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Chapter 6
Pre-commitment design features
6.1
As a concept, pre-commitment has the potential to be a useful management
tool for recreational gamblers and an effective harm minimisation measure for
problem gamblers and those at risk. However, the key features of the design of
a best practice pre-commitment scheme remain an area of debate. The committee therefore
sought the views of a range of interested stakeholders on the design of a
best-practice system. The committee intends for the features recommended below
to apply to high intensity EGMs.
Views on the need for a mandatory scheme
6.2
One of the key issues around pre-commitment is the debate on whether it
needs to be mandatory, which would require all EGMs machine players to pre-set
limits in order to play, or if it should be voluntary which would allow players
to set limits if they chose, opt out altogether, or set no limits at all.[1]
The committee was presented with contrasting views on this issue. Generally,
submissions and evidence provided by peak bodies from the gaming industry,
clubs, hotels and casinos opposed mandatory pre-commitment. Those in the
community and social services sector, and importantly, problem gamblers generally
supported a mandatory scheme. The positions of the main stakeholders and their
key arguments are outlined below.
Assessing the evidence
6.3
A key argument mounted against a mandatory scheme is that there is no
evidence that it would reduce the prevalence of problem gambling. Clubs
Australia claimed that the evidence supporting mandatory pre-commitment simply does
not exist.[2]
The Australian Hotels Association agreed stating: 'There is no clear evidence
precommitment technology will be effective as a harm minimisation measure in
Australia'.[3]
The ALH group echoed this view, indicating there is 'no relevant evidence based
research to hand' to support full pre-commitment.[4]
Some pointed to evidence showing that mandatory pre-commitment would fail to assist
problem gamblers. Clubs Australia cited a study by Professor Alex Blaszczynski
which suggests that the effectiveness of pre-commitment would be undermined if
problem gamblers chose not to participate or evaded the system.[5]
However, in his evidence to the committee Professor Blaszczynski did indicate
qualified support for pre-commitment:
What we need to do is work out a system which is effective.
Precommitment, in my view, can be effective if implemented properly. But it is
not going to be the answer. Self-exclusion is not going to overcome the
problems. I think it is going to contribute. My concern is that there is going
to be a vast amount of money allocated to precommitment and its implementation
at the cost of other interventions that may in fact be more effective—providing
signage, providing linkages with treatment and so forth.[6]
6.4
Instead of a mandatory scheme, many in the industry suggested the
adoption of a voluntary scheme. The Australasian Gaming Council recommended
that 'any pre-commitment strategy should be voluntary in its application,
respecting the rights of recreational players'.[7]
Clubs Australia also indicated its support for a voluntary, venue-based
pre-commitment scheme, and described mandatory pre-commitment as 'an expensive,
technologically complex and time-intensive solution'.[8]
Typical of industry concerns that a mandatory scheme would turn EGM playing
from enjoyable entertainment into an arduous past-time was Twin Towns Services
Club:
Mandatory pre-commitment interferes with the rights of every
person to play a poker machine for entertainment regardless of if they have a
problem or not. And, if this is to be the regime, then playing a machine no
longer becomes enjoyable, it becomes invasive, confronting and arduous. When it
is no longer fun, people will find some other form of recreation.[9]
Support for a mandatory scheme
6.5
In contrast to the industry view, the problem gamblers who presented to
the committee unanimously favoured a mandatory system. Ms Sue Pinkerton, a
former problem gambler summed up this view:
The introduction of a mandatory pre-commitment system,
electronically monitored and managed by an independent authority, is likely, in
my considered opinion, to be an effective method of early intervention and
prevention of the harms associated with excessive access to gaming machines.[10]
6.6
Another reformed problem gambler, Ms Gabriela Byrne reflected that if
mandatory pre-commitment had been available to her when she was in the midst of
her gambling addiction, 'I would have taken that opportunity and it would have
saved my family a lot of money.'[11]
Ms Julia Kaparthakis a former pokies addict echoed this view in her evidence to
the committee:
If there had been another option, there is no way I would
have been an addict. If there had been a precommitment card or an opt-out card
there is no way I would be an addict.[12]
6.7
Agencies also supported a mandatory rather than voluntary scheme. In its
evidence, the Independent Gambling Authority, SA, which regulates gambling in South
Australia argued that a voluntary or opt-in scheme 'simply will not make any
difference' because the take-up of such a scheme would be 'extremely small.'[13]
6.8
The Responsible Gambling Advocacy Centre, an agency established by the
Victorian government to promote responsible approaches to gambling, argued that
reliance on a voluntary measure 'is likely to yield much lower benefits in
terms of consumer awareness and protection and harm minimisation' in curbing
problem gambling expenditure than a mandatory system.[14]
Academic and economist Dr Jamie Doughney argued in favour of the adoption of a
mandatory scheme, based on what he described as 'precautionary and prudential
reasons'.[15]
6.9
Witnesses disputed the industry view that evidence on mandatory schemes was
lacking. The Responsible Gambling Advocacy Centre in their submission noted that
evidence from the voluntary pre-commitment trials revealed that those who used
pre-commitment 'exercised improved control over their spending', and concluded:
There are clearly benefits to nearly all consumers in using
pre-commitment, and they are achieved at minimal cost or inconvenience to
consumers once they are in the system.[16]
6.10
Professor Malcolm Battersby pointed out the key advantages of a
mandatory system:
The beauty of a mandatory system where you could not transfer
cards, or whatever the technology is, is that the problem gambler would not be
able to break their limit. If they had already decided to exclude themselves
and then changed their mind an hour later, that would be it. They would have to
have a time limit on it, whether it was a day, a week, a month or a year that
they banned themselves.[17]
6.11
Organisations which assist problems gamblers supported a mandatory
system. Ms Margie Law, Anglicare Tasmania explained:
I think that if it is card based and compulsory it will be
harder for people with a gambling problem to get around than if it is cash
based and voluntary. I believe that if it is cash based and voluntary, it will
not have very much effect on people with a gambling problem at all.[18]
6.12
Mr Mathew Rowell, Chief Executive Officer, Relationships Australia,
Tasmania outlined their view that a mandatory system would have wider benefits:
In summary, we support the introduction of a mandatory
precommitment scheme as one of the ways that harm can be minimised or mitigated
for people who are problem gamblers, but it is also for the people around
them—their kids, their families, their partners and their workplaces even.[19]
6.13
Mr Rowell added a mandatory scheme was needed because of shortcomings
with self-exclusion:
We would suggest a mandatory precommitment scheme because we
believe that a self exclusion scheme does not work well. In Tasmania in
particular, we believe that, as a proactive harm minimisation strategy, it does
a number of things: it reduces, in some ways, the need for some regulation
around things like ATM access, because, if you have a set limit, regardless of
whether there is an ATM next you, the limit has already been set. We hear
stories from clients who will drive home to get the last $2 coin out of their
sock drawer when they have run out of cash. If there were a preset limit with a
card system, we believe that would stop that. As I said, I am not a technical
expert, but we believe that this scheme would go some way to ensure that harm
was minimised for people who really are unable to stop once they get into that
situation.[20]
6.14
Dr Kerry Chambers, Public Issues and Stakeholder Relations Officer,
Gambling Awareness Nova Scotia, confirmed that the scheme should be mandatory
stating that it will assist problem gamblers in particular and help them overcome
their issues with willpower, giving them better control. Those at risk will be
able to monitor and manage their gambling and learn gambling behaviours which
are more recreational.[21]
6.15
Former problem gambler Mr Tom Cummings acknowledged that problem
gamblers will look for ways around the system[22]
but that this is no reason not to put it in place. Mr Cummings noted:
Whenever there is a restriction of any kind, there will be a
minority who find a way around it; the majority follow the rules. Mandatory
pre-commitment will be no different.[23]
6.16
Mr Stephen Menadue a problem gambler, told the committee that a system
which 'did not give up' would have helped him:
...I imagine that something where the organisation or the
parties involved in doing the helping did not give up if I busted again—if I fell
down—might have worked. I am well aware that it can appear that the person does
not want to help themselves if they keep busting...[24]
Committee view
6.17
The committee recognises that pre-commitment is not a silver bullet that
will miraculously eradicate all problematic gambling on EGMs and that other
measures will be necessary.[25]
The committee also acknowledges that no solution is immune from a low level of
abuse. The challenge is to design a system with a high degree of integrity
which will also, in the shortest time-frame possible, lift the burden of harms
associated with problem gambling from individuals, their families and
communities.
