000. In January 2003, it was advised that deficit had increased to $500,000.[218]
4.6
BR continued to trade after December 2002 despite its
financial situation because the committee of management believed, on the advice
of its auditor and others, that it could continue to trade if it did not incur
additional debts and if its ongoing expenses were met from its cash flow.[219]
4.7
In February 2003, BR's general manager sought
assistance from the GCRACC to assess BR's financial status. A grant of $10,000 plus
GST was made to GCRACC for that purpose, again under the Regional Assistance Program.
On 27 February GCRACC engaged a firm of chartered accountants 'to establish the
current financial position of BR and to consider...management, funding and
strategic options for the ongoing viability of BR'.[220]
4.8
The accounting firm, Lee Garvey, reported to GCRACC on
28 March 2003 that as at 28 February 2003 BR owed its creditors $1,244 644,
that it had insufficient liquid assets to meet current liabilities as and when
they fell due and that BR was therefore technically insolvent.[221] The report ('the Lee Garvey Report')
suggested that with the agreement of creditors it might be possible to put in
place a rescue package.[222]
4.9
The report was presented to BR's management committee
on 31 March. At a meeting on 30 April
2003, the management committee, knowing that legal action by
creditors to wind up the association was imminent, resolved to apply to the
Supreme Court of Queensland to appoint a provisional liquidator.[223]
4.10
The Court appointed a provisional liquidator (Mr
L McIntosh, a
partner in KordaMentha) on 2 May 2003.
After assessing BR's assets, and determining
that creditors would receive no more than 15 cents in the dollar if BR were
wound up, Mr McIntosh decided that it should continue trading because, as he
informed the committee of management, if BR had ceased to trade, 'any
likelihood of obtaining further government funding to pay out the creditors of
Beaudesert Rail would be jeopardised'.[224]
4.11
BR and Mr McIntosh
sought further Commonwealth Government funding through the local Member of
Parliament, the Member for Forde, Mrs Kay
Elson.[225]
Mrs Elson
made representations to the Prime Minister who responded, on 11 June 2003, that he was 'inclined
to support the provision of a $400,000 Commonwealth loan',[226] subject to certain conditions. Those
conditions were, first, that the project would have to obtain funds of at least
$800,000 from the Queensland State Government and/or other sources and, second,
that BR would need to provide updated financial statements and a business plan
demonstrating that the project could be made financially viable.[227]
4.12
Mr
McIntosh wrote to the Prime Minister on 15 July 2003 to inform him that
Queensland Government funding had been obtained from Queensland Rail, which had
agreed to take out a lien on BR's steam engine in consideration for forgoing
its unsecured loan of $675,236.22. He also informed the Prime Minister that the
Beaudesert Shire Council had agreed to provide funding of $200,000 towards
working capital for Beaudesert Rail, subject to conditions. Mr
McIntosh enclosed with his letter a business
plan prepared by BR's General Manager, which he said gave him confidence that
the project was financially viable. He formally requested the release of the
$400,000 by 5 August. [228]
4.13
BR continued to operate, paying for its ongoing
expenses from its cash flow, during the period that it was in provisional
liquidation (and then under administration, from 25 September 2003), except for
two periods amounting to several weeks following a derailment on 28 June 2003
and a bridge fire in October 2003. During that time the government, through
DOTARS, tried to establish with Mr McIntosh
whether the conditions of the proposed loan could be met.
4.14
Mr McIntosh
was able to satisfy DOTARS that BR could meet most of conditions for the loan, but
on 30 October 2003 he was
still attempting to satisfy the department that the project would be
financially viable.[229] In that regard, the Committee was informed
that DOTARS obtained from KPMG an independent financial assessment of BR's
ongoing financial viability.[230] BR's
financial viability is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
4.15
Documents provided in evidence to the Committee reveal
that in the final days leading up to the government decision on BR the Deputy
Prime Minister, The Hon John Anderson MP, who was also the portfolio minister
for RPP, was involved in discussions with the Prime Minister's office about the
matter of government assistance. It would seem that these negotiations
continued until late in the afternoon on 4 November—the day before the decision
was made.[231] It is also clear from
the evidence that at this stage the department was completely unaware of where
the discussions between the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's
office were heading in relation to BR.
