CHAPTER 5
Issues Arising: (2) Procedural Fairness
The Act establishes a reporting process as a guide to the exercise of
the Minister's discretion, but it does not specify how the reporter should
ensure that interested parties are treated fairly. This has left the Minister's
discretion open to legal challenges. Two declarations have been overturned
by the Federal Court and other decisions of the Minister have also been
set aside. The most recent cases of this kind involve Hindmarsh Island
(Kumarangk) and the Broome Crocodile Farm. The procedures laid down for
the Minister and the section 10 reporter by those cases have made the
process burdensome and taken it away from the relatively simple procedures
which were envisaged when the Act was introduced. They also expose Aboriginal
people seeking the protection of the Act to intensive scrutiny of their
religious beliefs. (Evatt Report pp.xiii,xiv)
The Need for Fairness
5.1 In the Committee's terms of reference it is noted that, for situations
like that concerning the Hindmarsh Island Bridge:
...the spiritual and cultural beliefs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people are not able to be properly considered under existing
legislative arrangements.
5.2 The Evatt Report recognized the competing interests involved in indigenous
heritage protection cases. Generally speaking, indigenous interests are
concerned about the difficulty of ensuring effective long-term protection
of sites of significance, while other land-users or development interests
are concerned about the cost and delays caused to developers, governments
and communities. [1]
5.3
The Hindmarsh Island Bridge controversy demonstrated the effect that
indigenous heritage concerns can have on proposed developments and the
desire of development interests to test assertions that particular sites
are of special significance to indigenous people.
Hindmarsh Island
5.4 Hindmarsh Island, known to the local Ngarrindjeri people as Kumarangk,
is on the Lower Murray River about 80 kilometers southeast of Adelaide.
In order to proceed with property developments on Hindmarsh Island, Binalong
Pty Ltd incurred an obligation to the South Australian government to build
a bridge linking the island with Goolwa; the principals of Binalong are
Mr Tom Chapman and Mrs Wendy Chapman. The State Government subsequently
assumed responsibility for the construction, formalized by a deed in March
1993.
5.5 In December 1993 the South Australian Crown solicitor requested Mr Samuel Jacobs QC
to provide an independent assessment of the government's position. Mr
Jacobs reported in February 1994; the State Government confirmed that
the report would not be released but announced that it was obliged to
proceed with construction of the bridge.
5.6 Also in December 1993, the Ngarrindjeri applied to the Commonwealth
Minister, the Hon Robert Tickner, for a s.10 declaration under the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984. The Minister
appointed Professor Cheryl Saunders to prepare a s.10 report. That report
was presented to the Minister in July 1994, advising that circumstances
existed to make a declaration. A declaration was subsequently issued,
protecting the area for 25 years.
5.7 The Chapman family made application to the Federal Court in July
1994 for judicial review of the Minister's decision. The Court delivered
its judgment in February 1995. The Federal Court agreed unanimously
that both the Saunders Hindmarsh Island inquiry, and Mr Tickner's bridge
ban were procedurally defective; it held that the requirements of s.10
had not been complied with in two respects. First, the notice of the inquiry
failed to comply with the requirements of s.10(3)(a); in particular, it
failed to identify with specific precision the area covered by the application.
Second, the Minister had failed to comply with the requirement in s.10(1)(c)
that he personally consider the representations attached to Professor Saunders'
report. The Court ordered that the decisions of both Professor Saunders
and the Minister be quashed.
5.8 This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Full Federal Court in
December 1995. The order quashing the Minister's decision had been stayed,
the stay being lifted on 24 July 1996. The key cases in this matter to
that date, then, were Chapman v Tickner (1995) 133 ALR 74 and the appeal
Tickner v Chapman (1995) 133 ALR 226.
5.9 Two further inquiries into this matter should be noted. In June 1995
the South Australian Government appointed a Royal Commission to examine
allegations that the restricted women's knowledge put forward by the applicant
Ngarrindjeri women had been fabricated. The applicant women and those
supporting their view chose not to appear before the Royal Commission
which heard from other ('dissident') Ngarrindjeri women that the purported
tradition was not genuine. In its report on 19 December 1995, the Royal
Commission found that there had been a fabrication of secret 'women's
business' and that the purpose of the fabrication was to obtain a declaration
from the Commonwealth Minister so as to prevent the construction of the
bridge.