6.18
The committee is convinced that a mandatory scheme will be more
effective in reducing the harms from problem gambling than a voluntary
arrangement. The chair sought but did not receive any evidence from industry
that a voluntary pre-commitment system would be effective. To paraphrase the
words of Mr Menadue, mandatory pre-commitment is a system that will not give up
on people, even when their own will power weakens. The committee shares the
concerns of those who argue that voluntary pre-commitment would allow problem
and at-risk gamblers to simply opt out, significantly diminishing the
effectiveness of pre-commitment as a tool for these vulnerable groups. Nor was it
convinced by arguments from the industry that mandatory pre-commitment would be
an onerous imposition on members, given that many clubs already run loyalty
programs that require members to sign up. It is not envisaged that players
would require a stringent level of identity checking; in most instances a
driver's license would be considered sufficient identification. With minimum
identity requirements occasional players should find it no more onerous to
adopt pre-commitment as joining their local library.
6.19
The committee acknowledges that while some may consider a faster
implementation date than that recommended by the Productivity Commission difficult
to meet, there is an urgent need to act sooner, rather than later in order to
minimise the considerable harms from EGM addiction. The addictive features of EGMs
make them potentially dangerous. The evidence shows that low risk EGM gamblers
can quickly migrate to high risk in a very short time period. The committee was
advised that implementation of a mandatory scheme could be achieved relatively
quickly. For these reasons, including the urgent need to act, we believe that
implementing pre-commitment by 2014 is both necessary and achievable.
Recommendation 12
6.20
The committee recommends that a mandatory pre-commitment scheme apply to
all players of high intensity electronic gaming machines by 2014.
Limit setting options
6.21
A range of limit setting options were canvassed during the inquiry and
these are outlined below.
Binding limits
6.22
The essence of pre-commitment is the ability to set binding limits on
spending, or maximum loss,[26]
before play commences and while the problem gambler is more likely to be in a
rational state. The need for players to set such limits was highlighted to the
committee. As noted by the Independent Gambling Authority, SA:
All credible research that the IGA has been able to access
shows that people do want to set limits on their play. They do not go to the
gaming venue intending to lose all their money and cause their family dismay;
they go there with the intention of behaving sensibly and responsibly, by and
large, even if they know they have a problem. But what happens is that the
machines are by their nature so seductive that people do not stop when they
reach their limit, and that is where we see the problem arising.[27]
6.23
The committee view is that setting binding limits on losses would ensure
that once a pre-set limit is reached it cannot be exceeded as the machine would
become disabled, preventing further play. As noted by Relationships Australia
(SA) setting a binding limit 'will provide some constraints that will hopefully
sit closer to people’s actual financial manageability and ensure that gambling
spend remains a conscious decision'.[28]
Setting binding limits will also ensure that gamblers don't start to chase
their losses while they are in an impaired or vulnerable state, further
exacerbating the harms of their gambling.
Player choice and consumer
sovereignty
6.24
A number of submissions emphasised that in any system the principles of player
choice and consumer sovereignty should be preserved, in line with the
Productivity Commission's view that personal responsibility should be
maintained, not eroded.[29] Ms Kate Roberts, Chairperson, Gambling
Impact Society (NSW) noted that 'the process of decision making in itself is a
protective factor in terms of helping someone make a conscious choice'.[30] However, some were cognisant that there may
be trade-offs:
The essential thing, this being a sort of a consumer
protection and giving people those sorts of choices, I guess there is a
trade-off in any sort of scheme that is going to be introduced along those
lines.[31]
6.25
As outlined in chapter two, the problem gamblers who gave evidence to
the committee all supported being able to set limits themselves.
6.26
Choice can promote responsible and informed decision-making:
People will make choices but what we are hoping will happen
and what we believe will occur is that people will make informed choices when
they are given that option right from the outset.[32]
6.27
Others, like Associate Professor Paul Delfabbro noted that getting
players to make decisions about their limits while they are still rational and before
their playing affects their decision-making, is optimal. Once playing commences,
there is a risk that the conditioning associated with gambling might cause that
rationality to 'disappear as their emotional arousal increases'.[33]
6.28
Arguments were made that problem gamblers would not be able to choose
limits rationally at any particular point because they are not rational at any
time. This view was disputed by many witnesses including problem gamblers, those
organisations who treat them and academics. They all spoke about problem
gamblers being able to function rationally when away from EGMs. Mr Alan Moss
from the Independent Gambling Authority, SA, observed:
I do not think that problem gamblers are irrational all the
time. They are just like you and I. They are fairly ordinary citizens and they
are not raving delusional lunatics. They are perfectly ordinary people who,
when they are not in front of a screen, are perfectly capable of making
sensible, rational decisions. It would be in that environment that they would
make the decision about how much money they were going to put on their card.
They do that because they know that when they get in front of the screen they
lose eventually that capacity to act rationally.[34]
6.29
Mr Mark Henley, Uniting Care Wesley Adelaide, a provider of counselling
services for problem gamblers, explained:
Certainly the assumption we are making—and I think this is
pretty well based—is that people with addictive issues, whether it is alcohol,
drugs, gambling or anything else, are rational people but that, when the
addiction takes over, that is when the irrational behaviour occurs. One of the
principles of precommitment is that people are well placed to make rational
decisions at their point, at a time when they are quite capable of making
rational decisions. They are less able to make rational decisions when the
addiction is taking over, which is, in this instance, while people are actually
gambling. So we do not see it as incongruous that a person can make a rational
decision when they are not gambling and then not be able to make rational
decisions while they are gambling. We think it is quite consistent with the
problem gambling behaviour.[35]
6.30
He added:
I think the issue that you are talking about is the capacity
of people to make rational decisions. The counselling that we have done across
a range of programs to do with addictions and other areas shows that people,
when they are not involved with the cause of the addiction, are able to tell
counsellors and family members very clearly what they are wanting, so they are
able to make rational decisions. However, once the gambling, or whatever the
addiction is starts, they lose that capacity to make rational decisions, and
the deeper the addiction then the more likely it is that there is going to be
relapse as the path to recovery is long, slow and fraught.[36]
6.31
Associate Professor Paul Delfabbro noted that irrational beliefs about
winning can over-ride rational beliefs:
One of the problems with educating gamblers and providing
information to then is that there seems to be a disjuncture between what they
will tell you in the cold, hard light of day about the odds of gambling. Often
we will find when we do some studies of gamblers is that their knowledge of the
objective odds will be quite good. In fact their knowledge of mathematics will sometimes
be quite good. Yet, at the same time they will endorse all sorts of irrational
beliefs about the machine. I have had mathematicians who are pathological
gamblers. They will tell me how to calculate the odds of the machine—they will
say it is one over 25 to the fifth, based on the five reels—and then they will
turn around and tell me how they beat the machine, which is entirely
irrational.[37]
6.32
He explained this is known as 'knowledge partitioning':
It is recognised in cognitive psychology that you have what
is called knowledge partitioning. It is the neuroscientist who believes in
astrology. People’s emotions will often override their rational thought. It is
recognised in modern cognition research that people have a high level of brain
function which is very rational but we also have sort of lower-level processes
which have a natural tendency to pick up connections and associations between
things. In healthily functioning people we wash our car and see it rains and
say there is no real connection there, it has just happened once. But in people
who have a vested interest in a particular outcome and have very strong
emotions vested in it, sometimes that high-level rational control or causal functioning
does not suppress the natural instinctual sense that there are connections
between things.[38]
6.33
He added:
We are, like any other species, very much programmed to find
connections and associations between things, to find how behaviours and stimuli
link, because that helps us adapt and survive. This is what happens with
gamblers. We can teach them about the odds but once they have gone to the venue
certain things happen, they maybe have a large win when they first sit down at
a machine and a lot of that rationality can disappear as their emotional
arousal increases. That is why the whole notion of precommitment is a sensible
avenue to pursue, because you try to get the person make a decision about their
gambling before they have put themselves in that emotional situation where they
might not be able to make those rational decisions, particularly about stopping
gambling once it is underway.[39]
6.34
Organisations which deal with problem gamblers described people
desperate to control their gambling:
It is important for me to say that the majority of clients
who come through our door actually want help. Our experience is that people
really do want to get their gambling under control. By the time they have come
to our gamblers help program they have often hit rock bottom. We work with a
number of high-profile, former professional people who have lost their jobs,
their careers, their freedom and their families. By the time they get to us
they really do genuinely want assistance either to learn how to gamble responsibly
or to stop gambling altogether because they have an understanding of the
detrimental impacts.[40]
6.35
Examples were provided to the committee:
I will start with a couple of quotes from the research that
we did in 2005, just to set the scene. We interviewed people on low incomes who
identified that they had gambling problems. One of them who gambled on poker
machines said:
[I set a $20 limit] but I always
end up spending more. I seldom make any money after spending $20 ... When I am
more centred I spend less. I do have a mood when I am very sensible and other
moods when I am not sensible. I don’t know what else there is to try.
