Democrats Minority Report
Inquiry into the provisions of five Bills amending the
Workplace Relations Act:
- Workplace Relations
Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002
- Workplace Relations
Amendment (Fair Dismissal) Bill 2002
- Workplace Relations Amendment
(Fair Termination) Bill 2002
- Workplace Relations
Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002
- Workplace Relations
Amendment (Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002
May 2002
Introduction
I have been a member of the Senate committees reviewing
Workplace Relations Act legislation for six years now. With this inquiry, once
again I have been struck by the fact that employer and employee organisations
have sincere well-argued and persuasive cases – that are inevitably opposed.
How one asks, can they see things so differently, faced with
the same circumstances? How is it possible for one clever and informed side to
claim that a proposed change is moderate and essential, and the other clever
and informed side to say it is extreme and unnecessary? How much is attitude,
how much is self-interest?
Matters are poisoned even more by a union view[1]
that the Howard Coalition government (or is it any Coalition government?) is
anti-worker and anti-union. Unions quite openly view Coalition Government
bills with great suspicion. Employer organisations (although less obviously)
seem to take the opposite view.
If it is the adversarial and ideological culture and history
of WR and traditional Coalition/Labor IR politics that is a problem, the common
result seems to be often that neither side of the argument will concede any of
their opponents’ argument. Consequently submissions frequently overstate the
dangers of proposals before us and understate the benefits, or vice versa.
Such opposed arguments make deciding the merits of WR Bills harder.
If adversarial advocacy is likely to distort or exaggerate a
case, empirical evidence (not assertion) and precedent or experience elsewhere
is helpful in evaluating the probable effects of new WR bills.
We have a workplace relations environment characterised by
lower unemployment, higher productivity, higher real wage growth, greater
export competitiveness and lower levels of industrial disputation. Many
factors contribute to that, but the ‘big bang’ IR federal law changes of 1993/4
and 1996/7 can take much of the credit.
Six years on, those big changes are still being absorbed.
Jurisprudence, systems, culture, convention, enforcement and implementation are
still being developed. WR law needs to be flexible but certain. Any new WR
laws proposed for an Act that that remains complex and difficult need time to
settle in, in this highly charged field.
It remains the view of the Australian Democrats that the
major changes it supported in 1996 do not require further major change, so soon
thereafter. We do accept however that the law does need constant attention
with moderate adjustments, since the workplace relations environment is a
dynamic one.
This Inquiry has addressed five bills introduced by the
Government in 2002.
Two bills would reform unfair dismissal law, and the other
three change the treatment of bargaining, introduce additional secret ballots
in relation to protected industrial action, and prohibit the collection of
union bargaining fees through enterprise agreements.
Together these bills amount to a large set of amendments to
Australia’s federal WR laws. Submissions to the Committee certainly saw
significant consequences flowing from their implementation, or alternatively,
the failure to implement them. By and large the intentions in these bills are
not new to the Parliament: many of these directions were anticipated in bills
that previous Parliaments have considered. There are some significant
differences, however.
It is important to consider the current industrial context
in Australia; several features are striking. These bills come to us at a time
when unemployment, while falling, remains high with over 621,000 Australians
looking for work. Underemployment reputedly affects well over a million
Australians. It is essential that we continue to take action to reduce this
source of social and economic waste. There are those who argue that a heavily
deregulated IR environment would deliver many more jobs and much greater growth
to Australia. However, the strength of the link between levels of regulation
and employment creation remains contentious, as many passages of evidence to
this inquiry revealed[2].
At the same time, productivity has been improving. It
showed a 3.2 per cent annual increase in each of the years 1997, 1998 and 1999,
1.4 per cent in 2000, while it slowed to 0.1 per cent in 2001[3].
Inflation remains low, while real wages have been growing at a steady rate.
After falling during the mid and late 1980s, real wages rose significantly
during the later 1990s and have shown continuing but more modest growth in 2000
and 2001[4].
Industrial disputation is at an historic low. Working days lost due to industrial disputes are now the lowest in at
least two decades. In the 12 month period ended January 2002 a total of 49
working days were lost per thousand employees. This is a dramatic reduction
compared with the 12 month period ended January 1983 (the earliest period
available on the ABS database) when the number of comparable days lost was 325.[5]
Simultaneously, our labour market is characterised by rising
levels of part-time work, much of which is casual. Many witnesses to this
inquiry commented upon the growth in casual employment in Australia (now around
27 per cent of the workforce), pointing to its high level as compared with
other industrialised countries. Some witnesses suggested, anecdotally, that
employers and employees, particularly young people and mothers, valued this
casualisation, while others pointed to the insecurity and restrictions this
implied – for access to finance for example, or uncertain irregular income.
The rise in casual employment creates a potential new policy focus, with some
calling for greater regulation in response, not less.
We do have a workplace relations environment characterised
by lower unemployment, higher productivity, higher real wage growth, greater
export competitiveness and lower levels of industrial disputation. Unions
hotly resist change in the law. The AIRC itself continues to develop principles
and practices that advance the intent of the law. Such activity by the AIRC
may make specific black letter law changes unnecessary in those areas it has so
addressed. In the face of these facts, the necessity, wisdom or the urgency of
further workplace relations law reform therefore have to be confronted and
justified.
Successive federal Governments have been undertaking
significant industrial reforms since at least 1993 as we have discussed in
previous reports[6].
The latest changes – to the regulation of federal dismissal laws – occurred in
the second half of 2001.
The Australian Democrats intend taking an approach to these
five bills that is consistent with our past approach. In reflecting on the 1999
Workplace Relations Legislation Amendment (More Jobs, Better Pay Bill) 1999,
(the MOJO bill) we said:
The Democrats are beholden to neither unions nor business.
Our policies are strongly supportive of a fair balance between the rights of
unions and employers, and of ensuring a strong award safety net, particularly
for workers in a disadvantaged bargaining position. We support access to the
independent umpire in the Australian Industrial Relations Commission; we
support productivity-based enterprise bargaining where employers and employees
genuinely wish to bargain, and promoting industrial democracy.
These background principles guide our approach to this
legislation.[7]
We supported the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act
against strong opposition. It is not a perfect Act, but our commitment to it
is proven. With the policy independence of being beholden to no single
interest, the Democrats look for evidence and convincing argument in support of
further changes, particularly in light of the pace and scope of change since
1993, and the relative health of the current system, judged on most relevant
indicators.