5.10 Also on 19 December 1995 the Minister received a new application
from Ngarrindjeri men and women seeking a protective declaration over
an area which included the land and water said to be required for the
bridge. In order to avoid the problem of a male Minister, Mr Tickner,
having to receive information that was to be revealed only to women, the
Government designated a female Minister, Senator the Hon Rosemary Crowley,
to act for Mr Tickner and determine the application. In January 1996
Senator Crowley appointed Justice Jane Mathews to prepare a s.10 report.
5.11 Prior to Justice Mathews completing her report, the Full Federal
Court delivered judgment in the Broome Crocodile Farm case. [2]
Comments in that judgment (delivered on 28 May 1996) indicated that a
s.10 reporter was obliged to inform all parties directly affected of all
the grounds being put to the reporter that might influence the outcome,
even although this might involve the disclosure of culturally sensitive
material. ( Importantly, in both Chapman v Tickner (1995) and the Broome
Crocodile Farm case, the procedures under the Act were found to be consistent
with the requirements of natural justice.)
5.12 Also prior to the Mathews report, one of the 'dissident' women and
eight others commenced proceedings in the High Court; they challenged
the role of Justice Mathews, arguing that the Constitution did not permit
a Federal Court judge to carry out what was an executive rather than judicial
function.
5.13 Justice Mathews reported on 27 June 1996 following the change of
Federal Government in March of that year. As a result, in part, of the
Broome Crocodile Farm judgment, the content of any tradition relating
to restricted women's knowledge was either not put to the Mathews inquiry
or was withdrawn once it became clear that its particular restrictions
could not be assured. In the absence of this material, Justice Mathews
found that the applicants had failed to provide adequate support for the
making of a s.10 declaration by the Minister.
5.14 Nevertheless, the High Court handed down judgment in September 1996
concerning Justice Mathews' role: the High Court found that the steps
taken by the Government to appoint Justice Mathews had not been effective.
Importantly, the effect of this judgment was that the Mathews report could
not be used as a s.10 report; the Minister still had an obligation to
obtain such a report. In late 1996, evidence to the Senate Legal and Constitutional
Legislation Committee stated that the application before the Minister
that gave rise to the Mathews report was considered by the Commonwealth
to be 'live'. [3]
5.15 The Commonwealth addressed this matter with the Hindmarsh Island
Bridge Bill 1996. The Bill proposed to remove the bridge area from the
scope of the Heritage Protection Act in two respects: to remove the ability
of the Minister to make declarations in respect of the area, and to remove
the obligation of the Minister to set in train the s.10 inquiry process
for applications relating to the area. The Bill was passed by the House
of Representatives on 7 November 1996, and by the Senate on 12 May 1997.
5.16 The Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 now is subject of appeal before
the High Court; hearings commenced on 5 February 1998. The appeal argument
is that Section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution (the 'race power') does not
provide for legislation to the detriment of indigenous people.
Issue Identified by the Senate
5.17 In referring this inquiry to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Native Title and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund,
the Senate expressed the view that, in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge matter,
'the spiritual and cultural beliefs of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people [were] not able to be properly considered under existing
legislative arrangements'. In the Hindmarsh Island matter, the situation
in regard to the consideration of spiritual and cultural beliefs of indigenous
people by s.10 reporters can be summarised as follows:
Saunders Inquiry
The Saunders inquiry received confidential information and reported
with the benefit of it. However, the Minister, being male, did not consider
the representations of a confidential nature attached to the report.
Mathews Inquiry
Largely as a consequence of the Broome Crocodile Farm case, confidential
information either was not put or was withdrawn.
5.18 Crucially, the difficulties concerning the consideration of spiritual
and cultural beliefs are in essence of two kinds, both of which have arisen
from judicial decisions:
Under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection
Act 1984, s.10(1)(c) requires that the Minister personally consider
all representations. In practice this difficulty can be overcome by
the appointment of a Minister of the appropriate gender for the purpose.
Of much greater difficulty is the consequence of the Broome Crocodile
Farm case which decided that, on natural justice grounds, a s.10 reporter
was obliged to inform all parties directly affected by the application
of all the grounds being put by the reporter that might influence the
outcome, even though this might involve the disclosure of culturally
sensitive material.