That was someone trying but failing to control their gambling
back in 2005. Another person said:
The strategies of trying to stop haven’t
worked. I haven’t really been able to stop. The only time I have stopped is
when I didn’t have any money. ... I always thought I could stop.
I feel that these are just two examples of the many people
out there who know that they have a problem with their gambling and who do
desperately try to control their gambling. I see a precommitment scheme as a
responsible action by government to help these people who are trying to stop
losing so much money gambling.[41]
6.36
It was self-evident to Mr Gary Banks, Chairman, Productivity Commission,
that problem gamblers could be rational:
An argument has been made that problem gamblers are unable to
choose rationally at any point. We do not believe that is the case and we do
not think that the evidence supports that. For example, many problem gamblers
self-exclude from venues. These are people who have realised they have a
problem and they have gone to the extreme solution of going cold turkey.
Precommitment allows them to choose how much to spend et cetera but these people
have chosen to self-exclude. That tells me that those people appreciate they
have a problem and they have taken action. Many more people we think who are
problem gamblers would use a precommitment system to do something short of that
draconian self exclusion option but self exclusion would be part of the system.[42]
6.37
Mr Robert Fitzgerald, Commissioner, Productivity Commission, added:
...in talking to problem gamblers and problem gambling groups
in both the 1999 inquiry and this inquiry they were very clear that there were
moments of lucidity, moments of rational thought, and moments in which they
will commit. What you do not want is a situation where you commit and 10
minutes later can change that commitment...[43]
6.38
Dr Ralph Lattimore, Assistant Commissioner, Productivity Commission,
further explained that:
...people are not uniform over time in their problems. The
advantage that precommitment brings to such people is that they can commit
during a lucid moment that binds their future, to avoid the irrationality that
they know will be around the corner. The example of this that we give is
Ulysses: he knows the sirens are there and ties himself to the mast. So you do
not need to have a situation where people are not irrational; they can be
irrational. The requirement for precommitment not to work is somehow that they
are irrational all the time...[44]
6.39
Dr Lattimore emphasised that problem gamblers are not irrational all the
time and have periods of lucidity during which they try to implement various
strategies to reduce their losses:
What we observe in relation to problem gamblers, both through
evidence we have received and in the literature we have seen, is that they do
try to take actions to precommit themselves such as to reduce their losses. For
example, we have had anecdotal evidence of problem gamblers wearing thongs on
their feet when they go out because they know that the dress codes in the clubs
and hotels will preclude them from entering. There are various other stratagems
that they have followed. They are all pretty imperfect substitutes for a formal
process of precommitment.
We know that even extreme problem gamblers, short of being in
absolute crisis and losing everything, voluntarily choose to self-exclude from
venues, even though the hoops that they have to jump through to do that are
quite onerous and significant and involve a certain amount of embarrassment and
confrontation with other people in order to go through that. So these are two
quite important examples, particularly the self-exclusion because, as I said
earlier, self-exclusion is just an extreme form of precommitment: you are
committing yourself not to gamble at all for some extended period of time.[45]
6.40
He added:
...I do not think the point you make that irrationality is
present amongst problem gamblers is being contested by parties. The issue is
whether they experience moments of lucidity. It is interesting that if you ask
people about some of the consequences of gambling, they are things like bills,
for example. So people realise that if they have spent a lot of money that is a
bad outcome. Some of the stories you hear are of people who have spent a lot of
money and their experience after gambling has been to, for example, commit
suicide. If there was an opportunity at the end of a period of playing when you
could commit yourself, having suffered significant losses, we would expect
people to use that strategy. We do see other strategies, as Gary has said,
where people wear thongs, freeze their credit cards and in some cases even move
to Western Australia.[46]
6.41
Reinforcing this was evidence from Mr Stephen Menadue, a problem gambler
who told the committee about his multiple but ultimately failed attempts to get
himself excluded from venues while he was in a rational state.[47]
Committee view
6.42
The committee agreed with those who argued that problem gamblers are
capable of making rational decisions when they are not in the grip of their
addiction, and that mandatory pre-commitment is a tool which would allow them
to exercise a rational choice.
Setting limits
6.43
The committee heard that in line with the consumer sovereignty principle,
players be allowed to set high personal spending limits or even no limits.
6.44
Associate Professor Paul Delfabbro argued that even if players set their
limits higher—above any mandated upper limit—the conscious act of setting
limits would be beneficial:
The Productivity Commission discusses the possibility of
having a default limit; in other words, you have a limit of, say, $100 a day
which is set by the state. You only spend above that when you make an actual
effort to change that from $100. As the commission points out, from all the
research a lot of the people will not make the effort to change that. Possibly
that in itself may serve as some safeguard for some pathological gamblers, particularly
those who are aware of the fact that they have a problem and maybe
contemplating change. For those who are quite technologically savvy and also in
a state of denial, they probably will reset the limit to a higher one. But they
have to make that conscious decision to do so. That does encourage them to at
least make a conscious decision about control—actually having to do something
with the technology. I think that is a good thing.[48]
6.45
Ms Jo Flanagan, Manager, Social Action and Research Centre, Anglicare
Tasmania, emphasised that pre-commitment is about 'enabling people to set
limits for themselves to manage a problem which is essentially an addiction'.[49]
Ms Margie Law, Anglicare Tasmania expanded on this point:
Our research and counselling shows that people with a
gambling problem desperately want to control their gambling because they do not
want to lose their house, their wife or husband or access to their children,
and they do not want to lose their job. So far, the only way of controlling
their gambling is either through self-will or self-exclusion. Self-exclusion is
not 100 per cent effective and when their self-will crumbles—some people we
have interviewed or seen through counselling have gone without gambling for
months. It is a bit like smoking. They go without gambling for months and then
something happens in their life and they go back to gambling, they break or
revoke their self-exclusion. They are desperately trying to control their
gambling. I believe that if there were a precommitment scheme in place a large
number of people with a gambling problem, after they have lost money and
especially if they are feeling guilty, would try to set a realistic limit.[50]
6.46
Mr Gary Banks, explained the view of the Productivity Commission in
relation to problem gamblers setting high limits:
...while the problem gambler may well set quite a high limit,
my understanding...is that some of the evidence suggests that they are less
likely to do that than recreational gamblers and more likely to realise that
they have a problem and set a limit that is more realistic.[51]
6.47
Some suggested mandatory upper limits could be set by the government.
