Chapter 3Key issues raised

3.1This chapter outlines the key issues raised by submitters and witnesses during the inquiry. Chapter4 sets out the legal analysis as to the international human rights compatibility of Parts 3AA and 3B of the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999, as they relate to compulsory enhanced income management or compulsory income management—referred to collectively as 'compulsory income management'.

3.2The committee received evidence from community groups, peak bodies, academics, and the Department of Social Services (the department). Submitters to the inquiry, and witnesses at the public hearing, raised a range of concerns about the human rights implications of mandatory income management and its effects in practice.

3.3The evidence provided by submitters and witnesses expressed an overarching position that compulsory income management is applied in a blanket manner that does not take into account a person's individual circumstances or even need for compulsory income management, and that not only does it not achieve its primary objective of reducing hardship and deprivation, but in many cases, it significantly increases those negative effects.

3.4Further, overwhelmingly the committee was told that the premise of compulsory income management is discriminatory and is based on historical notions that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people cannot manage their own lives and finances.

Restrictions on human rights should not be permanent, but in Australia, through compulsory income management, the federal government has turned restricting human rights for First Nations people and other people on social security into an art form. The result is an ugly system of prejudice that entrenches inequality.[1]

3.5The issues raised can be loosely grouped into the following categories:

limited evidence of positive impacts, particularly in meeting the purported key goals of compulsory income management;

evidence of harm caused, shows negative impacts on children's health, increasing costs and financial complications, stress and stigma among others;

discriminatory impact, as compulsory income management disproportionally impacts Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander persons, women and new migrants;

challenges in seeking exemptions, where the criteria are limited and the evidential burden is set too high;

lack of consultation with affected groups, including local support organisations, which leads to implementation failures; and

conduct of evaluations to date, which have been noted to either be poorly conducted or where findings are selectively quoted to present a false sense of positive impact.

3.6This chapter will examine the above issues in detail.

Positive impacts – limited evidence

3.7While there has been some evidence of positive impacts, that evidence has been limited and, in some cases, disputed as being the result of improper evaluation.

Purported purpose of income management

3.8The department outlined the key goals of income management are to:

reduce hardship and deprivation by ensuring that welfare payments are used to meet the priority needs of welfare payment recipients and their dependents;

provide budgeting support to welfare recipients to meet those priority needs;

reduce the amount of welfare payments spent on alcohol, gambling, tobacco and pornographic material;

reduce the likelihood that welfare recipients will be subject to harassment and abuse in relation to their welfare payments;

encourage socially responsible behaviour, including in relation to the care and education of children; and

improve the level of protection afforded to welfare recipients and their families.[2]

3.9The department further submitted that enhanced income management, the newer form of compulsory income management which began in 2023, has a more streamlined set of purposes to:

support vulnerable individuals to manage their welfare payments;

ensure that a portion of the recipient's welfare payments is available to be spent on necessities, including food, housing, utilities, clothing and medical care, and

reduce the amount of an individual's welfare payment that is available to purchase goods and services that contribute to social harm, including alcohol, tobacco, pornography or gambling services.[3]

3.10The department confirmed to the committee that compulsory income management will be phased out in favour of a voluntary model, reiterating that the government 'has committed to making income management voluntary for those individuals or communities who wish to keep a form of income management and to working with communities on these reforms'.[4] The department is undertaking consultation with affected communities, stakeholders and individuals, discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. The department advised the timeline is to conclude consultations towards the end of 2024 and then provide advice to government on future voluntary-based models, which may require the establishment of additional support services.[5]

3.11A key concern expressed by submitters and witnesses regarding the stated goals of compulsory income management is that most people it impacts do not exhibit any behavioural concerns related to alcohol, illicit drugs, gambling or pornography.

3.12The department stated that additional supports and social services had been provided to people in areas where the CDC trial operated, including drug and alcohol support and additional family violence services in Ceduna and East Kimberley.[6] However, the Centre for Policy Futures of the University of Queensland argued that the assumption that welfare recipients use alcohol and other drugs is erroneous. Thecentre cited statistics from its 2018–2021 study of compulsory income management that found respondents reported low instances of problems with alcohol and other drugs—87 per cent reported no problems with alcohol, 95 per cent reported no problems with drugs and 91 per cent reported no problems with gambling.[7]

3.13Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray PSM of the Centre for Social Policy Research at the Australian National University noted that overall, compulsory income management does not have effective positive impacts because to 'a large extent those subject to the measure do not experience the adverse outcomes which are targeted by the policy' and where individuals do have substance abuse histories, 'they can, and in fact in many cases do, engage in ways of working around the constraints of the policy'.[8]

3.14The Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group from RMIT University (RMIT Policy Group) noted that while compulsory income management is 'framed as a solution to drug and alcohol misuse, gambling, unemployment and social harms', the majority of compulsory income management participants do not have these issues as inclusion is instead based on broad criteria of geographic location, age and welfare history’.[9]

3.15The discriminatory imposition of compulsory income management, where criteria is not based upon the risks and circumstances of an individual person but are instead based on being resident in a region with high populations of either Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander persons or culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) persons, is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Limited evidence of positive impacts

3.16Multiple submitters noted that while the goals of compulsory income management are to improve food security of social security payment recipients and their dependents by limiting purchases such as alcohol, drugs and gambling, there is little concrete evidence these goals are being met.[10]

3.17The Accountable Income Management Network (AIMN) outlined that evidence from the department itself—found in regulation impact statements—'have not demonstrated that compulsory income management successfully achieves the programs objectives of reducing the issues in communities caused by alcohol, drugs and gambling'.[11] AIMN also stated that where there have been voices supportive of compulsory income management in media, 'those media sources rarely give voice to those who are subjected to the card, and we believe that's the voice that's most important in determining what the future of income management will be in Australia'.[12]

3.18The Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare submitted that although a primary objective of compulsory income management is to support children’s wellbeing by protecting them from harmful behaviours of their parent or caregiver, such as alcohol or drug abuse, there is minimal evidence that it 'changes their experience of socioeconomic disadvantage'.[13]

3.19Professor Liesel Spencer, of the Western Sydney University School of Law, argued that the limited evaluation data available indicates that compulsory income management has not been successful on improving food security. Professor Spencer noted that while claims were made that the legislation would improve food security for welfare recipients subject to compulsory income management measures, the Australian Government later agreed that there was only a small increase in the purchase of healthy food items such as fruit and vegetables.[14]

3.20Professor Spencer cited an evaluation conducted in Ceduna in South Australia, which found that while there may have been some improvement in food security, these may have been caused by the 'concurrent provision of additional social services in the Ceduna township over the course of the trial'.[15]

3.21The Australian Council of Social Service (ACOSS) similarly argued that there is no conclusive evidence that compulsory income management achieves its objectives to reduce spending on tobacco, alcohol and gambling to help people better care for themselves and their children.[16] It pointed to a 2014 study done by the University of NSW Social Policy Research Centre which found that for alcohol, gambling and drug use, there may have been a reduction in moderate use, but serious use may have actually increased. Furthermore, the study 'could not find any substantive evidence of the program having significant changes relative to its key policy objectives, including changing people's behaviours'.[17] ACOSS also noted that no compulsory income management evaluation has found a positive effect on employment, 'despite this being one of the goals of income management'.[18]

3.22A group of researchers from Charles Darwin University and Monash University conducted research on compulsory income management in the Northern Territory (NT) over 2021–2022, which found that the scheme 'was largely ineffective in achieving its stated aims of reducing social harms, including substance abuse'. That research found that cash could still be accessed to pay for alcohol or drugs, or the BasicsCard itself could be traded for those items. The researchers submitted that overall, compulsory income management in the NT 'has not substantially limited access to alcohol and these situations could also lead to further financial stress for individuals and families'.[19]

3.23The Centre for Policy Futures at the University of Queensland conducted a study from 2018 to 2021 in four separate compulsory income management locations which looked at its impact on participants, as well as the views of other stakeholders such as frontline workers.Overall, the study found that 87 per cent of survey respondents did not find any benefits to compulsory income management and argued that the empirical case for continuing the scheme is weak at best.[20]

3.24The Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council (NPY Women's Council) submitted that the one size fits all approach of income management did not consider the needs of people living remotely who:

pay substantially more for store bought goods due to freight and travel costs;

speak English as a second language, making it nearly impossible to access Centrelink phone support without translators; and

income management in a cultural context where resources are shared according to family obligations.[21]

3.25As outlined above, Anglicare noted that the most prominent review touting the benefits of the BasicsCard version of compulsory income management was very limited in scope and reviewed the functionality of the card itself rather than the success of the scheme in changing behaviours of participants. Anglicare further noted a four-year review conducted by researchers from the Australian National University and the University of NSW Social Policy Research Centre as 'the most comprehensive study to date' which could not find 'any substantive evidence of the program having significant changes relative to its key policy objectives, including changing people's behaviours'.[22]

