2.1
The annual reports for 2020-21 and 2021-22 were broadly positive regarding the performance of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission (ACIC). For instance, Mr Matthew Rippon, Acting Chief Executive Officer (CEO), ACIC, told the committee:
Reflecting on this two-year reporting window, the volume and tempo of our work remains high, with serious and organised crime networks who target this country adapting their business models through the pandemic to remain a constant threat to Australians. Notwithstanding this threat, there are some compelling highlights from the two-year reporting window which demonstrate the agency's efforts and effectiveness. By focusing on the highest-harm serious and organised crime actors and their networks, our criminal intelligence efforts, characterised by the application of the ACIC's unique collection and assessment capabilities, yielded significant results, contributing to the disruption of 107 criminal entities in direct partnership with the AFP, state and territory police forces and Commonwealth and international partners. Nothing the ACIC does is done alone; it's all in partnership. In addition, some 29,741 information and intelligence products were disseminated to around 271 stakeholders. Drugs and precursors with an estimated street value of $2.8 billion, and $90.5 million in cash were seized over those periods.
2.2
This chapter examines the following key issues relating to the ACIC’s performance in 2020-21 and 2021-22:
operational highlights and key corporate developments; and
the performance framework and results.
2.3
The chapter concludes by providing the committee’s view on the ACIC’s performance and the matters discussed in the report.
Operational highlights and key corporate developments
Operation Ironside
2.4
In 2020-21, the ACIC highlighted its assistance with Operation Ironside, which was led by the Australian Federal Police (AFP), in parallel with the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation. The ACIC explained that the covert operations ‘involved the management and access of a dedicated encrypted communications platform called ANØM, which allowed ‘law enforcement agencies around the world to target, identify and disrupt alleged criminal operations’.
2.5
The ACIC reported that it played a unique role in assisting Operation Ironside and that during 2020-21:
A large proportion of our analytical workforce was seconded to the AFP during the operation’s final stages, and we were involved in actioning unique insights to maximise effect. We helped to maximise the success of the operation and support our partners to achieve our vision of an Australia hostile to criminal exploitation.
2.6
While utilising a large proportion of analytical staff, the ACIC emphasised that:
Our workforce demonstrated agility and the ability to pivot to support new strategic priorities during Operation Ironside, while maintaining the significant work that we do every day to reduce serious and organised crime threats of most harm to Australians.
Operation Phobetor
2.7
In 2021-22, in partnership with the United States Department of Homeland Security, the ACIC uncovered a ‘sophisticated transnational organised crime network’ by identifying the entities involved and their crime methodology. The ACIC shared intelligence insights with its partners, the NSW Police Force (NSWPF) and the AFP, in the joint task force Operation PHOBETOR, which targets ‘high-level criminals, outlaw motorcycle gangs and drug importers’.
2.8
The ACIC detailed the outcome of the task force:
The task force partners focused on the crime network’s money laundering activities across Sydney, leading to the NSWPF State Crime Command’s Organised Crime Squad carrying out 4 search warrants and arresting offenders in April 2022.
During the searches, officers seized money counters, mobile phones, laptops, USB storage devices, 3 cryptocurrency automatic teller machines and approximately $4.7 million in cash. Approximately 5 kilograms of prohibited drugs believed to have been illegally imported into Australia, including heroin, methylamphetamine and cocaine, were also seized.
National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program
2.9
The National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program began in August 2016 and provides ‘leading-edge, coordinated national research and intelligence on illicit drugs and licit drugs that can be abused, with a specific focus on methylamphetamine and other high-risk substances’. The wastewater program is funded from the ACIC annual budgetary allocation. Currently, it covers around 56 per cent of the Australian population, which equates to about 14.1 million people.
2.10
The committee examined whether there would be any benefit in expanding the wastewater program by population or drug type, for example, to identify regional towns that may have a major drug problem.
2.11
Mr Jeremy Johnson, Executive Director, Business and Partnerships, ACIC, explained that because the program ‘is at a population level, [it] is a measure of consumption across the entire community’. He emphasised that although they are always looking to expand partnerships in areas of need, he understands the current cohort is statistically significant. He cautioned that additional areas would also require the ability to break down meaningful statistics in those areas. For example, if ‘it’s a catchment area that covers a very large geographic area and area of the population, it might not help us have much more meaningful data within that area’.
