Chapter 8 - ILO Conventions and the BCII Bill
Australia
is a signatory to the International Labour Organisations conventions, which
provide for freedomnot just freedom of associationto collectively bargain.
What you are alluding to is the attempt to criminalise normal bargaining
activities, to effectively outlaw things that are associated with fundamental
international legal rightsthe law, in other words... This law, if it is not
rejected, will actually criminalise working peoples rights by any definition
of international law, and that is just unheard of in a democracy.[396]
8.1
The committee's consideration of the Building and
Construction Industry Improvement Bill in the light of International Labour
Organisation (ILO) Conventions would normally be seen to be an academic
exercise. However, provisions of the Workplace
Relations Act 1996 and several amendment bills introduced subsequently,
have been found to contravene fundamental ILO Conventions in regard to freedom
of association and the right to collective bargaining. Provisions of the bill
now before the Senate are flawed in the same way. The BCII Bill goes even
further in singling out a particular category of employees who will enjoy fewer
rights than those employed in other industries, particularly in regard to their
rights to bargain collectively for improvements to wages and conditions. This
is the basic right proclaimed in the industrial laws of all OECD counties and
western democracies.
8.2
The right to collective bargaining is a benchmark right
which is recognised by ILO Conventions. There is some irony in the Government's
claims to be restoring respect for the law through the implementation of the
BCII Bill in view of the disregard it has for ILO Conventions, which form the
basis of our national industrial laws. While the conventions are not binding on
signatories to the ILO, it should not be expected that a country with Australia's
tradition of support for the ILO should suddenly disregard them.
Background to the ILO
8.3
The ILO was established in 1919 by the League
of Nations. In the aftermath of the First World War, there was a
widely held view that the war had been caused by commercial rivalry between the
leading powers. There appeared to be a clear correlation between the
preservation of peace and improvements in employment conditions and social
progress.
8.4
Principles established at this time sought to define
rights of association, standards of living, wages and conditions along with the
abolition of child labour in all countries. These principles were reconfirmed
in 1944 with the Declaration of Philadelphia, which became an annex to the
final constitution of the ILO.
Tripartite participation
8.5
As indicated by evidence referred to in other chapters
of this report, the Government's long-standing aversion to tripartite
arrangements is hardening. It is turning
towards a unilateral approach, of which the BCII Bill is an example. Much of the evidence provided to the
committee in relation to the BCII Bill (and in regard to several WR Amendment
Bills dealt with recently by the Legislation Committee) raised concerns about
the diminution of the tripartite process. This leads to shifts in bargaining
power in favour of one principal stakeholder in the employment relationship
which will lead to poor policy outcomes.[397] The ACTU
reported its attempt to persuade the Government that most aspects of its bill
were not relevant to the future of the industry:
None of it deals with the real issues of concern for the
industry. We proposed an alternative process to Mr
Abbotts some time ago... It basically
emphasised a tripartite approach involving the employers, governments at state
and national levels and the unions looking at some of the issues in the
industry to come up with a coherent and intelligent way of tackling them.[398]
8.6
The Government is unlikely to be influenced by
consideration of ILO principles, or by the fact that from its inception, the
ILO has recognised that the tripartite involvement of government, employers and
employees in labour relations is critical for economic and social progress,
both internationally and nationally. This principle was enunciated in response
to suppression of workers and organised labour, either by totalitarian
governments or by laws of the kind that existed in the United
States before the New Deal. There was a
crucial recognition of the unique roles that each of these participants played
in achieving global economic growth and improved standards of living. This was
recognised in the Philadelphia Declaration which states, as a core principle:
the war against want requires to be carried on with unrelenting
vigour within each nation, and by continuous and concerted international effort
in which the representatives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status
with those of governments, join with them in free discussion and democratic
decision with a view to the promotion of the common welfare.[399]
8.7
Accordingly, when the ILO charter was revised in 1944
it was given a constitution for the General Conference and Governing Body that
balanced representation between government, employer and employees, as set out
in Article 3 and 7,[400]
and which is reaffirmed through the national consultation processes
established in convention 144, Articles 2 and 3.[401] This
principle is further elaborated on through Recommendation 113:
Measures appropriate to national conditions should be taken to
promote effective consultation and co-operation at the industrial and national
levels between public authorities and employers' and workers' organisations, as