As usual, the bills considered here will be dealt with by
the Australian Democrats in the Senate on their merits.
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Genuine Bargaining) Bill 2002
This Workplace Relations Amendment (Genuine Bargaining) Bill
2002 amends the WRA 1996 to direct the AIRC to consider evidence of ‘de facto
or covert forms of industry-wide bargaining’[8]
or ‘pattern’ bargaining, in determining whether access should be given to
protected bargaining. It seeks to further discourage industry-wide bargaining
and to reinforce enterprise bargaining. The bill adds to the existing powers
to suspend a bargaining period. A ‘bargaining period’ provides statutory
protection to persons engaged in industrial action as part of the effort to
achieve a new workplace agreement.
This bill follows in the footsteps of proposals dealing with
these issues in the MOJO bill, and the Workplace Relations Amendment Bill 2000
(the 2000 bill), but with significant modifications. It is more moderate than
the previous proposals.
At its heart this bill does seek to make it harder to obtain
access to protected bargaining periods in specified circumstances.
Negotiated settlements are now key to collective agreement
making. Collective enterprise agreements cover about one third of all
employees. (The rest are on individual contracts and awards). The current
system of industrial relations gives primacy to enterprise bargaining and all
federal parliamentary parties support this primacy. Enterprise bargaining and
the associated protected action brings with it the accepted risk of disputation
and, as we have previously noted, parties to disputation must be given the
opportunity to work matters through[9].
The system we now have, by and large, serves Australia well. Unions and
employer organisations, and employers and employees, have a growing experience
with enterprise bargaining. Clearly the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (AIRC) has also developed principles and practices to deal with the
complex and varied bargaining circumstances that come before it.
The fear of manipulated enterprise bargaining (primarily in
manufacturing) – manipulated so that as a ‘pattern’ it would revert to
industry-wide bargaining – emerged in 2000. The predictions made at the time
the 2000 Bill was brought before Parliament (that the pattern approach of
‘Campaign 2000’ would result in widespread disruptive and economically
destructive industrial action across manufacturing) thankfully largely proved
unfounded.
As many witnesses to this inquiry made clear, enterprise
bargaining is not necessarily at odds with industry-wide negotiations. The two
are not mutually exclusive, and nor are multi-employer site or sector
agreements necessarily at odds with efficient and effective industrial
outcomes. In some cases, both employers and employees see benefits in having
an industry or sectoral standard in mind as they approach bargaining at the
enterprise level. Indeed, the federal government itself bargains in a
whole-of-government manner in the context of their ‘Policy Parameters’ that
shape bargaining in the public sector and give it a comparable character across
different government agencies.
The WRA does allow for some multi-employer agreements but
only if certified by the full bench of the AIRC, and where it is in the public
interest.
Munro J., in the decision which is said to have provided a
basis for aspects of this bill, points to practices on the side of both
employers and unions in pursuit of patterned claims[10].
A number of witnesses to this inquiry also made this point. This is not new,
nor is it necessarily undesirable. As we noted in 2000:
The Democrats recognise that there is a role for industry
level, multi-employer bargaining. This [2000] Committee has received extensive
evidence of multi-employer agreements in retailing, media, education and
electrical contracting which suit both unions and employers, particularly
smaller employers. Indeed, the Democrats insisted on an amendment to the Act
in 1996 to allow for multi-employer agreements to be made where the Commission
concluded that they were appropriate and in the public interest.[11]
What the Act acknowledges is that if that level of bargaining suits both
employers and unions, then it should apply. But, the principal emphasis of the
1993 and 1996 Acts remains on collective enterprise level bargaining as the
best means of unlocking productivity and hence affording sustainable increases
in real wages.[12]
At the time of consideration of that earlier bill, we noted
the predictions of high levels of industrial action as the AMWU pursued an
industry log of claims (‘Campaign 2000’), and pointed out that ‘time will tell’[13].
At that time we concluded:
Our best assessment is that there is a problem emerging with
changing attitudes of some unions to collective enterprise bargaining that may
threaten Australia's record in recent years of rising real wages, employment
and productivity. It may be that the current legal framework is adequate to deal
with that challenge. The powers of the Commission to suspend or terminate
access to protected action in the face of real or impending industrial action
in section 170MW may be sufficient to deal with these campaigns...A responsible
trade union movement and a responsible employer movement must be supported.
The Democrats will continue to support legislation that acts against
irresponsible action that materially threatens Australian jobs, industry
prospects and Australia’s economic performance.[14]
In the event, the record on industrial disputation has
continued to improve. The current legal framework has by and large proven
itself adequate to deal with the challenges before it.
As I remarked in my Report on the 2000 Bill, strikes and
lockouts as a part of the bargaining process are not legal unless under
protected action circumstances. There have been incidences of unprotected
industrial action – some of them very damaging to Australian employers and
employees, like the recent dispute in the vehicle industry in relation to
employee entitlements, (see the evidence to this inquiry). It is important to
note that strong criticism concerning industrial disputation often relates to unprotected
action disputation, rather than protected action disputation. It is possible
that of days lost in disputation that a significant (but to date unknown[15])
proportion of days lost are actually lost in unprotected industrial action.
Very heavy penalties are already in the law to address unprotected action. If
they are not used it is hardly the fault of the law.
However, this bill addresses protected action processes, not
unprotected action.
Overall the level of disputation is at an historical low.
There are relatively few prolonged enterprise bargaining disputes. Contrary to
popular belief, some of the most protracted have been by employers not unions,
through lockouts. On any assessment it appears that to date at least, the
parties, including the AIRC, have matured into a system of bargaining (some of
which has some pattern to it), which gives primacy to reaching agreement at the
enterprise level, and which involves relatively low levels of serious
disputation. Current legislation therefore can be said to work well at present,
for the most part.