Professor Malcolm Battersby pointed out that:
...unless compulsory, mandatory limits are set for everybody,
they certainly will not work to a significant degree. Voluntary limit setting
and things like that obviously might help some people. If you go through the
Sarah Hare report into the trial in South Australia, it looks like some of the
problem gamblers actually reduced their turnover to some degree, but [there] were
also the ones who broke their limits, reset limits or did not set limits. There
is small evidence from the sample of 90 people, including 16 addicted gamblers
and 34 borderline gamblers, but even that small sample showed that they cannot
really manage to control and set their limits on a consistent basis. So I think
mandatory limit setting by the state, the government or somebody is the only
real way to protect borderline and problem gamblers.[52]
6.48
It was also suggested that to assist people set affordable limits on
their losses, pre-commitment include a component on player education.[53]
Others added that assistance could be made available through counselling
services for those who want help to set their limits:
...potentially, there could be a role for counsellors—for those
people who are seeing counsellors—to be there at the venue with them when they
decide on their daily limit.[54]
Committee view
6.49
The committee was cognisant of the principle of consumer choice, but did
not see that this would be undermined if players are required to set binding
limits before play commences. In fact, this aligns with the principle of
informed choice and would promote more conscious decision-making. The committee
does not propose that an upper maximum loss limit be mandated, as this would
undermine the principle of consumer sovereignty.
6.50
The committee is strongly of the view that spending limits are only
useful if they are enforced. Players must be prevented from exceeding their
pre-set limits either on the machine on which they have been playing, or on any
other high intensity machine which they might be able to access. The technical
solution should also address the issue of 'venue hopping' where problem
gamblers might move across multiple venues in order to continue gambling, as
well as cross-border issues.
6.51
The committee accepts the evidence that the process of making a decision
is likely to encourage a player to think about affordability and accepts that
it may be necessary for some problem gamblers to go through the process of
setting limits more than once as they learn new healthier gambling behaviours.
Recommendation 13
6.52
The committee recommends that players set binding spending limits but
does not specify an upper limit.
Recommendation 14
6.53
The committee recommends that players be prevented from further
play—locked out—once they reach their pre-set spending limit.
Recommendation 15
6.54
The committee recommends that players be prevented from circumventing
pre-set spending limits by machine and/or venue hopping.
Recommendation 16
6.55
The committee recommends that player education be made available and
counselling services be offered to assist players set affordable limits.
Default limits
6.56
Some proponents of mandatory pre-commitment argued that there should be default
settings already on a card which the player could choose to use or modify. The
Productivity Commission which described these as 'vanilla' limits, concluded these
would act as an additional safety feature and encourage low risk playing. A
number of witnesses agreed with this approach.[55]
Dr Charles Livingstone summarised this view:
In terms of setting limits, we actually think that any system
implemented should have default limits. I think the Productivity Commission
cited this as a possible outcome—a ‘vanilla limit’, they said. We think that
should be relatively modest, and it should be fixed by some reference to, say,
average weekly earnings; but people could adjust that accordingly—they could
certainly adjust it down at any time.[56]
6.57
Some also pointed out that these default limits might better suit the
recreational gambler. Dr Mark Zirnsak, Chair, Victorian InterChurch Gambling
Taskforce stated:
Our recommendations have been that the default limits be set
at a reasonable range so that for the vast majority of people who are
recreational gamblers, once they have got their device, whether it is a card or
some other device or some other system to access the precommitment system, they
can pretty much set and forget.[57]
6.58
As to what level these default limits should be set at, the committee
was presented with a range of views. Mr Mark Henley from Uniting Care Wesley
suggested:
Here we take the option of using default settings as initial
settings that the customer can vary, but we suggest that the session spend
limit—that is, the default system for any precommitment system—would start as
the average session spend across that jurisdiction. That data is available to
the industry; it is not available to us. Let’s start by saying: ‘Here’s the
average spend per session in this jurisdiction. That becomes the default limit
for a session spend in that jurisdiction.’[58]
6.59
Mr Robert Chappell, Independent Gambling Authority, SA, suggested an
annualised figure could be considered:
In general terms, Senator, you have said something that
resounds with me, in the sense that it might make sense to help people set
their limits by annualising them and converting an annual figure into what
might be a typical daily spend. If you said you were prepared to spend $5,000 a
year playing slot machines and you were going to play fortnightly, that is
$5,000 divided by 26, and you would say your daily limit could be something
like that.[59]
6.60
Others suggested specific cash amounts be mandated, ranging from $20 up
to $100 or $200 per day.[60]
Committee view
6.61
The committee agrees with the proposition that a default limit be in
place on newly acquired cards which the player can choose to use, or modify. Given
the range of views on what this default limit should be, the committee took the
view it would be determined by an independent national regulatory authority.
This authority would determine the default taking into account, for example, average
spends and affordability issues.
Recommendation 17
6.62
The committee recommends that all pre-commitment cards be issued with a
pre-set default spending limit which the player can choose to use or modify.
How long should limits apply?
6.63
Different views were offered on the length of time a binding spending
limit should apply.[61]
Former problem gambler Ms Pinkerton favoured aligning this time period with
however long the cooling off period was:
With regards to changing limits that are set, if you set a
daily limit and you want to increase the limit then there should be at least
the equivalent time as a wait period. So if I set a daily limit I would have a
wait of one day before the increased limit would come into effect. If I set a
weekly limit, the wait until the new limit comes into effect should be a week;
if I set a yearly limit, the wait should be a year.[62]
6.64
The Productivity Commission spoke of aligning the time period for
setting limits with a pay or budgetary period, such as a fortnight as it will
encourage people to consider affordability issues in the context of their
budget.[63]
6.65
Most agreed that if the player wanted to reduce their limit this should
take effect immediately:
Having said that, if I wish to reduce the limit from $200 a
day down to $100 a day, that should come into effect immediately.[64]
Committee view
6.66
The committee is attracted to a two week period for a limit to apply as
it aligns with common family budgetary and pay cycles. This two week period
will promote more responsible decision-making amongst gamblers. Players will be
confronted with having to consider a much higher potential loss amount than
they would if they were setting a smaller daily limit. Twenty dollars lost on a
daily basis may not seem concerning to the player, but potentially losing two
hundred and eighty dollars when considered in the context of a fortnightly
budget may force a player to consider affordability issues. Nevertheless the
committee is mindful there are differing views on this issue, including that
players value flexibility, so this recommended time period may need to be
reviewed.
Recommendation 18
6.67
The committee recommends that the card include a default time period
which specifies the duration of the spending limit (decreasing a limit will
take immediate effect) which the player can choose to use or modify. The
committee suggests the length of this default time period could be a common
budgetary period such as a fortnight. The minimum timeframe it could be
modified down to is 24 hours.