3.26The study found:

no evidence of changes in spending patterns, improved financial wellbeing, or improved community wellbeing, including for children;

that income management did not increase people’s ability to manage their money better; and

that it may harm people’s ability to develop the skills to manage their own finances.[23]

3.27Professor Gray and Dr Bray provided an extensive summary of a 2010–2014 evaluation they conducted along with other researchers into New Income Management in the Northern Territory review. They submitted that the review found that compulsory income management had little positive impact:

A wide range of measures related to consumption, financial capability, financial harassment, alcohol and related behaviours, child health, child neglect, developmental outcomes, and school attendance have been considered as part of this evaluation … Despite the magnitude of the program the evaluation does not find any consistent evidence of income management having a significant systematic positive impact.[24]

3.28Anglicare submitted that despite seventeen years of trials, every consultation conducted on income management over the past two decades—including both government evaluations and peer-reviewed independent research—has shown that 'compulsory income management has been an expensive failure'.[25]

3.29Submitters also pointed to the program evaluations done by or on behalf of the department which claimed to have found positive outcomes of compulsory income management. Submitters argued that these evaluations are flawed, or in other cases have been selectively quoted or findings misrepresented to present a more positive view of the outcomes of compulsory income management. This issue of flawed evaluations is discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

3.30The department noted that it has had performance measures in place for compulsory income management—both the cashless debit card (CDC) and enhanced income management—to 'monitor the performance of IM Programs, and reviews and evaluations to assess the effectiveness of the overall approaches' which are reviewed on an annual basis. For example, the department submitted that performance measures indicated that 'CDC program data demonstrates improvement in social outcomes through analysis of card spending and use'.[26]

3.31However, the department also agreed that it is 'hard to try and just separate out the impact of income management from other effects in relation to the communities'. The department noted that, for example, outcomes in relation to education can be impacted by state and territory government staffing decisions, while alcohol abuse can be impacted by alcohol bans, and these external factors made determining causation of changes in communities very difficult to determine either way.[27]

3.32The department further noted the latest report on CDC, the May 2024 Review of the Impact of the Cessation of the Cashless Debit Card by researchers from the University of Adelaide. The department noted that the review did not quantify the number of respondents who supported the cessation of the CDC,[28]and in relation to the Bundaberg-Hervey Bay region, respondents had generally indicated that the transition from the CDC had facilitated positive impacts for past participants in relation to financial management, but that there were no observed impacts on alcohol misuse, community safety outcomes or incidences of gambling over the review period.[29]

Positive impacts where program is voluntary

3.33Submitters and witnesses argued that where there are some positive impacts of compulsory income management, these are generally felt by the small numbers of voluntary income management participants, or where there is extensive wrap around services to provide additional tailored support.

3.34The NPY Women's Council contended that where income management has positive effects, it is generally where engagement is voluntary:

An example includes Anangu living with acquired brain injuries having their income managed to ensure they are able to cover basic living costs. The successful outcomes of income management have been when they are voluntary and the strategy was self-identified and supports by Anangu themselves. Consent and self-determination remain at the heart of this positive experience.[30]

3.35Anglicare noted that reviews of compulsory income management conducted by the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research found 'the most effective schemes were voluntary and target people with high-needs as part of a holistic set of services'.[31]

3.36Professor Gray and Dr Bray similarly submitted that there is some evidence to show that compulsory income management may have positive impacts 'when used as part of an individually tailored program for some individuals' who have been specifically targeted due to personal or family vulnerabilities.[32]

3.37The department advised that during consultations to discuss the future of income management, just over half of participants wanted to come off income management, 'with not much fewer wanting to stay', but that being able to choose either way was a key message being heard from most consultation participants.[33]

3.38In relation to calls from other witnesses that a more effective approach would be to provide wrap-around support services, the department submitted that the income management program 'provides vulnerable participants with intensive face-to-face support from Services Australia to ensure their income support payment is directed to essentials, such as food, housing, electricity and education', but did not provide evidence of exactly what those support services have been in the past, or where they are available.[34]

3.39The department advised that moving forward, the government 'has committed up to $130 million in funds to provide services and initiatives and to invest in community led priorities, including youth services, financial and digital literacy and guidance, job readiness, employment capability and cultural connections to services'.[35]

Family Responsibilities Commission model

3.40Professor Gray and Dr Bray pointed to the model run by the Family Responsibilities Commission (FRC) in the Cape York region, as such an individually tailored program, which unlike other compulsory income management programs, 'is highly targeted' and is used 'on a selective basis and only where it is considered that it would be useful for the individual given their circumstances'.[36]

3.41The ongoing program of income management and how it operates in the Cape York region of Queensland under the FRC is discussed below.

3.42The Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the FRC, Ms Tammy Williams, argued that the committee should endorse the FRC model as being compatible with Australia's human rights obligations:

The Family Responsibilities Commission Act prescribes effective safeguards and controls to ensure the limitations of human rights are only applied when necessary and are reasonable and proportionate to the need of individual circumstances. The Family Responsibilities Commission operates on the opposite basis from the blanket income management approaches. In essence, our starting point is that all adults in our communities are in fact capable to manage their own lives and to contribute to their communities.[38]

3.43Commissioner Williams noted that interventions by the FRC are strictly time limited, and the legislative framework requires decision-makers to apply the least restrictive option, that decisions are made in the best interests of the child, and decision-makers must be satisfied that other decisions are not reasonable in the circumstances. Further, it was submitted that in the 'limited circumstances income management is applied, 65 per cent of those have been when clients have volunteered to participate in income management arrangements'.[39]

3.44The Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Dr Anna Cody, told the committee that solutions must come from First Nations communities and be co-designed. Inconsidering the FRC model, she informed the committee that 'if the model that they are talking about is a model that has actually come from communities and has been individually tailored to those communities, then it sounds like it could be a really effective model'.[40]

3.45Dr Bray highlighted that the difference between compulsory income management and the FRC model is that the FRC model is a proportionate response that 'considers the circumstances of the individual', and further noted that 'the FRC put up a reasonable case this morning as to why their policies were human rights compliant'.[41] Professor Gray concurred, noting that the FRC model 'very much came significantly from community, and I think that that is a really important point'.[42] Ms Judy Harrison of the National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network (4Rs Network) noted the FRC model emphasises voluntary participation and includes extensive wraparound support, both of which are positives.[43] Professor Schurer argued that the model of compulsory income management erodes trust and takes away the ability of people to make good decisions. However, she noted a model like the FRC income management model is a different approach:

So a participation model, a joint decision-making model, with joint responsibilities is a very good model that really asks for the community to step up and to co-design the right models. I've always thought that the Aboriginal health service providers in the NT are very well equipped to lead such initiatives together with the peak organisations. Whether you want to use the Queensland model or other models that are being proposed for the NT, I don't have a strong opinion on this.[44]

3.46Dr Padraic Gibson of the Jumbunna Institute for Education and Research had a different view, advising against 'setting up local committees that can identify the bad people that can have their money controlled'. He argued that:

The fact that you have Indigenous involvement in a program of controlling Indigenous communities doesn't take away from the fact that what is going on, fundamentally, is that there is an idea that Indigenous people can't manage their money, as opposed to the rest of the community, who can. That needs to go.[45]

3.47Instead, he advocated for 'self-determined programs that are about getting resources into the communities to alleviate the appalling poverty'.[46]

3.48Dr Bray pointed to a program that was operated by the Arnhem Land Progress Aboriginal Corporation prior to the original implementation of CIM, the ALPA Foodcard which could be used in the association's many stores across the NT:

They consulted with communities, and what they came up with was a card which people could choose how much money they wanted to put on and which could be used for healthy food purchases, and it said which members of the family could actually use the card, so you could send your children down to the store to get things. That card was basically operating quite well. Income management came along and decimated the use of the card, because everything was just dumped onto the BasicsCard, and people lacked that freedom. That is one example of a community led response which was quite effective, and it was basically destroyed.[47]

3.49Associate Professor Elise Klein OAM advised caution in governments trying to replicate the FRC model for a number of reasons, including that income management in other locations was externally imposed, so it can never be a considered a 'self‑determined idea' even if managed by Aboriginal organisations themselves.[48] She further noted that there had been previous attempts to replicate the model:

During one of the first rollouts in the East Kimberley and Ceduna, one of the objectives was community panels. They were an absolute disaster. They were pulled back straightaway because they were such a disaster in the discord, the disempowerment and the abuse of peoples' private data. It was a disaster, and the department pulled back. [49]

3.50As noted above, the department has reiterated the government's commitment to ending the compulsory model of income management in favour of a voluntary program and the department is currently undertaking extensive consultations on the future of income management. These consultations are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.