It is, then, the effect of the Broome Crocodile Farm case judgment (in
May 1996) that religious and cultural information be disclosed to all
parties; ironically, and as in the case of the Mathews inquiry, this may
consequently entail that such beliefs are not able to be properly considered
by anyone because, for reasons of sensitivity, they will not be disclosed
under such circumstances. The requirement to disclose sensitive information,
then, can be detrimental to indigenous interests seeking to protect their
heritage.
Procedural Fairness and Confidentiality: The Problem
The Developers' Perspective
5.19 Several witnesses gave evidence to the Committee how the absence
of an opportunity to examine the basis upon which heritage protection
was sought led to development interests questioning the procedural fairness
by which protection decisions are made. Mr Steve Palyga, solicitor for
the Chapman family who are the developers in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge
matter, advised:
Despite our repeatedly urging them that the requirements of natural
justice meant we had to know the 'women's business' claims, and be given
an opportunity to comment on them, they took the view that this was
not required of them. [4]
5.20 The term 'procedural fairness' is used to indicate those common
law principles that administrators should employ in order to make decisions
fairly. Overlapping with the notion of natural justice, procedural fairness
is composed of the 'hearing rule', the 'bias rule' and the 'no evidence
rule'. The 'hearing rule' requires a decisionmaker to provide a hearing
opportunity for any person whose interests may be affected. The 'bias
rule' compels the matter to be heard in a disinterested manner. And the
'no evidence rule' requires that a decision be based on logically probative
evidence. Where procedural fairness has not been observed by the relevant
decisionmaker, grounds may exist for a judicial challenge to any decision.
5.21 In addition to the risk of legal challenges arising out of a failure
to follow the principles of procedural fairness, significant community
disaffection can result from the perception, justified or not, of unfair
treatment. The divisions that emerged between indigenous groups and developers
as well as those within the indigenous community in the wake of the Hindmarsh
Island Bridge matter may have been exacerbated by the perception that
procedural fairness was lacking in the way the matter was handled.
5.22 The demands of procedural fairness are difficult to reconcile with
restrictions on the availability of evidence relevant to protection matters.
Mr Steve Palyga has argued that it is unjust for any party whose interests
are affected by the making of a protection declaration to be denied access
to the information upon which the decision to confer protection is based.
Mr Palyga considered that the requirements of procedural fairness should
apply to the issue of determining the significance of a particular heritage
site, and that any person whose interests are affected should have the
opportunity to test the evidence upon which this decision is made. In
his submission Mr Palyga stated:
If you allow information to be provided in secret, without the ability
for it to be tested, you greatly compromise the investigative process.
[5]
...
When heritage is claimed to be secret, then it absolutely must be rigorously
tested. [6]
...
In summary, complete secrecy is otiose. It can be claimed to sideline
parties. It frustrates legitimate inquiry. It can be used to hide a
fabrication. [7]
5.23 Mr Palyga described the unsuccessful attempts he made during the
Hindmarsh Island Bridge matter to gain access to confidential heritage
information. Mr Palyga indicated that during the protracted dispute he
gave several undertakings of confidentiality and was prepared to accept
gender restrictions on the viewing of restricted information. [8]
5.24
Mr Palyga's argument, then, amounts to an endorsement of the situation
now prevailing since the Broome Crocodile Farm case; in a supplementary
submission, HA1(a), dated 4 March 1998, Mr Palyga confirmed:
The Indigenous Perspective
5.25 A large number of indigenous witnesses before the Committee suggested
that indigenous persons seeking heritage protection under legislation
frequently had to decide between the lesser of two evils. Either the confidentiality
of culturally restricted information would have to be compromised or else
a significant site would be desecrated. The disclosure of such information
could in itself amount to the desecration of the site to which the information
related, or else a general desecration of indigenous culture. For example,
some witnesses [9] argued that the Hindmarsh
Island Bridge matter demonstrated that the lack of adequate protection
available for confidential information prejudiced the rights of indigenous
women to equality before the law.
5.26
The reluctance of indigenous people to disclose culturally sensitive
information confirms a desire to preserve their heritage from physical
desecration or from the possibility of desecration by the inappropriate
disclosure of culturally sensitive information. Like many other English
common law concepts, the need for transparency which is implicit in procedural
fairness is not a concept which commonly exists under indigenous law.