Significantly, Munro J. felt no limitation on the ability or
capacity of the AIRC to effectively deal with the matters in this bill, under
current law. Referring to the AIRC’s existing powers to suspend or terminate
bargaining (s. 170MW) he pointed to the necessity to consider the facts of
particular cases that may be complex, and arrive at a decision that implemented
a ‘sensible and practical’ resolution. However, he effectively recommended
against the unnecessary codification of specific solutions given the complexity
of specific situations:
For reasons that relate to the character of different sets
of employer negotiating parties, it is undesirable in my view to elevate
construction of these provisions into a policy dogma that compels a lopsided
application of the associated powers’.[16]
In this light it seems fair to require that the argument for
new instructions or power for the AIRC be convincing. Are the genuine
bargaining changes necessary? The new Bill gives powers that arguably already
exist at least in part, and in practical effect, within the existing Act,
although in a less prescriptive manner. As the ACCI put it:
The genuine bargaining bill really makes explicit—or
codifies, in a way—some of the principles that the commission is in the process
of developing when it is interpreting the current law dealing with protected
action. So we do not see the genuine bargaining bill as a major departure or
even a major extension of the current statutory framework. It really is
building on some of the general propositions in the statutory framework that
concern the protected action provisions of the act.[17]
A key challenge is to ensure that any such codification does
not introduce unwanted or unexpected new rigidities. Other witnesses argued,
for example, that such risks are real, and would constrict the operation of the
system, perhaps even preventing its effective operation in relation to some
matters.
On the issue of the termination of bargaining periods it is
important that unions and employers not manipulate bargaining periods to prevent
effective bargaining. Bargaining in good faith - genuine bargaining – is
essential. The WRA may need some further emphasis here. However, if the AIRC
has effectively acted to discipline such activities already, that would make
the case for further strengthening capacities to terminate bargaining not all
that vital.
On the issue of cooling off periods, the WRA (s 170MW and
170MV) provides such a mechanism at present. The AIRC can suspend a bargaining
period where parties are not genuinely negotiating, are causing significant
damage to the economy, or have failed to comply with directions. The argument
was put that the bill as currently drafted works in a lopsided way (given that
most industrial action is taken by unions not employers) in that it strengthens
the AIRC’s powers to impose a cooling off period. In practical effect this
would mostly impact upon unions (given they initiate most industrial action),
while no penalty exists to force an employer to bargain in a timely way, and
the capacities of the AIRC to arbitrate there remain very restricted.
There is also the unresolved criticism by the ILO that the
existing regime of statutory protection in relation to industrial action does
not extend to those engaging in industry bargaining.
In view of the effective operation of the system, it is
important that legislators do no harm to a system that functions in a flexible
way, and ensures effective enterprise bargaining in line with the objects of
the current Act. It would be counter productive to introduce new provisions
that cause confusion or legal argument (an example is provided by the phrase
‘shows an intention’) and which reduce the flexible capacities of the system
overall.
It is important that the system facilitate negotiations of
the parties, that they be required to bargain in good faith to genuinely reach
agreement at the enterprise level, and that no new rigidities or prescriptions
be introduced that would impede such bargaining.
Clearly, enterprise patterns are not uncommon in many industries,
authored both by employer and employee bodies. The TWU pointed to issues that
they seek to negotiate at an industry level, often with employers’ agreement,
like wages in the long haul truck driving industry, while the SDA pointed to
employer willingness to engage in negotiations around extended unpaid parental
leave, the definition of regular casuals, rostering in relation to family
responsibilities and junior rates. While enterprise outcomes may differ, they
were concerned that these approaches or intentions would, in the words of Joe
De Bruyn of the SDA ‘fall foul of the new Bill if passed’ and that many
employers were willing to negotiate such issues that generated business,
community and social benefit.
The case for codifying powers that the AIRC believes it
already has (and have not been subject to appeal or legal contest) is weak,
especially if it carries the danger of introducing new rigidities of the kind
that a number of submissions point to. The powers of the AIRC to terminate
protected action where parties do not genuinely bargain, and their capacity to
establish cooling off periods, are already extensive, and we see no hesitation
in the AIRC’s willingness to apply them.
Having said that, it is important to ensure that the parties
continue to feel pressure to genuinely bargain in good faith at the enterprise
level, and to ensure that coercive or mischievous manipulation of bargaining
periods (as Munro J. felt moved to restrain) does not occur.
The AIG pointed to the ‘exhaustive’ processes entailed. The
benefits of a WR system that does require exhaustive testing at law have long
been thought to be greater than the costs of such a system. Australia has
established a tribunal system that has specific and considerable powers, and is
directed to facilitate enterprise bargaining and effective industrial
negotiation. Regrettably for those who bear the cost, it may not always be
desirable to draw into black letter law every ‘sensible and practical’ solution
arrived at by the AIRC to short cut the process. Instead, it is sensible and
practical to ensure that the AIRC has the capacities and punitive powers to
ensure its task is done well in the face of constantly changing and complex
circumstances, many of which we cannot predict or prescribe.
If, however, specific administrative arrangements can be
suggested to assist organisations like AIG in meeting the technical demands of
enterprise bargaining, as referred to in their verbal submission[18],
then they should be considered.
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Fair Dismissal) Bill 2002
Despite rejecting this very proposition in 1996, the Howard
Government has since moved a number of times to remove small business from the
federal unfair dismissal jurisdiction. The main provision of this Workplace Relations
Amendment (Fair Dismissal) Bill 2002 would exempt businesses with fewer than 20
employees from unfair dismissal provisions. Although the bill only applies to
persons hired after the amendments come into effect, over time small business
employees under federal law, as a class, would be denied access to unfair
dismissal protections.
It is not known how many small businesses fall under the
federal jurisdiction in the States, although there are 291400 small businesses
under federal jurisdiction in Victoria, the ACT and the Northern Territory.
When asked for that information with a question on notice, as recently as 11
March 2002[19],
the Government indicated that it needed more time to investigate the data.
There are over 1.1 million Australian small businesses according to the ABS.
Some industries are more represented under federal law than
others, it seems. For instance the NFF in evidence to the Committee believes
that (excluding Victoria, which is wholly federal), 60% of agricultural
businesses fall under federal awards, 40% under state awards. Interestingly,
(again excluding Victoria), the NFF said that approximately 60% of their unfair
dismissal claims experienced were to state jurisdictions, 40% to federal. On
the face of it, this could mean that 40% of agricultural businesses falling
under state awards are generating 60% of the claims, a sure sign of less
stringent state laws. The NFF said that 90% of claims by farm casual employees
were under state laws.
Some sources believe that around 600,000 small business
employees are affected by federal unfair dismissals law, throughout
Australia. As there are over 3 million employees in small business, this
would represent up to 20% of all federal state and territory small business
employees. The Prime Minister and other ministers have repeatedly claimed that
exempting small business (600 000 employees) from federal unfair dismissal laws
would deliver 50 000 jobs. This has been shown to be a singularly dubious
claim.
