DISSENTING REPORT
The States Grants (Primary and Secondary Education Assistance) Bill
1996 represents a major shift in the financial arrangements between
the Commonwealth and the States with respect to the funding of education.
Moreover, it heralds the first moves by the Commonwealth to abrogate key
national responsibilities for ensuring an equitable and high quality schooling
system in Australia.
For the past two decades the Commonwealth has assumed, for extremely
good reasons, an important leadership role in promoting advances in the
curriculum, teaching and infrastructure of Australia's schools, in both
the government and the non-government sector. It has presided over an
unprecedented rise in the numbers of students staying on at school beyond
the compulsory years; the development and implementation of the National
Goals for Schooling; dramatic improvements in the professional development
opportunities for teachers; and the establishment of probably the most
equitable schooling system in the world.
All of this is being put at risk by a government which is unwilling to
bear its responsibility for the promotion of the national interest, and
this in an arena which is universally declared to be the most critical
in terms of assuring a nation's future -that of education.
Education and training constitute perhaps the greatest single
long term leverage point available to all levels of government...Improving
the general education system is an essential priority of government
and a matter for economic and not just social policy. [1]
We simply cannot afford to reduce our efforts in this area because, despite
the significant improvements over the last decade or more Australia's
contribution to schooling as a proportion of GDP remains among the lowest
of the OECD countries. Indeed, an investment of around $2 billion would
be needed to raise the investment in our schools to the average of OECD
countries. [2]
If we want Australians to be self-managing and flexible, to take initiative,
to be problem solvers, these are attributes which have their genesis in
school education. Therefore Australians must be able to access, wherever
they live, and whatever their personal circumstances, schools which are
adequately resourced and professionally conducted. This Bill puts such
opportunities at risk for that large majority of young people who attend
public schools. Moreover, this Bill promotes the notion of education as
a private rather than a public benefit by advancing the interests of private
schools, without first securing the provision of high quality public education.
The non-government schooling sector is a valuable feature of Australia's
education landscape, but it must not crowd out the picture.
There are three main elements of the States Grants Bill which
have significant implications for Australian schools:
- the rationalising and broadbanding of the Commonwealth's Targeted
Assistance programs
- the abolition of the New Schools Policy, and
- the introduction of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment.
All of these are major changes to the way in which the Commonwealth has
previously involved itself in school education, and their impacts require
careful scrutiny. To implement such changes without a clear understanding
of what they will mean for the day-to-day experience of children in our
schools would be irresponsible in the extreme. This Minority Report seeks
to undertake that scrutiny, to expose weaknesses and to render clearly
the likely outcomes of implementing the legislation.
Australia has developed a blended system of private and public education
which has generally served the nation well. Following the divisive state
aid debates of the early seventies, the system settled into a broadly
acceptable modus operandi, facilitated and maintained by the New Schools
Policy introduced by the Federal Labor government in 1986. For most of
the last two decades, the Commonwealth has "at least maintained its
funding in real terms and kept funding levels (in percentage terms) ahead
of enrolment increases" [3], while
there has been a general decline in the levels of expenditure on schooling
by the States and Territories. [4]
Of particular importance, given the muddied debate about the links between
expenditure and outcomes in education, is that there has to date been
no discernible difference in the overall educational performance of the
government and the non-government schooling sectors. The Labor and Australian
Democrat Senators are concerned that this key feature of the current blended
system will start to disintegrate under the proposed new arrangements.
This would be disastrous not only for Australia's economic future, but
for the somewhat fragile harmony that has been thus far maintained in
the community with respect to the government's financial support for public
and private schools.
This concern is based, at least in part, on the evidence placed before
the Committee by a long-time analyst and researcher of schools, both public
and private, Professor Don Anderson. It is worth setting out his concerns
in some detail.
As a sociologist I have studied schools choice and the public/private
division of school systems in Australia and overseas. My main conclusion
from my own work, and from the work of many others, is that choice does
not necessarily lead to better educational outcomes, nor does choice
necessarily lead to the most efficient use of education resources....Nor...is
there any evidence that the teaching in non-government schools leads
to better performance than teaching in public schools....
My final point is that this parity of outcomes between public
and private may not remain the case in Australia. The growth of our
private sector is now starting to impact negatively on public schools.
There is a distinct possibility that in many areas of our big cities
public schools will become residual institutions for the children of
families with problems or who cannot afford the fees...The argument
is a bit complicated... Briefly, it depends on schools having that critical
mass of able and capable students and if they lose that, performance
plummets. Because public schools provide for by far the greater number
of pupils, that small change can, in some critical areas in some regions
of our cities, lead to a big qualitative decline. So that is the explanation....
I very carefully stated that, if the present processes continue,
the parity of outcomes which we see at present will be lost. And I say
that very seriously and I repeat it: we are in danger of a decline in
performance in public schools, not because of the quality of teaching,
but because of the mix of the students who go there; and, because of
the size and responsibility of the public sector, that could lead to
an average decline overall in Australia of school outcomes...
Because you will find, in particular areas of our cities where
a good public school has lost pupils to private schools, that public
school has suffered qualitatively far in excess of the size of the loss.
That is the first point. ... It is a complicated thing to try and explain
but, nevertheless, it is terribly serious and I think it should be understood,
because of the implications it has for the changes that are taking place.
If one able student moves from the public to the private sector, that
is not going to change things much at all. If a large number move,not
a majority, but a significant cluster,that will have a negative impact
on the public schools. It will not change things much in the private
schools. [5]
Of further concern to the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators is that
the increased enrolments in the non-government sector appear to exhibit
socio-economic characteristics which have implications for the balance
and range of Australian students present in the two schooling sectors.
The shift from public to private has not been random:
In Australia, the shift from public to private has not been random.
It has not been even across the social spectrum. I analysed the census
data for the 1970s and 1980s and found that most of the growth of non-government
schools was in the non-Catholic private sector, particularly fundamentalist
schools and schools serving middle class parents. During that period,
the Catholic share remained pretty constant .... The growth of private
schools was strongest in the well-established suburban areas of our
large cities.
Overall, that distribution is very uneven across the social spectrum.
Just to give one example, in Melbourne the proportion of private school
children in Hawthorn is six times the proportion in Collingwood, and
you get a similar gradient in other cities. [6]
Such data lends weight to the concerns of those who place value on having
a public education sector which is representative of the full spectrum
of Australian society. Social cohesion, tolerance and respect for difference
are all enhanced when the day-to-day engagement of young people at school
occurs in a pluralist social environment. One witness noted the recent
lecture by the Minister (Dr Kemp) in which the Minister referred to the
issue of social cohesion. The witnesses comments on Minister's views bear
repeating here:
Dr Kemp...the other night, argued that we have for a long time
had a quite substantial private sector and we have remained socially
cohesive, and I think that is generally true...But I worry about the
extent to which all of the new schools are likely to be more unifocal,
more homogeneous, than many of the existing private schools because
they are smaller institutions, formed around an often narrowly shared
world view...around a particular faith or ...set of social interests.
That will generate a private system that gradually changes in character
from the one that has been there all along. ... I think we ought to
ask, on the other side of the coin: if substantial amounts of public
money are going into private schools, what public obligations do those
schools have beyond what they might otherwise just choose to do for
themselves? [7]
The question of choice and the social role of schools
Much has been made by the Minister of the issue of choice, which has
constituted one of the government's prime justifications for the major
changes being proposed through this Bill. But it is the view of the Labor
and Australian Democrat Senators that choice is a problematic concept,
the rhetorical simplicity and appeal of which masks its complex political
status and its vulnerability to a range of interpretations.
One witness provided a convenient account of 'choice' as it pertains
to the Australian education system:
The strongest argument in favour of choice is that in a pluralistic
society, with diverse religious and ethnic and social status distinctions,
members of particular groups should have access to schools which will
supplement the socialising role of their families or of their churches
or of their community groups. The way things are worked out in Australia,
the public/private divide of schooling very accurately reflects the
main segments and divisions of society,religious, ethnic, social class.
This provides a dilemma, I believe, for policymakers. On the one hand,
it is a mark of a tolerant society that we recognise different subcultures.
On the other hand, there is the matter of social cohesion,kids learning
tolerance and understanding of others,which occurs best when everyone
is educated together in the local school. [8]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators believe that the dilemma referred
to here, which goes to the heart of any Australian government's policy
about how best to provide for our nation's schools, has simply been ignored
for the sake of preserving an ideological commitment. As the Prime Minister
has been fond of telling us, the present government is 'for all Australians',
yet the present Bill eschews that perspective quite spectacularly.
A timely comment on the issue of choice is provided by Professor McKinnon
in the context of his government-commissioned review of the New Schools
Policy. He reminds us that:
Choice is easier to use as a rhetorical term than it is to operationalise,
at least with the funding of schools. Generalised support for the concept
of everyone having maximum choice does not translate into a system which
can realistically fund all conceivable options. Nor is choice an unambiguous
good. [9]
Moreover, choices are conditioned by the policy environment in which
such choices are made. Again, the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators
concur with the witness who pointed out to the Committee that:
[Choice] in itself is not adequate as a policy objective. Policy
objectives should be defined in terms of educational outcomes. In this
case it is a situation of partial choice, in the sense that the choice
is available to those with the capacity to pay. It is not clear what
the impact will be on those who do not have the capacity to pay. Choice
policies...do not necessarily result in improvements in educational
outcomes anyway. [10]
Thus there is a significant weakness in the policy upon which the States
Grants Bill is predicated. It is meant to provide for financial assistance
to primary and secondary schools, but it does so with notions of parental
choice as its overarching purpose, rather than a purpose directed towards
educational outcomes. It was repeated on several occasions to the Committee
[11] that choice has had no impact to
date on educational outcomes in Australian schools. What is likely, however,
is that a deliberate favouring of private provision over public provision
in our schools could quickly lead to a deterioration in the latter.