well as between these organisations... .Such consultation and co-operation
should have the general objective of promoting mutual understanding and good
relations between public authorities and employers' and workers' organisations
... with a view to developing the economy as a whole or individual branches
thereof, improving conditions of work and raising standards of living.[402]
8.8
The objective of developing mutual understanding and
good relationships is fundamental for the establishment of an efficient and
productive construction industry. Evidence was provided to the committee on the
benefit of industrial relations models that supported partnership between tripartite
industry participants to achieve high performance in the industry.[403] As the
joint submission from the states and territories stated:
a cooperative and collaborative approach to the industry
provides an appropriate basis for reforming the industry. The approach in the Bill
does not address the needs of the building and construction industry nor does
it address the need for culture change in the industry. Instead the
confrontationist model adopted will only serve to entrench negative practices.[404]
8.9
The committee majority echoes the views overwhelmingly
expressed by industrial relations practitioners that the bill lacks a balance
in its approach to industrial relations. Neither has nearly every Workplace
Relations Amendment Bill introduced following the passage of the 1996 Act. The
Government is unlikely to be moved by calls for a tripartite approach to
industrial relations, all the more so if this is ILO policy. For the record,
the Government will concede that unions have a legitimate role in establishing
appropriate working conditions for the industry, particularly in relation to
occupational health and safety, and workers' entitlements.[405] Off the
record, the Government is unlikely to be turned from its goal of removing union
influence from workplace agreement negotiation processes. The committee
majority urges the Government to re-establish consultative processes with all
participants in the industry to ensure their acceptance and involvement in any
changes to laws. It does so in the knowledge that this process is the only way
of achieving lasting productivity improvements. As the International Centre for
Trade Union Rights (ICTUR) submitted in oral evidence to the committee:
At the end of the day these conventions seek to balance
competing interests and competing rights. In my view they generally achieve
that. They achieve it through a very longwinded process involving all the
relevant interest groups coming to a compromise on the issue. That is why we
emphasise that these are standards that are not partisan in any particular
direction. They have been the subject of rigorous scrutiny from all interested
parties.[406]
Enforcing the conventions
8.10
Article 19 of the ILO Constitution sets out the
obligations of members to enact domestic law in line with the conventions that
have been adopted. Commonwealth and state parliaments have traditionally
considered industrial relations legislation in the light of ILO conventions.
The main process by which the ILO monitors compliance with its conventions is
through the review of annual reports by governments to the International Labour
Office in conformity with Article 22 of the Constitution.[407] Such reports are initially reviewed by a
Committee of Experts, and, if they find that the conventions are not being
fully complied with, the Committee addresses a comment, known as an
'observation', to the government and requests that amendments be made to the
legislation. Observations are generally used in more serious or long-standing
cases of failure to fulfil obligations.[408]
8.11
The ILO review process does not extend to draft
legislation or to bills, and it has not been the usual practice of the
Government to invite comment from the ILO on draft legislation.[409] DEWR
provided internal advice that the legislation complies with Australia's
obligations under ILO conventions. The committee notes that such internal
advice as the Government believes it needs is easily obtained and will always
approve the policy purposes of the Government. This applies almost equally to
external advice as well, as Governments 'shop around' to find justification
from 'independent' consultancies.
8.12
The Government has provided evidence that there is a
'continuing dialogue' with the ILO in relation to WRA legislation. However, the
committee has been advised that dialogue is an inaccurate description of the
communication that the Government has with the ILO: that in fact the ILO has
used the strongest mechanisms it has, in the form of observations, to admonish
the Government over its failure to draft legislation supporting the
implementation of ILO conventions. The
most recent report from the Australian Government resulted in the following
observations in relation to the Workplace Relations Act which are likely to be
applied to the provisions of the BCII bill:
'Workers' organizations should be able to take industrial action
in support of multi-employer agreements; providing in legislation that workers
cannot take action in support of a claim for strike pay is not compatible with
the Convention;
Prohibiting industrial action that is threatening to cause
significant damage to the economy goes beyond the definition of essential
services in the strict sense of the term. The Committee requests once again
the Government to amend the provisions of the Act, to bring it into conformity
with the Convention.