The issue of access to unfair dismissal remedies in small
business was the subject of greatest discussion in the submissions made to the
committee, and continues to generate vigorous disagreement. While we have good
data about the incidence of unfair dismissal applications at federal and state
level, the debate continues to be confounded by the absence of good evidence
about the effects on employees and employers of the six different federal and
state regimes of unfair dismissal law.
We have good sites for such research before us. In Tasmania
and Western Australia for instance, the absence of many restrictions on unfair
dismissal application that apply federally make them good sites for comparison
with the more restrictive federal case, yet neither employer nor employee
associations could provide the committee with evidence about the effects of
these differences.
Similarly, the assertion of the employment-creation effects
of removing unfair dismissal access in small businesses remains unproven. This
effect and some of the estimates circulating in public debate were questioned
by unions and employer associations (for example, COSBOA’s President had
limited confidence in the claim that 53,000 new jobs would be created through
the Bill).
This is a vital point. The Government’s case rests on a
public interest trade-off. They say the public good would be served by the
creation of 53 000 jobs, set against the public harm of removing rights from a
little over 2 600 federal small business unfair dismissal applications. Until
the evidence exists, the argument that employment will be created by removal of
rights from a class of employees based on business size is moot, to put it
mildly[20].
Moreover, the removal of these rights remains unacceptable to the Australian
Democrats, on human rights and equity grounds.
As we said in relation to the MOJO bill:
The Democrats have consistently opposed removing the right
to access unfair dismissal provisions, but have always supported improvements
to process.[21].
This remains our position, as I have again stated in the
Parliament recently[22].
Several factors reinforce our opposition. We note that many employers (and
indeed unions) are unsure of whether federal or state law covers them. Many
criticisms are consequently singularly ill informed, since complaints about
federal law are often in fact based on entirely different state law
experiences. Further, the great bulk of unfair dismissals occur under state
laws, which this bill will not touch. Frankly, the Government has grossly
misled most small businesses. Were this bill to pass, they would wake up in
NSW and WA for instance, to the reality that most of them fall under state law,
and nothing would have changed.
Improvements to process, in 1996 and 2001, supported by the
Democrats, have meant that there has been a significant fall in the number of
unfair dismissal applications. The total number of federal cases in 2001 was
8157, down from 15,083 in 1996[23].
Only a small portion of federal unfair dismissal applications are in small
businesses. Finally, the important changes made in August 2001 have not yet
been analysed for effect, as witnesses indicated to the Committee. Their
effects are still in the pipeline. Given that they exempt the great majority
of employees in their first 3 months of employment, the reforms were
significant, as the Minister pointed out at the time. However, the fact that
at least one representative of a peak organisation appearing before this
committee had no knowledge of these changes, suggests that education around
existing provisions is needed.
The AIG proposed another approach: they suggested extending
the current blanket exemption of 3 months to 12 months in small business.
However, this will arbitrarily remove the right for a large number of employees
and we would oppose it, in line with our test of fairness.
The AIG also suggested removal of some of the procedural
constraints on small business, when they are obliged to respond to applications
for unfair dismissal. We would consider specific proposals on their merits.
The main challenges for unfair dismissal reform appear to be
two-fold: firstly, moving towards some convergence in state and federal
approaches[24];
and secondly, taking steps to better inform employers of their real capacities
to dismiss employees. Recent surveys strongly suggest that public alarmism
about unfair dismissal has fostered misconceptions about what employers can
actually legally do to deal with a range of employee misdemeanors. An
education program is sorely needed to address this issue. Submissions to this
inquiry provide much more support for this step than further legislative
change.
The core proposition of this bill is unacceptable to the
Australian Democrats. Our views on this matter have been consistently put in
detail, on the record. As previously announced, we will oppose this bill.
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Fair Termination) Bill 2002
As its main proposition, this Workplace Relations Amendment
(Fair Termination) Bill 2002 seeks to put into primary law matters that have
been the subject of regulation for the last five years.
The bill would confirm a range of exclusions from unfair
dismissal provisions in federal law for certain classes of employee (including
limited term employees, probationers, casual employees engaged for a short
period as defined, and trainees) that were largely already excluded previously
through regulation. The outcome of the Federal Court decision in relation to Hamzy
v Tricon International Restaurants trading as KFC (2001), FCA 1589, (16
November 2001), and the consequential invalidation of regulations which
essentially ensured these exclusions, has led to development of the Bill. The
bill would also confirm the continuance of the federal $50 application filing
fee that has also been in place for five years.
The Australian Democrats supported these WRA provisions and
regulations that have been in place since 1996.
In their submissions to the Committee, employers were
concerned at the uncertainty that changes to existing regulations would
generate.
Employers were also concerned at a campaign to grant casuals
earlier access to federal unfair dismissal provisions than the present 12-month
exclusion. The labour market is dynamic. Growth in casual employment has
accelerated to reach 27% of all employees. This may not be as relevant in the
federal jurisdiction as some submissions believe. Except for Victoria, which
falls under federal law, it seems likely that most casuals fall under state
law, not federal law, but more data is needed. The ABS indicates that the
total number of casual employees in Australia now totals over 2 million.
There appears to be growing attention to the issues
affecting workers who may be casual, including in relation to conditions like
unpaid parental leave, and their access to permanent employment after certain
periods of time. The definitions of casual undoubtedly need refinement and
improvement, possibly to reflect the diversity of different types and
permanency rates of casual employment in different industries.
There are also obvious differences in the treatment of
casuals in relation to unfair dismissal at state level. Casuals are not
excluded from access to unfair dismissal provisions in WA and Tasmania. In NSW
the exclusion is for 6 months, South Australia for 9 months, and Queensland and
the Commonwealth are 12 months. These differences constitute an argument for
an agreed national/state approach to this issue, so that the obvious
uncertainty, inconsistency and lack of knowledge of rights – on the side of
employer and employee – can be addressed and reduced.
Unfortunately we still have no indication about the number
of federal employees that are likely to be affected by the continuing exclusion
of casuals as defined in the Bill.
On balance, it would seem the most sensible and consistent
course would be to preserve the situation of limited exclusions that have
existed since 1996. That does not preclude examination of other issues
however. For instance the exclusion of casual workers from the unlawful
dismissal provisions may need attention.