Several witnesses also pointed out that increased choice for some people
inevitably means less choice for others. As well, the choice does not
simply operate at the level of parental preference. The choices able to
be exercised in the private sphere are less constrained than those which
can be exercised by public providers given their particular responsibilities
for the public benefit.
[Consider] the real situation in Australia which is being posed
as choice between public and private schools. Private schools are not
subject to the sort of regulation that public schools are. They can
choose who goes there. It is not only a matter of parents choosing but
of the schools choosing. They can also choose not to keep any students
that they do not want to keep [12]
One of the key considerations which must be taken into account when dealing
with choice in an education context is that the (private) choice of parents
is being exercised, to a greater or lesser degree, with (public) funding.
Australia does not operate a voucher system which would facilitate the
direct expenditure of separate quantums of public funds by a private citizen.
Instead, public funds are largely expended on behalf of citizens by properly
authorised public agencies to optimise the general benefit to the citizens
as a whole. In the words of one witness:
There is a question about an individual decision not to use the
public resources that are made available, just as I would choose not
to use the train to travel to work but you are not subsidising me to
drive my car. I think there is an issue about how we pay for our choice.
... I would want to say that choice, wherever it is, has to be tempered
by its effect on the good of the majority. [13]
An important question associated with choice, and the way in which it
is inextricably bound up with broader questions about the kind of education
system that Australia strives for, is the question about the social role
of our schools and the socio-economic profile of school populations. This
has important repercussions for the cohesiveness of our society and the
strength of its democracy. It has become increasingly evident of late
that these are concerns which governments must address as a fundamental
component of all social and economic policy-making.
The issue of the social mix of students in our schools has already been
introduced above. The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators regard it
as an issue which is very much alive both at the macro level of education
policy and the micro level of individual families' decisions about the
education of their children. The following statement is illuminating on
both counts, and is worth quoting at some length:
If there is some withdrawal of Commonwealth funding from the
states ...[the] overall outcome is likely to be a continuation but acceleration
of the most recent trend..to too large class sizes and larger pupil
teacher ratios... I think we are now going to see a more rapid deterioration
in government school resourcing than we have had in the last five years.
This bill will materially assist that process.
As a result of that, it will be harder for parents to stay in
the government system. We have a small child...and we are looking at
her schooling now with a good deal of concern. We wonder whether we
will be able to find a viable government secondary school which has
a good academic program, where the kids are properly looked after in
the playground, within reach of our home. We are seriously wondering
whether that will be possible. I think that has always been possible
until fairly recently for families such as ours.
The effect of a significant resource gap opening between government
and non-government schools will be to make it even harder for government
schools to compensate for their social role of involving all members
of the community, of giving extra assistance to those who need it more
than others and so on...
In a situation where government schools were somewhat better
funded than non-government schools, which we have had until recently,
we were able to strike the right balance. But now, I think, we have
the situation where government schools might well be poorer overall
than most non-government schools and yet have a much broader role as
well. It is going to be hard for families with a strong commitment to
education to keep supporting those schools....
I think we then need to face the fact that, by doing that, we
withdraw from our older project of trying to provide a good education
for every Australian citizen, and embrace the idea that a good education
will only be provided in those schools which are competitive, and to
those parents who are prepared to outlay extra resources, whether they
are in the government or the non-government school system. [14]
Another aspect of this situation has been revealed by JK Galbraith in
his discussion of the 'contented majority'. It goes to the point that,
if governments encourage people who have private means, and can buy private
services, to opt out of the public system, those people will abandon the
public system and in time come to oppose funding to support. [15]
The ramifications of such a scenario are profound. The Labor and Australian
Democrat Senators consider that, unlike other policies which deal with
infrastructure-type services, there is a serious attempt being made to
fund individual family choice to a high degree, which has enormous risks
for our capacity to ensure a quality, comprehensive, readily accessible
education system. The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators note international
evidence that governments maintain a viable public sector service by ensuring
that around 85% of people use it. The present Bill will breach such constraints
significantly in excess of the status quo which itself is already beyond
that international benchmark.
As already emphasised, choice is conditioned by the policy environment
in which that choice is to be exercised, and the policy environment of
the State Grants Bill is sending clear messages to Australian parents
that if they choose to opt out of the government sector their children
will be catered for in the non-government sector by a significant public
subsidy. In such a situation, parental fears for the future of their offspring
in a public system which is seemingly at risk of Commonwealth neglect
cannot be ignored in estimating future patterns of enrolment. This aspect
was eloquently set before the Committee by a representative of the NSW
Federation of P&C Associations:
[I refer to] so-called evidence of widespread discontent with
the public system. We contest this head on. Most of the evidence is
anecdotal and the rest is based on deeply flawed opinion polling. None
control [is made] for the most important variables. The first of these
is parental fear for the future of their offspring whether this fear
is founded or not. Second, is the desire in parents to receive assurance
that they are taking the best course for their children and the third
is the desire of parents to effectively counter feelings of guilt, inadequacy
and fear, and fear of criticism, in relation to their care of their
children. It seems to us that what we have been facing is not a genuine
desire to discover the real wishes of parents but a genuine desire to
create a climate in which these natural fears of parents will be exacerbated.
Existence of a private alternative to a public system both creates these
fears and provides an avenue for their easy resolution. I
pay therefore I care. [16]
(Emphasis added)
Such a situation is anathema to Australia's traditional education ethos.
Under the previous government, the Commonwealth funded a number of specific
purpose programs which focused on target groups of students who are educationally
disadvantaged. The National Equity Programs for Schools (NEPS) included
the following components:
- English as a Second Language
- Special Education
- Disadvantaged Schools
- Country Areas
- Early Literacy
- Students at Risk
- Transition Support
As well, a Students with Disabilities loading was paid with general recurrent
grants, and a collaborative initiative of Commonwealth, State and Territory
governments - the National Asian Languages and Studies in Australian Schools
(NALSAS) Strategy - sought to assist schools to enhance their provision
in Asian studies.
Importantly, the NEPS program was the Commonwealth contribution to the
National Strategy for Equity in Schooling which was approved by Commonwealth
and State ministers for education in 1994, and represented "national
consensus on priorities, goals and expected outcomes for the priority
student groups for the period 1995-2000." [17]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are concerned that the proposed
changes put key aspects of the National Strategy at risk, and will not
adequately realise the agreed goals articulated in 1994.
There is something to be said for targeted assistance programs being
flexible, to enable decisions to be made at the State level concerning
the expenditure of funds on particular needs. However, allocations must
be determined through transparent decision-making processes, and there
must be accountability sufficient to assure the Commonwealth that the
goals for which the funds were made available are being met. In other
words, flexibility must not weaken the effective targeting of funds to
areas of greatest disadvantage.
The rationalising of around 40 targeted programs into five main programs
risks blurring the specific goals which the discrete programs targeted
in an unequivocal and identifiable way. For example, the drawing in of
the Disadvantaged Schools program into the broader Literacy strategy may
well mean that pockets of acute disadvantage get lost in the broader push
to national goals which are articulated expressly in literacy terms and
which will be judged using literacy measures. Disadvantage is a complex
phenomenon which does not lend itself to one type of measure, either in
the analysis or the treatment of it. Several witnesses with expertise
in equity matters pressed their concerns about inadequate targeting.
I think that the spreading of this money thinly across systems
in some kinds of literacy programs is certainly going to disadvantage
schools, both in terms of ...actual dollars,...and in terms of their
capacity to make decisions for themselves....
It seems to us that there is a probability, rather than a possibility,
that schools currently receiving funds under the disadvantaged schools
programs will not receive similar funds from the literacy program. Any
broadbanded program is going to have priorities determined at the centre,
whereas, DSP schools were able to access funds to develop programs that
were relevant to their local area. ... [18]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are concerned that successful
programs conducted under NEPS' highly targeted approach may disappear,
simply because under a broadbanded system, the specific target group will
not have an identifiable element of the broad funding package earmarked
for their use. Such money is therefore much more susceptible to erosion
from a range of other demands which may or may not be as pressing. The
Students at Risk Program is a key example here:
[One] of the most important things about the students at risk
program is that it has been able to come in to provide support for young
people who are considered to be in jeopardy for all the reasons that
the program faces, but more than anything to try and make connections
between the schools and other agencies that can support not just the
students' education but families in a way that students can continue
to participate...
This has been a program not built in to the general resources
of schools but providing those additional dollars that has enabled schools
to make connections with other agencies, to support those young people
to stay at school. It is quite different to most of the other programs
of the Commonwealth, and it has been a critical one in building those
links...
Its loss will be extraordinary, not just in metropolitan areas
but in country areas where whole towns have coalesced, where a series
of towns have coalesced around this program to make connections with
other support services for families and students. [19]
The majority report states that from 1997 the mechanism which will be
used to allocate funds under the former Disadvantaged Schools Program
(DSP) and the funds allocated to schools under the new Early Literacy
and Numeracy Strategy will be the ABS Index of Relative Socioeconomic
Disadvantage (IRSED), in conjunction with ABS enrolment data and the ACER's
Youth in Transition survey data. [20]
A revised mechanism is also being used for the Country Areas portion (CAP)
of the new Special Learning Needs program. But the impact of these changes
is significant.