The Committee recalls once again that a general prohibition on sympathy
strikes could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such
action, provided the initial strike they are supporting is lawful.[410]
8.13
It would be surprising if similar comments are not made
about the BCII Bill if it becomes law. The committee notes that the ILO, unlike
the WTO, does not have powers to compel countries to comply with its rulings.[411] The Government makes only an acknowledgement
of receipt of observations. The communications do not attract public attention.
There are no sanctions to be feared by the Government in Australian courts, or in
international courts and tribunals. As the committee was told:
The history of challenging domestic law on the basis of
international instruments is not altogether a happy one. Clearly much of the
bill would infringe the international instruments to which Australia
is a party.[412]
ILO views on pattern bargaining
8.14
The provisions in the BCII Bill prohibiting pattern
bargaining are contrary to ILO conventions. The ILO has recognised the right of
workers and employers to enter into collective bargaining arrangements through
Philadelphia Declaration III (e), which provides for:
The effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining,
the cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of
productive efficiency, and the collaboration of workers and employers in the
preparation and application of social and economic measures.
8.15
This principle has been further developed through
Convention 98 which supports the right of collective bargaining:
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken,
where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation
of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers'
organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of
terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.[413]
8.16
Freedom of association and the right of collective
bargaining are 'core' labour standards that form a subset of human rights
defined in the International Bill of Human Rights.[414] Freedom of
association and the right to collectively organise are one of eight fundamental
conventions that:
are a precondition for all the others in that they provide for
the necessary implements to strive freely for the improvement of individual and
collective conditions of work.[415]
8.17
The BCII Bill would restrict the rights of employers
and employees in the construction industry to establish appropriate agreements
by democratically elected officials which meet the needs of all industry
participants.[416]
The committee received advice from a range of submissions and witnesses about
the likely observations that the ILO would issue in relation to breaches of
Conventions which support the right of employees to collectively bargain.[417]
However, what I would say is that those ILO conventions assert, as
part of international law, that employees and their representatives have the
right to engage in collective bargaining. This bill, which I think stultifies
collective bargaining, certainly has the capacity to go against the spirit of
these conventions.[418]
8.18
The committee sees a serious weakness in the proposed
legislation for the construction industry in that it should provide a framework
for the equal participation in industrial relations by all participants in the
industry in line with international best practice. Instead, it provides for
heavy penalties for misconduct for employees, while exempting employers from
the rigours of the law. This is one of many instances of such discrimination in
the bill.[419]
It makes for very bad legislation and, with these provisions included, is
unworthy of Parliament's consideration:
My concern with this legislation is that it really deals much
more with trade union conduct and employee conduct in an asymmetrical manner
than it deals with employer conduct. The fact that the building commission does
not have any powers, as I read them, over wages and employee entitlements is an
instance of this. The fact that all industrial action is deemed unlawful is
another instance of this. I am simply saying that good legislation has to be balanced,
has to be workable and has to have discretions reposed in bodies so that they
can act in an independent manner.[420]
8.19
The committee majority notes that the Government and
those who support its legislation take a narrow interpretation of the
requirements of the ILO Conventions, claiming that measures to restrict
collective bargaining to individual workplaces do not contravene the
Convention:
HIA further submits that the requirements of Convention 98 with
respect to collective bargaining have in no way been contravened. Collective bargaining is still possible but
it will be rightly based on the premise of individual business units. Article 4 of this Convention states that
Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary,
to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for
voluntary negotiation between employers or employers organisations and
workers organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions
of employment by means of collective agreements. How can widespread enforcement of pattern
bargaining by the CFMEU be seen as in any sense voluntary? HIA submits that the coercion into signing a
pattern bargained arrangement in itself contravenes this Article.[421]
8.20
What this fails to acknowledge is that ILO Conventions
are not written as black letter law is written: as clauses to be interpreted by
courts or circumvented through legal argument. They cannot be 'written down' or
subject to narrow interpretation. They can, however, be violated through
disregard of the principles they embody, and this is what the Government has
done in this legislation. Nor can the argument about the alleged CFMEU
enforcement of pattern bargaining be taken as justification for disregarding
ILO conventions, even if this charge was valid.