[10]
5.27
Anthropologists (such as Professor Weiner) distinguished between the
Western concept of knowledge separate from the identity of the person
possessing it, and the situation in Aboriginal societies where the nature
of an individual's status and their position in a community defines the
status of knowledge held. [11] Cultural knowledge
being structured in this way, it is difficult for an outsider to gain
a clear picture of the basis for the significance of a particular site.
5.28
Other witnesses explained that legal proceedings dealing with different
levels of indigenous knowledge sometimes entail the gradual emergence
of details ; this can give courts an impression that the story had changed
from one day of hearings to the next. [12]
Unfortunately, the emergence of new information which conflicts with what
previously may have been said exposes indigenous spokespersons to allegations
of inventing cultural information. [13]
5.29
A further problem concerns the form in which relevant information, restricted
or otherwise, may be compiled. In their evidence representatives of the
ALRM made the point that indigenous people may preserve their confidential
information in the form of paintings, dances or songs. The ALRM suggested
that confidentiality provisions should specifically deal with safeguarding
information preserved and presented in such ways. [14]
Possible Solutions
Site Registers
5.30 Witnesses raised several different approaches to ways in which sites
of significance could be registered without compromising the confidentiality
of restricted cultural information. AMEC [15]
recommended the establishment of confidential State and Territory registers
containing all information relating to cultural heritage with restricted
information being given only to government officials following consultations
with the indigenous groups involved. The ILC submitted that a clear definition
of what may be considered confidential material is required before a non-indigenous
party can have access to the submissions of an indigenous party. [16]
The question of site registers is considered in more detail at Chapter 7
of this report; the Committee considers that registers are a necessary
part of the solution to difficulties concerning the management of confidential
information.
Ms Evatt's Report
5.31 In her report Ms Evatt found that restrictions on access to certain
kinds of information are a central feature of traditional Aboriginal life.
She observed that the need to respect Aboriginal customary law restrictions
on information is well established. Nevertheless, Ms Evatt noted that
there was widespread ignorance among non-Aboriginal people about the matter.
[17]
5.32 In addressing this question, Ms Evatt laid down four standards for
recognizing customary restrictions on information:
Standard 1 Heritage protection laws should respect Aboriginal
customary law restrictions on the disclosure and use of information
about Aboriginal heritage.
Standard 2 Procedures under heritage protection laws should
minimise the amount of information Aboriginal people need to give about
significant areas or sites to ensure protection and avoid injury or
desecration.
Standard 3 The laws and related procedures must ensure that
customary law restrictions on information received for the purpose of
administering heritage protection laws or received in related proceedings
are respected and observed.
Standard 4 Heritage protection legislation should specifically
provide that a claim for public interest immunity may be made for restricted
information.
5.33 Further, Ms Evatt recommended that State, Territory and Commonwealth
heritage protection laws should meet those standards. [18]
ATSIC
5.34 ATSIC [19] supports the approach recommended
by Ms Evatt. The religious beliefs of indigenous people should not be
subject to scrutiny. Where there are differences of opinion among indigenous
people as to the significance of an area, as occurred in the Hindmarsh
Island Bridge case, the emphasis should be on determining whether the
area is of significance to a particular group of indigenous people, usually
the applicants. In assessing that group's claim on significance, 'the
emphasis should be on establishing the existence of sacred knowledge and
restrictions..., rather than on extracting all the relevant details about
why the site or object is significant'. According to ATSIC, the differing
views would be included in the report to the Minister on his decision
about whether to make a declaration over the area.
Mr Palyga's Submission
5.35 Mr Palyga has responded to Ms Evatt's position concerning the protection
of confidential information:
... as the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Royal Commission demonstrates, secrecy
claims are a ready cloak for fabrication.
When heritage is claimed to be secret, it is absolutely vital that
it be rigorously investigated.
...
In essence, Ms Evatt recommends that, if heritage is claimed to be
secret, affected parties should be shut out of the process (paragraphs
7.9 and 7.10).
...
Ms Evatt's proposal would be to set at nought the rights of natural
justice and fairness which are not only clear and vitally important,
but have also been declared on 28th May 1996 by the Full Federal Court
in the Broome Crocodile Farm case.
...
Ms Evatt's proposal will only perpetuate the root cause problem in
the bridge and Crocodile Farm cases, namely the lack of robust criticism
of claims in a bureaucratic closed shop. [20]
The Courts
5.36 The question of how to reconcile the requirements of procedural
fairness and justice with the need to respect traditional restrictions
on the availability of information has been considered by the Courts.