Right up until the eve of the decision the department, including the most senior
officer in charge of the BR issue, were continuing to work on the basis that
any funding would be in the form of a loan.[232]
4.16
On 5 November
2003, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, Mr
Anderson, advised Mr
McIntosh that the government would provide
BR not with a loan, but with a grant (of $600,000) for its future
operations. The grant was to be made on the condition that BR obtained at least
$800,000 from the Queensland State Government and/or other sources. This was
one of the conditions set in the Prime Minister's letter to Mrs
Elson of 11 June 2003 regarding the possible loan. The grant was to
be paid in two instalments—the first, of $400,000, was for BR's immediate
funding needs and the second, of $200,000, was for operating capital. The second instalment was to be paid when BR
had satisfied the Australian Government that all arrangements were in place to
give effect to the Deed of Company Arrangement, that is, that all creditors had
been paid the amounts specified in the legal agreement that had been made between
the creditors and the administrator. [233]
4.17
Following the payment of the grant, the management of
BR then became the responsibility of a new management committee.[234] BR continued to operate until August
2004, when the largest bridge on the railway was burnt. This was the fifth or
sixth mishap, including a derailment and grass and bridge fires that had
befallen the railway since it commenced operations in December 2002. On this
occasion BR did not have sufficient funds ($132,000) to effect the necessary repairs,
and had to cease operations. Subsequently, in February 2005, on the application
of a number of creditors, those creditors took possession of certain assets and
of BR's operational records and bank accounts.[235]
Commonwealth Government involvement
4.18
The Commonwealth Government provided BR with four
grants amounting in total to $5.7 million.
4.19
As stated earlier the first grant of $75,000 plus GST,
was for the production of a business and marketing plan. That grant was made
under the Regional Assistance Program and was processed through the GCRACC. The
responsible government department was the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations
and Small Business. Ms Riggs
informed the Committee that the grant was acquitted through that department on 25 May 2001.[236]
4.20
The second grant of $5 million was made from the Centenary
of Federation Fund. DOTARS had the responsibility for administering that grant,
but the GCRACC was not involved. There are different views about whether the
grant was adequate for the intended purpose and indeed whether it should have
been made at all.[237] Nevertheless the
evidence indicates that the various instalments of the grant were carefully
administered and monitored by DOTARS,[238]
but the grant was not acquitted with DOTARS till October 2003.[239] The late acquittal of the grant was
one of the issues that was raised by DOTARS when it was corresponding with Mr
McIntosh regarding the conditions of the
proposed loan, as is discussed later in the chapter.
4.21
The third grant of $10,000 plus GST was made in
February 2003 and was for a report on BR's financial situation and suggestions
for a way forward. That report (the Lee
Garvey report) has been discussed earlier in
this chapter. BR applied to the GCRACC, which supported the application. The
grant was made from the RAP to the ACC and was administered by DOTARS.
4.22
The Commonwealth Government was again involved in the
project in June 2003 when, on the representations of the Member for Forde, the
Prime Minister made a conditional offer of a loan of $400,000. DOTARS was given
the responsibility for facilitating the loan, although the department did not
administer any programs that offered loans.[240]
4.23
DOTARS did not
intend, however, that the proposed loan would be made under either the RP or SR
programs. Ms Riggs
informed the Committee that at the time DOTARS was 'contemplating the provision
of additional funding through the additional estimates process, in the latter
part of 2003, specifically for the proposed loan'.[241] Ms
Riggs also admitted in evidence to the
Committee that, as it failed to fit any existing departmental programs, the
unique nature of the proposed loan and the one-off appropriation to fund it
amounted to effectively an additional or new program.[242]
4.24
From 13 August
2003 till early November 2003 DOTARS and Mr
McIntosh were in frequent communication concerning
BR's ability to meet the conditions of the loan. As discussed in the next
section, BR had satisfied DOTARS that it would be able to meet most of the
conditions for the loan but on 30
October 2003 the department was still seeking detailed, additional
evidence from BR, as follows:
I am seeking further evidence that the project's prospects of
solvency in the first year can be improved. I will require this response as
soon as possible tomorrow if I am to maintain the possibility of finalising a
loan agreement before 6 November 2003.[243]
4.25
The offer of a loan was in effect withdrawn on 5
November 2003 when the government decided to provide further assistance to BR
by way of a fourth grant. DOTARS was given the responsibility of administering
the grant through the RPP.