Cooling off period
6.68
Most supporters of pre-commitment also agreed that when limits are first
set or increased a mandatory 'cooling off' period should apply. The cooling off
period is the time period that must elapse before an increase to the limit can
take effect.[65]
Some argued that cooling off is a necessary consumer protection measure which
allows players to 'become more aware of their spending patterns and commitments
and make wiser decisions as consumers about how they choose to gamble and how
much they are prepared to spend'.[66]
It was also argued that by making players feel their decision was not fixed
forever it would encourage them to view pre-commitment more favourably as a
flexible and 'useful tool'.[67]
6.69
Mr Mathew Rowell, Relationships Australia, Tasmania, explained the need
for a cooling off period:
In the moment, where people have lost a significant
proportion of their income on a particular day, the impulse to then continue to
play the games in order to recover that money is high. At the same time, if
someone faces some kind of reality check and decides to reduce the limit, then
being able to respond to that in a proactive way by reducing their limit as
soon as possible would add to the harm minimisation approach. Providing a
cooling off period for increases is really important in ensuring that people do
not continue to bear those losses.[68]
6.70
In terms of how long the this period should be, some suggested that the
minimum cooling off period be 24 hours; others suggested longer periods—48
hours or even quarterly:[69]
As to when they should take effect, I do not see any reason
why people should be able to make changes to their limits any more than once a
quarter, for example. And those limits should apply, as Richard has said, even
in cases of a lost device or card or whatever.[70]
Committee view
6.71
The committee agrees that players should be required to wait a specified
time—a cooling off period—before they can increase their limits. Those who
chase their losses will benefit from a cooling off period as it will block
their chasing behaviour. There were a range of views on the optimal length of
this period, but many nominated a minimum of 24 hours.[71]
Witnesses also agreed that the length of the cooling off period be in line with
the limit setting period. The committee believes that players should not be
allowed to change their time limits during the period they have specified. For
example, a player choosing the minimum 24 hour timeframe would have a cooling
off period of 24 hours before their limits could be increased. Whereas a player
who has chosen a two week timeframe for a limit to apply would need to wait until
the end of this period to increase their limit.
Recommendation 19
6.72
The committee recommends that players be unable to increase their
spending limit during the time period they have specified for their limit to
apply.
How frequently should the limit be
reviewed?
6.73
A number of witnesses suggested players should be regularly prompted to
review their limits. The Victorian InterChurch Gambling Taskforce favoured an
approach which was not too frequent to avoid annoying the player:
We would suggest the frequency should not be at a level that
will be annoying to the gambler, but not so infrequent as to be meaningless.
Thus, a period of around three months would seem reasonable between being
requested to confirm if no limits remains a person’s preference.[72]
6.74
The South Australian Council of Social Services agreed, although they
suggested that prompts to players be at least weekly.[73]
Committee view
6.75
While the committee acknowledges that prompting players to regularly
review their limits has merit, it is mindful that doing so too frequently could
unnecessarily annoy the player. Balanced against this is the need to encourage
players to actively monitor their expenditure and ensure that regular prompting
does not encourage players to increase limits. The committee regards an annual
prompt to players to review limits, perhaps on the anniversary of first
obtaining the card, would be appropriate.
Recommendation 20
6.76
The committee recommends that players be prompted to review their limits
every twelve months.
Where to set limits
6.77
The committee heard arguments that players should set their limits away
from the stimulus of the gaming environment. Associate Professor Paul Delfabbro
pointed to the emotional arousal that gaming venues can stimulate impairing
rational decision-making:
We can teach them about the odds but once they have gone to
the venue certain things happen, they maybe have a large win when they first sit
down at a machine and a lot of that rationality can disappear as their
emotional arousal increases. That is why the whole notion of precommitment is a
sensible avenue to pursue, because you try to get the person make a decision
about their gambling before they have put themselves in that emotional
situation where they might not be able to make those rational decisions,
particularly about stopping gambling once it is underway.[74]
6.78
The Responsible Gambling Advocacy Centre argued:
Gamblers should only be able to increase their settings at a
separate place from the gaming machine. This could be a kiosk located away from
the gaming machines (a similar rule to that in Victoria in relation to
Automatic Teller Machines and gaming venues) or could require attending a
separate location entirely.[75]
6.79
Other locations that were suggested included online via the internet, at
shopping centres or at a designated agency.[76]
Committee view
6.80
The committee accepts the proposition that limit setting should be
conducted away from the direct influence of gaming machines in order to
minimise their seductive influence. Provided the location of the limit setting
is well away from these machines, the committee does not consider that limit
setting must occur outside the gaming venue itself.
Recommendation 21
6.81
The committee recommends that the process of setting limits not occur in
close proximity to gaming machines.
Messaging
6.82
The committee heard evidence that players should receive messages
alerting them they are near to reaching their limits. Uniting Care Wesley,
Adelaide expressed this view to the committee:
It is of crucial importance to us that, whatever the
consequences of exceeding the limit, there must be a visual message to the
gambler. There must be the option for text messages to go directly to the
patron or to third parties and there must be active involvement from the venue.[77]
6.83
The Independent Gambling Authority, SA, suggested that messages be
meaningful and highlight where gambling expenditure is likely to be harmful:
Perhaps the way to make it work in the context that you have
been speaking about is that if you put into the screen, ‘I would now like my
daily limit to be $300,’ then the computer would say, ‘Did you realise that
that is the equivalent of spending $12,000 a year?’ and that would help people
make an informed choice.[78]
6.84
Ms Sue Pinkerton went further and suggested messages be personalised so
as to reflect the actual expenditure of individuals and warn them of excessive
expenditure:
There should also be a mandatory on-screen display of a
gambler’s monthly gambling activity prior to the commencement of their gambling
on any given day. This is a no-brainer too. This would be a pop-up which, for
example, would say: ‘In the last month you have spent X amount of dollars; in
the last year you have spent this much; in the last session you spent that
much. Do you wish to continue? Yes/No.’ It is easy to do.[79]
6.85
Anglicare Tasmania also suggested that progress warnings be given when
the player starts to reach their limits, and that these include messages such
as 'don't forget the kids' or 'go home'.[80]
6.86
The NSW government also indicated it 'strongly supported' dynamic
warning and cost of play systems, but noted the design of such systems should
be determined by research.[81]
Committee view
6.87
The committee agrees that messages alerting players that they are close
to reaching their limits can be a useful tool and will promote safer gambling
behaviour among players. It may also avert negative reactions when people reach
their limit as the approaching limit will be clearly conveyed several times to
the player.
6.88
Some venues offer staff interaction with gamblers who are identified as displaying
problem gambling behaviours.[82]
Consideration could be given to expanding this staff interaction to include those
who routinely reach their limit.
Recommendation 22
6.89
The committee recommends that the system include dynamic warnings to
alert players when their limit is approaching and it include the capacity to
personalise messages.
Other pre-commitment features
Links with self exclusion
6.90
Self-exclusion is where a problem gambler agrees to exclude themselves
from specified gambling venues. All states and territories offer self-exclusion
as an option for problem gamblers. Typically, the gambler must first register in
order to self-exclude.[83]
However, the committee heard evidence that there are limitations with current self-exclusion
arrangements, including for example, that enrolment can be cumbersome and it is
too easy for gamblers to avoid identification.[84]
Some submissions suggested that linking pre-commitment to self-exclusion could improve
this situation:
Improving the capacity for self-exclusion is a major benefit
of implementing a full pre-commitment system. Exclusion is a key tool for
dealing with severe and moderate problem gambling behaviours. The policing of
self-exclusion has been a major issue in Victoria. Both the number of venues
and the lack of identification required to enter them makes monitoring the
success of this policy difficult.[85]
6.91
Some options for linking with self-exclusion could include:
As part of a pre-commitment system, self-exclusions should be
built into the technology that delivers pre-commitment. This will require both
that a gambler can't access a new pre-commitment card (or whatever the device)
for the period of their self-exclusion or, in the case of venue-specific
self-exclusion, that the card can't be used in particular venues pre-agreed by
the gambler.[86]
6.92
Or:
If a person logs onto a machine, their photograph would come
up on a machine in some place like a backroom and someone would see that they
were there. That is much more easily recognisable than a photo on a wall that
no-one can actually recognise.[87]
6.93
Dr Kerry Chambers spoke about the system in Nova Scotia where players
can self-exclude on pay days or for a longer time if they have experienced a potential
gambling trigger such as a death in the family.[88]
6.94
It was also pointed out to the committee that enabling self-exclusion on
pre-commitment cards could save considerable time and effort elsewhere:
At the moment, a lot of the energy in our barring process
goes to persuading people that they need to focus their barring on the venues
they attend. We like to make sure that people do not get themselves barred from
400 places but that they get themselves barred from 20. That is partly because
of the enforcement and compliance issues at the other end. In South Australia
the breakdown is 90 per cent publicans and 10 per cent clubs, and we cannot
expect publicans and club managers to be tracking hundreds and hundreds of
photographs in their venues because everyone is barred from 400 places. If we
had a card system like this, the authority’s orientation would change
completely. People would apply for barring and the default would be that you
are barred from everywhere, because it could be enforced systematically.[89]
6.95
Venues might also see some benefits as the following exchange shows:
Mr CHAMPION—No. The precommitment system would help that
process because, in effect, we could use technology quickly and simply and help
the publicans to prevent a problem.