In a letter from DEETYA to school authorities seeking their comments
about the proposed changes to targeted programs, a table was attached
which set out the differences between the amounts for both programs (DSP
and CAP) under the existing, compared with the recommended, new systems.
[21] The Labor and Australian Democrat
Senators note with some concern that the letter was dated 29 July and
required comments by 19 August, setting an impossible time frame for consultations
within the States about their response.
According to the table, in Victoria, for example, the DSP allocations
will drop by 11.8% ($7.85 million) overall, with State schools bearing
a 10.8% rEducation - a loss of $6.67 million. Western Australia experiences
the most significant rEducation under the new CAP methodology, dropping
3.22% overall, with Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania also experiencing
cuts. Combined with the substantial cuts to schools and teacher numbers
in Victoria, students in that state will be most severely affected by
these changes.
Accountability for the expenditure of Commonwealth targeted program funds
has always been a problematic issue. The National Report on Schooling
is barely adequate as a general account of the state of the nation's schooling
system, let alone as an accountability instrument for the achievement
of national equity goals. What is of considerable concern to the Labor
and Australian Democrat Senators is that it will be more difficult than
ever to monitor the operation and effectiveness of the new broadbanded
programs. This is especially so given the sizeable cuts to DEETYA staff
who were previously able, at least to some extent, monitor developments
'on the ground'.
The successful targeted programs under the former NEPS have built up
that success over time, but have remained somewhat fragile, and are susceptible
to small changes in the availability of dollars. This fragility will be
exacerbated under the new regime. Previously, the Commonwealth has provided
leadership not only at the National Strategy level, but also in very specific
equity areas. The Students At Risk (STAR) program, for example, has been
a very effective mechanism for focussing attention on a particular area
of high educational need.
Without sufficiently tight targeting to areas of greatest need, and without
responsive accountability mechanisms in place, effective programs could
easily crumble. Once lost, it would be virtually impossible to resurrect
such programs. The Commonwealth has, over several decades, pursued a careful
equity strategy, and has almost single-handedly been responsible for tackling
disadvantage in schools, targeting and nurturing areas of highest need.
The record of some States in this area has left a lot to be desired.
The funding for specific programs and the effects of the broad
banding will...remove any specific responsibility for targeting increasing
levels of child poverty in this country. It is not good enough to broad
band money, to say that we have priorities that focus on program needs,as
valuable as those needs might be,but to ignore the fact that the Commonwealth
government has played an historic role in accepting responsibility for
and therefore targeting the alleviation of socioeconomic disadvantage.
[22]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators urge the States and Territories
to exercise their broadbanding options with care, and to ensure that adequate
advisory mechanisms are in place to ensure that allocations are made on
the basis of need, with priority to those students and schools which suffer
the greatest disadvantage. It is apparent that there are considerable
differences between States in their approaches to equity programs, and
these must be reconciled if Australian students are to enjoy similar levels
of access to programs irrespective of where they live. One example which
highlighted the differential treatment of targeted programs concerned
the ethnic schools' after-hours languages programs.
We have had concerns in relation to community languages element
of funding up until now, as to how different states treat that element
of the funding and how those funds are distributed...There are some
states...which bring together all players and also there is a bipartisan
approach to the LOTE provision and the after-hours ethnic schools program...In
other areas...we have enough evidence to suggest that there are a number
of states that are not dealing with this program in the way that I think
it was initially set up to be dealt with. [23]
The accountability issues attaching to the targeted programs are quite
profound. It was always the case, even under NEPS, that the Commonwealth
had a difficult time ensuring even a modest level of accountability by
the States for the ways in which they spent NEPS funds. Under the new
arrangements, that difficulty will be compounded in the extreme. It is
absolutely essential that the Commonwealth is in a position to assure
itself that funds provided to the States to redress educational disadvantage
are efficiently and effectively deployed.
In an earlier inquiry, this Committee received evidence of States automatically
creaming off the top of NEPS funds a certain percentage for 'administrative
costs', and of funds which did not get passed on to intended recipients
for many months after the start of the school year. These problems are
likely to be exacerbated under the proposed supposedly 'more flexible',
but certainly 'looser' regime.
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are not only interested in
the number of dollars applied to targeted programs, but in the outcomes
which those dollars achieve. It is important to have in place effective
ways of measuring those outcomes. One of the key problems with this Bill
as far as the equity programs are concerned is that, since the reporting
arrangements depend upon the States and Territories agreeing with the
Commonwealth on the reporting mechanisms, the States and Territories have
an effective veto over the form and degree of rigour which such reporting
mechanisms should embody.
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators RECOMMEND that, with respect
to the reporting obligations of all parties under the National Report
on Schooling,
(a) MCEETYA strengthen the accountability and reporting requirements
pertaining to the new targeted assistance programs by focussing on the
measurement of educational outcomes, particularly with regard to students
who are socio-economically disadvantaged, of Aboriginal or Torres Strait
Islander background, non-English speaking background or who have designated
special needs.
(b) that, each year, one of these programs be subjected to a formal,
independent evaluation, with special emphasis on the achievement of
outcomes for the designated disadvantaged groups. This would mean a
five year cycle of review for each of the new equity programs proposed.
The previous government's New Schools Policy has been portrayed by the
present government as some kind of insidious and discriminatory piece
of regulatory engineering designed to suppress choice and to deny minority
groups the opportunity to establish schools reflecting their particular
religious, philosophical or ethnic concerns. On the contrary, the New
Schools Policy was introduced to manage the expansion of choice and the
growth of distinctively-styled schools, but in a way which was consistent
with economic efficiency, educational accessibility, and the need to avoid
the divisiveness which had emerged during the 'state aid' debates of the
1970s and early 1980s.
The new schools policy...was not designed to prevent freedom
of choice being exercised, but it was designed to bring that principle
into conjunction with other concerns, mainly those of planned development
and the stabilisation of the existing systems.
To me, that was quite a good policy because it did balance the
different interests and allowed them all to be expressed. I am concerned
that the new policy environment will be firstly one where those regulatory
checks and balances have been removed but, secondly, one where the different
voices and different interests cannot be expressed as well through the
process. [24]
The Policy flowed out of a special Schools Commission report on the growth
of the non-government sector. Moreover, in announcing the policy, the
then Minister (Hon Susan Ryan) "pointed out that the dual system
of schooling required the development of cooperative arrangements among
the funding partners, in particular with the States." [25]
It was clearly the Commonwealth's wish to proceed in harmony with the
States and the non-government school authorities to facilitate a socially
and economically sound approach to planned educational provision.
The suggestion that the New Schools Policy acted like a wet blanket thrown
over the fire of non-government sector development is completely erroneous.
In the year in which the policy was announced, "a large number of
schools sought review of their funding categories which resulted in 73
schools being placed in more favourable categories." [26]
By 1988, the proportion of students enrolled in non-government schools
had increased from the 1985 figure of 25.8% to 27.3%, and from 1989-94
enrolments continued to increase, to the extent that by 1994, in all States,
the non-government share of enrolments had increased to over a quarter
of all enrolments.
Overall, during the period since the introduction of the New Schools
Policy, a total of 251 new schools opened, of which only 18 have closed.
[27] This is hardly evidence of suppression
of non-government schools by a repressive regulatory regime. Of particular
interest here is the fact that, since the New Schools Policy, few schools
have closed. In the first couple of years of the Policy, 117 new schools
opened and 100 schools closed, with 97 of these being closures of schools
which opened prior to 1985. Clearly the New Schools
Policy, under which large numbers of new schools opened and very few closed,
introduced stability to the sector.
The New Schools Policy is essentially about planned educational provision.
If the need for planning is not already sufficiently obvious in its own
right, the need for it was clearly stated by a host of witnesses - notably
representatives of the non-government sector:
We [the National Catholic Education Commission] supported the
principle, implicit and explicit in the previous new schools policy,
of so-called planned educational provision.
We think it is reasonable that, first of all, new non-government
schools should not start up unless they are demonstrably viable and
unless their quality is assured. We also felt that it was reasonable
to ask people to give due notice of intention to start a school and
that it was also reasonable to have regard in the development of a new
non-government school to its potential impact on an existing school.
That was our position and that remains our position. [28]
Existing non-government schools and school systems do have a
concern that unless State registration authorities pay appropriate regard
to the notion of planned educational provision, there is potential for
unnecessary duplication of schooling services in particular areas. [29]
Moreover, the States and Territories have tended to rely on the New Schools
Policy as their de facto planning mechanism. This was revealed most clearly
in an illuminating submission from the ACT Government:
[The ACT] registration procedures for non-government schools
are quite comprehensive, but did rely on the New Schools Policy in three
areas:
* control of minimum and maximum enrolment numbers
* control of impact on existing schools and the requirement for
2% growth
* control of financial viability
It is the view of the ACT Government that it should have been
provided with advance warning of the proposed changes so that legislation
and regulations could have been amended to provide sensible controls.