Negative impacts

3.51In addition to arguing that the positive impacts of compulsory income management were negligible, submitters and witnesses pointed to the many independent program evaluations which proved significant negative outcomes to individuals placed on compulsory income management. Numerous submitters pointed to a range of independent evaluations of income management that 'demonstrated the limited impact of these policies and the significant social harm and stigma they cause'.[50]

3.52The key areas of negative impact of compulsory income management were described as:

impacts on women and children, including fleeing domestic violence, exacerbating family tensions and meeting children's needs;

added pressures to share limited cash funds;

increasing the cost of purchasing items by restricting people from the cash economy;

adding further complexity to peoples' financial arrangements and budgeting;

causing stigma and mental health concerns;

privacy breaches; and

causing feelings of disempowerment.

3.53These issues are outlined below.

Women and children

3.54Many submitters and witnesses pointed to the negative impacts of compulsory income management on women, particularly in fulfilling their roles as mothers. Professor Beth Goldblatt (a professor of law at the University of Technology Sydney) advised that compulsory income management poses hardships on female carers who are recipients of social security payments, which hinders their access to the right to social security 'and, rather than promoting gender equality, reinforce women’s disproportionate household responsibilities while imposing unfair new requirements'.[51]

3.55Single Mother Families Australia submitted a range of negative impacts of the BasicsCard and the CDC that particularly impacted women and their children, with women reporting:

difficulty purchasing bus fares, school lunches, and second-hand clothes;

challenges in engaging in any market process that requires cash, such as bartering or buying local fresh produce;

in some places, there was a requirement to line up at separate tills, adding to humiliation and an inability to acquire second-hand goods and services;

the card prevented saving for larger items; and

the card prevented putting money aside to have some funds to escape abuse.[52]

3.56The Centre for Policy Futures cited examples from its study into compulsory income management which reported that it made it harder for participants to care and provide for their children:

They impact what I can and can’t do with my children like take them out in the community. School excursions are cash only. The fair and Christmas parade activities are predominantly cash only. I have 4 children and 20% doesn’t get us far.[53]

3.57Dr Shelley Bielefeld (an academic who has written extensively about income management) contended that compulsory income management 'can also have adverse and gendered impacts on women seeking to develop a pathway out of relying on social security payments' by thwarting efforts to engage in vocational training because some childcare cannot be paid with a BasicsCard.[54] She noted her field research—which included field studies and participant interviews—where she was told:

Well, the partner can take off with the card as well and then leave the kids with no income and no card; most of them are 80 per cent trapped on the card, and then the kids and the mum have got no income at all to last them a weekend.[55]

3.58Professor Stephanie Schurer submitted evidence of a study she conducted with other researchers, which found that compulsory income management 'led to a significant reduction in child health, both at birth and during the first 5 years of life'. In particular, they found that children exposed to the scheme in utero averaged 85 grams lighter at birth and those children then spent 45 per cent more time in hospital throughout early childhood.[56] Professor Schurer further noted that a birthweight 'drop of 100 grams is roughly equivalent to the drop in the case of a woman being exposed to domestic violence while pregnant, being in a community hit by a hurricane or being exposed to Ramadan'. The study also found that after compulsory income management was first introduced 'school attendance dropped by five per cent'.[57] Professor Gray and Dr Bray noted such studies, expressing particular concern that the numbers of Indigenous children being assessed as developmentally vulnerable also increased since 2021.[58]

3.59A range of experts pointed to compulsory income management as potentially increasing domestic violence risks for women. Australia's Sex Discrimination Commissioner pointed to the impact that compulsory income management has on women who are leaving domestic and family violence, as it prevents them from having access to their full income 'which they may need at that crucial moment, and so it goes counter to their right to safety and life free from violence'.[59] The commissioner further noted that compulsory income management can impact carers, primarily women, from being able to manage family finances and feed their children effectively.[60] Similarly, the Centre for Policy Futures argued that compulsory income management can exacerbate family tensions due to the increased economic stress it causes, thus itself potentially leading to increased domestic and family violence.[61]

3.60A group of researchers from Charles Darwin University and Monash University likewise contended that compulsory income management 'can exacerbate issues such as family violence, where it has been seen being weaponised by men who use violence' and further, that it provides family violence perpetrators with additional avenues of control over their victims, which can then leave victim-survivors with no money to leave situations of violence and also impacts the family's food security.[62]

Added pressure to share cash

3.61Rather than protect compulsory income management participants from being forced to share their social security payments, many submitters argued that the scheme can in fact increase that risk. The NPY Women's Council argued that mandatory income management actually increased the risk of pressure on community members with cash to share what resources they had.[63]

3.62Dr Bielefeld noted that during her research people reported that the BasicsCard made caring for families more difficult, and itself was a means through which the financial abuse of Elders occurred.[64] Dr Bielefeld described it as a 'micro economy of exploitation' that developed around CIM cards in particular locations:

The person who was doing the trading, who was actually the cardholder, was always getting less money in response to the bargain being made, if you will. The currency of the cashless debit card or the BasicsCard was treated as an inferior currency.[65]

3.63The Centre for Policy Futures citied multiple studies of compulsory income management which found that participants can still be subjected to financial harassment or 'humbugging' from others. It also stated that cards can be taken and used just as easily as cash benefits.[66]

Restriction from cash economy

3.64The reduction of ready cash means that compulsory income management blocks people from being able to shop at many stores, which are cheaper but require cash. Additionally, people are blocked from the second-hand goods market and must therefore purchase more expensive items.[67]

3.65Dr Bielefeld noted that many participants in her research informed her that the BasicsCard limits the range of choices and often meant people could not purchase 'fuel in particular locations, bus fares, laundromats, some clothing stores, and some health services'.[68] One participant advised that the restriction on laundromats had health implications:

If you can't wash your clothes and your blankets and all of that, then you've got - with overcrowding, you've got all the kids sleeping together and they're going to end up with things like scabies, head lice are just going to run rampant, you're going to have ear infections and eye infections, all of that that's going to happen.[69]

3.66Dr Bielefeld further noted the impact that compulsory income management has had on some participants with a disability. She described a situation where a woman had:

…experienced health outcomes so adverse that her health was irreparably damaged by the stress because she had trouble paying her rent and all sorts of problems with getting what she needed as a person with disability. The end result for that woman was irreparable damage to her body, where she was literally further disabled as a result of being put on this card…This sort of thing just shouldn't happen to people. No-one, under the guise of a 'This is good for you if you just realise it's good for you' kind of rationale, should be actually experiencing adverse health outcomes as a result of government interventions.[70]

3.67The Centre for Policy Futures also provided examples of when compulsory income management participants are blocked from buying cheaper goods, including textbooks for study:

It [CIM] has negative[ly] impacted my ability to buy second hand, ESPECIALLY TEXT BOOKS FOR UNIVERSITY. As these are quite expensive brand new, if I want to buy second hand ones I need ‘approval’ and then a waiting period for the buyer before I can purchase, most people want the ready cash so I lose items to someone who has the availability to pay instantly.[71]

3.68The North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency (NAAJA) further advised that in order to access the cash economy when needed, such as purchasing second hand goods or providing cash assistance under cultural obligations, their clients report resorting to other options such as exchanging items for cash or high-risk financial products such as pay day loans, which ultimately is more expensive.[72]

3.69NAAJA indicated that compulsory income management can also make people vulnerable to predatory lending practices:

Our clients on income management can't do what many Australians do to find a good quality used fridge or second-hand washing machine. They can't use that money on places in the cash economy such as Facebook Marketplace. They don't have access to those markets. As a result, we have a lot of clients who have been forced to buy second-hand goods in the most expensive and exploitive ways possible. They are taking out payday loans online, they are signing up to consumer leases, where they will never actually own the item, and they are paying more than double or triple than what they would pay for that item in the cash economy. This is a detrimental consequence of compulsory income management.[73]

Complicated finances and budgeting

3.70Compulsory income management can also make finances more difficult for people, rather that streamline how they are able to spend their social security payments, with participants sometimes required to split the different bank accounts or sources for how they pay certain bills.[74]

3.71The Centre for Policy Futures found in its study of compulsory income management that the majority of survey participants reported that they previously had no trouble managing their own money, but then being placed on CIM had actually caused financial strains:

I had no problems in the past, now I have received payment defaults, [late] … payment fees, etc. All because my banking and income was changed. I am struggling to come back from almost complete ruin.

…

I have had more financial issues being on the [CIM] card than I have when I wasn’t on it.