4.26
DOTARS and BR signed a Regional Partnerships funding agreement
on 14 December 2003. As is
the normal practice, DOTARS paid the grant monies only when it was satisfied
that the conditions of the agreement had been met. The first instalment of the
grant was paid to BR on 18 December
2003. The second instalment was paid in February 2004, after Mr
McIntosh attested that he had complied with
all the requirements to give full effect to the Deed of Company Arrangements.
4.27
Although the grant was made from RPP funds, the government
apparently did not treat it as a grant that would normally be made under the program.
In that regard, BR had not applied for a RP grant, nor had GCRACC been
consulted. Ms Riggs
told the Committee:
Regional Partnerships was simply an existing program from which
the grant was paid, and that is why in the subsequent budget the government
provided an additional $600,000 to top up the Regional Partnerships
appropriation.[244]
4.28
The manner in which the government resorted to using
program funds for the BR grant reveals the disregard on the part of its most
senior ministers for the RPP guidelines. It is one of several examples in this
report of the virtually unfettered discretion in the hands of ministers under
this program (see also chapter 7 on Primary Energy). The other striking aspect
of the BR case is that program funds were used to achieve a political outcome
in a government-held electorate following direct intervention from the Prime
Minister.
Financial viability
4.29
A major issue arising from the provision of taxpayers'
monies to BR is whether the government could have reasonably concluded at any
time that the project would be financially viable, which is a requirement under
the RP guidelines.
4.30
The first grant that was made to BR was for the
provision of a business and marketing plan to gain accreditation from
Queensland Transport as a railway manager-operator. That report presumably was taken
into account when the government awarded the $5 million Centenary of Federation
grant. The Committee did not have access to that report, but one witness stated
that the business plan had some serious flaws. In that witness' opinion, an
overestimate of the possible income was one of the flaws.[245]
4.31
Mr Daynes,
the former General Manager of BR, also identified a number of flaws, as follows:
The report was attractive in the promise of financial returns
and a wonderful contribution it would make to the workforce and economy of the
Beaudesert Shire.
The plan did not include the upgrades and maintenance of the
railway infrastructure or any cost of restoring locomotives or rolling stock.[246]
4.32
Mr Daynes
also wrote that:
There was never any figure that could be substantiated as to how
much the infrastructure upgrade would cost or if the rolling stock restoration
figures were realistic. Surely this was the responsibility of the funding body
before handing out $5 million if public money.
When the grant was made public the BSRSG was as surprised to get
the grant as the political organisations who condemned the grant.[247]
4.33
However, the Committee was informed by another witness that,
but for the inadequacies of the then management, the project could have been
brought in on budget and on time in accordance with the business plan.[248] The then secretary of the committee
of management, Mr Robert,
did not necessarily share that opinion[249]
and neither did Mr Daynes,
who claimed in April 2003 that it was apparent by October 2001 that the project
would have a deficiency in funds to complete the project by December 2002.[250]
4.34
When the BR management committee was told in January 2003
that the deficiency amounted to $500,000, it prudently decided to ask the
GCRACC to fund a report on its financial situation. As reported earlier, the
ACC received a grant of $10,000 plus GST with which it commissioned the Lee
Garvey report.