2.12
In relation to identifying particular locations of concern, Mr Johnson explained:
…there are other ways of identifying particular locations that may have a problem. Local police tend to see it. Local health authorities tend to see it. So we wouldn't necessarily use the wastewater program to identify that place, but, once it was identified, then potentially, even if it wasn't part of the full program, you could do wastewater to confirm suspicions or to do something if it was of value at a population level in that area.
We would use a number of other collection capabilities to provide a holistic picture of a potential problem or a hotspot within a regional area of Australia or a capital city. Then we would work very closely with state and territory counterparts and the AFP, where appropriate, to apply more of an intelligence and law enforcement effort to try and illuminate the serious and organised crime groups which might be capitalising on a particular market in either regional or capital cities. We're very conscious of making sure that we don't leave country and regional Australia in the dark here. It's really important that we look at this problem across the entire country as best we can, and we've got a really good spread across both regional and capital city wastewater testing sites.
Drug seizures and research
2.14
Mr Rippon highlighted that over the reporting period under examination, the ACIC’s intelligence contributed to the seizure of drugs and precursors with a combined estimated street value of $2.8 billion.
2.15
At the time of the hearing, the committee had just commenced an inquiry into the challenges and opportunities for law enforcement in relation to illicit drugs in Australia. The committee was therefore interested in exploring several issues with the ACIC.
2.16
The committee discussed the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on drug consumption, and Mr Rippon reported:
…we did see, over that fifth year of the wastewater program, some changes: some increases in prices and some impact on drug purity as well, as the amount of drugs dwindled and went down in Australia for that fifth year of the wastewater program. But they have increased now to pre-COVID levels.
2.17
The committee questioned ACIC officials about the impact of seizures on the Australian drug market, including availability and price. Ms Virginia Hartley, Acting Deputy CEO, Intelligence, ACIC, replied that the drug market is ‘strong and resilient and can bounce back after seizures’, with Mr Rippon adding that:
Organised crime groups factor into their business model losses—big losses. The big organised crime groups lose a tonne on the water or a tonne to interdiction by law enforcement. The good transnational serious and organised crime groups have another vessel on the way already.
2.18
Mr Rippon advised that observations from the wastewater program, seizure data and other sources indicate that ‘multi-hundred-kilo’ seizures result in an ‘immediate impact’ on drug supply and consumption; however, only for a short period:
So there is a period between two and six months from the time of the seizure where there is an opening for other arms of the community and government to apply harm reduction strategies—health strategies and education strategies. But it's only a small window.
2.19
When asked about the level of coordination with public health messaging and health interventions, Mr Rippon indicated:
Over a 28-year career now, I've seen some really good examples of that. I've seen health and education representatives standing up with police and law enforcement at media conferences to get messaging across to the broader community and I've seen and heard of a range of programs that are timed to try to meet law enforcement efforts, but it's tricky. Sharing intelligence between intelligence agencies and policing agencies has come a long way, but that was a struggle 10 or 15 years ago. If you can imagine the time it's taken for us to be in the very strong position we're in at the moment with our relationships across law enforcement and intelligence, it's a similar journey that you need to take with the other arms of health, education et cetera. And, like I said, it's a courageous one but it's an important one.
2.20
In response to questioning regarding the street value and size of the illegal drug market, in particular cannabis, the ACIC advised that the 2019-20 Illicit Drug Data Report estimated the street value of amphetamines, MDMA, cannabis, cocaine and heroin seized nationally to be $9.72 billion, with a breakdown as follows:
Amphetamines: $8.46 billion
Cannabis: $293 million, and
2.21
The ACIC added that ‘cannabis continues to be the most consumed illicit drug world-wide’. It is the ‘largest illicit drug market in Australia’ and accounts for the ‘greatest proportion of national drug seizures and arrests’. However, the ACIC pointed out that it is ‘difficult to quantify the exact size of the illicit drug market’, and that the agency relies on a range of data sources to access the scale of illicit drug activity in Australia.
Improved information and intelligence systems
2.22
The ACIC provides a range of policing information systems that enable Australian police agencies to share essential policing information with each other. During 2020-21 and 2021-22, the ACIC reported that it significantly enhanced and improved several of its information and intelligence systems which are outlined below.
Australian Firearms Information Network
2.23
In 2020-21, the ACIC completed the Australian Firearms Information Network (AFIN) integration project, enabling ACIC partner agencies to provide firearms data directly to the AFIN, providing national access to ‘detailed, historical and near-real time, cross-jurisdictional firearms information to improve safety’.
National Criminal Investigation DNA Database
2.24
In 2020, the National Criminal Investigation DNA Database was upgraded with advanced software, enabling all state and territory law enforcement agencies to use crime scene evidence to perform familial searches against the national DNA dataset and identify missing persons and disaster victims.