…

It [CIM] has added extra challenges and financial strain.[75]

3.72In particular, the Centre for Policy Futures found that participants' direct debit payment schedules lapsed when being put on compulsory income management, leading to extra fees and charges, and people were having to manage 'separate pools of money deposited into separate accounts, and having to negotiate non-cash payments, has also made budgeting more difficult for some respondents'.[76] The RMIT Policy Group similarly argued that compulsory income management can make paying rent and bills more difficult, which in turn 'can have a flow-on effect on an individual’s rental and credit history, further entrenching a reliance on welfare support and poverty'.[77]

3.73NAAJA informed the committee that a major social housing provider in the NT recently advised they had 70 families on their books at risk of eviction and homelessness because the extra administrative burden of compulsory income management resulted in rent payments not being transferred from the NT Government:

The housing provider spoke to their counterparts in other states and territories, who had no solutions. Why? Because compulsory income management is predominantly a Northern Territory problem. The housing provider has even raised this issue with the Northern Territory Minister for Housing and has asked for our help to advocate with Services Australia, which we did by formally writing to them this Tuesday.[78]

3.74Conversely, the department advised the committee that at recent consultations, they were told that some people found that compulsory income management:

… allowed them to better manage the money through the payment period. There was one male who called it 'Sunday money', which was getting him through to that Sunday before the next payment, so it gave him confidence that he would still have things at the back end of that payment period.[79]

3.75The department further noted that due to the length of time that compulsory income management has been operating, some people have subject to the scheme for their entire adult lives, meaning that in the consultations to move to voluntary income management, it is important to discuss mechanisms to support 'financial literacy to empower people to manage their resources well'.[80]

Stigma and mental health

3.76The stigma of being subject to compulsory income management, particularly when it is accessed via a BasicsCard, was noted by many submitters.[81]

3.77Dr Bielefeld submitted that her research found that there was a lot of stigma around using the BasicsCard, where people were very uncomfortable using the card as it immediately identified them as 'on welfare'.[82] Professor Spencer noted that the shame and stigma associated with the BasicsCard was compounded by the lack of accompanying financial skills training.[83] Part of the stigma arose from people—often community Elders—being put in a position where their purchases were being called into question by store staff, often young people, as described by an Elder to Dr Bielefeld:

‘It was a really shameful sort of thing to have it, especially when I’m lined up here…I done my shopping and … a young little white girl, said, oh, hold on a minute, I might have to check this. You may not be able to get this on your BasicCard. … I was standing there and I told her, well stick your shopping, I’ll go somewhere else. … it was really power play. Brought in a lot of supremacy stuff that just really re-traumatised a lot of people.[84]

3.78The Centre for Policy Futures noted that its study of compulsory income management outcomes showed 'significant decline in the mental health and well-being of CIM participants' including 'extreme mental exhaustion, depression and anxiety' with a "ripple effect” on the families and friends'. One respondent noted that compulsory income management felt similar to the financial control and abuse they suffered in a former domestic violence relationship.[85]

3.79The Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare pointed to recommendations from the Royal Commission into the Robodebt Scheme, which emphasised 'the need to design policies and processes with a focus on the people these are meant to serve'. The centre argued that it is 'unclear how income management can reflect the intent of, or sit comfortably alongside, this recommendation'.[86]

3.80The department noted that 'shame' in having a BasicsCard and 'point-of-sale bias' was a consistent message from many communities heard during recent consultations.[87]

Privacy

3.81Several submitters raised privacy concerns in relation to compulsory income management. For example, ACOSS argued that the limitations on a person being able to purchase goods and services or access cash if they wish is itself a breach of the right, and highlighted that the BasicsCard identifies the holder as both on social security payments as well as being subject to compulsory income management.[88] ACOSS further noted that companies delivering compulsory income management are prevented from providing refunds directly to participants—companies must instead provide the refund to Services Australia, which then deposits the refund into the person's compulsory income management account:

This represents a gross breach of someone's privacy and autonomy because what should be a private transaction between a merchant and consumer includes a government agency.[89]

3.82Economic Justice Australia stated that in addition to having their personal choices restricted, people on CIM are also subject to surveillance and data‑sharing and cannot control how their data is used.[90]

Disempowerment

3.83In addition to the specific negative outcomes listed above, which impact individuals, many people pointed to the broader negative impacts of individual and community disempowerment caused by compulsory income management, largely because it is primarily imposed on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities—discussed further below.

3.84NACCHO summarised these impacts as:

It extends the legacy of colonisation and intergenerational disadvantage.

It disproportionately targets Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities and often exacerbates poverty.

It perpetuates disempowerment and contributes to the stigmatisation of Aboriginal and Torress Strait Islander people.

Rather than fostering independence and capacity-building, income management policies have inadvertently increased dependence on welfare for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.

It has been found to have an adverse impact on birth outcomes.

Research conducted by four universities involving 114 in-depth interviews conducted in Playford, Shepparton, Ceduna and Hinkler and a mixed-methods survey of 199 people at income management sites across Australia found there is an overwhelming number of negative experiences stemming from income management, including stigma and feelings of shame and frustration.[91]

3.85Aboriginal Peak Organisations NT similarly contended that compulsory income management 'isa vehicle for disempowerment, and perpetuates stigmatisation of Aboriginal people'.[92] NAAJA compared compulsory income management policies with legal frameworks for decision-making and guardianship, arguing that it appears to breach these standards:

One thing that's important to understand in this, the way the system operates now in the Northern Territory, is people are assumed to not have a decision-making capacity and they have to prove otherwise.

An analogy is how we treat someone who has an acquired brain injury or dementia, in terms of financial guardianship. Our laws are very clear that we assume someone has capacity unless there's a medical report to say that they don't. We protect their right to make their own financial choices. But with compulsory income management, it's been reversed. It applies to a whole class of people and then they can apply for an exemption that lasts for up to 12 months.[93]

3.86The Centre for Policy Futures concurred with this view and submitted that people on compulsory income management report a statistically significantly lower 'feeling that they had autonomy over their lives and wellbeing'. The centre argued that compulsory income management attempts to control negative behaviours 'is not only insufficient to sustain positive behaviour change in a person but is instead likely to lead to them experiencing lower confidence in their abilities, and to produce diminished effort and performance'.[94]

3.87Dr Bielefeld noted compulsory income management participants reported to her they were having to go back on antidepressants for the first time in years because of the 'stigma and shame' associated with the scheme, and had feelings of frustration for the lack of consideration paid to the efforts already undertaken to improve their lives:

One of the men talking to me said: 'It's like I did nothing. It's like I did none of that work in rehab for all those years to get sober and to get clean. The government's still treating me as if I never did any of that, and they're treating me as if I'm just this person who is irresponsible, when I've taken all of these steps to try and improve my life and I contribute in all of these ways to try and help society.'[95]

Discriminatory impact

3.88Many submitters argued the selection criteria for compulsory income management is discriminatory, as it is based on an individual's geographic and demographic information rather than being based on individual circumstances.[96]

3.89The 4Rs Network noted that most people subject to compulsory income management are 'included on a blanket approach' and that there is no legislative criteria that relates to the circumstances of an individual, where the onus is on the decision-maker to ensure the criteria for inclusion are demonstrated'.[97] Professor Gray and Dr Bray submitted that while there are a number of elements to compulsory income management which involve individual assessment, 'overwhelmingly persons subject to compulsory income management have been placed on this as a result of automatic processes driven by the form of income support payment they receive and the duration for which they have received it'. Their submission noted that only 0.8 per cent of people on compulsory income management in the NT were placed on the scheme pursuant to an individualised assessment.[98]

3.90NAAJA similarly contended that many of their clients are placed 'under CIM regardless of their occupation of paid employment roles, and where there is no indication that income management is necessary'.[99] Mr Shane Foyster of NAAJA informed the committee:

I see, theoretically, that it could be a tool to reach an end to improve someone's life, but, in the way that it's being applied in the Northern Territory, it has such a blanket operation. There are no resources to do that intensive case management or to do the referrals, and the decision-makers don't understand the lives of the people who are subject to it. I can see that there would definitely be some circumstances where it is helping some people, but it's a scattergun approach.[100]

3.91ACOSS provided statistics showing that only a small number of people subject to compulsory income management exhibit the problematic behaviours that the scheme is intended to change:

80% of respondents said they had never gambled.

97% said they had never gambled or gambled more than what they could afford to lose.

90% said they had never used an illicit drug.

Only 18% said they drank alcohol more than once per week, with around 81% saying they either never drank or drank less frequently than more than once per week.[101]

3.92The department stated that throughout compulsory income management it 'has sought to give effect to government policy while maintaining the rights of individuals to receive social security and, so far as possible, minimising any disproportionate impact on certain groups, including Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples and children'.[102] It stated that prior to September 2023, 'aparticipant became subject to IM through various measures…targeted to specified groups of income support payment recipients'. The submission later detailed that those 'targeted' groups include anyone in the NT who has received JobSeeker payment, Youth Allowance, Special Benefit or Parenting Payment for more than one of past two years, or three of the last six months if under 24 years old.[103] However, NAAJA noted that as parenting payments are intended to last until a child is school age, including this category essentially means all parents receiving this payment will end up on compulsory income management.[104]

3.93However, the department conceded that less than one per cent of people are subject to income management due to an individual assessment, increasing to less than 3 per cent for enhanced income management:

Income Management (IM)

As at 31 May 2024, 127 IM participants (less than one per cent of all compulsory IM participants) are on IM pursuant to an individualised assessment of their personal circumstances. This is defined as those on IM who are on the Child Protection, Supporting People at Risk, or Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipient measures. Further there are 1,974 voluntary IM participants.

