3.1
This chapter considers the Australian Federal Police's (AFP) progress in improving mental health and diversity in its workforce, its strategic and organisational restructure, key reports and findings from external scrutiny agencies, which were released during or pertained to the 2019–20 year, and its compliance with annual report requirements.
Changes to AFP sensitive investigations
3.2
A number of inquiries and reviews were commenced in the 2019–20 period following concerns raised in relation to recent search warrants executed on members of the press and the issue of balancing national security with the freedom of the press.
3.3
On 4 July 2019, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) was referred an inquiry into the impact of the exercise of law enforcement and intelligence powers on the freedom of the press by the then Attorney-General, the Hon Christian Porter MP. The PJCIS tabled its report in August 2020, providing 16 recommendations that seek to improve processes, training, transparency, reporting, and oversight. As of July 2021, a government response to the report was pending.
3.4
On 23 July 2019, the Senate referred an inquiry to the Environment and Communications References Committee (Communications committee) to examine the adequacy of Commonwealth laws and frameworks covering the disclosure and reporting of sensitive and classified information. The inquiry considered issues including freedom of the press, whistle-blower protection, referral practices, and whether the mechanisms underlying AFP impartiality are sufficient when investigating politically sensitive matters.
3.5
In its report, tabled on 19 May 2021, the Communications committee found that it 'did not receive sufficient evidence to substantiate suggestions of a lack of [AFP] independence in the investigation of those matters'. The Communications committee did, however, recommend changes to Commonwealth legislation to ensure that 'prior to the use of any intrusive or coercive power in relation to a journalist or media organisation, the importance of a free press in Australia's democratic society and broader public interest factors are taken into account'.
3.6
In October 2019, Commissioner Reece Kershaw, Commissioner of the AFP, announced that the AFP had commissioned a review into how it investigates leaks and other sensitive cases, known as the Lawler Review. The report of the Lawler Review was released in February 2020 and offered 24 options, all of which were accepted in principle by the AFP.
3.7
At the Parliamentary Joint Committee for Law Enforcement (committee) public hearing on 28 May 2020 into the examination of the AFP's Annual Report 2018–19, Commissioner Kershaw explained how the decision-making process for AFP sensitive investigations had changed since the review, including how the AFP defines a sensitive investigation and the creation of a board that oversees such investigations:
It is new in the sense that other investigations that traditionally were sitting in other crime areas of the AFP were not deemed sensitive; some of those have now been deemed sensitive…Previously each line area would deal with those matters in a very professional way, but they weren't coalesced into one pool where a board was sitting over the top looking at all of those issues and making sure that we supported our decision-makers at a higher level, given that there's often the national interest, in particular, and the sensitivities around those particular matters. That has been something new. Our investigators, from my own feedback, have actually enjoyed that because they get a greater ability to talk through their strategies with a number of senior officers—these are deputy commissioners that sit on this particular board, as well as assistant commissioners. Collectively, I believe it leads to better support and better outcomes for our officers out there.
3.8
Following on from the above advice, the AFP's Annual Report 2019–20 clarified that the AFP's adoption of a new definition of 'sensitive investigation' allows the AFP to escalate investigations identified as requiring additional supervisory and senior executive oversight and decision-making. Further, the Annual Report 2019–20 noted the establishment of the Sensitive Investigations Oversight Board (SIOB), chaired by the Deputy Commissioner Investigations, to oversight the most sensitive investigations.
3.9
At the more recent hearing on 12 April 2021 for the Annual Report 2019–20, Deputy Commissioner Pointing, Deputy Commissioner for Operation at the AFP, told the committee the SIOB 'enhances the accountability of operational decision-making' and described how it operates:
[W]hat the sensitive investigation oversight committee allows us to do is actually triage sensitive matters to make sure that there's the appropriate accountability across a whole range of areas—operationally, legally and other sensitive matters such as privacy are considered. I have been in law enforcement over 40 years and it is certainly the best overview process that I have seen. It allows input from a whole range of expertise within the organisation. I believe it's delivering better operational outcomes, higher accountability, more effective and well thought through operational decisions that consider risk and how to mitigate risk.