National Criminal Intelligence System
2.25
The National Criminal Intelligence System (NCIS) securely connects law enforcement and intelligence agencies, enabling them to share information nationally in a targeted, timely and relevant way. In March 2021, the NCIS began to be rolled out to some law enforcement partners to use in active operations for the first time. In 2021-22, incident datasets from Queensland Police Service, Victoria Police and Western Australia Police Force were shared through the NCIS. In 2022-23, it is expected that incident data for the NSWPF will be incorporated in the NCIS, as well as the remaining four police agencies and other datasets. The ACIC will also continue the rollout to operational police.
National Automated Fingerprint Identification System
2.26
The National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) will be replaced with a new software platform called ‘NAFIS NextGen’ by May 2023. The ACIC stated that the NAFIS NextGen would allow the agency to ‘deliver an upgraded fully supported system, with protected government cloud capability, advanced latent fingerprint processing and integration with partner agency systems’. The system is also expected to offer a new range of capabilities, including increased automation of standard tasks to free up experts for higher-value work.
Organisational structure reforms
2.27
Several changes were made to the ACIC’s organisational structure during the reporting periods. In 2020-21, three new positions were created, including a Deputy CEO of Intelligence, Deputy CEO of Corporate, and Executive Director of Business and Partnerships, to allow the agency to focus on its core areas of activity.
2.28
In January 2022, the ACIC created the Executive Director Covert Collections and Insights position and restructured the Intelligence Group to ensure it is best positioned to carry out its operations and other functions. The agency also established the Intelligence and Information Systems Division to strengthen its enabling capability.
2.29
In support of the ACIC structural changes, Mr Rippon, explained to the committee it was important that the ACIC provided ‘unique’ intelligence service capabilities to its partners, and that this required the right leadership. Mr Rippon advised that for this reason, the ACIC recruited several very experienced senior officers from the national intelligence community to lead some of its more sensitive capability work, particularly collections and insights.
Increased number of examiners
2.30
During 2020-21, the ACIC created an Examinations Branch within the Intelligence Group to ensure its coercive powers were at ‘the centre of the agency’s operational effort’. The Intelligence Group also moved to a ‘north-south’ operating model to ensure a coordinated national focus on transnational serious and organised crime threats facing Australia.
2.31
Subsequently, in December 2021, the former Minister for Home Affairs appointed three new examiners, bringing the total number of examiners to six (including four full-time and two part-time).
2.32
Mr Rippon highlighted the value of having three additional examiners, noting they are a ‘key tool in fighting organised crime’. He advised that the additional examiners, based in Perth, Melbourne, and Queensland, provide national capability and coverage, allowing the ACIC to deploy coercive examinations across the country more easily.
Significant legislation changes
2.33
During 2021-22, three significant changes were made to the ACIC’s legislative framework. These are discussed below.
Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Act 2021
2.34
In July 2021, the Telecommunications Legislation Amendment (International Production Orders) Act 2021 established the new international production order (IPO) framework under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (TIA Act).
2.35
The ACIC explained that the IPO framework ‘enables Commonwealth, state and territory agencies to seek data and communications, via the Australian Designated Authority, from communications service providers in foreign countries with which Australia has a designated agreement.’ Importantly, the ACIC can access powers to seek information connected with the investigation of an offence of a serious nature. Its use of the powers will be overseen by the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021
2.36
In September 2021, the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021 (SLAID Act) commenced, providing the ACIC and the AFP with ‘powers to investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime, particularly where criminal networks are hiding behind anonymising technology or operating on the dark web to facilitate their criminal activities’. The SLAID Act provides the ACIC and the AFP with three warrant types, including network activity warrants, data disruption warrants and account takeover warrants.
Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Act 2021
2.37
In June 2022, the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Act 2021 amended the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (ACC Act) to allow the ACIC to conduct criminal intelligence assessments as part of its background checking process for Aviation Security Identification Cards or a Maritime Security Identification Cards.
2.38
The ACIC advised that the process will reduce the ‘ability of individuals with links to serious and organised crime to gain access to our airports, seaports and other Commonwealth sites’ and that the agency ‘will continue expanding its capability to conduct these assessments progressively over the next
12 months to reach full capability in June 2023’.
2.39
Ms Hartley, told the committee that the criminal intelligence assessment team had conducted ‘around 50,000 checks’ to date and that a smaller proportion, around 25,000, were ‘referred for further checking’ as they had matched against some of the ACIC’s ‘indices or traces’.