Enhanced IM

As at 31 May 2024, 428 enhanced IM participants (3 per cent of all compulsory enhanced IM participants) are on IM pursuant to an individualised assessment of their personal circumstances. This is defined as those on enhanced IM who are on the Child Protection, Supporting People at Risk, or Vulnerable Welfare Payment Recipient measures. Further there are 570 voluntary IM participants and 70 participants in Cape York.[105]

3.94The reasons for both cohorts being on income management (averaged at 1.8 per cent of all participants) is due to either being referred under a child protection order or by being assessed as a 'vulnerable welfare recipient' by Centrelink.[106]

Racial discrimination

3.95Submitters argued that the compulsory income management criteria constitutes racial discrimination, as it is applied in geographic regions that have high populations of either Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander or CALD people.[107]

3.96Professor Gray and Dr Bray noted in their submission that income management was first introduced as part of the NTER, and at that time as 'almost all persons subject to the measure were Aboriginal' it required a suspension of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 'which had been suspended to allow for the targeting of specific Indigenous communities as prescribed areas'. New Income Management, they contended, was then introduced in August 2010 in a form that was not a breach of racial discrimination laws.[108] AIMN submitted that when compulsory income management was originally applied to all remote Aboriginal communities and Town Camps in the NT this was discriminatory, because residents of Town Camps—with an exclusively Aboriginal population—are subject to compulsory income management, but residents of neighbouring low-income areas who are not Aboriginal are not subject to geographic determinants for automatic inclusion.[109]

Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people

3.97Statistics show that in the NT, around 90 per cent of people subject to compulsory income management are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, and the national average is that 80per cent of all people on CIM are Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.[110]

3.98Anglicare Australia argued that the impact of compulsory income management disproportionately impacting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people was 'symptomatic of a colonising approach to working with First Nations communities adopted by successive governments' and further noted that 'many First Nations peoples who voluntarily transitioned from income management in the Northern Territory to the cashless debit card…went on to be compulsorily transferred back to income management in 2022 after its abolition'.[111] ACOSS also argued that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people are also more likely to be denied an exemption from compulsory income management.[112] This is discussed further below.

3.99Professor Beth Goldblatt cited the 2010 report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous people, James Anaya, which found the compulsory income management policy to be racially discriminatory.[113]

3.100Associate Professor Elise Klein and Dr Francis Markham provided a statistical breakdown of compulsory income management participants by race, citing that of the 24 000 individuals in the NT subject to the scheme, 80 per cent—or around 19 200—are likely to be Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander persons:

Put differently, around 36% of working-age Indigenous people in the NT are subject to CIM simply because they have been unable to find work for an extended period. Nationally, less than 0.2% of working-age adults are subject to CIM. Clearly, Indigenous adults in the Northern Territory are unfairly targeted for CIM on the basis of their race and place of residence.[114]

Culturally and Linguistically Diverse people

3.101Professor Spencer submitted outcomes from field research she conducted in 2017 on the operation of the BasicsCard in Bankstown, western Sydney. Herresearch found:

the least expensive food retail outlets were not approved to accept the BasicsCard;

accessing information about where the BasicsCard can be used to purchase food locally is complicated and information is unreliable;

government rules about shop signage are not being adhered to;

halal meat is not sold in any shop accepting the BasicsCard in Bankstown CBD;

the small number of shops accepting the BasicsCard in Bankstown means people on CIM are excluded from participation in most of the local food landscape and food culture; and

physical, economic and social access to food security is constrained for CIM participants.[115]

3.102Professor Spencer went on to contend that rather than improving food security, compulsory income management 'has had the effect of placing further, non-physical, barriers to participation and belonging in the path of people who are already vulnerable to social exclusion'.[116]

3.103Professor Spencer contended that although compulsory income management purported to be place-based via its geographic regions, there has not been 'sufficient or any attention been paid to the five trial sites as separate and distinct places with local conditions which might impact upon the success or otherwise of the scheme'.[117] Professor Spencer also noted the Refugee Council of Australia has argued that the BasicsCard creates difficulties for CALD people to obtain culturally appropriate food.[118]

Women

3.104Professor Goldblatt noted that in addition to concerns of race discrimination, concerns have 'extended to gender discrimination due to the numbers of women subject to income management and the role of women who often have responsibility for shopping for families, and the way that income management has limited their shopping options sometimes increasing the burdens of them, which are additional to their disproportionate caring obligations'.[119]

3.105Dr Anna Cody, the Sex Discrimination Commissioner, stated that ‘women disproportionately carry the responsibility for looking after children, and thus the impact of the compulsory income management regime has on First Nations women is contrary to human rights'.[120]

Exemptions and reviews

3.106Concerns were also raised in evidence to the inquiry that people face many difficulties when seeking an exemption from, or of review of, their compulsory income management arrangements.

3.107Economic Justice Australia argued that seeking exemptions was made more difficult because 'the Enhanced Income Management legislation is so complex that it is impenetrable, even for people experienced in statutory interpretation', with variations by states 'further complicating the extent and operation of affected individuals’ review and appeal rights'.[121] It pointed to the Services Australia website as being an additional barrier to seeking reviews or exemptions from compulsory income management, as the instructions on review and appeal rights are generic and therefore 'of limited assistance for other than straightforward social security decisions'. Where a person does successfully lodge a review request, the instructions for the Services Australia officers conducting the review are similarly convoluted and difficult to follow:

The self-evident complexity and opacity of compulsory income management appeal rights constitute a significant barrier to both internal and external review of decisions, the result being that vulnerable participants at risk of or already experiencing acute harm as a result of being subjected to compulsory income management are denied access to statutory internal appeal rights.[122]

3.108NAAJA similarly argued that the complexity of social service legislation, policy guidelines and evidentiary requirements means that people require specialist legal assistance to apply for exemptions. It noted that permanent exemptions are not allowed, so people must continually seek an exemption at least every 12 months, further increasing the burden on legal services, which NAAJA estimates to be at least 25 hours per application.[123]

3.109NAAJA outlined one case where it had provided assistance to a mother of two children in a very remote region of the NT who fell under income management 13 years ago under blanket geographic criteria:

Our lawyer estimates that they spent over 20 hours helping this client to understand her rights, to gather all the documents—school records and medical records—and then submitting it to Centrelink. Yet five months later, there is still no decision. This is the system that operates right now and does not give people a permanent way out of this financial control. Even if she was successful in seeking an exemption, the exemption currently available under the legislation is only for 12 months and then it resets and she is back on compulsory income management all over again. She would have to get all those records again every 12 months.[124]

3.110NAAJA further argued that the 12 month exemption maximum is not logical for the parenting payment as, unlike JobSeeker payments which are intended as a temporary support while seeking employment, parenting payments are expected to be paid for many years.[125] It also argued that exemptions are made more difficult because 'decision‑makers are often in call centres thousands of kilometres away and have no idea about the cultural context or even the geographic context of where you're operating'.[126]

3.111The 4Rs Network submitted that individual review of a person's inclusion in compulsory income management is not part of legislative provisions, which the Network contended are constructed to 'reduce exits and maintain geographic coverage'. The Network also noted that the cost of compulsory income management would 'dramatically escalate' if regular reviews of individual's cases was involved, particularly if that were a reviewable and appealable decision.[127]

3.112Dr Bielefeld presented findings from her research that compulsory income management participants found that exemptions from the scheme were seen as not accessible in practice, because the process was too difficult. Additionally, her research found that for many people 'the impact of having choice removed in the first instance was sufficiently disempowering that further attempts at exercising agency were seen as futile in terms of trying to have budgetary autonomy restored'.[128]

3.113Professor Gray and Dr Bray noted that exemptions are generally on grounds of 'being full-time apprentices or students; meeting certain parenting requirements; or where persons only receive a relatively small proportion of an income support payment' (due to income tests). This means that for participants without children, the only way they can gain an exemption is to gain employment with sufficient earnings, or if they cease claiming their income support entitlement completely.[129]

3.114Professor Gray and Dr Bray further submitted that exemptions are difficult to achieve and appear to be disproportionately given to non-Indigenous participants. As detailed in the figure below, a parenting exemption is primarily given to non-Indigenous persons.[130]

Source: Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 11.