8.21
The ILO does not force either employers or employees to
establish a particular type of agreement. It establishes the principal that
such agreements should be determined by the parties affected, who should be
free to establish how they will meet their bargaining objectives.[422]
It is one of the reasons why the conventions are deliberately
not prescriptive, because the conventions take the view that, as far as
possible, matters should be left to the bargaining parties as to what is contained
in whatever agreement eventuates from that process.[423]
8.22
The committee majority believes that the Government
should revise the legislation to restore to the AIRC the powers which it has
lost in recent years, to allow arbitration and conciliation between employers
and employees. The committee is concerned that the introduction of a third
party to the bargaining process to enforce a bargaining process that does not
suit the needs of employers and employees will force inefficient and costly
processes on the industry.[424]
Freedom of Association
8.23
The committee notes the arguments of the Government and
industry employer groups that the WRA and the proposed building and
construction bill contain legal protection for freedom of association in line
with the intent of the ILO clauses, but notes also that this is a curious
inversion of the normal meaning of the term. The committee has criticised
elsewhere, in its legislation scrutiny role, the semantic ploys and rhetorical
devices used by the Government to put misleading 'spin' on legislative
intentions, as in the short titles given to bills. These signal such objectives
as to provide more jobs and better pay, and to 'protect' Victorian workers.
Such outcomes cannot be assured, and are sometimes intended to disguise the real
objectives of the bill. In the same spirit, the Government provides in this
legislation for protection of workers who wish not to be represented by unions
in their pursuit of better pay and working conditions. It would be more
accurate to describe this as 'freedom of disassociation', which is covered by
current workplace relations legislation, and does not need to be reissued
through the BCII Bill:
I think the debate internationally is inconclusive as to whether
there is a freedom to not associate. The Workplace Relations Act already deals,
through section 298, with the kinds of impediments you speak of. Coercing
someone to join a union is already a breach of section 298.[425]
8.24
The committee majority has no criticism to make of
section 298. However, not everyone is assisted by. The committee heard from
witnesses representing the trades sub-contractors who are members of the
Christian Brethren Fellowship. The beliefs of this religious group allow them
no association with organisations beyond those who live by their creed. While
the freedom not to associate may appear to be tailor made to suit this sect, or
others like them, a difficulty may arise in their relations with other
contractors because of their opposition to EBAs. In these circumstances lead
project contractors may come to the conclusion that their participation in a
project may require more delicate negotiation than they have time to make. The
result would be that some minority groups may be excluded from sections of the
industry by their own rules, and in the case of builders may be advised to stay
with the bungalow and town house market.
8.25
Such cases would be rare. The committee majority takes
the view that it is the right to collective bargaining which is most under
threat in this legislation. The committee sees particular dangers in this
provision for the reason that it may be used by unscrupulous employers to
strenuously discourage union membership on the proposed grounds, even though
this may be against the law.
8.26
The committee believes that, far from affirming freedom
of association, it is more likely that it may be compromised by enactment of
this legislation. This is particularly in relation to Article two of convention
87 which states that workers have the right to organise and adopt rules for their
organisation. This states:
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation
concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous
authorisation.
Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the right to
draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full
freedom, to organise their administration and activities and to formulate their
programmes.[426]
8.27
The committee is critical of the BCII provisions that
will prevent employees from taking lawful industrial action because of the
highly complicated processes that must be established for bargaining and
undertaking secret ballots. The bill places many restrictions on the processes
that workers can use to organise themselves. Secret ballot provisions are
unduly complex and are likely to prevent ordinary workers, union officials or
indeed employers from using such provisions, and increase the administrative
burdens for employers, unions and individual employees. It is expected that the
bill will result in both employers and employees requiring the support of
specialists such as industrial lawyers, adding considerably to their costs and
time in pursuing the usual bargaining process. The effect of such complicated
provisions, rather then encouraging the active participation of individual
employers and employees in the bargaining process, will require the active
participation of lawyers in all future industrial relations activities. [427]
The problem is the hoops that would need to be jumped through...