4.35
The Lee Garvey
report found that 'Capital expenditure relating to the Commonwealth Grant was
$6,091,188, $1,091,188 over budget'[251]
and observed that in normal circumstances winding up would be the most likely
scenario. The report suggested, however, that if a rescue package could have been
put in place there may have been a chance for BR to move forward. One option
that the report put forward required BR to obtain a package of funding from
financial institutions, Commonwealth and State Governments.[252] As discussed earlier, that was the
option eventually chosen by the liquidator.
4.36
Lee Garvey
prepared a cash flow forecast for the year, 1 April 2003 to 31
March 2004, which indicated that BR might achieve an operating
surplus of approximately $462,000 for the year. The report stated that the
forecast cash flow 'establishes a basis for ongoing viability however there is
insufficient cash flow ... to meet current creditor liabilities'.[253]
4.37
The Lee Garvey
forecast assumed that monthly ticket sales and charters would be as much as
$131,699 in February 2004. Estimates submitted by Mr
McIntosh to DOTARS in October 2003 forecast
sales of only $31,973 for February 2004, and DOTARS sought assurances that
sales forecasts even at that level were realistic.[254]
4.38
Following the Prime Minister's indication that a loan
of $400,000 might be available, DOTARS explored with Mr
McIntosh the viability of the project. As
stated earlier, the matter had still not been resolved to the satisfaction of
DOTARS before the Deputy Prime Minister offered the grant of $600,000 plus GST
on 5 November 2003. As Ms
Riggs informed the Committee on 25 February 2005 in relation to BR's
ability to service the loan:
Senator O'Brien
– So, Ms Riggs,
at that time the department had overwhelming evidence that the project, in its
view, was never going to be viable, and you were defending the interests of the
taxpayer at that time?
Ms Riggs – We had what I believed to be an informed and
experienced judgment that if what the Commonwealth offered were a loan then,
based on projections available to us from the person then responsible for
Beaudesert Rail, its future could not be assured on those terms.[255]
4.39
As discussed earlier, the first tranche of the grant promised
to BR on 5 November 2003
was used to pay its creditors under the Deed of Settlement. The second tranche
of $200,000 was for working capital. The need for working capital had been
recognised in the Lee Garvey report which had recommended that it would be
important to allow for working capital of approximately one third of [the]
expected surplus of $462,000 'in order to ensure that BR is able to always meet
future commitments as and when they become due'.[256]
4.40
Lee Garvey
therefore had considered that an amount of approximately $150,000 would be needed
to support BR's ongoing operations. As it happened, even the apparently
generous grant of $200,000 from the RPP proved to be insufficient. In August
2004, BR was not able to find $132,000 to repair a bridge that was damaged by
fire.
Conclusion
4.41
Clearly, Mr McIntosh
had not been able to demonstrate to DOTAR's satisfaction that BR was
sufficiently economically viable to service a loan of $400,000. That appears to
have been for that reason that the government decided to provide financial
assistance in the form of a grant. However, even a grant of $600,000 proved
insufficient when BR needed to find funds to repair a bridge so that it could
continue operating.
4.42
As stated earlier, BR was wound up on the application
of a number of creditors in February 2005.
4.43
It may be, as some witnesses claimed, that without the mishaps
that adversely affected the operation of the railway at vital times, BR may
have been viable in the medium to long term.[257]
However, its ongoing viability was at best marginal, and the Committee must seriously
question the government's decision to expend a total of $5.7 million of
taxpayers' monies on a project that failed.
4.44
It is also significant that the major grants provided
to BR ($5 million from the Centenary of Federation Fund and $600,000 from the
RPP) were not processed through the relevant area consultative committee. The
Committee did not receive sufficient evidence about the Centenary of Federation
grant for it to determine whether the usual processes for grants under that
program were followed. In relation to the latter grant, however, the evidence
is that the decision to make the grant was made at the political level. The
GCRACC was not involved and DOTARS was only informed of the grant on the same
day that the Minister informed the voluntary administrator.
4.45
In making this ultimately futile grant of $5.7 million to
a project in a Government-held electorate it is clear that the government bypassed
its own normal procedures for the administration of the RPP. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that the grant was made for political purposes.
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