3.10
To improve how it communicates with stakeholders, the AFP is also ceasing to use certain investigative terminology that creates ambiguity. For example, the words 'evaluation’ and ‘assessment’ will cease to be used, and the term ‘referral’ has been replaced with ‘report’ and ‘request’. The AFP is also focusing on considerations of harm, impact, efficiency and opportunity when prioritising investigative activity.
Changes to AFP operating model
3.11
After Commissioner Kershaw was sworn in on 2 October 2019, he commissioned a review from Ernst & Young to ensure the operating model and structure of the AFP was fit for purpose.
3.12
According to the Annual Report 2019–20, in late 2019, in response to the findings of both the Ernst & Young review and the Lawler Review, the AFP governance structure was streamlined to increase the link between strategy and performance and align with the new organisational structure and imperatives. This approach, according to the AFP, supports 'the reduction of red tape, the facilitation of faster decision-making, and an emphasis on data-driven performance monitoring'. The previous committee structure ceased operating in December 2019, with the new arrangements commencing from January 2020.
3.13
The AFP has shifted to a regionalised command structure and is developing capability hubs across the country. It established the National Operations State Services Centre and the Strategy and Performance Office and created the Chief Learning Officer portfolio.
3.14
At this committee's hearing on 28 May 2020 to examine the Annual Report 2018–19, Commissioner Kershaw explained the change to the operating model:
Our decision-makers are now in what we call the regional commands—so you've got eastern, southern, northern, western and central. They are now all, for the first time in a long time, with assistant commissioners in charge. The importance of that is we think that will cut through some of our red tape and bureaucratic processes.
3.15
Commissioner Kershaw advised that the new model is anticipated to provide better outcomes, as it offers improved flexibility in terms of the deployment of resources and improved accountability. For example, as the AFP had seen growth in areas such as organised crime and counterterrorism requiring greater staff numbers in Sydney and Melbourne, the agency had circulated an expression of interest to move 140 officers out of Canberra and into those commands. The AFP had also implemented its first lateral detective program, where qualified detectives are brought into the organisation to build capability quickly without the usual lag time of six or seven years.
Committee view
3.16
The committee would first like to acknowledge the findings of the Environment and Communications References Committee, that the AFP was appropriately independent when investigating politically sensitive matters. The committee welcomes the work undertaken by the AFP to address other recommendations for improvement made in recent external reviews. In particular, the committee commends the AFP for the establishment of the Sensitive Investigations Oversight Board, which appears to have not only addressed concerns regarding how sensitive investigations remain independent, but also improved the effectiveness of the investigations themselves.
3.17
Finally, the committee commends the AFP for acknowledging community concerns regarding press freedoms, and taking steps to reassure the Australian community of continued AFP independence from political interference.
Workforce health
Mental health in the AFP
3.18
Policing is overrepresented in the statistics on work-related mental health injury, and for some time there have been a number of initiatives and other efforts undertaken, or currently underway, to address this issue. This section outlines some recent progress in this space and provides suggestions for how the AFP might use its annual reporting to keep stakeholders informed of progress.
3.19
The AFP Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2018–2023 (Health and Wellbeing Strategy), released in May 2018, provides a long‑term commitment to physical, psychological, organisational and social health for all employees across the AFP. It aims to achieve health protection (empowering staff to self‑care), intervention (timely and appropriate support for staff), and frameworks that provide standards and quality assurance. The Health and Wellbeing Strategy is being phased in over a five year period.
3.20
In early 2018, the results of the Phoenix Australia review into the AFP's approach to mental health services and systems were released, along with the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) audit into managing mental health in the AFP. The AFP accepted all recommendations made and subsequently examined its effectiveness in managing its employees' mental health. The audit and the Phoenix review informed the AFP's development of the Health and Wellbeing Strategy.
3.21
At the committee's hearing on 28 May 2020 into the Annual Report 2018–19, mental health in the AFP was discussed with Commissioner Kershaw, who advised that the AFP was looking to develop 'health hubs' to enable AFP workers to easily see which health services were available to them in different areas. He also advised that the AFP had created a new former and retired members association that was connected to the AFP reserve, which enables officers to maintain their security clearances, stay on the AFP's books as casual employees, and access health services.