Take the situation in Victoria.
I think there are about 3,000 or 4,000 individual enterprise agreements in Victoria.
If this regime were imposed, I think it would be practically impossible for the
union and the workers of each of those employers to go through the process here
in order to reach protected action. If they took industrial action, it would
not be protected and therefore would be unlawful.[428]
8.28
The committee is also concerned that employers have
sought to select which employee representatives they will negotiate with.[429] It
recommends that the legislation is revised to enforce the rights of employees
to select their representatives for the purposes of negotiating agreements with
employer representatives. The Government should take into account the 1998 ILO
CEACR Observation which states:
The Committee requests clarification regarding section 170LL of
the Act which appears to permit an employer of a new business to choose which
organisation to negotiate with prior to employing any persons. The Committee
recalls that the choice of bargaining agent should be made by the workers
themselves; section 170LL appears to allow the employer to preselect the
bargaining partner on behalf of the potential employees, regardless of whether
or not that union will ultimately be truly representative of the workers
finally employed.[430]
8.29
The purpose of current provisions is to exclude or
discourage union participation from negotiations for enterprise bargaining agreements
(EBAs). The committee majority is of the view that the Government regards union
involvement in EBA negotiations, even when conducted on the worksite and with
no apparent connection with other similar enterprises, as a variation of
pattern bargaining. The Government would take the view that union workplace
organisers have an incorrigible tendency to 'exchange notes' across worksites.
Its preferred position, which it would find impossible to legislate for, would
probably be to exclude union organisers or representatives from negotiating
parties.
8.30
The issue of freedom of association has also arisen in
relation to negotiations with the United States
of America over the proposed free trade
agreement. There has been some frank criticism of the attitude and performance
of the Australian Government by the United States Labor Advisory Committee
(LAC) in its report to the trade representative of the President, who is
responsible for negotiating the free trade agreement on behalf of the United
States Government.
8.31
The
Labor Advisory Committee has reported that Australia's laws contain a number of onerous
restrictions on workers' right to freedom of association and their right to
organise and bargain collectively. It states that many of these restrictions
were created by the Workplace Relations
Act 1996, which constituted a major restructuring of Australia's labor laws and has been criticised repeatedly
by the ILO, the US State Department, and the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The report continues:
The fairly recent
enactment of the WRA shows that problems with workers rights in Australia are not the result of insufficient
enforcement resources or the inheritance of outdated labor legislation from
another era they are the result of a conscious and recent decision in the
Australian government to restrict the fundamental rights of workers.[431]
8.32
The Labor Advisory Committee reported with disapproval that the Workplace Relations Act allows employers to
choose a union to bargain with before it has even employed any workers, through
'greenfield agreements'; that these agreements can last for up to three years,
and effectively deny workers the right to choose their own bargaining
representative for that length of time. The ILO had twice criticised this
provision and requested that the Australian government review and amend the Act
to eliminate this problem. According to the ICFTU, the WRA also makes it much
harder for unions to get into workplaces to organise workers, further depriving
workers of their ability to freely join the union of their choosing.[432] These are
observations of industrial relations experts from the United States, a country regarded as being at the leading
edge of the free market in labour. Australia, which for many years indeed for most of
the post-war era has a strong record of support for the ILO and the rights of
trade unions, is now criticised for being backward by a country with a
chequered labour relations history. The irony of this is not lost on the
committee.