Mr Chappell—Yes. It would relieve an enormous compliance
burden on the licensees because the system would do the enforcement and they
would not have to be looking after them at all.[90]
Committee view
6.96
The committee accepts the proposition that enabling self-exclusion on
the pre-commitment card is a sensible option that would deliver real benefits
for those who find current self-exclusion arrangements are failing them. It
would also remove a significant monitoring burden from venues. A player should
also be able to self-exclude for varying periods to encompass the need to not
play in a month when an individual has no discretionary funds for gambling or
events such as a death in the family which could be a trigger for some to
return to gambling.[91]
As with pre-commitment spending limits a player who self excludes for a certain
period of time should not be able to shorten that period within the specified
timeframe. The pre-commitment card should complement existing self-exclusion
arrangements where these are seen to work, in order to ensure that players have
the most effective self-exclusion options available to them.
Recommendation 23
6.97
The committee recommends that a self-exclusion option be enabled on the
pre-commitment card and varying periods for self exclusion be made available. This
could be linked to existing jurisdictional exclusion schemes to provide players
with effective self-exclusion options.
Recommendation 24
6.98
The committee recommends that players who self-exclude for a certain
period of time should not be able to shorten that period within the specified
timeframe.
Identification and privacy issues
6.99
The committee heard from a number of witnesses that the pre-commitment
scheme should require players to provide some proof of identity in order to
obtain the pre-commitment card:
The system should work to give adult customers access to
gambling facilities and improve their control in a personal and private manner.
For this reason the system will need proof of identity for each person
requesting an access card or other technology. This will have the benefit of
preventing minors accessing the system and make it difficult for the system to
be circumvented via stolen, swapped or multiple cards or other technology.[92]
6.100
Concerns were raised that problem gamblers might resort to multiple
cards or gamble across multiple venues, if identity processes were inadequate.[93]
Cross border issues may also need to be addressed.[94]
6.101
A number of submissions and witnesses supported the proposal that a
driver's license be used for ID. The Productivity Commission suggested that
this ID could also be used to verify a player's identity in the event of a
payout:
...one way of ensuring, for example, that gamblers did not
swap cards and so on would be to ensure that the larger prizes had to be paid
out and that they would only be paid out with identification—a drivers licence
or something...[95]
6.102
Some submissions supported biometric ID in the event that the individual
did not have photo ID:
Not everyone would be in possession of photo ID – people who
are not licensed drivers, students, or holders of passports. Biometric/face
recognition would have the advantage of obviating the need for photo ID.[96]
6.103
Others, like the IGA rejected biometrics:
This is really a question of marginal effectiveness. If you
wanted to lock down everyone, you might adopt Mr Ryan’s technology that uses a
thumbprint. The authority has considered that particular question and does not
believe that the level of security you need for this sort of program requires a
biometric identification.[97]
6.104
The Productivity Commission also saw no need for biometrics:
...it does not need to be biometric. The issue is identification,
and biometric would usually relate to things like fingerprints or eyes and so
on. It merely has to be a robust approach to identifying people. Of course, we
use those approaches in a range of official areas; passports or to have a post
office box. Even if you want to get a mobile phone these days you have to
demonstrate who you are. So it does not have to be biometric in approach...[98]
6.105
Mr Tom Cummings a former problem gambler also did not see the need for
biometric options to be pursued:
While biometric scanning (fingerprinting) is one option, I
believe that it is the least likely to be adopted. Public perception is against
it. However, the same industry that rejects fingerprinting as an invasion of
privacy is happy to fingerprint their drinking patrons; biometric scanning is
in widespread use in pubs and clubs in NSW.[99]
6.106
The committee heard that biometric measures were already being employed
in some NSW hotels. According to a recent newspaper article a number of hotels
in Sydney have introduced fingerprint scanning to identify their patrons, as
described in the following exchange:
Mr STEPHEN JONES—I will quote from it then:
The fingerprint scanning system
takes a photograph of the patron, scans their ID and takes a fingerprint which
is converted into a map of the meridian points on the print and converted into
a PIN. When a patron returns, the scanner matches the meridian points of their
finger to the code to find their identity. The company insists there are no
fingerprints kept in the system. Patrons can request their details be deleted
from the system although not if they are flagged as troublemakers.
ID Tect scanners scan identities
into a database which can be shared with hundreds in the country. The system
stores the data for 28 days and then it is deleted.
The article goes on to talk about the sharing of biometric
data between hotels within and outside Sydney.
Mr Whelan—Is that right? Which hotels?
Mr STEPHEN JONES—This was the Coogee Bay Hotel.[100]
6.107
The Australian Hotels Association (AHA) did not dispute the use of
biometrics in NSW hotels, although they argued against the collection of
personal information for the purposes of pre-commitment. Mr John Whelan, AHA, defended
the use of biometrics in NSW hotels as being necessary in some cases:
I also understand that those hotels have been forced to
undertake those types of measures due to alcohol related issues and possibly in
consultation with the local police force. I think what you are talking about
there is only a dozen or so hotels out of 3½ thousand across Australia that
have gaming machines. So I do not think you can really hold them up as
representing the entire industry.[101]
6.108
The issue of the storage and security of personal information was also
raised by others. Some expressed the view that the pre-commitment system would
require a large database to manage player information:
The size of the database will be extremely large, ultimately
holding player records of more than five million customers. Australia has approximately
5,700 venues that offer gaming machines to customers and there will need to be
clear procedures in place to allow customers to set and change limits and
procedures in place to answer queries and issue replacement cards. The security
and administration of this data base may require the type of procedures applied
for the Medicare data base. This will be costly to operate and consideration
must be given to who will pay for the operation of this system.[102]
6.109
It was even suggested to the committee the database could be managed by
an independent non-government operator, chosen by tender:
Mr FRYDENBERG—Taking up this issue of privacy concerns, you
say on page 26 of your report that ‘only the independent scheme operator’ would
maintain the database linking the smart card number and the details of the
cardholder. Who do you envisage to be the independent scheme operator?
Mr Donald—This is a process we suggest you tender. It is most
likely to be a major computer supplier in Australia—an IBM, a Unisys, a Fujitsu
or someone of that ilk.
Mr FRYDENBERG—You are saying that a nongovernment agency
would posses all this information?
Mr Donald—They do now. A lot of health and other departments
outsource their computer operations.[103]
6.110
Not everyone agreed that a large centralised database would be necessary.
The Independent Gambling Authority, SA, rejected this view and suggested the
necessary data could be kept on the card itself:
Mr FRYDENBERG—But there are sensitive issues too in terms of
the issuing authority and where the money is being spent.
Mr Moss—There could be; it depends on how it is designed. I
do not see that there is any great necessity to design it in a way which
necessitated that sort of collection or storage of information.