[30]
It was clear from the evidence that many witnesses assumed or expected
that States took their planning responsibilities seriously in relation
to non-government schools. It was equally clear, however, that such faith
in the States was not justified by the facts of the matter. The State
registration process for non-government schools, which in the absence
of the New Schools Policy would be where the establishment of new schools
would be determined, is wholly unsuited to perform a planning role. Moreover,
there are considerable differences from State to State in the registration
requirements and the rigour with which they are applied. The Labor and
Australian Democrat Senators were disturbed to hear of the inadequacy
of some States' registration procedures across a range of important issues:
The requirements are only that the school complies with local
government regulations as to drains, toilets and the like, and that
they have staff..[who are]..appropriately qualified or experienced staff,
or staff who are supervised by appropriately qualified or experienced
staff. That is it.... But what happens in the legislation that the Senate
is considering is that that is the only requirement that the Commonwealth
would take on under its legislation to part with a huge amount of public
money..., and it is not reasonable. [31]
Of particular concern is that in State and Territory registration requirements,
questions of a school's financial viability are often not taken into account;
minimum enrolment requirements apply in only one jurisdiction; and only
the Northern Territory has a registration criterion that concerns itself
with a new school's impact on other schools. These are all crucial factors
in planned educational provision. The Commonwealth government has announced
its intention to rely on the States to determine whether or not a new
school should proceed. The irony is, that thus far the States have relied
on the Commonwealth's New Schools Policy to determine whether or not a
school should proceed. The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators consider
it entirely irresponsible for the Commonwealth to dispense millions of
taxpayers dollars based on registration processes in the States and Territories
which are not geared to planning considerations, viability of a proposed
school, impact on other schools and so on.
A number of witnesses emphasised the need for national guidelines to
ensure that State registration procedures were sufficiently rigorous to
serve as planning mechanisms. The Business Council's National Industry
Education Forum called for "national guidelines that give you some
sense about how to establish schools" and that "there should
be a capacity to...monitor whether or not [states] are fulfilling those
guidelines". [32]
A further complicating factor here is the relative stringency of the
planning that is required of education departments for new government
schools when compared with what applies to non-government new schools.
One witness described this in terms of "double standards over the
opening and continuing of government schools compared to non-government
schools" with requirements for state schools being "many times
larger". [33] Nowhere has this
been more starkly demonstrated than in the recent decisions by the Victorian
government whereby state schools which do not have a minimum number of
students are being amalgamated or closed. While State secondary schools,
for example, are regarded as non-viable if they fall below 400 pupils,
non-government schools are allowed to operate with numbers as low as 10
pupils per year level. The Commonwealth government compounds the inequity
of the situation by proposing to abolish the New Schools Policy and thereby
remove minimum enrolment criteria of any sort for non-government schools.
Issues of school viability are closely bound up with questions of planning.
As was noted above, the 251 new schools established since the New Schools
Policy was introduced have, with very few exceptions, proved viable. This
stands in stark contrast to the preceding period when non-government schools
opened and folded with disturbing frequency. The fallout from such instability
should not be underestimated, a point made strongly to the Committee by
people closely involved with such matters:
We point out that, over the years, we [Independent Education
Union] have had to deal with circumstances where schools have not been
able to sustain financial viability and have gone into receivership.
The losers out of that are staff, who have not been paid and have lost
accrued entitlements like long service leave and superannuation. [34]
[There] has been considerable instability, often in rural areas
of the various states, when schools are allowed to open on minimal numbers.
They do not have sufficient infrastructure to sustain themselves or
their community groups for very long. Quite typically, such schools,
after three, four or five years, fracture into different factions and
divisions on the parent body, the school crumbles, and parents withdraw
their children and either go back to some government school or perhaps
a Catholic or a Christian school that is already well established. The
whole thing is a destabilising and traumatic experience in the totality
of educational provision in those regional centres.
The operation of the new schools policy has, in our view, been
to minimise that. I would point to the kind of experience that we had
with schools in the period 1980 to 1986...Over time, a good number of
those schools floundered and the community disquiet about all of that
is what led to the inquiry that ended up with the new schools policy...
[35]
On the evidence, it is clear to the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators
that the abolition of the New Schools Policy effects a change in the ease
with which non-government schools might get started at the expense of
sound educational planning, and the exposure of substantial Commonwealth
funds to considerable risk. To allocate significant funds to schools whose
registration could have been determined according to the most meagre of
criteria is indefensible.
Moreover, its abolition puts at risk the mutual goodwill between state
and private schools arrived at following the divisive 'state aid' debates
of the 1970s-80s. The New Schools Policy was the key formulation in the
resolution of those longstanding tensions. The Labor and Australian Democrat
Senators note that many witnesses emphasised the importance of avoiding
a return to 'state aid' conflicts. The Australian Parents Council, for
example, stated that:
We would be concerned about that. We have worked closely with
government schools and would want to keep doing that. So we would be
concerned that any action in this exercise could provoke any return
to what you call the state aid issue. In terms of the debate about the
shift of funding, we would be concerned that, if that was seen as a
government, non-government schooling issue rather than a state-Commonwealth
issue, we think it could cause misunderstanding or even tension that
could provoke the question. [36]
A final point is that we have some fears coming out of these
decisions. We fear increasing inequalities in our schooling system that
is government and non-government. We fear an increasing divisiveness
in public debate about state aid for private schools... [37]
The National Catholic Education Commission has made it absolutely
clear to both government and opposition that, in general, it regards
the achievements of the last 10 years or more in the non-government
school funding area,where, in essence, the state aid issue has been
settled in Australia,as a major milestone in Australian social and educational
history, and it would not want it to be re-opened or revisited. I hope
it will not. That is one reason why we are keen for the Commonwealth
and the states to treat this not as a government versus non-government
school issue but as a Commonwealth-state financial relationships issue.
[38]
Given that the States Grants Bill provides for financial arrangements
between the Commonwealth and States it would be folly for the government
to allow the provisions of such a Bill to be articulated in terms of the
relative benefits flowing to the private or public sectors. But the Labor
and Australian Democrat Senators note that, in relation to this inquiry
into the States Grants Bill, the Committee has been inundated with
letters from parents and others expressing their opposition to this States
Grants legislation. This opposition has been expressed almost invariably
in terms of benefits which the Bill is seen to bestow upon private schools
at the direct cost to public schools.
This is precisely the consideration which led to the earlier 'state aid'
debates, and the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators express their
deep concern that this Bill will provoke a similar outcome. The recent
quoting of Minutes of a Coalition ERC meeting [39]
which recorded that "[Dr Kemp] noted that the Coalition sought to
encourage students to move from government to non-government schools"
compounds the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators' fears in this regard.
In summary, the alleged restrictive and discriminatory features of the
New Schools Policy do not hold up under scrutiny, particularly in the
light of the data pertaining to the expansion of the non-government sector
during the period since 1985, and to the stability and viability of new
schools established under the NSP. The operation of the New Schools Policy
has created an environment in which both government and non-government
schools can get on with the job unfettered by divisiveness of the 'sate
aid' variety. The intrinsic merits of the New Schools Policy, articulated
by the Schools Commission in its 1985 report, and acknowledged by the
States and Territories in their use of it as a de facto planning mechanism
since that time, further affirm its value.
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators RECOMMEND that the States
Grants (Primary & Secondary Assistance ) Bill 1996 be amended to include
provisions requiring proper planning processes in the development and
establishment of new non-government schools. Such processes should reflect
the considerations regarding new non-government school proposals articulated
by Professor McKinnon in his Review of the New Schools Policy.
Some preliminary remarks on funding
Before turning to a detailed consideration of the Enrolment Benchmark
Adjustment, some comments concerning the broader education funding picture
are warranted.
The first concern relates to the claims by the government that it is
increasing education funding in the 1996-97 Budget, a claim which at least
deserves closer scrutiny.
In its budget propaganda this government has claimed to have
increased funding by five per cent. Where does this figure come from?
It represents the nominal expenditure growth in schools funding budgeted
for 1996-97 when compared with actual expenditure in 1995-96, an increase
of some $167 million. This percentage does not represent a real increase.
Even less is it the result of decisions taken by this government. As
with other areas of education and training spending in the budget, the
government relies on what it hopes is people's ignorance of forward
estimates arrangements for expenditure and the automatic mechanisms
for their adjustment for changes in prices, enrolment numbers and so
forth. It is quite spurious for the government to claim any credit for
funding increases resulting from these standard adjustments. [40]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators note with interest that, although
the States Grants Bill deals with the allocation of Specific Purpose
Payments to States, the Commonwealth's submission to this Committee, and
the Minister's arguments elsewhere, insist on the inclusion of attributed
levels of Financial Assistance Grants throughout the Commonwealth's justification
and explanation of its funding proposals. The Labor and Australian Democrat
Senators have major concerns about the assumption that a 24% share of
FAGs will continue to be applied by the States to education. While that
has been roughly the share attributed in the past, it is an average across
all States which masks the differences between States, and is an average
which has been drawn across a period whose policy environment was considerably
different from that which is now proposed. As one witness put it:
As far as I understand, financial assistance grants are untied
in every sense. In a practical sense they are paid to state treasuries.
Therefore, the Commonwealth has no control over how state treasuries
allocate financial assistance grants. It seems to me to be a very bold
assumption to say that any proportion of financial assistance grants
is allocated to education at the state level. [41]
In any event, recent decisions of the Premiers' Conference have seen
the Commonwealth ask the States to pick up a total of $1.5 billion dollars
over the triennium as a contribution to the Commonwealth's debt rEducation
program. This will put even more pressure on already stretched State budgets.
