Submission No. 3
JOAN COXSEDGE 8 LEICESTER STREET NORTH BALWYN VICTORIA
3104 AUSTRALIA
TEL: (03) 9857 9249 FAX: (03) 9857 6598
Grant Harrison
Committee Secretary
Parliament of Australia
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
21 April 1999
A FEW GENERAL COMMENTS
I seriously criticise the amount of time given to respond to the ASIO
Amendment Bill. It is grossly inadequate and reinforces the view that
the government is treating community consultation as a joke.
Studying the proposed changes, I am forced to ask why does ASIO need
these extra powers at this particular time, seeing as no evidence is given
indicating that their absence has created a problem for the organisation
in the past or would do so in the future?
A number of items relate to the Olympic Games. Is that the raison detre?
If so, what happens when the Olympic Games are over? Is there a sunset
clause to terminate the extra powers?
There appears to be no absolute limitations placed on ASIOs quest for
these new powers because it appears that every proviso can be over-ridden.
In his Second Reading speech, Attorney-General Williams mentioned that
new computer access provisions will enable ASIO to gain access to through
other means. What did he have in mind? And for ASIO to do certain things
which may be necessary, a rather chilling phrase which could mean absolutely
anything.
He then talks about a strict limitation so that ASIO will not run amok,
presumably. How does he intend to ensure a strict limitation when, due
to the inherent secrecy of its work, ASIO can virtually do what it likes?
In the past it has routinely breached its charter. Is he seriously suggesting
that it wont in the future? Secrecy is at the very core of the problem
when discussing limitations, controls and accountability.
Joan Coxsedge
8 Leicester Street
North Balwyn 3104
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS FROM THE EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
Page 3, Item 4. permits ASIO to collect foreign intelligence.
How does that square with ASIS? Are they working in tandem or competing
with each other?
Item 5. Permits ASIO to recover part or all of its costs. Does
that infer that some of ASIOs work is being privatised?
In the same clause, it mentions other persons at their request. Who
did they have in mind? How do we know that ASIO is not acting to disadvantage
certain groups and individuals? In the past it was shown that information
was selectively handed out and could be very destructive, being based
on hearsay, lies and half-truths. If money enters the equation, then surely
ASIO is moving into a completely new arena.
Page 4, Item 11, subsection 24(1) How will you ensure that
recovering listening devices will not be used to intimidate? Or is that
the general idea?
Page 5 Item 12, subsection 25(5) Access to computers. How
will you ensure that access to data in computers is limited to the particular
event and will not be used in a wider fishing expedition? Appears to
be relevant is mentioned in relation to examining and copying data. Who
decides? How will you know until you download all the material?
Subsection 25(10) The time limit is 28 days to give greater flexibility
to ASIO. How will this substantially assist in the collection of intelligence
unless the operative is going on a fishing expedition?
(contd on page 6) to add, delete or alter data and tamper with a
computer. A very disturbing clause which permits possible interference
in someones computer, rather like a virus. Data is data. Altering it
can only have a mischievous purpose. Why does ASIO want this particular
power? Should not be allowed.
Page 6 Item 22 The right to enter premises to remove surveillance.
The effect of such a clause would seem to be intimidatory. It only relates
to picking up an item in situ in an open manner but not when installing
the item. No time limit means the item could stay put forever or be recovered
when it suits ASIO.
Page 7 Item 24 How is it proposed to protect articles in
transit from inspections by unauthorised people? How would this be carried
out in practice?
Page 8 Item 27 Issuing warrants to a specified computer
or thing. What the hell is a thing?
Page 8 Item 29 Many clauses extend the period of a search
warrant to 28 days. How does ASIO propose to keep track of all these extended
search warrants?
Page 9 Item 33 This clause appears to wander into territory
normally inhabited by ASIS. As mentioned previously, how will this work
out? Especially in light of inter-agency rivalries.
Page 9 Item 34 Allows the ASIO Director-General to broaden
the range of warrants in an emergency and tell his minister after the
event! I wondered what the minister would be told to explain the need
for such a circumstance. And if he/she agrees there was no such emergency,
what then?
Page 10 Item 37 This item and many others relate to the
Olympic Games, which will conclude at the end of next year. As mentioned
previously, is there a sunset clause on each of the items? If not, why
not?
Page 10 Item 39 subsection 38(1) permits ASIO to communicate
security assessments... in certain circumstances. Too vague. What are
these circumstances? Would the provisions of adverse review rights notification
also apply to a third party who receives such information?
Page 16 Items 3EA All clauses relating to financial transactions
to follow the money trail appear to overlap the functions of the National
Crime Authority and the Federal Police etc, so why is ASIO seeking these
powers and why from the Taxation Office rather than via the other law
enforcement bodies?
Is the push coming from the United States? I read that the CIA and National
Security Agency, for example, are emphasising economic espionage and stressing
co-operation with law enforcement agencies on issues such as drug trafficking
and money-laundering. A few years ago, the US Department of Defence and
Department of Justice signed a memorandum of understanding for Operations
Other Than War and Law Enforcement to facilitate joint development and
technology.
I dont have any illusions about the dangerous anti-democratic proposals
contained in the bill, adding to the ones already in existence. The reality
is, as anyone with half a brain knows, that an organisation like ASIO
can do what it likes, when it likes, how it likes and against whom it
likes, especially with an overly-compliant government. This is actually
spelled out in Section 8 (4&5) of the 1979 ASIO Act, which states
that the Minister cannot override the authority of the Director-General.
So much for parliamentary scrutiny and control.
I have a question. If committee members inadvertently came across information
relating to security they believed would be in the peoples national
interest to know about, but that ASIO was determined to suppress, what
would they do? I wont hold my breath waiting for an answer.
A copy of this submission is also available from the
Committee Secretariat.
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