We believe that the larger issue of the definition of casual
employees, and their conditions and bases of employment, deserve serious
examination in view of the rapid growth of this less secure form of
employment. The committee heard a range of views about the merits of casual
work, with arguments that it facilitated family-friendly flexibility and the
preferences of young mobile workers, alongside views that it constrained
employees’ ability to borrow money or have predictability in their lives. The
evidence on these questions still remains largely anecdotal it seems.
On the issue of filing fees, we were concerned in 1996 about
the effect these might have on lower income applicants and potential applicants
and successfully argued for a process of fee waiver in cases of hardship. This
occurs at a very high percentage. We believe that this is appropriate and
should continue. In this light we support the setting of a filing fee at its
1996 level of $50, and its indexation, although we remain open minded about the
basis of indexation, in view of the AIG’s recommendation that it be indexed to
average weekly earnings rather than inflation. Four of the six IR
jurisdictions presently apply a filing fee.
The Committee hearings were useful for flushing out some
further process improvement possibilities. Some of these could perhaps be
considered more fully when the bill is debated in the Senate.
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Secret Ballots for Protected Action) Bill 2002
This Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for
Protected Action) Bill 2002 will require the conduct of a secret ballot amongst
employees as a prerequisite for taking legal protected action during enterprise
bargaining. Similar provisions were included in the MOJO bill in 1999, and again
in the Workplace Relations Amendment (Secret Ballots for Protected Action) bill
2000. The provisions in the bill are additional to those that already exist in
the WRA.
Despite changes to this bill from it’s predecessors, my
comments in my Minority Report at the time of the inquiry into the MOJO bill,
about the proposed additional requirements for secret ballots remain, by and
large, relevant. At that time I noted:
As a principle, the Australian Democrats are generally
strongly supportive of direct democracy. Democrats are also strongly
supportive of the democratic protections afforded by secret balloting
processes. These are available under the WRA. At present pre-strike ballots
are available to employees under section 136 of the Act, and the Commission can
order secret ballots at its discretion under section 135. And of course,
elections of union officials are by secret ballot. The provisions of section
135 and 136 have apparently been rarely used, suggesting that there maybe
little real demand from employers or employees for further access to secret
ballots.
However, the new provisions pose great dangers of actually
escalating conflict, lengthening disputes, and making for more litigation. (see
submissions from Professors Isaac and McCullum.) The committee heard evidence
concerning the poorly designed Western Australian secret ballot laws, forced
through their compliant upper house before the Coalition lost control of it.
They have been an utter failure.
In short, the provisions of this Schedule add little to
industrial democracy and add greatly to impediments to unions to undertake
legitimate industrial action, while opening up the prospect of longer disputes
and litigation.
This schedule should be opposed outright. It does not add
to industrial democracy.[25]
The bill varies in some ways from previous approaches, and
is less aggressive. The relevant Bills Digest see these changes as ‘subtle’
while the ACCI describes them as more significant.
A number of submissions to the committee addressed the issue
of secret ballots and a range of significant points arose.
Coercion: Clearly some witnesses believe that coercion of at
least some employees occurs, or that some employees perceive that they are
under pressure to vote a certain way, in the event of an attendance vote on
industrial action. This is not hard to imagine in some circumstances, but there
is no indication that it is usual or common. Obviously, if at all possible,
such coercion should be prevented where it exists. The Department however, advised
the Committee that this was not the prime purpose of the bill.
Mr. Smythe – I do not think the legislation is predicated on
the premise that there is intimidation and therefore there must be secret
ballots. As you have acknowledged, it is not impossible that there may be
intimidation, but I think the simple proposition is, as Mr. Anderson said, that
a secret ballot process can most readily guarantee the principle of democracy.[26]
This bill is directed at secret ballots prior to protected
action being taken, with consequent disputation occurring. However, as
outlined earlier in my remarks on the Genuine Bargaining bill, disputation may
well be more common as a result of unprotected action. In evidence to the
Committee, the Department indicated that it had no data to separate out the
protected action disputation days lost from unprotected action disputation days
lost, although it was negotiating with the ABS to ascertain such data in the
future. If the purpose of the bill is to encourage employees to take their
time and be more considered when taking strike and other actions, the bill will
be ineffectual if it is in fact unprotected action strikes that occur.
The Bill imposes a comprehensive and detailed requirement on
all unions in relation to protected action, regardless of their past record or
responsibility in ensuring an effective and informed employee voice.
Admittedly the sample was small, but four unions questioned at the Hearings all
indicated there was no impediment at all to employees asking for a secret
ballot at the time of any vote, or in introducing rules that required secret
ballots in specific circumstances. It is possible that numbers of unions may
already have such provisions in their rules.
Given that the WRA already has provisions for secret
ballots, if the Government want additional protection to ensure union
democracy, it may be that a simpler approach at this stage would be for the WRA
to simply require that union rules recorded that secret ballots were possible
on request by show of hands at any vote, and themselves detailed the procedures
to accomplish that. Procedures could vary from the very comprehensive to
putting slips of paper in a box to be counted at the meeting. Those rules
could be subject to AIRC review.
The Bill is somewhat arbitrary in terms of the events that
it prescribes a secret ballot for. There is no provision requiring a secret
ballot in relation to acceptance/rejection of an enterprise agreement, and no
requirement in relation to the ending of protected action. A more
comprehensive imposition of secret ballots to end disputes would be in danger
of increasing the length of disputation rather than reducing it, given the
delays it may result in – a point accepted by unions and employer organisations
alike.
There is no reciprocal obligation upon employers or their
organisations to ensure their internal democracy through a secret ballot of an
appropriate constituency in relation to lockouts or industrial action by
employers. Why should an employer’s lockout commencement not be subject to a
vote of shareholders, if such is necessary for a vote for employees to strike?
If democracy is the object of this bill, then a more even handed approach to
the imposition of secret ballots may be called for.
At present pre-strike secret ballots are available to
employees under section 136 of the Act, and the Commission can order secret
ballots at its discretion under section 135. The mechanisms for such ballots
are deliberately not prescribed in the Act in detail, except that they must be
conducted ‘in accordance with directions given by the Commission’. This
discretion may be useful to retain. Certainly the provisions of section 135
and 136 have been seldom used, perhaps suggesting that there may be little real
demand from employers or employees for further access to secret ballots, or
perhaps because the strike or industrial action is more often taken in
unprotected circumstances, so the employees would not be approaching the AIRC
anyway.