It is clear from the DEETYA submission that the calculations of per capita
funding have been made on the explicit assumption that "state fiscal
contributions (1996 Premiers Conference) do not affect FAGs funding for
schools." If the States actual fiscal decisions do not prove to be
as assumed by the Commonwealth, the estimated per capita figures will
be different. Given that services like health and education are 'big ticket'
items in State budgets, it would be surprising if these portfolios were
not modified in order to achieve the contributions agreed at the Premiers
Conference. Moreover, as Table 14B.1 on page 3-180 of the Budget Statements
makes clear, the FAGs grants have incorporated road grants as follows:
$398.2m in 97-98; $414.9m in 98-99; $432.2m in 99-2000; a total of $1.25
billion over the forward estimates. This significantly distorts the amount
of FAGs funding available for other purposes, including education.
The majority report claims that DEETYA analysis of State budgets reveal
that, on average, States are increasing their education budgets by over
6%. But how meaningful is this for the purposes of analysing the impact
of this States Grants Bill ? Indeed, the recent announcements by
the Victorian government of further substantial rEducations in schools,
for example, can hardly be considered an increase in that State's education
effort. Moreover, spending by the States on school education as a proportion
of total outlays has been falling steadily. Figures derived from unpublished
ABS data commissioned by Novus Research reveals:
... that only Queensland and NSW could be said in any real sense
to have increased their own real per capita education outlays during
the decade to end June 1994, and these States did so from a low base.
Victoria, on the other hand, reduced its total own per capita outlays
by 17 percent...and by 15 percent alone in the two years since the current
State government came to power. The $95 rEducation for every person in
Victoria (between 1991-92 and 1993-94) amounts to a rEducation of $425
million state-wide expressed in 1989-90 prices... [What] is surprising
that the rEducation proceeded despite the fact that Victoria was only
the fifth highest spending State in education at the time the cuts were
effected (from end 1991-92). [42]
On this account, there seem little grounds for the confidence expressed
by the Commonwealth regarding the States' willingness to cordon off education
from budget cuts, let alone increase their own proportion of the total
education funding bucket. The question of the role of FAGs in influencing
State effort, and the impact of the 1996 Premiers' Conference decision
has been a frequent theme of the criticism directed at the States Grants
Bill in parliament
I contend that it is impossible to divorce consideration of the
impact of what the government is doing through direct schools funding
legislation from cuts to the Commonwealth general revenue assistance
to the states. This is a key point when considering the rationale for
the enrolment benchmark adjustment. [43]
At the meeting of COAG on 14 June, the Commonwealth cut financial
assistance grants to the states by $1.5 billion over the next three
financial years. States spend on average around 17 per cent of FAGs
grants on schools. This means that a cut of $1.5 billion in FAGs grants
translates into a cut of around $255 million in schools funding over
this period, assuming people maintain the same proportions. The effective
cut to schools from this exceeds the $108 million in increases due to
budget measures relevant to direct schools funding by a substantial
margin. [44]
Whether the 1996 Premiers' Conference decisions are described as a 'cut
to FAGs' or an 'agreement by the States to assist the Commonwealth's deficit
rEducation strategy', the key point is that the Commonwealth will not be
contributing $1.5 billion to the FAGs pool as initially planned. It then
remains a matter for judgment as to whether the States will reduce their
efforts proportionately or will raise the replacement revenue. There remains
then the questions as to whether any reduced State effort will include
rEducations in education, or whether any replacement revenue will find
its way into the education funding vote from State treasuries.
In the view of the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators, such uncertainty
gives little grounds for confidence about figures predicated on an attribution
of 24% of FAGs to education, and also on the assumption that this proportion
will be maintained by the States. A State official appearing before the
Committee had a clear view on this matter:
In our state one quarter of the state budget is school education
and, clearly, any fundamental change to financial assistance grants
will have to be felt to some extent. [45]
Overall, the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators consider that the
true funding picture for education remains a very hazy one, and that the
government is pursuing a risky strategy in grounding some quite radical
changes to Commonwealth-State education funding arrangements on such shifting
sands. The reaction of the States to this particular Bill, regardless
of the political persuasions of the incumbent State and Territory governments,
is a further strong reason for the Commonwealth to reconsider its position.
The Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment
The introduction of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment, while not explicitly
articulated within the States Grants legislation, is nevertheless
provided for under Section 44 of the Bill, and has been the source of
some of the most intense controversy in relation to the Bill.
Part of the controversy arises from the lack of consultation involved
with the measure. State governments, who have been planning ahead on the
basis of existing financial arrangements, have suddenly had a significant
fiscal spanner thrown in the works. Individuals and groups who warrant,
and have hitherto been granted, a stake in the education policy process,
consider that they have been disenfranchised by the government's failure
to consult on this radical change to funding policy.
I think the process has been appalling. There has been no consultation...
Two weeks ago I spoke at an education conference in Hobart. There were
150 people,educators,present, and I asked the conference organisers
permission to raise these issues, and I did, and I asked how many people
knew about them, and three people put up their hands. I did a radio
program a few weeks ago and my mobile phone has not stopped ringing
since... I think, when there is more visibility and when the impact
becomes known by families with children in non-government schools, people
are going to be very resentful. [46]
[If shared responsibility] is the model that the Commonwealth
government has, why was there no prior discussion with the states and
territories about such a profound change in arrangements? Why were these
matters simply announced in a federal budget paper,in fact, found rather
buried away in supplementary papers? [47]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators agree that consultation is
of the essence, especially when policy changes are radical, have major
financial implications and potentially realign the schooling sectors.
State governments were highly critical of the lack of consultation:
South Australia is disappointed at the lack of consultation and
basic information provided on the detail of the enrolment benchmark
adjustment. [48]
No discussion was undertaken with Queensland central agencies,
including Treasury...despite the fact that this proposal is expected
to have a significant impact on the level of Commonwealth payments to
Queensland in the future....[The] lack of detailed consultation is a
matter of significant concern. [49]
The Department of Employment Education and Training has not allowed
nearly sufficient time for States and Territories to comment on the
outline of proposals for changing the...Bill. Nor does Tasmania believe
that the Commonwealth has provided sufficient detail to enable comprehensive
comments to be made. [50]
The EBA has been explained by the Minister (Dr Kemp) in the following
terms:
[What] we are calling the enrolment benchmark adjustment [is]
the mechanism which will allow the Commonwealth to share in any savings
which the states will make as a result of the movement of pupils from
government to non-government schools.
The average saving for state governments when a pupil moves from
a government to a non-government school is $3,400. The Commonwealth
is saying to the states, `You have, over the last decade or so, made
savings of the order of $3 billion as a result of this outflow.' ..[Thus]
the states have had...a very big incentive to shift students from government
to non-government schools.... [51]
The EBA "adjusts the share of government general recurrent grants
to the States by approximately 50% of the gain that would accrue to State
governments as a result of enrolment drift from the government sector
to the non-government sector." [52]
In simple terms, beyond the benchmark proportion of non-government enrolments,
an average net saving to the State of $3,400 per student arising from
the transfer of students from a State school to a private school would
return to the Commonwealth $1700 per student, leaving the rest of the
saving with the State for use as it sees fit.
The EBA is not simply a process whereby, on average, $1,712 is removed
by the Commonwealth from the State for every student that leaves a government
school and transfers to a non-government school.
The EBA is triggered by a shift in the proportion of government and non-government
school enrolments. The 'benchmark' refers to the proportions applying
in each State as measured by the 1996 school census.
This becomes particularly problematic for the State systems if government
school enrolments stay at the same levels in terms of numbers of students,
but nevertheless represent a decreasing proportion of the total school
enrolments because of 'natural growth' increasing the absolute numbers
of enrolments in non-government schools. Senator Allison of the Australian
Democrats has calculated that, under these circumstances, and on the basis
of DEETYA projections of enrolment growth, around $270 million would be
deducted over four years from government schools recurrent grants. Senator
Allison has also developed a table of figures which expands on material
provided by DEETYA (see next page), and has calculated the effects of
the EBA on the government's most recent enrolment projections.
Over a four year period in which government school enrolments drop by
23,000 and non-government school enrolments increase by 94,000, the EBA
produces a dEducation from government schools of $305 million. Because
the adjustment is triggered by an end-of-year census of schools, it is
not until the following year that the 'adjustment' is made to grants.
Therefore, by the year 2000, only $179 million will have been deducted
for the triennium from the EBA. However, the balance - some $123 million
- is deducted from the following year. Thus, the 'debt' of the year 2000
is carried over to the next.
By the year 2000, this shift in proportion of government/non-government
enrolments means an annual, EBA-induced dEducation of $123 million if the
proportion were to remain constant from thereon in.
The promotion of the EBA as easy way by which the Commonwealth could
automatically transfer funds between the public and private schooling
sectors was seen by some witnesses as the hallmark of its inadequacy:
The IEU believes that the enrolment benchmark adjustment is a
crude formulaic quasi-voucher system and is inappropriate [53]
The concern that the EBA is a simple mechanism which fails to match the
complexity of its environment was raised on several occasions. The Labor
and Australian Democrat Senators consider that the EBA is a blunt instrument
which lacks the capacity to manage complexity of the type described by
one witness in the following terms:
The assumption that the benchmarking exercise is premised on
is that the subtraction of a student from one system has what you might
call a comparable unit cost effect compared to the addition of a student
to another system. The difficulty is this: when you add a student to
a growing system, then there is going to be a marginal cost, and it
is unlikely to be, in incremental terms, as great a cost as the cost
effect of subtracting a student from a declining system, which runs
into the difficulty of having to provide much the same infrastructure,
whether or not enrolments are declining; much the same course structure,
whether or not enrolments are declining; and so on. In a declining system
in enrolment terms, per capita costs are rising because of the fixed
costs of infrastructure and providing a comprehensive curriculum.