External oversight
2.40
During the reporting period, the work of the ACIC continued to be overseen by other parliamentary committees, the ACIC Board and agencies such as the Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), the Commonwealth Ombudsman, Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity and the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security.
Australian National Audit Office
2.41
For instance, in June 2022, the ANAO presented a report on the ‘Management of Staff Leave in the Australian Public Service’, which included the ACIC. The report contained four recommendations, two of which were related to the ACIC. The recommendations focused on entities ensuring the use of long service leave complies with relevant frameworks and requirements and that they have systems and controls in place to support managing flexible leave provisions in enterprise agreements and determinations. These recommendations were accepted and actioned by the ACIC.
Commonwealth Ombudsman
2.42
Throughout 2020-21 and 2021-22, a range of inspections were carried out by the Commonwealth Ombudsman to examine ACIC compliance with statutory requirements governing the use of its powers, including records relating to its use of controlled operations under Part IAB of the Crimes Act 1914, the powers accessed under the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the TIA Act. A range of suggestions were made to the ACIC to improve their compliance, which the ACIC agreed to action. The results of the inspections of ACIC records become publicly available once the Minister has tabled them in Parliament.
2.43
With the enactment of the SLAID Act, the Commonwealth Ombudsman now oversees the ACIC’s use of data disruption and account takeover warrants. In line with its new oversight role, the Commonwealth Ombudsman inspected
16 computer access warrant records and conducted a ‘health check’ review of the ACIC’s data disruption warrant policy, procedures, and guidance.
2.44
No compliance findings were made regarding the ACIC’s computer access warrant records, and the Commonwealth Ombudsman did not identify any non-compliance issues during the ‘health check’ review. However, as a matter of better practice, it did suggest that the ACIC develop a definition of the term ‘material loss or damage to one or more persons lawfully using a computer’. The ACIC has since formed a preliminary definition and is developing a template to notify the Commonwealth Ombudsman that material loss or damage has occurred under a data disruption warrant.
Performance measurement framework and results
2.45
During 2020-21 and 2021-22, the ACIC assessed its performance against one outcome and one program specified in the Home Affairs Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS). There were minor wording changes for the outcome and program between the years, as detailed in table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1: ACIC outcome and program structure for 2020-21 and 2021-22
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Outcome 1: To make Australia safer through improved national ability to discover, understand and respond to current and emerging crime threats and criminal justice issues, including the ability to connect police and law enforcement to essential criminal intelligence, policing knowledge and information through collaborative national information systems and services.
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Outcome 1: To protect Australia from criminal threats through coordinating a strategic response and the collection, assessment and dissemination of intelligence and policing information.
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Program 1.1: The ACIC will improve the national ability to respond to crime affecting Australia through the discovery and understanding of new and emerging crime threats—working with and connecting partners to build the picture of crime impacting Australia. The ACIC will respond to serious and organised crime threats by developing new prevention and disruption strategies that disable or dismantle criminal groups through collaborative enforcement, as well as informing and influencing regulations, policy or legislative responses that make Australia safe from criminal threats. The ACIC will contribute to or lead nationally coordinated actions and activities through Board-approved special investigations, special intelligence operations and joint taskforces. The ACIC will provide high-quality national policing knowledge and information systems, and service that support the Australian policing community and will ensure controlled access to appropriate information, including by accredited third parties in relation to criminal history checks.
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Program 1.1: The ACIC supports the protection of Australia from criminal threats through developing and coordinating innovative disruption strategies that disable or dismantle criminal groups. The ACIC, through Board-approved special investigations and special operations collects, assesses and disseminates criminal intelligence to improve the national ability to respond to crime affecting Australia. The ACIC provides high-quality national policing information systems and services to commonwealth and law enforcement partners and keeps the community safe through delivery of background checking services to support employment or entitlement decisions.
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Source: Commonwealth of Australia, Home Affairs PBS 2020-21, p. 95; and Commonwealth of Australia, Home Affairs PBS 2021-22, pp. 91 and 94.
2.46
The Home Affairs PBS 2021-22 stated that as the ACIC works collaboratively with Commonwealth law enforcement and national security partners to protect Australia from transnational serious and organised crime, these agencies also contribute to the ACIC’s sole outcome.
Revised performance framework
2.47
In 2020-21, the ACIC revised its performance measurement framework to align with the agency’s key areas of activity, as outlined in the ACC Act. The revised framework sets out three broad areas of activity, including:
(1)
‘Criminal intelligence delivery’—includes performance criterions one to six.