In 1999/2000, for example, while 9640 applications were made
for a bargaining period, only 2 orders for a secret ballot were made,
presumably because the AIRC did not judge it would be helpful to do so. Only
12 orders for such ballots have been made since 1996.[27] In the same period 32957 applications were
made for a bargaining period. There does not appear to be a need, certainly as
perceived by the AIRC, for ballots to allow members to express views that are
seen to be well expressed by existing methods of decision-making.
There does not appear to be any criticism of the AIRC’s
current methods that it uses to implement the conduct of a ballot ‘in
accordance with directions given by the Commission’. Their approach gives the
AIRC powers to flexibly determine the mechanisms for the conduct of a ballot,
rather than prescribe them step by step. The bill in contrast seeks to impose
a fairly fixed approach, in all examples of protected action, creating new
administrative complexity, cost and (no doubt) legal argument. The potential
for delays in implementation, while exaggerated by some, exists. Unions have
argued the bill’s real intent is to frustrate the timely exercise of employee
democracy, and work to reduce (through the burden of administrative complexity)
the level of industrial action taken around enterprise agreements.
Instead, the AIRC might be directed to require a ballot in
relation to the taking of protected action ‘in accordance with directions given
by the Commission’, and to do so in situations where it perceives that an
argument for secret ballots arises, for example where the AIRC has suspicion
that members’ views are not being properly represented by an association, or
where there is historical evidence suggesting that coercion has occurred or
might have occurred. There are industries, employers and unions, whose history
is known to the AIRC, who might properly take that history into account. In
those cases the AIRC might be encouraged to be more likely to impose additional
secret ballots, but still at their discretion. This more targeted approach to
secret ballots might be less onerous for the parties, less costly, and achieve
an increase in democratic voice and decision making in the areas where it is
truly needed.
Will more secret ballots across the whole union sector make
a difference? The committee was not presented with evidence about whether the
outcomes that arise from mandating more secret ballots than we presently have
were expected to be different from, say, a show of hands. While UK precedents
for such laws were cited, empirical evidence was not led for Australia to
expect a change in industrial action that could be expected to flow from the
bill. If there were to be, in fact, little material difference to the outcome,
the cost and complexity of imposing these ballot provisions might turn out to
be a waste of private and public resources.
The technical prescription is fairly onerous. The bill
generally requires a secret postal ballot although some provision for an
attendance ballot exists. It also requires ‘a ballot to hold a ballot’ and is
quite detailed in its requirements.
It is hard to estimate the effect of this Bill on the
outcomes of decision making about protected action, or upon the costs it will
impose not only on the public purse, and upon the AIRC, but also upon the
employers and unions who must compile lists of employees and meet requirements
about the conduct of ballots.
The object of the Bill is ‘to establish a transparent
process which allows employees directly concerned to choose’ whether to take
industrial action. It is sensible to guard against coercion of employees into
protected action that they do not support (remembering that any employee can
elect not to join industrial action). However, this object might be approached
by a much simpler mechanism that builds upon the WRA’s existing provisions.
Workplace Relations Amendment
(Prohibition of Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002
This Workplace Relations Amendment (Prohibition of
Compulsory Union Fees) Bill 2002 will prevent collective certified agreements
containing requirements that non-union members pay bargaining fees to unions,
and will prevent the forced payment of such fees.
The Australian Democrats have considered this issue in the
recent past and concluded:
The Australian Democrats support the rights of employees and
employers to join or not to join registered organisations. We support the
prohibition on duress. This bill addresses the possibility of non-members of
unions being forced to pay bargaining fees (fee-for-service as it is also
known), which then converts into a kind of compulsory unionism. The Democrats
believe that fee-for-service issues must be separated out from issues of
freedom of association and a prohibition on duress. Both fee-for-service and
freedom of association are principles we support. The question then revolves
around enabling legislation and whether this bill is the appropriate vehicle
for the resolution of these issues.
The Government has characterised such fees as a form of
compulsory unionism and this comprises their main argument for these
amendments.
It is hard to see how provisions for bargaining fees should
be against the spirit of the WRA and its object of facilitating agreement
making. Agreement making is desirable, and if fee-for-service contributes to
that, it is to the good. There is also the issue of ‘free-riders’, by
employers on the backs of employer organisations, and employees on the backs of
unions.
We consider it fair that those who benefit from agreement
making should make a contribution towards its costs, whether employers or
employees. This strikes us as a fair principle.
The bargaining fee may represent only a small portion of the
real cost of completing an agreement, for instance where that agreement
involves union members’ foregone earnings through taking protected action.
We see a clear distinction between the notion of compulsory
unionism (which we oppose) and a contribution to the costs of bargaining, where
the person paying is a direct beneficiary of that bargaining. Such payees are
not joining a union, but clearly the fee should not be a substitute for a
normal union fee. They are paying for a service. They are not contributing to
other activities of the union, or electing to play any role in the activities,
policies or other conduct of the organisation, or getting any of the other
benefits of a union. They are not union members.
Coercive attempts to
force union membership are clearly illegal under the WRA and should remain so.
At that time we noted that a fee-for-service is not at all
unusual under industrial relations and bargaining regimes in other countries.
In some countries it is imposed. In the US those non-unionists in workplaces
where a majority vote to join a union, and who then benefit from bargaining to
reach workplace agreements, must generally pay a fee to the union that wins the
certification ballot and negotiates the agreement. Allowing workplaces to take
a vote on agreements which include provision to charge such a fee, and then
where the majority vote in its support, permit its collection, is not out of
step with practice in other places. To repeat, it seems fair and reasonable
that those who benefit, whether employers or employees, also pay. The ILO view
bargaining fees as a legitimate issue for collective bargaining.
One submission stated
...the ACCER does not support the charging of a bargaining fee
without the direct consent and authorisation of the non-union member, prior to
the negotiation of a certified agreement.[28]
This statement encapsulates some key principles – that the
consent has to be direct by the employee affected, [without duress], and prior
to the negotiation, not subsequent.