3.22
At the more recent hearing into the Annual Report 2019–20, Commissioner Kershaw informed the committee that analysing mental health outcomes for AFP officers was not a simple numbers game, as it was arguable that a rise in mental health claims is 'possibly a good thing because, historically, police—in particular, frontline police—have always been hesitant to report those matters for fear of losing their job and a whole range of things'. The AFP looks deeper into potential mental health concerns by, for example, analysing long-term sick leave rates, and the number of claims and incidents with Comcare.
3.23
Ms Charlotte Tressler, Chief Operating Officer for the AFP, outlined recent work being done to improve the AFP's response to the health needs of AFP officers. In addition to the regular reporting from Comcare, which 'breaks down incidents across a range of metrics', the AFP has also been 'building our reporting capability internally within the AFP as well.' This improved reporting capability encompasses both formal and informal reporting mechanisms. Ms Tressler stated that, for example, 'we have developed dashboards that are available to our assistant commissioners and national managers so that they can see where there might be work health and safety issues that they might need to address'.
3.24
Ms Tressler also informed the committee of two recent reviews, conducted with support from Ernst & Young, which reviewed the Comcare arrangements as well as took a holistic look at the AFP work health and safety framework 'to see where we might continue to improve and monitor our performance and also the support that's being provided to our staff'.
3.25
Commissioner Kershaw further informed the committee of new funding that had been given for the AFP's SHIELD program. The SHIELD program will be a 'comprehensive program of work health and safety mental wellbeing' that will encompass strategies and approaches to address the health impacts of both challenging periods such as the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the impacts of ongoing confronting work in child protection and similar areas. Commissioner Kershaw suggested it may be useful for the AFP to include SHIELD activities in the next AFP annual report.
3.26
The Annual Report 2019–20 itself does not include the level of detail that AFP witnesses provided at the hearing; however, it does contain some information on actions taken by the AFP to address the mental health challenges of the work undertaken by AFP officers, including:
mental readiness training to more than 1600 AFP appointees, providing tools to help them cope with stress and improve their mental health and resilience;
increasing the presence of support services in regional and remote areas, including engagement of additional regional nurses;
establishing a telehealth model of service delivery;
increasing the number of mental health practitioners;
improving members’ Comcare claim experience; and
educating members about how to support their own health and wellbeing and that of their colleagues, family and friends.
Committee view
3.27
In the committee's report on the examination of the AFP Annual Report 2018–19, the committee noted there were a number of reports and recommendations relating to mental health in the AFP which had, at that time, been recently released or were being implemented by the AFP. The committee's examination report suggested that due to the 'ongoing interest in the wellbeing of AFP employees, the AFP might consider including some discussion of the implementation status of recommendations arising from reviews in its future annual reports.'
3.28
The committee commends the AFP for responding to that recommendation by including some information in the current annual report on steps being taken to support the mental health challenges inherent in the work being undertaken by AFP staff. Further details, such as that provided at the annual report examination hearing, may be usefully included in future annual reports where possible.
External scrutiny
3.29
The AFP is subject to a range of oversight and accountability mechanisms, including those provided through the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity (ACLEI), the ANAO, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, and various Parliamentary committees. The following section briefly summarises key reports and findings released which relate to the AFP for the 2019–20 year.
ACLEI investigations
3.30
ACLEI investigates corruption issues involving staff members and former staff members of several agencies, including the AFP (and Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Policing).
3.31
The ACLEI annual report for 2019–20 summarises a final investigation report provided to the Attorney-General by the Integrity Commissioner regarding the misuse of an official credit card by an AFP appointee. The Integrity Commissioner made one finding of corrupt conduct against the AFP Federal Agent, finding the agent withdrew a total of $45 050 in cash for their own benefit.
3.32
ACLEI was notified of 63 corruption issues by the AFP Commissioner in 2019–20, and had 19 corruption issues relating to the AFP referred to it by other sources. During the period, of the 63 referrals from the AFP, ACLEI commenced investigations into 33, took no further action on 26, and had four under assessment. Of the 19 referrals from other sources, ACLEI commenced investigations into nine, took no further action on five, and had five under assessment. Two investigations were commenced on the initiative of the Integrity Commissioner.