Right of Entry
8.33
The Government has stated that the right of entry
provisions are in line with ILO conventions, particularly Convention 135,[433] and that
employers have the right to conduct their business without undue interference
or harassment.[434]
Freedom of Association principles of the ILO include the right for employees to
communicate amongst themselves and to engage them in the process of industrial
relations both at a local and national level.[435]
8.34
The committee accepts that directives about how and
when employee representatives can meet members or to recruit members will
restrict the rights of union officials. Restrictions on their rights to
communicate with members, and to investigate issues on their behalf, is
contrary to Article 3 of ILO Convention No. 98, and is likely to result in
further observations by the ILO.[436] The
committee supports the legitimate rights of unions to maintain these
relationships.[437]
The new restrictions on right of entry place too much weight on the rights of
employers and give too little protection to employees' representatives to
exercise their proper functions. These are to monitor the implementation of
agreements that they are party to, including the payment of employee
entitlements.[438]
This is especially true for the more vulnerable members of the workforce
including apprentices who, while they are not often union members, often
request the assistance of unions when issues of OH&S or employee
entitlements arise.[439]
There are clear similarities between the right of entry
provisions. These effectively prevent a union official from going about their
lawful duty, which is to go onto work sites without causing undue disruption to
the work and to recruitwhich means to encourage workers to join unions. That
is the rightful, recognised, international principle...We as international
participants in the ILO recognise that principle, but we seem to consider in
our laws or in the proposed bill that that will be removed.[440]
8.35
The proposed use of trespass provisions as a deterrent
to union representation on worksites is an iniquitous abuse of the legislative
process. The committee notes the MBA's frustration at a magistrate refusing to
treat right of entry dispute as a criminal matter.[441] It is
clearly not a criminal matter, and this assumption underlines the danger of
injecting into industrial law the notions underlying both commercial and
criminal law. The failure of the Cole royal
commission, and the drafters of the BCII Bill, to recognise that industrial law
involves the recognition of an industrial contest and the need to negotiate
agreements, is at the bottom of impatient claims for the application of
black-letter law. The committee notes advice it received from a legal
practitioner at its Perth hearings:
.... under the federal and state laws there are rights of entry.
If those rules are followed then the right of entry is a lawful right of entry;
if they are not it is an unlawful right of entry. Technically, I suppose that
in some cases it is a trespass, but in most cases it is simply a breach of the
right of entry provisions...I thought that the right of entry provisions in the
federal act and also the right of entry provisions in the Western Australian
act had been designed to get away from the use of police act and Crimes Act
provisions. They have been designed to return issues of right of entry to the
industrial arena, as opposed to the criminal arena. That has always been my
understanding.[442]
8.36
Of serious concern to the committee majority is the
proposals by industry employer groups to ban right of entry to union officials
who are seeking to investigate occupational health and safety concerns.[443] The
committee accepts that there are few resources available to the industry to
police occupational health and safety in the industry and such proposals are
likely to increase the numbers of injuries and deaths on construction sites
which are already one of the most dangerous work places in Australia.
Further discussion on occupational health and safety is to be found in chapter
6.[444]
8.37
The complexity of current right of entry provisions in
the Workplace Relations Act and right of entry laws enacted under state
legislation are sufficient to keep legal minds occupied. The right of entry
provisions under the BCII Bill will increase uncertainty and the likelihood of
increased industrial disruption to the industry.[445] The
committee majority believes that a uniform approach to right of entry for all
workers, as currently provided for in the Workplace Relations Act, is more
likely to be acceptable than a law which places intolerable restrictions on the
employees in a particular industry. Construction workers should have access to
the same rights and protections that are available to workers in all other
sectors of the economy.[446]
8.38
The committee notes that there are powers available to
the AIRC to cancel right of entry permits when an abuse of the system has
occurred.[447]
The committee majority believes there should be a review into how the AIRC
enforces the provisions of current industrial laws to address concerns raised
by the Master Builders Association and to ensure a balanced right of entry
process that encourages the resolution of disputes.[448] This manner
of collaborative management of a problem is preferable to introducing specific
restrictions on some unions in contravention of ILO principles and conventions.