3.115Professor Gray and Dr Bray submitted that exemptions are promoted in program guidelines as 'one of the principal means by which income management seeks to promote "personal responsibility and positive social behaviour"', but as it is a mechanism disproportionately used by non‑Indigenous people with children, there is little evidence of 'access to exemptions operating as an incentive for changing behaviours, or of income management playing a role in preparing people to be in a situation in which they can gain an exemption'.[131] They outlined that a person placed on compulsory income management under a 'youth trigger' can be excluded if inclusion would place the person's mental, physical or emotional wellbeing at risk, or it would not be practicable to income manage the particular person. They noted that neither exemption grounds bears 'any relationship to the objectives of the program, such as whether the person had any adverse outcomes, or the ability of the individual to manage their money'.[132]

3.116Economic Justice Australia additionally noted that there are no sunset clauses for the compulsory income management scheme itself, which means that it 'can potentially continue indefinitely, there being no timeframe for transitioning to a purely voluntary scheme – despite the Government’s statements that this is their intention'.[133]

3.117The department noted that while exemptions are handled by Services Australia, a separate entity, there are two general criteria for exemptions:

The first one—if you have dependent children, they're basically evidentiary in relation to whether the child has had immunisation or whether they're attending school. Then there's one which is a decision made by Services Australia in relation to vulnerability indicators. Those vulnerability indicators include things like homelessness, whether there is evidence of financial coercion, and financial mismanagement.[134]

3.118The department argued that it was unable to 'draw conclusions about structural issues' that may lead to a difference in exemption rates. It further advised that Services Australia does 'do a lot of work within [the] first nations community' including a 'strong first nations or Indigenous service officer network, that they lean into within these spaces'. The department further noted that the disparity of exemption rates between indigenous and non-indigenous persons was reduced over time:

From 2010 there was a fairly significant disparity. From 2021 that disparity starts to reduce. So, for example, in 2010, there's about an 81 per cent success rate for non-indigenous and 34 for Indigenous. In relation to, in 2022, that had narrowed from 96-75. And from 2024, that had reduced again to 98-91 per cent.[135]

Lack of consultation with affected groups

3.119In addition to concerns with how specific aspects of compulsory income management impact individual people's lives, many submitters and witnesses contended that there has been limited appropriate consultation on the policy approach, which has led to such poor implementation outcomes.[136]

3.120The NPY Women's Council pointed out that the National Agreement on Closing the Gap (Closing the Gap) policy includes Priority Reform 1, Shared Decision Making, which recommends 'the need for policy partnerships in policy areas that are place-based and drive community-led outcomes through an investment in community-led development initiatives'. It stated that compulsory policies breach this principle,[137] noting that remote communities were not consulted when the scheme was first introduced, and therefore the scheme 'failed to acknowledge the experiences of people living in poverty and the limited access to permanent employment' and that income management would not change this reality.[138]

3.121NACCHO similarly highlighted that the lack of consultation breached a central component of Closing the Gap, which is genuine partnership and shared decision-making with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people'.[139] AIMN contended there has been a lack of consultation with affected groups and noted that the first time they met with the department to discuss compulsory income management was in March2024, with no consultation opportunities prior to this.[140] AIMN further asserted that the approach to consultation has been harmful and divisive:

By and large community based consultations have not effectively engaged with those for whom the policy has directly impacted and instead has created greater community friction by seeking and obtaining the views of others in the community about those on income support payments.[141]

3.122The NT Council of Social Service (NTCOSS) submitted that consultation and engagement with affected communities has been limited. NTCOSS noted that the department undertook consultation between November 2023 and February 2024 on the future on income management. NTCOSS recommended the department publish the results of the consultation and ensures transparency for decisions on compulsory income management moving forward.[142]

3.123Dr Bielefeld submitted that her research into CIM found there was no initial consultation when the policy was first introduced, and subsequent consultation was 'where coerced cardholders were only given an option to continue the program with or without exemptions rather than cease the program altogether'. Dr Bielefeld submitted that this lack of consultation and community buy-in for compulsory income management 'has been an ongoing source of anger, grief, frustration, and resentment amongst many people subject to the program'.[143] Similarly, researchers from Charles Darwin University and Monash University noted their research 'highlighted a lack of consultation with communities in relation to compulsory income management in the Northern Territory' where consultation was described as 'limited, tokenistic or absent across all iterations' of compulsory income management in the NT, leading to an 'under-prepared social services sector'.[144]

3.124The department acknowledged that, in the past, some community consultation in relation to income management had been handled poorly, but did outline that in some cases it was not a matter that it 'wasn't an effective communication approach' but because it was 'a truncated time'.[145] However, looking forward, the department discussed the ongoing consultations regarding the future of income management, reiterating the policy position that the government 'has committed to making income management voluntary for those individuals or communities who wish to keep a form of income management and to working with communities on these reforms'.[146]

3.125The department advised that it is in consultation with communities and stakeholders on the future of income management, in relation to the government's position that compulsory income management would be phased out in favour of a voluntary model.[147]

3.126The department advised those consultations are:

being conducted by First Nations organisation ETMP, which has 'extensive experience in working with First Nations and culturally and linguistically diverse peoples';

as of June 2024, ETMP/the department consulted with just under 4,000 community members from 72 communities across the NT, the APY Lands in South Australia, the East Kimberley region in Western Australia and Shepparton in Victoria;

since December 2022, consulted with over 200 community organisations; Commonwealth, state and territory governments; peak bodies, including Economic Justice Australia; the Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare; CatholicCare; and various land councils across the Northern Territory;

consultations include a lead senior cultural adviser and facilitators with cultural connections and ties to communities in the NT. Department staff were present as notetakers only and did not participate in discussion; and

consultation materials were in 14 languages and interpreters were present at face-to-face consultations.[148]

3.127The department noted that consultations were conducted over time—from November 2023 and May 2024—with the team spending days with large communities to 'build relationships' and show a 'commitment to hearing their stories and gathering their views on the future of this program’.[149] It stated that the next stage of consultation is to seek views on the process to support people to transition off compulsory income management, the process for people to stay on the scheme, and the support necessary should they choose to do so.[150]

3.128The department noted that the clear message from consultations is that people want a choice to remain or exit from compulsory income management, and that the program should be voluntary.[151]

Concerns regarding conduct of evaluations

3.129As outlined earlier in this chapter, where there has been claims that the compulsory income management approach has had positive impacts on individuals and communities, witnesses and submitters have argued those evaluations have been either improperly carried out, or the findings have been misrepresented.

3.130In their submission, Professor Gray and Dr Bray summarised a range of evaluation findings, and noted concerns with the manner in which these evaluations were conducted:

Social Policy Research Centre (2014) evaluation of introduction of voluntary income management in Anangu Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara (APY) Lands. The evaluation found the introduction was positively viewed and may have made modest contributions to addressing community challenges. However, Professor Gray and Dr Bray contend that early optimistic findings should be tested against later sharp declines in participation, from 233 persons to 68.

ORIMA (2010) undertook an early evaluation of Child Protection and Voluntary Income Management in WA and was largely positive in its findings. Professor Gray and Dr Bray contend the evaluation was 'mainly reliant upon the viewpoints of stakeholders, especially those involved in implementing the program, and some surveys of participants focused on self-reported change' but did not evaluate any changes in actual outcomes.

Department of Social Services (2014) conducted a qualitative evaluation of Child Protection compulsory income management in WA, which found that intermediaries reported it to be a useful tool, and participants reported both positive and negative experiences of the scheme. Professor Gray and Dr Bray contended that an independent evaluation of the same program found that compulsory income management effectiveness is dependent on the 'willingness of families to engage with services and with a process of change' and was 'reported to have very little impact where parents/carers are not committed to change'.

ORIMA (2016–17) conducted an evaluation of the cashless debit card in Ceduna and East Kimberley and reported the trial was effective in reducing both gambling and alcohol consumption and potentially also illicit drug use.Professor Gray and Dr Bray highlighted concerns with the study due to the lack of baseline data and a control population, the method of sample selection and interviewing approach, the confounding of population data and the highly limited use of administrative data.