3.33
While the rate of referrals from the AFP has remained stable over the past three years, the referrals from other sources more than doubled in 2019–20. A number of factors may be contributing to the increase, and ACLEI's annual report did not provide specific comment on the increase in externally referred matters relating to the AFP, nor was this issue discussed in the AFP Annual Report 2019–20.
Commonwealth Ombudsman
3.34
The Commonwealth Ombudsman (Ombudsman) provides independent oversight of the AFP by inspecting its records to ensure it has complied with requirements stipulated in:
the Surveillance Devices Act 2004;
the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Telecommunications Act); and
the Crimes Act 1914 (Crimes Act) in relation to the AFP's controlled operations.
3.35
The Ombudsman also assesses the adequacy of the AFP's complaints handling.
Surveillance devices
3.36
Under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, specified law enforcement agencies can covertly use surveillance devices when investigating certain offences. Each agency's compliance with the requirements stipulated in the Act is independently assessed by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman presents six‑monthly inspection reports which provide the results of its inspections carried out in that period. The inspections typically consider surveillance device records that expired during previous reporting periods.
3.37
The Commonwealth Ombudsman's six-monthly inspection reports of the AFP for the period of 1 July to 31 December 2019 and 1 January to 30 June 2020 were released in March and September 2020.
3.38
In its July to December 2019 review, the most significant issues identified were, firstly, the use and retrieval of surveillance devices without proper authority and, secondly, the lack of adherence to the requirements for internally issued emergency and tracking device authorisations.
3.39
With respect to the first issue, the AFP disclosed one instance where it had inadvertently used a surveillance device in a foreign country and consequently conducted extraterritorial surveillance without meeting requirements. The AFP advised that within 48 hours of identifying this issue, it had ceased collecting protected information extraterritorially and quarantined the affected protected information.
3.40
With regards to the second issue, the Ombudsman identified that an application for a tracking device authorisation was applied for, and relied upon, to retrieve a tracking device that had been previously installed under a surveillance device warrant. The Ombudsman was of the view that the AFP should have applied to an eligible judge or nominated AAT member for a retrieval warrant to retrieve the device, rather than seeking a tracking device authorisation. The AFP was seeking internal legal advice on the issue, and the Ombudsman intends to monitor the matter at future reviews.
3.41
The Ombudsman also identified:
instances where the AFP appeared to have relied on written records of authorisations to retrieve tracking devices, despite the authorisations not specifically authorising their retrieval. The AFP was considering the Ombudsman's suggestion that it update its written templates to include details of whether the tracking device authorisation also authorises retrieval;
an instance where the written record for the application for an emergency authorisation was in the form of a tracking device authorisation which could lead to intrusion on privacy without proper authority. While this instance was the result of an administrative error, the AFP intended to provide additional training to staff;
two tracking device authorisations that were given in relation to an investigation of a territory-based offence, without any reference to a Commonwealth offence which may not satisfy the requirements of the legislation. The AFP quarantined protected information obtained and provided the Ombudsman with legal advice it had obtained on the issue which will be considered in the Ombudsman's next report; and
a number of instances where the endorsement of an extension or variation of a warrant was completed on an adhesive label that was attached to the original warrant, instead of the details being directly recorded onto the original warrant, and was not signed or dated. The AFP sought legal advice to assure itself that the practice of using adhesive labels is compliant with requirements.
3.42
Additionally, a small number of errors or omissions in the AFP’s reports to the Minister under s. 49 of the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 were identified at inspections, following which the AFP sent amended reports to the Minister.