The right to strike
8.39
The committee has been provided with evidence on rights
to strike established through the International Covenant for Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and in ILO conventions.[449] The
committee accepts advice from the ICTUR that:
the right to strike ought to be respected. The right to strike
is not an unlimited right. The right to strike is limited to action taken in
furtherance of industrial claims: for instance, it is limited to action, by the
Workplace Relations Act, which does not involve damage to property or
defamation. There are a number of other such limitations that I think you will
find in section 170MT of the Workplace Relations Act.[450]
8.40
As discussed above, the unduly complex requirements for
prestrike ballots will either prevent industrial action, or they will prolong
those which occur. It is unclear from the legislation how employees would
return to work after agreeing to a strike in accordance with the secret ballot
provisions. In particular, it is unclear from the proposed legislation what
processes could be used to finalise a dispute once a prestrike ballot has
occurred, because the normal relationships and negotiation processes between
employer and employee representatives would no longer be available for fast
resolution of a dispute.[451]
...I would not support all of the components of the legislation.
One thing that sticks out to me, and I have been doing this job for 30 years,
is that having a secret ballot is absolutely insane. What happens if they
actually vote to go on strike? How the hell do you get them back?[452]
8.41
The ILO view is that it is up to employees to arrange
how they will organise themselves, which has been discussed above. The
committee notes that employees who have any concerns over democratic processes
within unions in relation to strike action have access to section 136 under the
Workplace Relations Act. The use of strike action can be seen as the exercise
of economic power by both unions and employers through a bargaining process.
Generally our view is that if you are talking about economic
coercion by the exercise of a right to strike then that is legitimate. It is
accepted as legitimate under international law. That is collective bargaining.
That is what it is about. An employer has the right to impose economic coercion
through lockouts and the employees collectively can strike as a means of
imposing economic coercion on employers, as long as that is done as part of a
bargaining process for reaching collective agreements.[453]
8.42
The committee majority accepts this view. However, it
understands the Government's tendency to be captive to obsolete rhetoric.
Strike ballots were supposed to be the answer to the once prevailing view that
real workers would happily stay at work if it was not for the militant union 'bosses'.
Such a provision as this was intended as a curb on union 'bosses'. In fact, as
union leaders admit, much of their time is spent dampening the enthusiasm of
their members for industrial action. This provision should be resisted by all
parties interested in maintaining industrial harmony. It presents serious
potential problems for both employers and unions.
Rights against self incrimination
8.43
A fundamental tenet of common law is the right of an
individual not to incriminate themselves. While the government has provided
plausible reasons for overriding this principal of law in the case of
anti-terrorism legislation, the committee has not been provided with evidence
that workers in the building and construction industry represent a threat
comparable to that of terrorist organisations. The removal of their basic legal
right not to incriminate themselves is another characteristic of a law intended
to discriminate against a particular segment of the workforce. The committee
heard evidence from legal practitioners in its Melbourne
hearings on this issue, the first from an industrial lawyer, and the second
from a representative of the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties:
It is...repressive to set up an industrial relations
industry-specific body with coercive powers to compel the production of
documents and compel answers to questions on oath without the privilege against
self-incrimination. Those powers are normally reserved for terrorists and
organised crime and suchlike.[454]
In relation to the privilege against self-incrimination ...we
would say that is an indefensible departure from basic human rights. We have
had in our criminal justice system that privilegethat is, I can refuse to
answer a question if it will expose me to prosecution or punishment...is a fundamental
tenet of our system..... there are limited areas where you might justify
abrogating that privilege, but this is not one of them. There is nothing very
special or exceptional about the alleged criminal activity in these areas.[455]
8.44
The committee's strong views on the request for the
Building Industry Taskforce to be given powers similar to statutory bodies like
the ACCC, ASIC and the ATO is expressed in chapter 3. Suffice to say here that
it is appropriate that regulatory bodies such as the police, ATO and DIMIA
continue to investigate and prosecute any infringement of Australia's
taxation and criminal laws as they affect participants in the construction
industry. There are sufficient powers available to these regulators, including
the right to gather evidence, and it is not appropriate to provide such powers
to compel individuals to provide self-incriminating information.[456]
8.45
The powers sought for the ABC Commissioner in relation
to information gathering should be more clearly defined to ensure that the
rights of the individual are clearly established. Only in this way can the
Senate ensure that workers in the industry do not have lesser legal rights in
comparison with the rest of the workplace.[457]