5.37 On 11 April 1997, in handing down judgment in the case Ben Ward
& Ors (on behalf of the Miriuwung Gajerrong Peoples), Lee J set out
rules under section 50 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976
for the treatment of sensitive, culturally restricted evidence. These
rules provided for the protection of evidence before the Court.
5.38 Subsequently, in the Federal Court case of Yarmirr and Others v
Northern Territory of Australia and Others 143 ALR 687 (15 April 1997)
Olney J considered a request made by the native title claimants to restrict
the attendance of females from the deliberations of the court in the course
of determining a native title claim. The claimants had requested the exclusion
of all female court officers, legal representatives and members of the
public from a hearing being conducted on an island relevant to the determination
of the claim.
5.39 Olney J acknowledged the significance of restricting information
to particular classes of people according to Aboriginal traditions and
customary law along such lines as 'men's business' or 'women's business'.
On this basis, Olney J agreed to exclude female members of the public
from the hearing but he declined to order the exclusion of female legal
representatives. He found that such an order would interfere with the
right of a party to be represented by a lawyer of that party's choice
as provided by section 78 of the Commonwealth's Judiciary Act 1903. Olney
J did not make any order in relation to the attendance of female court
officers as it was not contemplated that they would be present at the
particular hearing in relation to which the orders were sought.
5.40 The decision of Olney J in Yamirr was not followed in the subsequent
case of State of Western Australia v Ward (on behalf of the Miriuwung
Gajerrong Peoples) and Others 154 ALR 512 (8 July 1997); in that (appeal)
case, Hill, Branson and Sundberg JJ of the Federal Court considered the
validity of the rules that had been created by Lee J, the presiding judge
in the original case Ben Ward & Ors (on behalf of the Miriuwung Gajerrong
Peoples).
5.41 In rejecting the conclusions of Olney J in Yamirr, the Court in
the Ward appeal found that section 78 did not confer an absolute right
upon a party to the counsel of its choice. Instead the Court found that
section 78 confers a right upon a party to represent themselves or
else be represented by legal practitioners, and that an order restricting
a party to legal representation of a particular gender was not inconsistent
with this right.
5.42 The rules considered in the original Ward case were made in order
to consider evidence about a claimant application brought under the Native
Title Act 1993 by the Miriuwung and Gajerrong peoples in Western Australia.
These rules were considered valid by all three Judges hearing the appeal,
two of which expressly rejected the earlier case of Yarmirr, subject to
some minor amendments. The amended rules for the protection of evidence
upheld by the court were:
6. Occasions may arise when it will be in the interests of the administration
of justice that the taking of evidence should occur in restricted circumstances.
These occasions may arise where traditional laws and customs prevent women
and men respectively speaking about certain matters, for example, matters
going to Law, ceremony and ritual, in the presence of persons of the opposite
gender and the communication of the details of such matters to persons
of the opposite gender.
7. In those cases where the taking of evidence should be restricted,
it is to be understood that restrictions will apply to both the circumstance
in which the evidence is taken and recorded, and the subsequent sharing,
communication or dissemination of the evidence or record of the evidence
produced.
8. In the event that a party seeks restrictions in respect of evidence
to be given in the proceedings, notification of the restrictions sought
and the basis for the restrictions is to be given to the Court and other
parties no later than 28 days before the date the evidence is to be heard.
9. Any party who objects to the restrictions sought is to file and serve
a notice of objection within 14 days of the receipt of the notification
of the restrictions sought.
10. Each party is entitled to be represented at a hearing of 'gender
restricted' evidence by no more than two lawyers of the same sex as the
witnesses.
11. Each party is entitled to have present at a hearing of 'gender restricted'
evidence one anthropologist of the same sex as the witnesses for the purpose
of assisting the party's lawyers.
12. Only if cause has been shown and leave obtained from the Court to
do so may -
(a) the party's lawyers and anthropologists who attend the hearing
of 'gender restricted' evidence divulge information about the evidence
to that party's other lawyers or anthropologists engaged in the proceedings
regardless of gender, or
(b) transcript of gender restricted' evidence be available to the party's
other lawyers or anthropologists regardless of gender.