(2)
‘National policing information and systems and services’—includes performance criterions seven to 11.
(3)
‘The National Police Checking Service’—includes performance criterions 12 to 14.
2.48
The revised framework included 14 performance criteria and, for most criteria, several corresponding measures and targets. The agency reported against the framework for the first time in 2020-21.
2.49
The ACIC advised that its ‘performance metrics are reviewed annually to ensure they remain fit for purpose and accurately capture the performance of the ACIC’.
Stakeholder survey amendments
2.50
The ACIC advised that it conducts an annual stakeholder survey to understand stakeholders’ perceptions and satisfaction levels with its delivery of information systems and services.
2.51
In 2021-22, the ACIC engaged an independent contractor to redevelop and renew its stakeholder survey, and several changes were made. The survey compromised an interview with the head of each organisation or senior staff and a questionnaire to collect qualitative and quantitative data.
2.52
The survey was confined to a smaller number of individuals across the ACIC’s stakeholders, and it primarily targeted ACIC Board-member agencies, the National Intelligence Community and industry partners, and internal partners with police liaison officers in Canberra. In total, the renewed survey attracted 34 responses.
2.53
The committee queried why the survey was confined to a smaller number of respondents than previously. ACIC officials clarified that the same number of entities were approached; but they targeted individuals that use the ACIC’s services regularly as they would be in a better position to comment. Previously, the survey had been distributed to a large number of individuals who had very little interaction with the ACIC’s services, which led to low response rates.
2.54
Responses to the stakeholder survey helped to inform the ACIC about its annual performance, which is discussed in greater detail below.
Performance results
2.55
In 2020-21, the ACIC summarised its results using three scores: ‘met’, ‘partially met’ and ‘not met’. In 2021-22, an additional score was used—‘substantially met’. A criterion is assessed as:
‘Not met’—if no indicators are met;
‘Partially met’—if 1 of 2, or 2 of 4 indicators are met; and
‘Substantially met’—if 2 of 3, or 3 of 4 indicators are met.
2.56
For both reporting periods, the ACIC reported that it achieved its purpose of protecting Australia from criminal threats, even though some performance criteria were not fully met.
2.57
Table 2.2 provides a comparative summary of the ACIC’s performance results for the reporting periods.
Table 2.2: Summary of performance results - comparison of 2020-21 and 2021-22
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1.
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The ACIC discovers and targets current and evolving criminal threats to Australia.
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Met
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Met
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2.
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The ACIC produces criminal intelligence products to better inform partners and stakeholder agencies.
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Met
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Met
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3.
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The ACIC informs partners of the current and evolving criminal threats to Australia.
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Met
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Substantially met
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4.
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ACIC intelligence facilitates a response to criminal activity affecting Australia.
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Partially met
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Substantially met
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5.
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ACIC intelligence is helping to make Australia more hostile to crime.
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Met
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Met
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6.
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Stakeholders agree that ACIC intelligence is meaningful and useful.
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Partially met
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Met
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7.
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ACIC information systems are available when required by partner agencies.
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Met
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Met
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8.
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ACIC information systems are used by partner agencies.
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Partially met
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Partially met
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9.
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ACIC information systems provide useful information to police partners.
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Partially met
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Partially met
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10.
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The ACIC continues to enhance information systems.
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Met
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Met
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11.
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Stakeholders are satisfied that the national policing information systems are meaningful and fit for purpose.
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Partially met
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Met
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12.
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The National Policing Checking Service is available to conduct checks as requested.
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Met
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Met
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13.
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The ACIC contributes to community safety by delivering timely information to support employment decisions.
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Not met
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Not met
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14.
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National Police Checking Service accredited bodies are fulfilling their obligations to ensure an accurate and reliable service.
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Met
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Met
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Source: Table reproduced from ACIC, Annual Report 2020-21, p. iii; and ACIC, Annual Report 2021-22, p. iii.
Targets not met
2.58
The committee will focus its discussion on those targets which were not fully met over the reporting periods.
Criminal intelligence delivery
2.59
Criminal intelligence delivery contained six performance criteria. Criteria three, four and six were not fully met during one or both reporting periods.
Performance criterion three
2.60
In 2020-21 and 2021-22, the ACIC measured performance criterion three (the ACIC informed partners of the current and evolving criminal threats to Australia) according to the number of:
requests for information it received;
intelligence products disseminated;
partners receiving disseminations; and
products disseminated to ACIC Board agencies, non-board agencies and international partners.