University of Adelaide (2021) conducted a study of the cashless debit card in the Goldfields, East Kimberly and Ceduna sites. This study reported that compulsory income management reduced alcohol consumption and gambling, and 'was reported to make things better for those who were probably the most vulnerable and who needed it most'. Professor Gray and Dr Bray contended that the study was flawed as it relied on 'retrospective change questions' which are known to be unreliable, and further, that the chapter outlining participants' perceived changes was then taken as factual outcomes in the report's conclusion chapter.[152]

3.131Professor Gray and Dr Bray also raised concerns with the manner the department was presenting findings of the above evaluations, arguing there has been 'a consistent pattern of highly selective use, and misrepresentation of the evaluation findings by the department and successive governments'. They cited a department 2022 document, Reforming the Cashless Debit Card and Income Management, which made claims on the positive impacts of compulsory income management that Professor Gray and Dr Bray refer to as 'a deliberate attempt to mislead' and noted:

The way in which these particular figures were cherry picked out of a discussion which compared these with other results, and where the evaluation found that these did not accurately reflect actual outcomes, can only be considered as a deliberate policy to give readers an erroneous understanding of the evaluation findings.[153]

3.132The department stated that it did not agree with this characterisation.[154]

3.133Professor Gray and Dr Bray further noted limitations on compulsory income management-related data—in that it is being produced inconsistently by the department—limits the capacity of researchers to undertake fulsome and accurate analysis. Their submission noted different data sets being reported between 'Income Management' and 'Enhanced Income Management', particularly the proportion of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people subject to the different restrictions.[155]

Auditor-General reviews

3.134The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) echoed concerns around the appropriateness of evaluations of various compulsory income management operations. The ANAO has conducted three performance audits into the scheme’s operation.[156] Its report of 2018–19 found that it was difficult to conclude whether the cashless debit card trial 'was effective in achieving its objective of reducing social harm' because while the department established appropriate arrangements to implement the trial, 'its approach to monitoring and evaluation was inadequate'.[157] A later report of 2021–22 found this lack of appropriate program evaluation continued, as the department had implemented the 2018–19 report recommendations relating to 'risk management, procurement and contract management, partly implemented the recommendations relating to performance monitoring, and did not effectively implement the recommendations relating to cost–benefit analysis, post‑implementation review and evaluation. ANAO advised of the 2021–22 findings that:

Internal performance measurement and monitoring processes for the CDC [Cashless Debit Card] program are not effective. Monitoring data exists, but it is not used to provide a clear view of program performance due to limited performance measures and no targets…

The CDC program extension and expansion was not informed by an effective second impact evaluation, cost–benefit analysis or post‑implementation review. Although DSS evaluated the CDC Trial, a second impact evaluation was delivered late in the implementation of the CDC program, had similar methodological limitations to the first impact evaluation and was not independently reviewed. A cost–benefit analysis and post-implementation review on the CDC program were undertaken but not used.[158]

3.135Professor Gray and Dr Bray provided further analysis of the ANAO reviews and cited the 2018–19 report as finding 'a lack of robustness in data collection' and further, that 'the department's evaluation did not make use of all available administrative data to measure the impact of the trial including any change in social harm'.[159]

Deloitte Access Economics reviews

3.136Deloitte Access Economics (Deloitte) conducted a range of reviews of compulsory income management on behalf of the department, which found limited positive benefits. Professor Gray and Dr Bray cited the Key conclusions of the 2015Deloitte review as finding compulsory income management 'did not appear to have a substantial or sustained impact on the level of alcohol, tobacco or gambling consumption, although face-to-face interviews confirmed that it had been effective for some individuals'. However, they also argued that findings based on individual interviews must be taken with some hesitancy, due to the limitations of 'retrospective change questions' where 'reported perceptions can at times be fallible and may reflect more general issues of outlook or other changes in the environment in which people live'.[160]

3.137Professor Spencer contended that the Deloitte reviews of compulsory income management in Bankstown NSW were of limited utility because:

there were small numbers of respondents;

the evaluation data was not disaggregated by location of trial sites;

the evaluation also did not extend to an analysis of price and range of available food products available in food retail outlets approved to accept the BasicsCard; and

the evaluation did not assess the impact of the price and range of available food products on food security for households subject to CIM measures.[161]

3.138Professor Spencer noted that, in any case, the overall finding of the report series was that food security did not improve in a statistically significant way.[162]

3.139Anglicare submitted that the 2015 Deloitte review was based on a survey of 547 participants from the trial sites, including 124 participants (nearly 25 per cent) who signed on to the scheme voluntarily. That review primarily studied the functionality of the BasicsCard—whether participants were able to use the card for purchases and did it quarantine a designated amount of income—as opposed to studying whether the program of compulsory income management achieved its designated purpose of improving money management and food security.[163]

3.140Anglicare further submitted that the Deloitte review found that 26 per cent of survey respondents said it helped them with their money situation, but 59percent reported that the BasicsCard made their money situation worse, and 53 per cent said there were goods that they would like to buy but are not able to. Anglicare submitted that the Deloitte review:

…showed that the card made no impact on how participants rated their health. No data was presented on child welfare, as these results were not published.[164]

Review of Cessation of the Cashless Debit Card

3.141The most recent review of compulsory income management funded by the department was conducted by researchers at the University of Adelaide, published in May 2024. The review studied the impacts of the cessation of the CDC and subsequent move to enhanced income management in October 2022.[165] The report notes that conclusions in the review were largely drawn from interviews, cautioning that 'the quantitative data available to the review has little power to demonstrate the impact of the cessation of the CDC', and that while the review assessed the impacts and outcomes of the cessation of the CDC ‘no causal statements could be issued from the analyses’.[166]

3.142The review found the cessation of the CDC had some positive impacts, around 'reduced feelings of discrimination and increased personal agency' however some respondents noted that 'at times this greater freedom over money had resulted in poor decision-making'.[167] It also found significant negative impacts from the cessation of the CDC, including:

financial management: poorer outcomes in financial management and budgeting, increases in financial coercion. Data showed an increase in Centrelink urgent payments following cessation of CDC;

alcohol, illicit drug and gambling misuse: qualitative evidence showed considerable increase in alcohol consumption and misuse in some regions, along with higher incidents of public drinking and intoxication and rates of alcohol-related violence, but limited impact on illicit drug use;

health and wellbeing: concerns raised in some regions of declining levels of child wellbeing and welfare following CDC program cessation, including increased emergency department admissions;

safety and violence: stakeholders in some locations reported increased criminal activity and worsening perceptions of community safety since the ending of the CDC program; and

support service usage: increased support service need was reported since the ending of the CDC program, particularly demand for emergency relief services.[168]

Other issues

3.143Many submitters agreed, while addressing poverty and food security of social security payments was a positive goal that should be prioritised by governments, compulsory income management was not an appropriate mechanism, and that there were other more effective mechanisms to address the causes of poverty and disadvantage. For example, the RMIT Policy Group referred to the compulsory income management approach as 'a reductionist approach to complex issues that need a whole-of-person approach to understand and address the barriers to meaningful engagement in life and society'.[169] Similarly, the 4Rs Network argued that 'to achieve good support for women, children and others who are at risk of domestic and family violence there need to be targeted responses, not generalised, blanket responses which have diverse and unpredictable effects'. The network recommended that legislation should be better 'tuned to what it's trying to achieve and not try and do that in a blanket way'.[170]

3.144Anglicare recommended greater investment in entry-level job creation and raising the rate of social security payments above the Henderson Poverty Line.[171] ACOSS similarly recommended increases in social security payments.[172] AIMN recommended 'the Social Security Act is amended to include a statement of objects which briefly outline the purposes of the Act and recite the relevant human rights obligations'.[173] The 4Rs Network also recommended social security legislation be amended to include human rights obligations and that government ensure access to independent social security advocacy and legal help.[174] The Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare recommended a more effective alternative to compulsory income management would be engagement with community service organisations for wrap-around supports including financial counselling.[175]

3.145Multiple submitters argued that the small number of positive benefits of compulsory income management could be increased if the scheme was made a wholly voluntary program.[176] In this regard, the department confirmed that compulsory income management will be phased out in favour of a voluntary model.[177]

Footnotes

[1]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 36.

[2]Department of Social Services, Submission 13, p. 3.

[3]Department of Social Services, Submission 13, p. 4.

[4]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.

[5]Mr Patrick Burford, Group Manager, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2024, p. 15.

[6]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000139, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024) in reference to Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice SQ17-000149, 2016–2017 Senate Community Affairs Committee Additional Estimates.

[7]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 7.

[8]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 27.

[9]Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group, RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 3.

[10]See, for example: National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations, Submission 12; Aboriginal Peak Organisations NT, Submission 18, p. 2; and Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group, RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 3.

[11]Accountable Income Management Network, Submission 6, p. 2.

[12]Mr Simon Schrapel, AM, Convenor, Accountable Income Management Network and Chief Executive, Uniting Communities, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 24.

[13]Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare, Submission 7, pp. 1–2.

[14]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, pp. 1–2.

[15]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p.2.

[16]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 3.

[17]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 3.

[18]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 4.

[19]Charles Darwin University and Monash University, Submission 13, p.2.

[20]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, pp. 3, 10–11.

[21]Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council, Submission 2, p. 3.

[22]Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 6.

[23]Anglicare, Submission 3, pp. 6–7.

[24]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 16.

[25]Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 6.

[26]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000042, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[27]Mr Patrick Boneham, Branch Manager, Income Management Policy and Data, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 51.

[28]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000138, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024).

[29]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000143, 29 July 2024 (received 22 August 2024).

[30]Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council, Submission 2, p. 3.

[31]Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 7.

[32]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 16.

[33]Mr Patrick Boneham, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 45 and Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services. Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 50.

[34]Department of Social Services, Submission 14, p. 3.

[35]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services. Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 45.

[36]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, pp. 6–7.

[37]Family Responsibilities Commission, Submission 20, pp. 2–18.

[38]Ms Tammy Williams, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer, Family Responsibilities Commission, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 2.

[39]Ms Tammy Williams, Family Responsibilities Commission, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 2–3.

[40]Dr Anna Cody, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 10.