The actual outcome of all those sums, and taking into account
the point I have made, I think, is quite a complex exercise and to some
extent a speculative one, in the sense that we would have to try and
estimate what the effects of enrolment decline or increase are on costs
in each of the systems in each of the states and territories. That is
quite a complex exercise. [54]
Several witnesses expressed the view that, if the EBA is addressed on
its own simple terms, its effect can be described fairly in the following
way. When a student leaves the state sector for a non-government school,
the Commonwealth withdraws an average of $1700 from the State as an off-set
to the Commonwealth's extra expenditure incurred as it now has to fund
that student in the private sector.
The justification is that the State will save a total of $3400 from the
loss of the student, and the Commonwealth is entitled to share that saving,
and leave 50% of it with the State. However, Commonwealth recurrent funding
to the States for public school students is around $400 per head. The
removal of $1700 is therefore equivalent to the removal of the Commonwealth's
per capita funding for four students. In other words, the loss
of one student from the State sector results in the loss to the State
of the equivalent of four students' funding from the Commonwealth recurrent
grants.
The alleged savings to the States and the associated EBA amounts are
set out in the following table provided by DEETYA:
Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment Savings
| |
1996-97 |
1997-98 |
1998-99 |
1999-00 |
| State savings |
n.a. |
$53.526m |
$118.284m |
$184.053m |
| EBA |
n.a. |
$26.763m |
$59.142m |
$92.027m |
Many witnesses questioned the use of 'average costs' as opposed to 'marginal
costs' in calculating savings arising from student transfers. As the Majority
Report acknowledges, this issue is one which has not been resolved satisfactorily
in the debate thus far. The Commonwealth Department (DEETYA) has not clearly
articulated the distinction, nor explained how it has accommodated such
a distinction in its EBA calculations, other than to advise the Committee
that:
The decision to recoup [to the Commonwealth] only 50 per cent
of the saving to a state was based partly on issues surrounding marginal
costs versus average costs. [55]
In the view of the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators, this leaves
much to be desired. While this suggests that the Commonwealth at least
recognises the legitimacy of the average/marginal cost distinction, it
fails completely to counter the criticisms presented to the Committee
by a range of witnesses and submitters, including State and Territory
governments.
Some of these criticisms are set out below:
The transfer of students out of the government system will be manifested
at the individual school level often only as very minor changes to the
numbers of pupils in a class. This will not result automatically in savings
to a school's global budget, nor to the running costs of a system's infrastructure.
I do not believe that the EBA will lead to savings in government
schools: firstly, because of the difference in margin and average costs
which the designers of this mechanism do not seem to be aware of; secondly,
because of the all encompassing role that systems of education have,
which mean they have residual responsibilities which do not necessarily
reduce in a lock-step way as they lose students; and, thirdly, because
the overall student population is increasing, and I believe that state
schools, approaching the year 2000, will retain their absolute numbers
of students, or maybe increase them. [56]
State governments have made it quite clear that they regard figures suggested
by DEETYA as attributed savings arising from enrolment drift been calculated
according to an inappropriate methodology. Both in submissions to this
Committee and in evidence presented at public hearings, the governments
of the States and Territories have indicated quite clearly that there
are many aspects of the States Grants Bill with which they have
concerns, but these concerns are directed in particular at the effect
of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment.
[You] will not save across the school system entirely, based
on the average cost of that school system. You will not see a librarian,
a head teacher, a principal, a deputy principal, the ancillary staff,...the
director-general's position or state office positions changed... Therefore,
to take all the school system, including the administrative and executive
structures of the schools as well as the state infrastructure, being
the state head office areas, as being deleted or changed in any way
is a nonsense. You will only see the change at the margin. Therefore,
the DEET analysis is substantially flawed. [57]
NSW considered that the EBA process may in fact result in a net cost
to the State. In its submission to the Committee, the NSW government stated
that "the Commonwealth's proposal will result in a net cost to this
State of between $20 million to $30 million for every 2% shift in enrolment
shares between Government and non-Government schools." [58]
In oral evidence the Committee heard similar advice from Queensland officials:
If I could take up that point: based on the Commonwealth's assessment
that there is going to be about a 1.7 per cent drift to the non-government
sector, and given their assessment of cuts to the states of about $1,700,
and given our existing enrolment share, then that would have an impact
of the order of about $16 million per annum by the year 1999....If anything,
the abolition of the new schools policy will accelerate that shift, so
the 1.7 per cent estimate could be conservative. It has also not taken
into account the growth in enrolments that we will experience between
the current year and the turn of the century. An absolute bare minimum
would be around $16 million and we suspect that it will probably be higher.
[59]
The NSW argument can be summarised as follows:
- The analysis in the DEETYA paper indicated that enrolments would remain
unchanged in the government sector. If NSW has a drift to private schools
of approximately 20,000 students, but through enrolment growth has an
increase of students of an equivalent amount, there is no savings to
New South Wales
- There is the issue of marginal versus average costs. NSW believes
that you will not save across the school system entirely, based on the
average cost of that school system. You will only ever see marginal
changes in classroom numbers - one, two, three or four, depending on
the school. You will not see whole schools disappear; you will not see
whole subject areas disappear.
- The average cost structures between government and non-government
systems are substantially different. The state systems have the higher
cost areas of schooling, being those associated with isolation, rurality,
special education and students with low socioeconomic circumstances,
to a greater proportion than the non-government system. Therefore, even
if the average cost approach was used, which it should not be, under
micro-economic reform principles, those distortions need to be taken
into account in applying an average cost approach.
Queensland government officials appearing before the Committee shared
many of the NSW concerns, declaring that they "could see no policy
or equity rationale for the enrolment benchmark adjustment that is proposed."
[60] The submission from the Tasmanian
government criticised the proposed arrangements as "based on the
misconception that there will be savings to the State if the enrolment
mix changes...[Certain assumptions are] inappropriately simplistic...
Furthermore, Tasmania...cannot achieve the economies of scale...which
the large States enjoy". [61]
The Tasmanian submission argues that "the Commonwealth should be
prepared to contribute to an expansion of the non-government sector with
additional funding, rather than expecting the government school sector
to fulfil this function through sacrificing existing levels of funding."
The Western Australian government submission "vigorously opposed"
moves to "introduce funding arrangements that rapidly increase enrolments
in non-government schools and to fund these places from cuts in expenditure
on government schools." [62]
There is another aspect to the States' possible response to the EBA which
was raised by one witness. A State education minister, confronted by the
withdrawal of the per capita $1700 of Commonwealth money from the state
system when a student moves to a private school, may decide that, as Commonwealth
money has followed the student to a non-government school, then it would
be appropriate for the State to recoup the "lost" money from
the very sector which has benefited by the Commonwealth's action.
The State minister could choose to reduce proportionately the amount
of State funding going to the non-government sector. The Labor and Australian
Democrat Senators consider that the EBA could result in considerable gamesmanship
by State Treasuries as they try to come to grips with a potentially dramatic
fiscal change which has been thrust upon them without consultation and
which impacts severely upon the forward planning which they have in place.
Australian students will be the losers, irrespective of the sector in
which they are enrolled.
Another interesting parallel in the 'marginal vs average costs' debate
lies in the area of higher education funding. It was drawn to the Committee's
attention by Professor McGaw:
The other point I would want to make is in relation to the impact
of the funding rEducation on schools. It actually has a parallel, from
the other side, in what used to happen in universities.
During the period of growth in enrolments in universities, in
the early days university funding was increased at the rate of the average
funding per student places for each new set of students it took in.
Then the government quickly realised that you do not need to keep funding
new places at the average cost of places, so new places were funded
at the marginal cost. Now what we are seeing in this case is a proposal
to remove funding not at the marginal cost but at the average cost.
So that will take funding away from government schools at a much faster
rate than their expenses are reduced. [63]
Further criticism of the government's calculations was forthcoming from
an independent analysts, Ms Louise Watson, who used DEETYA figures to
arrive at projections considerably different from those presented by the
Department:
When I looked at the budget papers.. I came to the conclusion
that their estimates were based on an enrolment shift of around 75,000
students. I decided to check the veracity of this estimate by looking
first at the trends in enrolment growth over the last 20 years...[Based]
on grade progression ratios...by the year 1999 there will be 49,000
extra students in the non-government sector...
That was prior to the impact of any policy change. In other words,
if nothing had changed, DEETYA expected 49,000 extra students to be
in non-government schools by the year 1999.
I then looked at the impact of individual elements of the policy
change. The ...McKinnon review... had a lot of data in it, provided
by DEETYA, about the number of schools which had been rejected under
the new schools policy over the last four years.
By looking at the schools which were considered but rejected,
I came up with an estimate of 33,000 additional students enrolling in
non-government schools as a result of the new schools policy being abolished,
merely on the assumption that the 65 schools that were rejected over
the last four years would be likely to start up.
The third factor in my calculation was the lifting of the enrolment
maxima, on which I think I have been quite conservative. In the McKinnon
report, the data provided by DEETYA indicated that non-government school
enrolments might increase by 15,000 students if the enrolment maxima
on new schools were lifted, again on the basis of the number and type
of applications that have been rejected over the last four years.