2.61
In 2020-21, the target was to achieve within a five per cent either side of the four-year average. In 2021-22, the target was to achieve greater than or equal to the four-year average.
2.62
In 2020-21, the ACIC ‘met’ this performance criterion but only ‘substantially met’ it in 2021-22. The performance criterion was assessed as substantially met ‘as all targets under this performance criteria were met except the number of partners receiving disseminations’. Looking at more detail, ‘while the ACIC increased disseminations to board partners, fewer disseminations were made to non-board Australian and international agencies’. The ACIC explained:
The decrease in disseminations reflected our continuing to cover the sporting and gambling sector while pivoting resources to other priorities. We also ceased disseminating products to some agencies that would not usually receive products from the ACIC but had a temporary need for criminal intelligence during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority.
2.63
The ACIC also explained that there were changes in how they interacted with several international partners, which affected the dissemination of products to those partners. For instance, the ACIC now ‘liaises with, and disseminates intelligence products to a single point of contact rather than several individual agencies’. A tighter labour market, leading to increased vacancies, and shifts in priorities have also resulted in a ‘reduction in the development of products that may be disseminated to international partners’.
Performance criterion four
2.64
In 2020-21, the ACIC measured performance criterion four (ACIC intelligence facilitates a response to criminal activity affecting Australia) by:
the number of disruptions recorded;
Criminal Assets Confiscation Taskforce (CACT) referrals to partners;
the number of Joint Project Proposals initiated; and
supported by qualitative examples.
2.65
In 2021-22, the measures differed from the previous year and performance was measured by:
number of disruptions recorded;
financial referrals to the CACT and other partners; and
number of Joint Project Proposals initiated.
2.66
In 2020-21 the target was to achieve within a five per cent either side the four-year average. In 2021-22 the target was to achieve greater than or equal to the four-year average.
2.67
The ACIC ‘partially met’ this performance criterion in 2020-21 and ‘substantially met’ it in 2021-22. The performance criterion was assessed as substantially met ‘as all targets under this performance criteria were met except the number of financial referrals to the CACT and other partners’.
2.68
In 2020-21, the number of CACT referrals to partners was below the 4-year average due to an operational shift in how the ACIC engages with financial referrals to CACT. Previously, the agency was involved in confiscations and recovery of assets but now performs an intelligence and operational support role.
2.69
In 2021-22, the number of financial referrals to the CACT and other partners had significantly reduced. The ACIC stated that as its role has changed, this criterion is no longer an appropriate way to measure its performance and that it will not be used going forward.
Performance criterion six
2.70
The ACIC measured performance criterion six (stakeholders agree that ACIC intelligence is meaningful and useful) against the following targets:
number of requests for additional dissemination of its intelligence products, with a target to achieve within five per cent (either side) of the 4-year average for the measure;
stakeholders agree or strongly agree that the ACIC provides intelligence products that identify changes within the criminal environment, with a target of 80 per cent; and
stakeholders agree or strongly agree that ACIC intelligence products provide a comprehensive and relevant understanding of crime impacting Australia, with a target of 80 per cent.
2.71
Performance criterion six was ‘partially met’ in 2020-21. In contrast, it was ‘met’ in 2021-22.
2.72
In 2020-21, the ACIC met its target for additional disclosure requests, receiving 661 requests, nearly double the 4-year historical average of 345. However, it fell short of meeting its stakeholder survey targets.
2.73
Seventy-seven per cent of respondents agreed (or strongly agreed) that the agency provides intelligence products that identify changes within the criminal environment. Sixty-six per cent agreed (or strongly agreed) that the intelligence products provide a comprehensive and relevant understanding of crime impacting Australia. Both results had declined from the previous three reporting years.
2.74
In 2021-22, the agency completed 490 requests for additional disclosure, which was 26 per cent lower than the previous year but still within its target. It also received positive feedback on its intelligence products. However, as the survey methodology changed during 2021-22, the survey results from the previous reporting period are not directly comparable.
National policing information systems and services
2.75
National policing information systems and services contained five performance criteria. Criteria eight, nine and 11 were not fully met during one or both reporting periods.
Performance criterion eight
2.76
The ACIC measured performance criterion eight (ACIC information systems are used by partner agencies) according to the number of users and the number of searches performed. In 2020-21, its target was to surpass its 4-year average. In 2021-22, its target was to achieve greater or equal to its 4-year average.