[41]Dr J. Rob Bray, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 34.

[42]Professor Matthew Gray, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 34. See also, Robert Heron, Submission 23, p. 1.

[43]Ms Judy Harrison, Co-Convenor, National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 27.

[44]Professor Stefanie Schurer, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 34.

[45]Dr Padraic John Gibson, Senior Researcher, Jumbunna Institute for Education and Research, University of Technology Sydney, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 35.

[46]Dr Padraic John Gibson, Jumbunna Institute for Education and Research, University of Technology Sydney, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 35.

[47]Dr J. Rob Bray, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 33.

[48]Associate Professor Elise Klein OAM, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 42.

[49]Associate Professor Elise Klein, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 41.

[50]Social Work Policy and Action Group RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 1. See also: Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 4; Charles Darwin University and Monash University, Submission 13, p.1.

[51]Professor Beth Goldblatt, Submission 1, p. 2.

[52]Single Mother Families Australia, Submission 21, p. 1.

[53]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 5.

[54]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 5.

[55]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 40.

[56]Professor Stephanie Schurer, Submission 4, p. 3.

[57]Professor Stefanie Schurer, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 30.

[58]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, pp.29–31.

[59]Dr Anna Cody, Australian Human Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 9.

[60]Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Submission 16, p. 4. See also: Ms Taylah Bell, Committee Member, Accountable Income Management Network and Project Officer, Remote Women's Access Project, Economic Justice Australia, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 24; Mrs Jessica Stevens, Committee Member, Accountable Income Management Network; and Senior Advocacy Advisor, Uniting Communities, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 26.

[61]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 9.

[62]Charles Darwin University and Monash University, Submission 13, p.2.

[63]Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council, Submission 2, p. 3.

[64]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 3.

[65]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 39.

[66]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 8.

[67]Associate Professor Elise Klein and Dr Francis Markham, Submission 8, p. 2. See also: Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group, RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 3.

[68]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 4.

[69]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 4.

[70]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 38.

[71]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 5.

[72]North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 19, pp. 2–3.

[73]Mr Shane Foyster, Housing and Social Security Consultant Lawyer with the Northern Australia Aboriginal Justice Agency, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 14.

[74]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 7.

[75]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 6.

[76]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, pp. 6–7.

[77]Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group, RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 3.

[78]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 14.

[79]Mr Patrick Boneham, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 46.

[80]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 48.

[81]See, for example: Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 9; Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 17; and Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 38.

[82]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 4.

[83]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 6.

[84]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 5.

[85]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 10.

[86]Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare, Submission 7, p. 2.

[87]Ms Justine Fievez, Branch Manager, Income Management Engagement and Support Services, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 46.

[88]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 7.

[89]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 7.

[90]Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, p. 10.

[91]National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations, Submission 12, p. 4.

[92]Aboriginal Peak Organisations NT, Submission 18, p. 2.

[93]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 17.

[94]Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 10.

[95]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Private capacity, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 38.

[96]Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare, Submission 7, p. 2. See also: Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, p. 5; North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 19, pp. 2–3.

[97]National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Submission 24, p.5. Co-convenor of the 4Rs Network, Ms Judy Harrison argued that geographic targeting is not necessarily discriminatory, but rather depends on what the effects of it are. She stated that if 'the effects are negative, then that's discriminatory' whereas if it is 'a special measure and it's enlarging rights and enlarging wellbeing, then that's permitted and aligned with human rights compliance'. See, Ms Judy Harrison, National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 25–26.

[98]Charles Darwin University and Monash University, Submission 13, p.10.

[99]North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 19, p. 1.

[100]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 16. See also Ms Judy Harrison, National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 23.

[101]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 4.

[102]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 45.

[103]Department of Social Services, Submission 14, pp. 4 and 6–7.

[104]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 16.

[105]Department of Social Services, answer to question on notice IQ24-000047, 13 June 2024 (received 4 July 2024).

[106]Mr Patrick Boneham, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 53.

[107]See, for example: Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, p. 8; Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare, Submission 7, p. 2; North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 19, p. 3; Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 4; Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 6; Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 6; and Council of Single Mothers and their Children, Submission 28, p.1.

[108]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 6.

[109]Accountable Income Management Network, Submission 6, p. 4.

[110]National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations, Submission 12, p. 4.

[111]Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 6.

[112]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 6.

[113]Professor Beth Goldblatt, Submission 1, p. 1.

[114]Associate Professor Elise Klein and Dr Francis Markham, Submission 8, pp. 2–3.

[115]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 8.

[116]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 9.

[117]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 8.

[118]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 6.

[119]Professor Beth Goldblatt, Submission 1, pp. 1–2.

[120]Dr Anna Cody, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, Australian Human Rights Commission, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 9.

[121]Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, pp. 5–6. See Also Women's Legal Service NSW, Submission29, p. 2.

[122]Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, pp. 6–7.

[123]North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, Submission 19, pp. 1–2.

[124]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 14.

[125]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 16.

[126]Mr Shane Foyster, North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 16.

[127]National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Submission 24, p.5.

[128]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, pp. 9–10.

[129]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 11.

[130]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 11.

[131]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 12.

[132]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 12.

[133]Economic Justice Australia, Submission 9, p. 3.

[134]Mr Patrick Boneham, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 49.

[135]Mrs Letitia Hope and Mr Patrick Boneham, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 29July 2024, pp. 10 and 11.

[136]See, for example: Mrs Jessica Stevens, Accountable Income Management Network, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p.23; and Jumbunna Institute of Indigenous Education and Research, Submission 26, p. 3.

[137]Closing the Gap, 6. Priority Reform One – Formal partnerships and shared decision-making, cited in Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council, Submission 2, p. 2. See also: Aboriginal Peak Organisations NT, Submission 18, p. 2.

[138]Ngaanyatjarra Pitjantjatjara Yankunytjatjara Women’s Council, Submission 2, p. 3.

[139]National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisations, Submission 12, p. 4.

[140]Accountable Income Management Network, Submission 6, p. 3.

[141]Accountable Income Management Network, Submission 6, p. 4.

[142]NT Council of Social Service, Submission 15, p. 2.

[143]Dr Shelley Bielefeld, Submission 11, p. 8.

[144]Charles Darwin University and Monash University, Submission 13, p.2.

[145]Mr Patrick Burford, Department of Social Services. Committee Hansard, 29 July 2024, p. 5.

[146]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services. Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.

[147]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services. Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.

[148]Mrs Letitia Hope and Ms Justine Fievez, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July2024, pp. 44–47.

[149]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, pp. 44–45.

[150]Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 45.

[151]Mrs Letitia Hope and Ms Justine Fievez, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5July2024, pp. 45–46. See also Mrs Letitia Hope, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 29 July 2024, p. 7.

[152]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, pp.15–23.

[153]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, pp.24–25.

[154]Mr Patrick Boneham, Department of Social Services, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 53.

[155]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 1.

[156]See, Auditor-General Report No. 19 2012–13 Administration of New Income Management in the Northern Territory; Auditor-General Report No. 1 2018–19 The Implementation and Performance of the Cashless Debit Card Trial; and Auditor-General Report No. 29 2021–22 Implementation and Performance of the Cashless Debit Card Trial.

[157]Australian National Audit Office, Submission 17, p. 18.

[158]Australian National Audit Office, Submission 17, p. 19.

[159]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, p. 21.

[160]Professor Matthew Gray and Dr J. Rob Bray, Australian National University, Submission 30, pp.17–18.

[161]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, pp. 3–4.

[162]Professor Liesel Spencer, Submission 25, p. 3.

[163]Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 6.

[164]Anglicare, Submission 3, p. 6.

[165]University of Adelaide, Review of the Impact of the Cessation of the Cashless Debit Card: Final Report, May 2024, p. 6.

[166]University of Adelaide, Review of the Impact of the Cessation of the Cashless Debit Card: Final Report, p. 19.

[167]University of Adelaide, Review of the Impact of the Cessation of the Cashless Debit Card: Final Report, p. 4.

[168]University of Adelaide, Review of the Impact of the Cessation of the Cashless Debit Card: Final Report, pp. 4–5.

[169]Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group, RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 4.

[170]Ms Judy Harrison, National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 27.

[171]Anglicare, Submission 3, pp. 9–11.

[172]Australian Council of Social Service, Submission 22, p. 8.

[173]Accountable Income Management Network, Submission 6, p. 5.

[174]National Regional, Rural, Remote and Very Remote Community Legal Network, Submission 24, pp.7–8.

[175]Centre for Excellence in Child and Family Welfare, Submission 7, p. 2.

[176]See, for example: Centre for Policy Futures, University of Queensland, Submission 10, p. 11; Council of Single Mothers and their Children, Submission 28, p. 1; Social Work Policy and Advocacy Action Group, RMIT University, Submission 5, p. 4.

[177]Mrs Letitia Hope, Deputy Secretary, Families and Communities, Department of Social Services. Committee Hansard, 5 July 2024, p. 44.