Mr Chappell—If privacy is a huge concern, then that points
you more in the direction of a smart chip type card where the data is kept on
the card. That would reduce the need for aggregation in a centralised database.
If you went for the drivers licence type option then of necessity there would
be payment, transaction and player records that would have to exist for a period
of time.[104]
6.111
It was also emphasised that players should only be able to obtain one
card, not multiple cards:
There should be the establishment of a one person, one card
system. I should be able to obtain only one card, not multiple cards.[105]
Committee view
6.112
The committee's view is that whatever pre-commitment technology is
implemented it must be robust and meet key privacy and security standards.
Essential features of the system must include that it be simple to use and easy
to register, it must demonstrate integrity and robustness to meet security
concerns, it must minimise fraud and card-swapping, and it must meet national
privacy standards. The committee agrees with those who explicitly reject
proposals around biometrics.
Recommendation 25
6.113
The committee recommends that only basic identification information be
collected for the purposes of verification.
Make it simple
6.114
Many witnesses emphasised that whatever pre-commitment scheme was
adopted, it should be simple and easy to use, also taking into account cultural
diversity:
I noticed in the Hare report that there was lots of feedback
from people interviewed that they just did not understand the system and they made
mistakes about how they set limits or did not set limits and so forth. I
suspect really strongly that they and other disadvantaged groups—culturally
diverse groups, Asian populations, migrants from Iran and Iraq that we see in
our gambling services—would have a lot of trouble negotiating their way through
these sorts of systems. So another submission I am making is that the systems
should be mandatory and compulsory across Australia and they should be really
simple. It should not be some great, complicated system—choose this, choose
that and so forth—so everybody can understand what the rules are and the
Australian population can tell their neighbours, ‘The most you’ll be able to
spend on a machine today is $150,’ or $200, $300 or whatever it is. It should
be common knowledge. It is a simple system.[106]
6.115
The Victorian InterChurch Gambling Taskforce emphasised that pre-commitment
'needs community education and the promotion of it being a tool for all players'.[107]
The Responsible Gambling Advocacy Centre explained in further detail:
Ease of use relates both to the familiarity with the
technology referred to above but also to the software interface. Choices
offered should be clear and not too numerous. Multiple menu pages should be
kept to a minimum. Simple categories such as “my spending limit” “my time
limit” “my win/loss report” “self-exclude me for...”, “remind me when” should be
sufficient and easily within the capabilities of simple technology.[108]
6.116
Relationships Australia recommended that an educational campaign be
funded prior to the introduction of pre-commitment:
We recommend that sufficient resources be devoted to a
national education program about a precommitment scheme well before its
introduction in order that people using EGMs post implementation do so with
enough knowledge to make informed judgements.[109]
6.117
Furthermore:
...all information about the pre‐commitment system, information about
gambling on EGMs and information about help services be available in a range of
languages and formats, in order that those with literacy problems, those from
culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds, and those with intellectual
disabilities all have an opportunity to understand the scheme, the financial
implications of gambling, and support services available.[110]
6.118
The committee was urged to consider the tenets of the Ottawa Charter[111]
in the development of any public awareness or education campaign and to:
...use words and images that are directly relevant so, if we
are using the affected and effected communities in the development of those
messages, their language will be included and those messages will resonate with
that percentage of people that have problems.[112]
6.119
Furthermore, the committee was warned that the absence of such a
campaign could undermine the success of a pre-commitment strategy:
But, more generally, I do not believe that any government
program has ever been effective without there being resources committed to
explaining to people what it is that the government is attempting to achieve.[113]
Committee view
6.120
The committee agrees that a national education or awareness campaign is
required in order to raise public awareness around pre-commitment.
Recommendation 26
6.121
The committee recommends the new national regulatory authority be tasked
with developing an appropriate national awareness campaign aligning with the
principles of the Ottawa Charter, to raise public awareness of pre-commitment.
Links to loyalty schemes
6.122
The issue of whether the pre-commitment card be linked with
loyalty programs offered by venues was discussed with a number of witnesses.
Some were opposed, suggesting it would send a mixed message:
From our point of view, it is really sending a mixed message.
Loyalty cards are about increasing information and increasing sales to the venue—and
we accept that it is not just gambling sales; it is sales across a range of
hotel or club products or casino products. However, when the message about
precommitment is about safe spending limits, that is about consumer protection
and consumer safety, and that we think is a different message to that of a
loyalty program which venues are operating.[114]
6.123
Others pointed out that linking to loyalty schemes could save venues
money:
You could use the same card for that, and many clubs have
that already. So there is a further saving. If you were to put a loyalty card
on that, which you can dynamically load, there is a further saving, because
people generally have a separate card for loyalty.[115]
6.124
It was also suggested that linking the card to a loyalty program would
encourage a more favourable view of pre-commitment and be the basis for further
personalised interaction with the player:
To encourage people to take up a card you have to give them
something other than, ‘This is something that you don’t really need, because
you say that you haven’t got a gambling problem, but we’d like you to take this
card anyway.’ If you can give them some points or benefit for coming into your
venue rather than the venue down the road, you might get them to take it up.
Once you have them using the card, you will start having interaction with them.
You will know who they are. You will know their name. You can send them
information. When they are sitting at the machine, you can suggest things and
give them reminders. You can ask them: ‘Do you have a problem with gambling? Do
you need to put a limit on yourself to make sure that you do not spend any more
than you need to?’ By personalising it, you can make sure that you can track their
play. I would suggest that the advantage of offering loyalty along with
precommitment is one of awareness.[116]
6.125
Mr Tony Toohey of eBet outlined how linking player loyalty programs with
pre-commitment systems could be an incentive to players:
You can run both systems together in tandem or you can run
them separately. You could have a player who is using a precommitment facility
that does not earn loyalty points or vice versa. The flipside to that is that,
as part of trying to bring the players on to a precommitment system, you could
give them incentives to participate in precommitment. You could actually
promote the whole concept of precommitment.[117]
6.126
It was pointed out to the committee that some clubs do not offer loyalty
programs. Clubs that do have such programs may have members who prefer not to
have their gaming tracked even if doing so might accrue loyalty points. Mr
Robert Smith of Twin Towns explained:
Those people get to decide voluntarily whether they put that
card into a gaming machine to receive loyalty points and the like when they
play. The majority of people do not put that card into the machine and have
their play tracked, for want of a better term. They choose not to take the
loyalty points and they retain their private gambling activity.[118]
Committee view
6.127
The committee acknowledges there are differing views on this issue. It
does not consider the case for prohibition with loyalty schemes is
overwhelming, although it acknowledges there are legitimate concerns in some
quarters. If individual venues decided in the interests of their members they
would like to 'piggy back' their loyalty schemes onto pre-commitment this should
not be prohibited. Monitoring the effects of linked loyalty programs on problem
gambling would be a prudent measure.
Recommendation 27
6.128
The committee recommends that linking loyalty schemes with
pre-commitment schemes not be prohibited, but this be monitored by the new
national regulatory authority for adverse consequences.