When I added together the effect of the trend, plus the new schools
policy, plus the abolition of the enrolment maxima, I came up with a
figure of closer to 100,000 students moving into non-government schools,
rather than the 75,000 on which I thought the DEETYA estimate was based.
[64]
Given that Ms Watson's paper had received wide coverage in the press
and amongst education researchers, one might have expected that any major
flaws in her projections would have come to light. At the very least one
might have expected DEETYA to attempt a specific refutation of her claims.
Neither of these has eventuated, which seems to the Labor and Australian
Democrat Senators to confirm the view that the government's calculations
and projections are problematic.
It is interesting to note that the original Commonwealth projections
in Budget Measure 5 of Programme 1 set down total savings from the EBA
over the quadrennium to be just over $128 million. However, in the table
provided to this Committee in its submission, the EBA contribution totals
$178 million - a $50 million difference from the Budget Papers. The Labor
and Australian Democrat Senators consider that such variations, for which
no doubt an accounting justification can be made, nevertheless point to
the difficulty of producing sound financial projections.
In a situation where relatively small movements in some factors - for
example, proportionate enrolment share - can have major implications for
funding levels, proper decision-making calls for caution in the 'number
crunching' and close consultation with the affected parties. If, for example,
a State retained the same number of government school enrolments from
year to year, but the proportion of all students attending non-government
increased, then the State schools would have resources shifted away from
them, even though their student numbers remained the same.
These concerns of the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are reinforced
by Ms Watson's calculation that :
In reality [the States] will realise no savings because on DEETYA's
enrolment projections the size of the school population is increasing,
therefore the physical number of students in state schools will remain
the same,that is the government's estimates. So, even though I have
estimated that there will be an additional 100,000 students in non-government
schools, this does not mean that there are 100,000 students less in
government schools... it is not as if 100,000 students are suddenly
leaving the state system. It is an increase of 100,000 students in the
non-government sector drawn largely from an increase in the total student
population. So the first point is that there are no real savings based
on existing enrolments shifting across. [65]
Other analysts have expressed similar reservations concerning the validity
of the government's projections about school enrolments to the extent
that enrolment patterns have not been sufficiently well analysed.
On the question of the adequacy of the estimation of the impact,
much depends upon the way in which the recent trends are interpreted.
Certainly, there has been a shift from government to non-government
enrolments. I suspect the underlying magnitude of that is greater than
is immediately apparent in the figures, because government enrolments
over that period have increased because of increased retention rates
in years 11 and 12.
The growth in retention at years 11 and 12 has had a much greater
impact on government enrolments than on non-government enrolments and
if, despite that, there has been a shift of the magnitude we have seen,
there is an underlying shift of a greater magnitude. That may mean,
therefore, that the costs of the shift that might flow from these changed
arrangements is likely to be greater than estimated to date. [66]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators believe that it is irresponsible
for the government to proceed with such radical changes to the funding
regimes of schools while there remains so much doubt about the validity
of the projections supposedly justifying such changes.
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators agree with Ms Watson that:
Public accountability is simply requiring governments to give
an answer for the way in which they spend public money, allocate resources
and use the power in their control...[Individuals]...should be able
to evaluate the extent to which governments meet defined policy objectives...[and
whether] their programs are efficient and..effective.. I do not think
that this budget change has been adequately justified in terms of a
policy goal. I think it will be very difficult, therefore, to measure
its impact over the longer term. [67]
On this account, the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are of the
view that the government will decide in haste only to repent at leisure.
However, such repentance will entail enormous pain to Australian schools
and their students, to say nothing of the disruption to State and Territory
education authorities.
To pursue the present course when there are so clearly a host of imponderables
and disputed claims is indefensible. The conflict with the States alone,
evidenced by the submissions and oral evidence placed before the Committee
by Ministers and officials, should suffice to give the government pause
with respect to the introduction of the EBA. The Labor and Australian
Democrat Senators urge the government to reconsider the EBA, and attend
to overall resourcing issues for Australia's schools.
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators RECOMMEND that the government
not proceed with the implementation of the Enrolment Benchmark Adjustment
mechanism, and that
(a) the mechanism and its projected impacts be placed before MCEETYA
for detailed consideration before it is further considered by the parliament,
and
(b) MCEETYA develop a strategy to improve Australia's relatively poor
performance in school expenditure compared with other OECD countries.
Accountability
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators have already highlighted accountability
concerns arising out of the changes to the targeted assistance programs.
However, those concerns extend more generally into the realm of the public
accountability of all schools for the provision of education which is
consistent with Australia's best interests socially, culturally and economically.
This is particularly important given the very large sums of public money
that are expended on schools, and the significant differences between
the private and public school sectors in terms of their responsibilities
to public authorities, and through these, to the Australian community
generally.
A useful exposition of accountability issues was provided by representatives
of secondary principals from the government school sector:
In the government system, where public funds are used, there
are: firstly, stringent financial audits; secondly, annual and tri-annual
reports required; thirdly, inspection of the schools is required, with
public reporting; and, fourthly, compulsory curriculum directions which
have to be taken. None of this accountability applies to the private
school system. We say that where public funds are being used, the accountability
processes should be similar...
Secondly, with government schools, the enrolment in the school
reflects the social, socioeconomic and ethnic mix of the neighbourhood
in which the school is located. We would argue that non-government schools
should have to reflect this same neighbourhood mix to at least a percentage
equal to the percentage of government funds that they are receiving.
For example, if 40 per cent of their funds are from government sources
then 40 per cent of their student enrolment should reflect the socioeconomic,
social and ethnic mix of the neighbourhood in which the school is located.
Enrolment must be based on fair and non-discriminatory policies...
Thirdly, we believe that the private school that is receiving
public funds must be accountable to the same extent as government schools
for student management. This means that if a non-government school wishes
to terminate the enrolment of a student, it must first accept the responsibility
to negotiate a placement for the student elsewhere. This is currently
not the case, and where a non-government school receiving public funds
wishes to terminate the enrolment of a student, the student is simply
told to go to a government school...
Fourthly, in an instance of a parent complaint, a government
school receiving public funds is required to have an open and transparent
process to deal with that complaint. Frequently, that process is hurtful
to the school. The government funds expended in a non-government school
do not produce this same accountability process with a parent complaint.
[68]
While the Labor and Australian Democrat Senators would not necessarily
agree with all the propositions expressed or implied in the above, it
conveys the overall sense of the differential accountability which applies
in the two sectors. The private sector stresses that it is highly accountable
to the parents of its students. The same applies, and to an ever-increasing
extent, in government schools, which are increasingly locally managed.
But government schools are required to fulfil a range of important other
responsibilities in conformity with State legislation guaranteeing a 'free',
universal and secular education to all, and in accordance with more general
international obligations arising from UN conventions and agreements to
which Australia is signatory.
The government's proposals, especially concerning the Enrolment Benchmark
Adjustment, are predicated on a simplistic view of the two schooling sectors
which regards the private system as having the same responsibilities,
cost structures, service obligations and accountabilities as the public
system. This is patently not the case, and to speak blithely of students
transferring between systems with average cost adjustments being made
accordingly totally ignores the financial implications which arise from
the factors just mentioned.
Accountability also applies to the Commonwealth government in terms of
its 'accounting' to Australia's citizens for the policy path down which
it seeks to steer the community, and for the overall level of resources
which it is prepared to commit to one of its traditionally most important
functions - namely the education of our children.
I am not going to refer to the OECD figures, which I am sure
you are all familiar with...except to ask: where is the justification
of the policy they represent? How is it that everyone is out of step
but us?
We [NSW P&C Associations] are waiting for the accountability
for the decisions that leave us at the bottom of the [OECD] list for
public funding for public education and at the top of the list for public
funding for private education. What do we know that the rest of the
world does not know? What is the outcome accountability for the billions
of dollars that Australian governments have spent to achieve a shift
of a few percentage points in the public-private mix of enrolments?
It seems to us that vast policy changes have been and continue
to be made without sufficient justification, without sufficient public
accountability and without sufficient discussion in the community [69]
As far as our education systems are concerned, the accountability of
the Commonwealth government to Australia's citizens goes beyond a concern
to enhance 'choice'. It is a term which has been translated from the marketplace
into education and is being forced to retain the status and reverence
ascribed to it in the market, even though in its new environment it should
be subordinated to the more important notions of equity, quality, comprehensiveness,
relevance and accessibility.
Competition
Competition is another notion which has been imported into the education
debate to serve particular ideological ends, and to render education susceptible
to the discourse of the marketplace. A telling comment on the risks of
the inappropriate application of ideas and methodologies from a market
context to a service context is revealed in the following remarks of the
Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser:
If you're seen to be advocating policies that emphasise all the
time the market...then [you] run the risk of losing the support, the
confidence of those forgotten people.... People talk as though [Thatcher
and Reagan] deregulated everything. ...The Americans know that if you
leave private enterprise to itself, without any broad rules to protect
the public interest...then all sorts of terrible things are going to
happen. [70]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are alert to the dangers referred
to here, and are critical of the government's predilection to employ market
words like competition in support of its policy. Several witnesses expressed
concern at the inappropriate application of 'competition-speak' to an
education environment:
We do not say that there is no place for competition in a society,
but we do say that education should be judged on its capacity to achieve
educational results. It should not be forced into a mould which is taken
from some other context altogether, assuming that educational results
will follow. We would like to see the government and those other proponents
of competitive provision, both of schools and between students in schools,
fully articulating it and justifying it.... [71]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators agree with these sentiments.