2.77
The ACIC ‘partially met’ performance criterion eight for both reporting periods. The ACIC explained that the ‘number and searches are indicative of the uptake of our information systems by partner agencies; however, there is considerable variation in how our systems are used’. For example, ‘some systems may be accessed through web service integration or mobile platforms, neither of which require unique user accounts or allow for the counting of individual users’. In addition, throughout 2021-22, COVID-19 working from home arrangements meant that ‘users were unable to access the physical workstations required for some of our systems’. COVID-19 also ‘led to the redeployment of national policing information registry staff for many jurisdictions, which reduced the number of system users’.
2.78
In 2021-22, six of the 10 systems able to be counted exceeded the four-year average for users and six of seven systems exceeded the four-year average for searches.
Performance criterion nine
2.79
The ACIC measured performance criterion nine (ACIC information systems provide useful information to police partners) according to the number of positive data matches. In 2020-21, its target was to surpass its 4-year average. In 2021-22, its target was to achieve greater or equal to its 4-year average.
2.80
Performance criterion nine was ‘partially met’ for both reporting periods as the results across the three systems were mixed. In 2020-21, two of three systems exceeded the 4-year average for positive data matches. In 2021-22, one of three systems exceeded the 4-year average for positive data matches.
2.81
The ACIC advised that some of its services can capture the moment when a user makes a positive data match, which indicates whether the systems are of use to police partners. However, it explained that a ‘failure to match may just be as important as a positive match’, as it may reveal new criminality or highlight flaws in the system that the agency can then correct.
Performance criterion 11
2.82
The ACIC measured its performance against criterion 11 (stakeholders are satisfied that the national policing information systems are meaningful and fit for purpose) based on whether stakeholders agreed, or strongly agreed, that the ACIC’s national policing information systems:
were of value to their work, with a target of 90 per cent;
are reliable, with a target of 80 per cent; and
meet the needs of their organisation, with a target of 80 per cent.
2.83
The ACIC ‘partially met’ performance criterion 11 in 2020-21, but successfully ‘met’ it in 2021-22.
2.84
In 2020-21, 92 per cent of survey responders agreed (or strongly agreed) that the ACIC’s national policing information systems were of value to their work. However, it fell short of meeting its targets for the second and third measures. Sixty-eight per cent of survey responders agreed (or strongly agreed) that the systems were reliable, and only fifty-four per cent agreed (or strongly agreed) that the systems meet the needs of their organisation.
2.85
In 2021-22, the ACIC advised that although it ‘met’ the three targets for this criterion, due to the changes it made to its stakeholder survey methodology, its results are not directly comparable with historical results.
National police checking service
2.86
National police checking service contained three performance criteria. Criteria 13 was not met during both reporting periods.
Performance criterion 13
2.87
In 2020-21 and 2021-22, the ACIC measured performance criterion 13 (the ACIC contributes to community safety by delivering timely information to support employment decisions) according to the time taken to perform:
non-urgent checks, with a target of 95 per cent of standard checks completed within 10 business days; and
urgent checks, with a target of 95 per cent of urgent checks completed in five business days.
2.88
The ACIC advised that its performance against this criterion depends on a combination of factors—the work of the ACIC, police partners and accredited bodies. The process can also be complicated, leading to long delays.
2.89
In 2020-21, nearly 93 per cent of standard checks were completed in
10 business days, and almost 90 per cent of urgent checks were completed within five business days. Although the results were relatively high, the agency failed to meet its Board-agreed benchmarks.
2.90
Until March 2021, the ACIC was on track to meet the Board-agreed benchmarks for both types of checks. However, when the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions were lifted, and hiring practices commenced, the agency was inundated with over six million National Police Checking Service (NPCS) requests. This was the highest number the agency had received since its establishment and was not predicted in any modelling. In addition, some police partners experienced workforce impacts due to COVID-19.
2.91
In 2021-22, the ACIC reported that 94.5 per cent of standard checks were completed in 10 business days, narrowly missing the Board-agreed benchmark of 95 per cent. Eighty-nine per cent of urgent checks were completed in five business days, which did not meet the Board-agreed benchmark of 95 per cent.
2.92
During 2021-22, five out of 12 months met the benchmarks for standard checks, and four out of 12 met the benchmark for urgent checks. However, this was not sufficient to meet the benchmarks for the entire period. The ACIC explained that its timeliness with checks continued to be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and timeliness was affected by additional requests related to the 2021 census and the 2022 federal election.
2.93
To improve its performance, the ACIC implemented various mitigation strategies:
The NPCS team took on additional work that would normally be completed by our partners; overtime was approved; and temporary additional positions were created, drawing resources from across the ACIC to help reduce processing times.