13. The transcript of evidence or other record made of or in relation
to any evidence restricted on the basis of gender and information in respect
thereof may not be disseminated to any persons other than to counsel,
instructing solicitors and anthropologists as instructed by a party, such
persons being of the gender required by the aforesaid restriction unless
leave has been obtained from the court in the same terms as described
in item 7.
5.43 All three judges agreed that rule 10 should be amended to remove
the restriction on the number of lawyers that may be present. On 20 October
1997 the State of Western Australia was refused leave by the High Court
to appeal against the decision.
5.44 In his evidence Western Australian barrister Mr Greg McIntyre expressed
support for the decision of the Federal Court in Ward and the principles
applied by the Court to restrict the disclosure of evidence. Mr McIntyre
went on to describe a situation that arose in the course of his own practice
where a judge agreed to exclude all women from hearing the evidence of
a particular witness. The witness on that occasion feared for his life
if he disclosed particular information to women. [21]
5.45 Mr Palyga has also expressed agreement with the judgment in Ward:
Western Australia v Ward gives particular guidance on appropriate
procedures. Those procedures retain an appropriate degree of flexibility
(because one cannot legislate for all contingencies).
The two Full Court decisions [Broome Crocodile Farm and Ward]
have dealt with this vexed issue in the best way possible by balancing
the competing claims, rather than ignoring one side or the other, which
is a recipe for dissension.
Key Aboriginal representatives appear to agree with me. The day after
the decision in Western Australia v Ward, an article appeared in
the Adelaide Advertiser ... quoting the head of the Aboriginal
Legal Service of Western Australia.
He plainly applauded the decision for the balance it struck between
Aboriginal law and other dictates of our legal system.
Both sides have to give a little. The Aboriginals will have to reveal
the heritage to some outsiders, although not to the opposite sex. And
those affected may find that the lawyer with overall control and conduct
of the case is excluded from important information. [22]
5.46 The Committee recognises the need for legislative clarification
of the methods by which the confidentiality of restricted information
can be maintained in proceedings under indigenous heritage law. Consideration
should be given to the approach taken by the Federal Court in the Ward
and Broome Crocodile Farm cases, and the need for flexibility as well
as sensitivity when dealing with culturally restricted information. Notably,
Ms Evatt's approach to this question has been overtaken by the Broome
Crocodile Farm and Ward cases.
Conclusion
The Committee accepts that:
- Indigenous people may be reluctant to divulge culturally restricted
information in relation to heritage protection issues because disclosure
itself can amount to a desecration of indigenous culture;
- consequently, in regard to establishing that a site is significant,
disclosure of information need not be required;
- nevertheless, consistent with the Broome Crocodile Farm case,
all parties potentially affected by a decision relating to indigenous
protection matters are entitled to know the details put to the
reporter that may ultimately influence the decision of the Minister;
- in order to safeguard the release of restricted information, and in
the interests of procedural fairness, the need of land users must be
balanced with the need to respect the cultural restrictions of indigenous
people;
- the judgment of the Federal Court in Ward provides guidelines
appropriate to achieve this balance.
Recommendation 4
That, in regard to the process of determining whether heritage protection
may be removed, the Act require compliance with guidelines to protect
culturally sensitive information and that the guidelines follow those
of the Federal Court in WA v Ward.
Footnotes
[1] Evatt Report, pp.145, 146.
[2] Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs v Douglas, unreported, Full Court of the Federal
Court, 28 May 1996, No. WAG 18 of 1995.
[3] Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation
Committee Report, Hindmarsh Island Bridge Bill 1996, December
1996, p.6.
[4] Evidence, p.NT 8.
[5] Evidence, p.NT 9.
[6] Evidence, p.NT 10.
[7] Evidence, p.NT 13.
[8] Submission No HA1, p.9.
[9] Submission No HA4, p.4.
[10] Evidence, p.NT 163.
[11] Evidence, p.NT 174.
[12] Evidence, p.NT 678.
[13] ibid.
[14] Evidence, p.NT 93.
[15] Submission No HA2, p.25.
[16] Submission No HA6, p.15.
[17] Evatt Report, pp.47, 48.
[18] Evatt Report, p.58.
[19] Submission No HA11.
[20] Evidence, pp.NT 10, 11.
[21] Evidence, pp.NT 674, 675.
[22] Submission No HA1(a), p.3.
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