Good pedagogy challenges and stretches students, encourages cooperation
between students, and views competition as operating only within that
pedagogical framework.
I think a good example of that very problem is the way we bring
up children in families. We attempt to instil in all our children the
techniques they need to survive and compete successfully in the world.
But ...we do not do that by setting our children against each other
consistently from the moment of birth so that their sibling rivalries
become the dominant form of family relationship...I guess the point
I am making is that competition is not an unfettered good, that competition
has to be brought into conjunction with other social practices, such
as cooperation.
In the case of education, the case for competition between students
is obviously much stronger than the case for competition between schools.
We have organised our government systems in Australia until fairly recently
on the principle that schools should cooperate with each other within
a common system....Having now decided that we should set the schools
against each other, I do not think we are seeing any necessary improvement
in the learning outcomes of students. To some extent schools are being
forced to compete in a whole range of areas such as the provision of
music or extracurricular activities at the expense of things like basic
literacy. [72]
That competition is not a particularly straightforward concept, nor one
that necessarily produces an optimal outcome for the community, was reinforced
by Professor McGaw:
We talked before about competition. The evidence in England from
work that Whitty at the University of London has done is that, when
schools in the public sector compete, the ones that are successful differentiate
themselves in ways that put them in niches at the top of the market,
and then parents do not choose them; they choose their students. Choice
in the provision of professional services is usually exercised by the
service provider; not by the consumer. [73]
Another curiosity with respect to competition was raised by a secondary
school principal, who was struck by the fact that the idea of cooperation
between the Commonwealth and State governments in the provision of education
might be seen in a somewhat different light under the new proposals:
It seems odd, when you take that argument just a little further,
that if the federal government does allocate funds for the formation
of an independent or private school, in the light of the way the current
legislature seems to indicate, in effect, it would appear that the federal
government is in competition with the states for the provision of schooling.
What it means is that the federal system will be paying for private
schools and they will be in competition for students from the state
system, which ultimately bears responsibility for the quality of education.
[74]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators note that the valuing of competition
as a means to educational effectiveness is simply not justified by the
evidence.
An OECD study concluded that increasing ...competition between
schools does not improve school performance. It concluded that providing
parents with increased opportunities for choice,and this is in systems
where choice policies have been widespread,does not actually affect
the school effectiveness. It does have an effect on other factors, but
not on school effectiveness. [75]
The Labor and Australian Democrat Senators are committed to a vision
of Australian schooling which is equitable and of high quality. Such a
vision requires that the public sector is supported through an explicit
commitment of governments to a primary obligation for ensuring universally
accessible public schooling. Such a commitment entails the resourcing
of public school systems to provide leadership in pedagogy and curriculum
and to promote a vigorous culture, economy and democracy. The Labor and
Australian Democrat Senators are concerned that the States Grants Bill
is in several key respects inimical to such a vision.
Footnotes
[1] Porter, M The Competitive Advantage of
Nations Free Press, NY p628
[2] Marginson,S et al. Creating and Education
Nation for the Year 2000 AEU Discussion Paper 1995, p5
[3] McIntosh, G Commonwealth Funding for
Schools PRS Background Paper No.14, 1994, p34
[4] McIntosh, G Commonwealth Funding for
Schools PRS Background Paper No.14, 1994, p36
[5] Transcript of Evidence pp139-140,p143
and p146,1 November (Prof. Anderson)
[6] Transcript of Evidence p140, 1 November
(Prof. Anderson)
[7] Transcript of Evidence p81, 24 October
(Prof McGaw, ACER)
[8] Transcript of Evidence p139, 1 November
(Prof Anderson)
[9] McKinnon,K Report of the Review of the
New Schools Policy 1996
[10] Transcript of Evidence p192, 1
November (Ms Watson)
[11] For example, see Transcript of Evidence
p139, 1 November (Prof Anderson)
[12] Transcript of Evidence p140-141,
1 November (Prof Anderson)
[13] Transcript of Evidence p39 24 October
(Ms Brown, Australian Centre for Equity through Education)
[14] Transcript of Evidence p75, 24
October (Dr Marginson, University of Melbourne)
[15] Cited by the Member for Fremantle (Dr
Lawrence) Hansard p5296 15 October 1996
[16] Transcript of Evidence p93-94,
24 October (Mr Molesworth, NSW Federation of P&C Associations)
[17] Commonwealth Programs for Schools 1996
: Administrative Guidelines AGPS p2
[18] Transcript of Evidence p34, 24
October (Ms Brown, Australian Centre for Equity through Education)
[19] Transcript of Evidence p36, 24
October (Ms Brown, Australian Centre for Equity through Education)
[20] Information Paper Delivery of Commonwealth
Targeted and Quality Schooling Programs from 1997 DEETYA, p7
[21] Letter from DEETYA Schools and Curriculum
Division, 29 July 1996
[22] Transcript of Evidence p148, 1
November (Ms Burrow, AEU)
[23] Transcript of Evidence p182 &
184 1 November (Mr Romaniw, Australian Federation of Ethnic Schools Associations.)
[24] Transcript of Evidence p73, 24
October (Dr Marginson, Melbourne University)
[25] McKinnon,K Discussion Paper: Review
of the New Schools Policy AGPS 1995, p9
[26] McKinnon,K Discussion Paper: Review
of the New Schools Policy AGPS 1995, p10
[27] McKinnon,K Discussion Paper: Review
of the New Schools Policy AGPS 1995, p13
[28] Transcript of Evidence p 200, 1
November (Dr Tannock, NCEC)
[29] Submission No. 6 (Anglican Schools Commission)
[30] Submission No. 146 (ACT Government)
[31] Transcript of Evidence pp44-45,
24 October (Mr Lee, IEU)
[32] Transcript of Evidence p88, 24
October (Ms A McLeish, National Industry Education Forum)
[33] Transcript of Evidence p90, 24
October (Mr Staples, ACSSO)
[34] Transcript of Evidence p43 24 October
(Ms Rolley, IEU)
[35] Transcript of Evidence p45 24 October
(Mr Lee, IEU)
[36] Transcript of Evidence p179, 1
November (Mr Dunne, Australian Parents Council)
[37] Transcript of Evidence p193, 1
November (Dr McMorrow, NSW Government)
[38] Transcript of Evidence p202, 1
November (Dr Tannock, NCEC)
[39] Media Release 7 November 1996,
Shadow Minister for Education (Mr Baldwin)
[40] Hansard p5281, 15 October (Hon.P
Baldwin, Shadow Minister)
[41] Transcript of Evidence p190, 1
November (Ms Watson)
[42] Marginson et al Creating an Education
Nation AEU, Melbourne 1995, p32
[43] Hansard p5281, 15 October (Hon.P
Baldwin, Shadow Minister)
[44] Hansard p5283, 15 October (Hon.P
Baldwin, Shadow Minister)
[45] Transcript of Evidence p195, 1
November (Dr McMorrow, NSW Government)
[46] Transcript of Evidence p143, 1
November (Ms Morrow, Australian Schools Lobby)
[47] Transcript of Evidence p192, 1
November (Dr McMorrow, NSW Government)
[48] Submission No. 101 (Hon R Lucas, SA Government)
[49] Submission No. 117 (Mr P Ellis, Queensland
Government)
[50] Submission No. 145 (Hon. T Rundle, Tasmanian
Government)
[51] Hansard p5507, 16 October 1996
(Hon D Kemp)
[52] Submission No. 102, (Department of Employment,
Education, Training and Youth Affairs.)
[53] Transcript of Evidence p144, 24
October (Ms Rolley, Independent Education Union)
[54] Transcript of Evidence p77, 24
October (Dr Marginson, Melbourne University)
[55] Transcript of Evidence p213, 1
November (Mr Evans, DEETYA)
[56] Transcript of Evidence p143, 1
November (Ms Morrow, Australian Schools Lobby)
[57] Transcript of Evidence p194, 1
November (Mr Taggart, NSW Government)
[58] Submission No. 13 (NSW Dept of Education
and Training)
[59] Transcript of Evidence p197 1 November
(Ms Deeth, Queensland Treasury)
[60] Transcript of Evidence p194, 1
November (Mr Ivessa, Assistant Under Treasurer, Queensland)
[61] Submission No. 145 (Hon.Tony Rundle, Premier
of Tasmania)
[62] Submission No. 33 (Hon C J Barnett, Minister
for Resources Development, Energy and Education, WA)
[63] Transcript of Evidence p80, 24
October (Prof McGaw, ACER)
[64] Transcript of Evidence p188, 1
November (Ms Watson)
[65] Transcript of Evidence p189 1 November
(Ms Watson)
[66] Transcript of Evidence p74, 24
October (Prof McGaw, ACER)
[67] Transcript of Evidence p191, 1
November (Ms Watson)
[68] Transcript of Evidence p83, 24
October (Mr Stalker, Australian Secondary Principals Association)
[69] Transcript of Evidence p94, 24
October (Mr Molesworth, NSW Federation of P&C Associations)
[70] Extract from Dateline program 29
October 1991.
[71] Transcript of Evidence p97, 24
October (Mr Molesworth, NSW Federation of P&C Associations)
[72] Transcript of Evidence p78, 24
October (Dr Marginson, Melbourne University)
[73] Transcript of Evidence p82, 24
October (Prof McGaw, ACER)
[74] Transcript of Evidence p83, 24
October (Mr Woolley, Australian Secondary Principals Association)
[75] Transcript of Evidence p192, 1
November (Ms Watson)