3.43
In its review of the January to June 2020 period, the Ombudsman identified:
an instance where the extension of a warrant was made using an adhesive label but the eligible Judge or nominated AAT member did not sign or date across the edge of the label and onto the warrant itself, meaning that the Ombudsman could not be assured the label was affixed to the original warrant in their presence. The AFP's updated guidance should address this issue;
an instance where the affidavit the AFP used to obtain two warrants did not include privacy considerations, and an affidavit which did not include information about an offence that was included on the warrant. The AFP was advised to seek legal advice regarding the validity of the warrant and any evidence it obtained and to review its quality assurance mechanisms;
that procedural and technical errors had combined to accidentally activate a surveillance device outside of Australia. The AFP quarantined the files created by the activation, and advised it was investigating more robust methods to prevent devices being accidentally activated;
instances where the tracking device authorisation record did not include wording to specifically authorise the retrieval of tracking devices which raised questions about whether the tracking devices were retrieved with lawful authority. The AFP advised that it had updated its template to include explicit wording; and
that AFP action sheets (a key transparency and accountability mechanism that provides visibility to the Minister of the way in which agencies use surveillance devices) did not contain sufficient information about how the AFP executed warrants and authorisations. The Ombudsman suggested the AFP remind its officers of the importance of including appropriate detail in action sheets and was invited to provide feedback to AFP teams.
3.44
The AFP also disclosed an instance where it did not revoke a retrieval warrant in a timely manner after the relevant device was retrieved.
Telecommunications interception and stored communication records
3.45
Under the Telecommunications Act, specified law enforcement agencies are able to lawfully access individuals’ telecommunications data and/or stored communications when investigating certain offences. Agencies have the power to internally authorise access to metadata; however, if an agency wishes to access telecommunications data that will identify a journalist’s source or the content of the communication, it must apply for a warrant.
3.46
Each agency's compliance with the requirements in the Telecommunications Act is independently assessed by the Ombudsman, with the results publicly reported. At time of writing this report, July 2021, the Ombudsman findings in relation to the Telecommunications Act for the period of 1 July 2019 to 30 June 2020 had not been released.
Controlled operations
3.47
Under the Crimes Act, the AFP (as well as other agencies) may grant an authority to authorise a controlled operation. Controlled operations are covert operations carried out for the purpose of obtaining evidence that may lead to the prosecution of a person for a serious Commonwealth offence. Participants involved in such operations are protected from criminal responsibility and indemnified against civil liabilities that may arise as a result of activities undertaken during the course of the operation, provided that conditions are met.
3.48
The Ombudsman performs independent oversight of this power by inspecting agencies' records, at least once every 12 months, to determine compliance with the Crimes Act. The Ombudsman annually releases its Report on the Commonwealth Ombudsman's activities in monitoring controlled operations, which presents the results of its inspections.
3.49
The Ombudsman assesses compliance based on records made available at the inspection, discussions with agency staff, observations of agencies’ processes through information provided, and agencies’ remedial action in response to any identified issues.
3.50
According to the AFP Annual Report 2018–19, for the review period covering 2018–19 the Ombudsman conducted one inspection visit under Part V in April 2019.
3.51
The Annual Report 2019–20 advised that, at the time of report writing, while the findings from the 2018–19 controlled operations review were yet to be published, preliminary discussions indicated that the Ombudsman would make a number of observations regarding process improvements, but no significant or systemic issues were expected to be identified. The Ombudsman has since published a report on the controlled operations review for 2018–19 and, as anticipated by the AFP, the Ombudsman found:
In 2018-19 we identified instances of participants or activities of controlled operations not being authorised, but acknowledge the number of instances has decreased from previous years. We consider these to be isolated errors rather than representing an ongoing systemic issue.
3.52
The Annual Report 2019–20 further advised that the 2019–20 inspection due to commence in April 2020 was rescheduled for June 2020 due to COVID-19 and carried out in a shortened format. The Ombudsman's controlled operations report for the 2019–20 period was subsequently published and found:
four instances where the Ombudsman was unable to determine that civilian participant conduct was under law enforcement officer direction;
a number of instances where required considerations were missing from applications for authorities and variations of authorities;
one instance where the written record of urgent application did not contain required information;
that the AFP’s general register did not include fields for all of the requirements under the Crimes Act; and
three errors in the six-monthly reports the AFP provides to the Ombudsman and Minister regarding controlled operations.
3.53
In each of the above instances, the AFP provided an explanation or agreed to improve training or amend procedures to address concerns raised, and the Ombudsman's report outlined it would review those changes in its next inspection report.