It seems, then, that a series of principles to guide the
setting of fees could include:
Advance notice: individuals should know in advance of paying
a fee, what that fee will be, and what it purchases (unions and employer
organisations would need a ‘price/service list’);
The fee should be a one-off for the service, not an annual
charge;
No coercion: no one should be coerced into paying a
bargaining fee. Payment of fees should be entirely voluntary;
No payment, no benefit: however, if a fee is not paid, then
it is fair that non-contributory parties should not receive the benefits
achieved by bargaining or association efforts. Without this requirement, there
will be no inducement for free riders to pay a fee, which is clearly fair where
they receive the benefit. This principle is not implied in the current bill;
Fee level: individuals have a right to know in advance the
relevant fee, and it should be set at a reasonable level. If it was not below
relevant comparable union membership rates (compared on an average annual
basis), in the case of union bargaining, there should be suspicion, given that
a fee buys less than the full benefits of union membership;
Clear expression in an agreement: the arrangements for such
fees should be clearly set out in any agreement
The current bill achieves some of these principles, but
prevents others. The Democrats will consider the bill further as it proceeds
through Parliament, guided by these principles. We remain open to the
possibility that bargaining fees or fee-for-service provisions become part of
workplace law, within the principles of freedom of association.
Senator Andrew Murray
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Key features of
Federal and State Termination Laws
Appendix 2: Question on Notice:
Unfair Dismissal Applications (No. 1005)
Appendix
3: Question on Notice: Small Business (No. 16)
Appendix 4: Question on Notice:
Workplace Relations: Unfair Dismissals (No. 5)
Appendix 5: Federal Unfair
Dismissal Cases
Appendix
1
Key features of Federal and
State termination laws
|
Cmwth
|
NSW
|
QLD
|
SA
|
WA
|
Tas
|
Employee
able to apply for remedy?
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Max
time period after termination to apply
|
21
days
|
21
days
|
21
days
|
21
days
|
28
days
|
21
days
|
Filing
Fee
|
$50.00
|
$50.00
|
$46.50
|
$0.00
|
$5.00
|
$0.00
|
Casuals
excluded, for what period?
|
12
mths
|
6
mnths
|
12
mths
|
9
mnths
|
No
|
No
|
Statutory
default probationary period
|
3
mnths
|
No
|
3
mnths
|
No
|
No
|
No
|
Conciliation
before arbitration
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Yes
|
Certificate
issued if conciliation fails?
|
Yes
|
No
|
Yes
|
Assess-ment
made
|
No
|
No
|
Penalty
for disregarding assessment?
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Yes
|
No
|
No
|
Commission
to consider size of business?
|
Yes
|
|
|
|
|
|
Penalties
against advocates for vexatious claims
|
Yes
|
|
|
|
|
|
Requirement
to disclose 'no win no fee'
|
Yes
|
|
|
|
|
|
Dismiss
claims which have no prospect of success?
|
Yes
|
|
|
|
|
|
Is
salary compensation capped?
|
6
months remuneration. Limited to $37,600 for non-award employees
|
6
months remuneration
|
6
months average wage
|
6
months remuner-ation limited to $38,700
|
6
months remuner-ation
|
6
months ordinary pay
|
Note: termination provisions contained in the CCH Australian
Employment Legislation at 21 December 2001.
No attempt has been made to include other authority a
tribunal might rely on to deal with a matter beyond those prescribed under the
particular termination provisions.
WA provisions do not apply to WA employees under WA
Workplace Agreements, and new industrial legislation will come into effect in
Western Australia post May 2002.
Prepared by Steve O'Neill, Department of the Parliamentary
Library for the Senate Employment, Workplace Relations and Education
Legislation Committee.
APPENDIX 2
Question
on Notice:
Unfair Dismissal Applications
(Question No. 1005) Senator Murray asked the Minister
representing the Minister for Workplace Relations and Small Business, upon
notice, on 26 November 1997:
(1) With reference to an answer to a question on notice
asked during the 1997-98 Budget Supplementary Estimates hearings of the
Economics Legislation Committee concerning the Industrial Relations portfolio,
subprogram 1.2—Legal and Industry:
Can a comparison of the industrial relations systems' nine
unfair dismissal jurisdictions in 1997 as compared to 1996 be provided at the
earliest date following 31 December 1997.
(2) At the earliest date following 31 December 1997, could
details of research undertaken on the number and percentage of unfair dismissal
applications which apply to small businesses with less than 15 employees,
compared with total unfair dismissal applications for 1997, in all nine unfair
dismissal jurisdictions be provided.
Senator Alston—The Minister for Workplace Relations and
Small Business has provided the following answer to the honourable senator's
questions:
(1) A comparison of unfair dismissal applications in all
jurisdictions in 1997 as compared to 1996 is as follows.
State/Territory
|
Jan-Dec 1996 1
|
Jan- Dec 1997 a
|
Combined 1997 Figures as % of
|
|
|
|
|
|
Federal
|
State
|
Combined
|
Federal
|
State
|
Combined
|
Combined 1996 Figures 1
|
New
South Wales
|
4,290
|
2,186
|
6,476
|
1,115
|
4,558
|
5,673
|
88%
|
South
Australia
|
633
|
1,240
|
1,873
|
273
|
1,384
2
|
1,6572
|
88%
|
Queensland
|
512
|
1,932
|
2,444
|
623
|
1,932
|
2,555
|
105%
|
Western
Australia
|
1,875
|
918
|
2,793
|
271
|
1,824
|
2,095
|
75%
|
Tasmania
3
|
360
|
1143
|
474
|
117
|
3693
|
486
|
103%
|
Victoria
4
|
5,958
|
358
|
6,316
|
4,527
|
NA4
|
4,527
|
72%
|
ACT
4
|
509
|
NA4
|
509
|
260
|
NA4
|
260
|
51%
|
NT 4
|
396
|
NA4
|
396
|
277
|
NA4
|
277
|
70%
|
Total
|
14,533
|
6,748
|
21,281
|
7,463
|
10,067
|
17,530
|
82%
|
Notes 1. Federal and State figures are based on calendar
months, and incorporate estimates and interpolations, where original data not
available. Official and unofficial sources are used.
2. The SA Commission has advised that figures for the months
of February, April and June 1997 were inflated by applications lodged on behalf
of over 100 workers each month who were made redundant from SAMCorp (a large SA
meat processing corporation) in February and April and from Bells (Sizzler) in
June.
3. Tasmanian State figures are unofficial only. Official
monthly figures are not produced by the Tasmanian Commission. The official
total figures for the 1995/1996 and
1996/1997 financial years were contained in the Commission's
annual reports for those years.
4. There are no separate Territory unfair dismissal systems,
and there has been no separate Victorian unfair dismissal system after 1996.