A national regulator
6.129
It was proposed that a national regulator or agency be established to
manage and drive pre-commitment:
I will conclude these brief comments by saying that we think
that, in terms of managing the precommitment scheme and the sort of scheme that
we have outlined, it is going to be essential that there is at least a national
regulator or authority tasked with the responsibility of precommitment—quite
possibly other gambling functions but certainly precommitment—and part of the
role of this national regulator or authority would be to in fact manage data
and release it for policy development.[119]
6.130
While some suggested the agency should be established within a government
department:
This committee needs to come up with some recommendations and
reasonably quickly. You have to find a project champion and establish a
national gaming and regulatory authority. In other words I would personally
suggest it becomes an agency of Treasury to drive this.[120]
6.131
Others suggested it be entirely independent:
The introduction of a mandatory precommitment system,
electronically monitored and managed by an independent authority, is likely, in
my considered opinion, to be an effective method of early intervention and
prevention of the harms associated with excessive access to gaming machines.[121]
Committee view
6.132
The committee agreed it would be appropriate to establish a national independent
regulatory body to oversee pre-commitment arrangements, develop new national standards
which include the required pre-commitment features and other consumer
protection measures. It should be a national body, with national oversight incorporating
a jurisdictionally focussed inspection and monitoring regime. The new body
needs to be established as soon as possible, because it will perform a key role
in the implementation of mandatory pre-commitment and associated reforms. The
precise role and functions of this agency should be agreed in consultation with
jurisdictions and key stakeholder groups. Until this body is established, the
committee recommends that the Department of Families, Housing, Community
Services and Indigenous Affairs perform the functions of the new authority.
Recommendation 28
6.133
The committee recommends that a national independent regulatory body be
established by the end of 2011 to oversee mandatory pre-commitment and
associated reforms in all Australian jurisdictions.
Recommendation 29
6.134
The committee recommends that pending the establishment of the national
regulatory authority, the Department of Families, Housing, Community Services
and Indigenous Affairs perform the functions of the new authority.
Trial of pre-commitment features
6.135
The committee notes the recommendation of the Productivity Commission that
a trial of pre-commitment be undertaken.[122]
As all trials to date have been on voluntary pre-commitment, a trial on the
design features of mandatory pre-commitment could be particularly useful.
6.136
Mr Robert Fitzgerald, Commissioner, Productivity Commission, explained
the purpose of a trial:
...the trial is not about whether there is precommitment—it
is the nature of the precommitment, the actual design features.[123]
6.137
Clubs Australia indicated qualified support for a trial:
Mr CHAMPION—You talk about there being no trials in mandatory
precommitment. Let us say there was a trial and there was evidence that showed
that it reduced problem gambling, and let us say it was an ideal world and
there was no leakage to other forms of gambling and that recreational gamblers
were not affected. Given that ideal scenario, if a trial was done and was shown
to be successful, would Clubs Australia accept it?
Mr Ball—I think we would tick that box and say: ‘You’ve passed
the first test. It is effective.’ The second question is: what does that mean
as far as implementation and other costs go? That is the essence of a
cost-benefit analysis. It has not been done yet, but we would be very happy to
be involved in one.[124]
6.138
Ms Nadine Grinblat, General Manager, Australasian Gaming Council, also
supported the Commission's proposal of a trial to garner more detailed
information:
We have already started trialling of voluntary systems. I
think the learning from that, in and of itself, raised a number of issues where
we did not realise that it might perhaps be an issue. With respect to
simplification of programs, for example, it is very easy when you are an
industry member to say, ‘This is all very clear and patrons will understand this
very readily,’ but when you look at the South Australian trials you see that
people were offered primary and secondary limits and very few people seemed to understand
the option for secondary limits. So what you sometimes think is clear is not necessarily
so.[125]
6.139
Mr Gary Banks, Chairman, Productivity Commission, elaborated:
In relation to the trials, we saw that as quite an important
way of understanding how to design a precommitment system to maximise its
cost-effectiveness. As you know, there are a few things we left open, including
default limits—how long the precommitment period would be for and so on—which
really only trials would reveal in terms of the most efficacious. Of course,
those things in turn could be adapted over time in a system which is actually
operating. As I said earlier, one of the advantages of the kind of system that
is based on a technological platform which is quite flexible and adaptable is
that changes can be made over time to make the system more effective.[126]
6.140
Dr Ralph Lattimore, Assistant Commissioner, Productivity Commission,
added that Tasmania might be a good location for such a trial:
The other comment I would like to make about the
implementation strategy is on the trial. We have seen trials of some forms of
commitment technologies in a number of contexts and they provided quite useful
information about aspects of commitment like player acceptance, how you sign
people on and so on. But they all take the form effectively of partial and
voluntary precommitment systems and they are like new year’s resolutions—you
have goodwill but you find it difficult to keep to them. The trial we are
talking about has to take a particular form that stops them from becoming de
facto partial precommitment systems. You would not want to have a circumstance
where a particular pub, hotel or club had this technology but you could walk
down the street and play on a machine that did not have that feature. That is
why we have suggested the trial involve a reasonably large area. Bass Strait is
a very nice natural barrier to people going and playing on other machines. In
some ways Tasmania would be an ideal trial site. But the idea is to find
somewhere to examine this issues rigorously such that people do not go and play
on machines that do not include the feature. The details of implementation and
things like the trial matter a great a deal.[127]
6.141
The committee notes comments from Ms Liza Carroll, Department of
Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, indicating that the
possibility of a trial is under consideration at COAG, but no specific
discussions have yet taken place:
Senator XENOPHON—One of the recommendations made by the
Productivity Commission is to have a trial before implementing mandatory
precommitment through all jurisdictions. Obviously, it needs to be
geographically robust so that you cannot have people just driving to the next
suburb to play machines that do not have any form of precommitments. So
presumably an island such as Tasmania or somewhere that is geographically
isolated would prevent that impulse to go from one suburb to another. What
consideration has been given by the departments to that? Is that factored in as
a key part of the implementation—to at least have a trial to nut out any technical
issues so that it could go smoothly in a broader rollout?
Ms Carroll—The government is yet to make a decision about
what the implementation might look like and how a trial would fit into any
implementation, but obviously it is one of the things under consideration. It
would also require working with the states. It is one of the things that are being
considered as part of that broader work with the states, but I could not
provide a definitive answer on that at this stage.
Senator XENOPHON—So far only the Tasmanian government has indicated
that it is willing to go along with mandatory precommitment, is that right?
Ms Carroll—At this stage there has not been a discussion at
the select council meeting about a trial in a particular area and all of those
sorts of things. So that is still under consideration but there have been no
decisions made about what the implementation might look like.[128]
Committee view
6.142
The committee agrees with those who advocate a trial of a mandatory
scheme be undertaken. However, it does not regard a trial as being a
pre-requisite for the introduction of the scheme. A trial will assist in refining
particular features of the scheme, but does not obviate the need to implement a
pre-commitment scheme within the proposed timeframe.
Recommendation 30
6.143
The committee recommends that a pre-commitment trial be conducted in one
jurisdiction in order to further inform and refine key pre-commitment design
features and help identify any unintended consequences. The trial should commence
as soon as possible but not delay the timeframe for implementation.
Conclusion
6.144
The committee welcomes the range of views it received on the desirable
features of a pre-commitment card. The committee considered all views, some it
concurred with or partially accepted, in other instances views offered were considered
but not accepted. However, the committee greatly appreciated this opportunity
to hear a full range of views and is extremely grateful to all those who made
contributions. The committee agreed there needs to be a key set of features
that must apply nationally to the pre-commitment system. These are:
-
introduction by the earliest possible date—2014;
-
a requirement for all players to set their maximum loss before
they start gambling;
-
lock out when limits are reached;
-
cooling-off periods for limit increases;
-
safeguards to prevent gamblers machine and venue hopping; and
-
an effective self-exclusion function.
6.145
In addition to these features the committee supports the establishment
of a national independent regulator to oversee pre-commitment and set national standards
which include required pre-commitment features and other consumer protection
measures. The use of low intensity machines with appropriate parameters as an
alternative to mandatory pre-commitment for tourists or low level players is
one the committee is attracted to, and is discussed further in chapters eight
and nine.
6.146
The committee emphasises it remains technology neutral and does not
favour a specific technological solution. It accepts this is beyond its
expertise but looks forward to the technological options, as discussed in the
next chapter, being progressed through the new national regulatory authority.
Recommendation 31
6.147
The committee recommends that development of the broad design of
mandatory pre-commitment be progressed by the national regulatory authority.
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