Complaints management
3.54
The AFP is responsible for resolving complaints about the actions of AFP appointees; however, the Ombudsman reports to the Parliament annually on the comprehensiveness and adequacy of the AFP’s complaint handling.
3.55
AFP annual reports record the number of complaints received about AFP appointees (that is, Deputy Commissioners, employees, secondees, and consultants) each year and categorises them by severity (tier one being the least serious and tier four being the most serious and likely a corruption issue).
3.56
Overall, there has been a decreasing trend in the number of complaints received by the AFP over the last three years. In 2019–20 the AFP received a total of 306 complaints, a decrease of 16.16 per cent from the previous year. The number of new alleged breaches of the AFP Code of Conduct resulting from these complaints was 586, 10.26 per cent lower than the previous period. In 2018–19, the AFP received 365 complaints which was 14.7 per cent less than the 428 complaints received in 2017–18.
3.57
The Ombudsman's report for the period 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (AFP Complaints Report 2018–2019) was only released in September 2020 and is therefore covered here. The AFP Complaints Report 2018–2019 provided the Ombudsman's findings from the single review it conducted in April 2019, where it monitored and assessed the progress the AFP had made against the Ombudsman’s previous findings.
3.58
The AFP Complaints Report 2018–2019 pointed out that, despite the AFP taking action to remedy previously identified issues around timeliness benchmarks, communication with complainants and conflicts of interest declarations by the Ombudsman over the past 10 years, 'there has not been substantive improvement in these areas and we identified the same issues during this review'.
3.59
The Ombudsman identified that, overall, the AFP’s administration of how issues are dealt with is comprehensive and adequate in relation to Category 3 and 4 complaints, while the AFP is considering ways to improve its handling of Category 1 and 2 complaints.
3.60
The Ombudsman found that the time the AFP took to complete Category 1 and 2 complaints was consistently outside internal timeliness benchmarks. With regards to Category 3 complaints, deficiencies in the management of conflicts of interest and how the AFP communicated with parties to complaints were also identified. The Ombudsman made four recommendations and 10 suggestions to assist the AFP to improve the management of complaints. The Ombudsman was satisfied that the issues identified did not have an adverse impact on the final outcome of associated complaints.
3.61
The AFP acknowledged the recommendations and undertook to update guidance material, practices and procedures. At that time, the Ombudsman was expected to assess and monitor AFP remedial actions at future reviews.
3.62
The Ombudsman's AFP Complaints Report for the 2019–2020 period was subsequently published in January 2021, and as with the previous report, noted that the commonly identified issues 'related to meeting timeliness benchmarks, communication with complainants and declaring conflicts of interest that might impact staff’s ability to investigate a complaint' were again found in the 2019–2020 period.
3.63
The Ombudsman did note, however, that the issues 'largely related to the AFP’s handling of Category 1 and 2 matters, which involve less serious conduct and are generally handled at a local level' and concluded that 'the AFP’s handling of Category 3 and 4 complaints, which allege serious misconduct or corruption, was comprehensive and accurate'.
3.64
The Ombudsman made 20 recommendations to assist the AFP to improve its management of complaints and noted that the AFP was considering methods to improve its administration of Category 1 and 2 complaints. The Ombudsman noted it will monitor the effectiveness of AFP improvements at future reviews, which will also be monitored by the committee.
Australian Information Commissioner
3.65
The Australian Information Commissioner (Information Commissioner) is responsible for upholding privacy and freedom of information (FOI) rights and overseeing government information management policy.
3.66
In its annual report for 2019–20, the Information Commissioner advised that the AFP was one of several agencies which decided fewer than 50 per cent of FOI requests within the statutory timeframes required (30 days) in the 2019–20 period. However, the Information Commissioner acknowledged that some response times may have been affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
3.67
During 2019–20, the Information Commissioner made four decisions concerning AFP FOI requests. Three decisions were varied but did not provide the applicant with greater access to the information contained in the documents, and one decision was affirmed.
Committee view
3.68
The committee acknowledges the reports and findings of ACLEI, the Information Commissioner and the Ombudsman. These eternal reviews are important oversight mechanisms.