2.94
However, resourcing the NPCS (both by the ACIC and police partners) to ensure it has the capacity to complete the number of requests it receives is an ongoing issue. Mr Johnson told the committee that the NPCS is ‘partially automated and partially manual, and the interfaces between those elements can create delays’.
2.95
For 2022-23, the ACIC is developing internal reporting that will ‘indicate how each partner is performing against the board-agreed benchmarks.
Conclusion and committee view
2.96
At the outset, the committee recognises that for operational reasons, and because much of the ACIC’s work is classified, it cannot publicly report on some of its activities. Furthermore, the committee appreciates that some of the agency's activities are long-running, and results can occur months or years after the agency's initial involvement.
2.97
Overall, the committee is of the view that the ACIC performed satisfactorily against its performance framework during 2020-21 and 2021-22, noting that the agency met eight out of 14 performance criteria in 2020-21 and nine in 2021-22.
2.98
Despite the challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic, the ACIC achieved a range of positive operational results. By focusing on serious and organised crime groups and their networks that cause the greatest harm, the ACIC’s criminal intelligence efforts, in partnership with other domestic and international law enforcement agencies, achieved significant outcomes, including the disruption of 107 criminal entities across the two reporting periods. In addition, the committee commends the ACIC for its important contributions to significant operational activities, such as Operation Ironside and Operation PHOBETOR.
2.99
Due to COVID-19, working from home arrangements during the pandemic, changes in how the ACIC interacted with its partners and changes needed in its operational priorities, some of the performance criteria were not fully met in either reporting year, that is, criteria three, four, eight and nine. These criteria rely on annual counts, which are likely to vary each year and are outside of the ACIC’s control. As the ACIC regularly reviews its performance criteria to ensure they remain fit for purpose, the committee encourages the agency to review and potentially refine these measures and targets to ensure that they reflect its work and accurately capture its performance. This could involve including other measures that, when combined with annual counts, assist in understanding the full value and effectiveness of the ACIC’s services.
2.100
The committee recognises that external demands on the National Police Checking Service significantly impacted the agency’s inability to meet its timeliness benchmarks for standard and urgent checks (i.e., performance criterion 13) for both reporting periods. Despite this, in 2021-22, the ACIC processed more than 6.7 million checks, which the agency reported was
18.3 per cent more than its four-year average. This is a substantial effort and demonstrates the considerable work of the NPCS, including police partners and accredited bodies, to ensure checks are completed within reasonable timeframes. As the agency has adopted several mitigation strategies to improve its performance against this criterion and is developing internal reporting to indicate how each partner is performing against the board-agreed benchmarks, the committee will review the effects of these efforts in 2022-23.
2.101
The committee understands that the redeveloped stakeholder survey now targets partners that are better placed to comment on the quality and reliability of the ACIC’s services. The committee was pleased to see that in 2021-22, the survey responses reflected positively on the ACIC and its work, noting that all survey participants agreed that the ACIC’s national policing information systems were of value to their work. The committee supports the enhancements to the national policing information systems over the period in review, which facilitate the sharing of essential policing information between Australian police agencies.
2.102
Several legislative changes occurred in 2021-22 that affected the ACIC’s responsibilities and activities. The committee will review the information provided on the use of these powers and the impact of the changes in upcoming annual reports.
2.103
The ACIC’s insight and research on drug consumption and law enforcement drug seizures are of particular interest to the committee, given its current inquiry into the challenges and opportunities for law enforcement in addressing Australia’s illicit drug problem. As the committee has stated previously, the ACIC’s National Wastewater Drug Monitoring Program is an important tool, providing valuable insights into trends in drug consumption across Australia and able to identify new sources of threat. When combined with other drug data, such as the Illicit Drug Data Report, these provide a national picture to assist decision-makers in the development of strategies to address the threat posed by illicit drugs.
2.104
The committee extends its thanks to Mr Michael Phelan APM, the former CEO of the ACIC, for leading the ACIC and the Australian Institute of Criminology over the past five years. The committee commends Mr Phelan for his dedication to disrupting criminal networks over his extensive career and positioning the ACIC to meet the challenges of a complex and continually evolving global organised crime environment.
2.105
Lastly, the committee commends ACIC executives and staff for their significant contribution and achievements in protecting Australia from criminal threats and keeping the Australian community safe throughout 2020-21 and 2021-22 and thanks the agency for its comprehensive annual reports.
Senator Helen Polley
Chair