(2) In relation to Federal unfair dismissal applications,
the Australian Industrial Registry is collecting information on the number and
percentage of unfair dismissal applications which apply to small businesses
with 15 or less employees, for each month from December 1997 to May 1998. This
information is being forwarded to Senator Murray. The information relating to
applications from 1 December 1997 to 31 January 1998 is as follows.
Registry
|
Total termination of
employment applications lodged
|
Total employer
responses to Industrial Registry’s question on employer size
|
Employers employing 15
or fewer employees
|
Employers employing 15
or fewer employees as % of total employer responses received
|
ACT
|
33
|
12
|
9
|
75
|
NSW
|
234
|
68
|
19
|
28
|
NT
|
43
|
18
|
8
|
44
|
QLD
|
55
|
29
|
6
|
21
|
SA
|
42
|
12
|
1
|
8
|
TAS
|
16
|
7
|
1
|
14
|
VIC
|
810
|
308
|
121
|
39
|
WA
|
50
|
17
|
1
|
6
|
Total
|
1,283
|
471
|
166
|
35
|
In relation to State unfair dismissal applications, it is
not possible to provide information on the number and percentage of unfair
dismissal applications which apply to small businesses with 15 or less
employees, as no State collects data on the size of respondents to unfair
dismissal applications.
APPENDIX 3
Question
on Notice:
SMALL BUSINESS
(Question No. 16) Senator Murray asked the Minister
representing the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, upon notice,
on 24 January 2002:
(1)How many small businesses are there in each state and
territory.
(2)For each state and territory, how many small business
fall under the Federal Workplace Relations Act provisions for unfair dismissal,
as opposed to state provisions for unfair dismissal.
http://hyperlink&class=name&xrefid=ld4/Senator
Alston —The Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations has provided the
following answer to the honourable senator's question:
(1)The following table provides information on the number of
small businesses in each State and Territory:
State/Territory
|
|
Number
of small businesses
|
|
New
South Wales
|
360
600
|
Victoria
|
264
300
|
Queensland
|
205
800
|
South
Australia
|
78
200
|
Western
Australia
|
116
300
|
Tasmania
|
22
700
|
Northern
Territory
|
9
100
|
Australian
Capital Territory
|
18
000
|
Total
|
1
075 000
|
Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics Catalogues 1321.0,
8127.0, 8141.0 and Yellow Pages Special Report on E-Commerce and computer
technology July 2001.
Approximately 50% of these businesses are non-employing
businesses. 34% of small businesses employ between 1 and 4 people, and 16%
employ 5 to 19 people. A total of 3 181 000 people are employed by small
businesses in Australia.
(2)Further time is required to obtain from various sources
the information needed to answer this question. The information will be tabled
when it is available.
APPENDIX 4
Question
on Notice: Workplace Relations:
Unfair Dismissals
(Question No. 5) Senator Murray asked the Minister
representing the Minister for Employment and Workplace Relations, upon notice,
on 20 December 2001:
With reference to the answer to question on notice no.1005
(Senate Hansard, 4 March 1998, p. 421):
(1)Can the Minister provide a table for all unfair dismissal
applications under federal and state law for the 2000-01 financial year, for all
states and territories, showing federal, state and total amounts on a similar
basis to (1) of the referenced question?
(2)Can the Minister provide a table for all small business
unfair dismissal applications under federal and state law for the 2000-01 financial
year, for all states and territories, showing federal, state and total amounts
on a similar basis to (1) of the referenced question?
Senator Alston—The Minister for Employment and Workplace
Relations has provided the following answer to the honourable senator's
question:
(1)The following table provides information on unfair
dismissal applications lodged in Australian jurisdictions between 1 July 2000
and 30 June 2001:
State/Territory
|
Applications
lodged between 1 July 2000 and 30 June 20011
|
|
Federal
|
State
|
Combined
|
New
South Wales
|
1,648
|
4,041
|
5,689
|
Queensland
|
420
|
1,866
|
2,286
|
Western
Australia2
|
398
|
1,7592
|
2,157
|
South
Australia
|
198
|
1,175
|
1,373
|
Tasmania
|
137
|
264
|
401
|
Victoria3
|
4,781
|
n/a
|
4,781
|
Australian
Capital Territory3
|
250
|
n/a
|
250
|
Northern
Territory3
|
263
|
n/a
|
263
|
Total
|
8,095
|
9,105
|
17,200
|
Notes
1 Federal and State figures are based on calendar months,
and incorporate estimates and interpolations where original data are not
available. Official and unofficial sources are used.
2 Western Australian State figures include both unfair
dismissal applications and applications which combine claims of unfair
dismissal and denial of contractual benefits.
3 There are no separate Territory unfair dismissal systems,
and there has been no separate Victorian unfair dismissal system since 1996.
(2)The Australian Industrial Registry collects information
on the number and percentage of unfair dismissal applications that involve
employers with 15 or fewer employees. However, this information relates to
unfair dismissal applications under the federal Workplace Relations Act 1996
only. As far as the Federal Government is aware, no State or Territory collects
data on the size of respondents to unfair dismissal applications. Therefore, it
is not possible to provide a table for all small business unfair dismissals
under federal and state law for 2000-01 as requested.
The following table provides information on federal unfair
dismissal applications, broken down by the State and Territory in which the
federal application was lodged. Note that this information is incomplete, as
employers provide the data voluntarily. Not all employers respond to the
Registry's request for information on employer size - the total number of
respondents who provided information on employer size is indicated in the
table.
Federal unfair
dismissal applications lodged between 1 July 2000 and 30 June 2001
|
Registry
|
Total termination of
employment applications lodged
|
Total employer
responses received to Registry's request for information on employer size
|
Number of responses
received from employers employing 15 or fewer employees
|
Employers employing 15
or fewer employees as % of total employer responses received
|
New South Wales
|
1,648
|
359
|
97
|
27.0%
|
Queensland
|
420
|
283
|
53
|
18.7%
|
Western Australia
|
398
|
104
|
37
|
35.6%
|
South Australia
|
198
|
104
|
14
|
13.5%
|
Tasmania
|
137
|
84
|
23
|
27.4%
|
Victoria
|
4,781
|
1,357
|
530
|
39.1%
|
Australian Capital
Territory
|
250
|
90
|
35
|
38.9%
|
Northern Territory
|
263
|
145
|
50
|
34.5%
|
Total
|
8,095
|
2,526
|
839
|
33.2%
|
Appendix
5
FEDERAL UNFAIR DISMISSAL CASES
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