3.69
The committee notes the Ombudsman found that concerns it raised in past reports, in relation to the way the AFP handles complaints, continued to be raised in its latest report for 2019–20. While it is noted that these issues are not considered to be of high importance, they are longstanding, and the committee considers the AFP should place greater emphasis on addressing these concerns.
Parliamentary inquiries
3.70
In June 2020, the PJCIS commenced an inquiry into AFP powers. The PJCIS is reviewing the operation, effectiveness and implications of police powers in relation to terrorism, control orders and preventative detention orders, and for continuing detention orders. At the time of writing, July 2021, the report of the inquiry has not been finalised.
3.71
In June 2020, this committee commenced an inquiry into the impacts of COVID-19 on criminal activity and law enforcement. The report, published on 21 June 2021, considered, among other things, how the pandemic impacted the prevalence of crime types of specific interest to the AFP. The one recommendation specific to the AFP was for the AFP to retain the Joint Intelligence Group 'while any COVID-19 security risks remain, so they can continue to coordinate efforts across Australian law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and international partners'.
ACT Policing oversight
3.72
There have been calls for the ACT Integrity Commission to take carriage of ACT Policing matters; however, in March 2020 the then Attorney-General was quoted in media as stating that 'any delineation between ACT Policing and the broader AFP would be legally and practically problematic'.
3.73
A member of the ACT Government has previously flagged that oversight of local policing by ACLEI is problematic because only the responsible federal minister can initiate inquiries rather than the responsible territory minister.
AFP annual report compliance
3.74
As a Commonwealth entity, the AFP is required to comply with the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (PGPA Act). The PGPA Act requires entities to provide an annual report to the responsible Minister for presentation to the Parliament on its activities during the period; include a copy of its annual performance statements in the report; and ensure its report complies with the requirements in the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Rule 2014 (PGPA Rule).
3.75
The PGPA Rule 2014 sets out presentation guidelines for annual reports, as well specific matters that must be included in reports such as financial performance, management and accountability sections.
3.76
Each annual report of the AFP must also meet the requirements stipulated in the AFP Act. The AFP Act requires that each annual report contain particulars of the agency's conduct issues and the actions taken in relation to these issues during the year.
3.77
As mentioned earlier, AFP annual reports contain additional yearly reports which fulfil its obligations under the following pieces of legislation:
Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, the AFP is required to provide this committee with an annual report that contains the number of matters investigated and the number and results of applications for restraining orders and unexplained wealth orders.
Under the Witness Protection Act 1994, the AFP Commissioner must keep the Minister informed of the general operations, performance and effectiveness of the National Witness Protection Program, and the Minister must present an annual report on these matters to Parliament.
Under the Crimes Act, the AFP is required to provide annual information on delayed notification search warrants to the Minister, which must be tabled in Parliament.
3.78
Based on the committee's assessment of the Annual Report 2019–20, all of these requirements have been fulfilled with the following exceptions:
The Annual Report 2019–20 report does not include the salary ranges available for APS employees by classification level and Indigenous employment data, which are mandatory requirements under the PGPA Rule.
On page 154, there is a list of statistical and other information which is missing some required data, such as statistics on the number of ongoing and non-ongoing employees who identify as Indigenous.
3.79
In addition, there appears to be a trend of providing less and less statistical information in annual reports over the past three financial periods. For example, the AFP's Annual Report 2017–18 provided three tables that have not been included in the Annual Report 2018–19 or the Annual Report 2019–20. The tables specified the number of AFP staff identifying as Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait Islander Australians by their sworn status and employment group, as well as by location and gender. A table providing the number of AFP staff identifying as culturally and linguistically diverse by their sworn status and employment group was also provided in the Annual Report 2017–18 but not in the Annual Report 2018–19 or the Annual Report 2019–20.
3.80
Additionally, while the Annual Report 2019–20 provides a table which distinguishes whether it has met the PGPA Rule requirements, it has not outlined whether it has met requirements stipulated under the AFP Act, the Crimes Act, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, and the Witness Protection Act 1994. While this is not a requirement of any legislation, it may be helpful to readers as an access aid.
3.81
The committee thanks the AFP for providing a satisfactory annual report and commends the organisation for its work during the year.