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Chapter 7 - Results
Introduction
7.1
This chapter attempts some general assessment of the
results achieved by the ACC after nearly three years in operation.
7.2
Overall, the reactions to the ACC by other
institutional participants in the Australian law enforcement world have been
very positive. The Australian Federal Police submission, for example, states
that:
The first years of the ACC have been a period of achievement in
a difficult environment with a new agency emerging from the shadows of its
three predecessors under a new legislative framework.
In the AFP's view, the Board and the ACC has produced tangible
outcomes strategically and operationally and the ACC has emerged as an
effective national law enforcement body.[260]
7.3
Chief Commissioner Nixon
of the Victoria Police
states:
...the ACC is operating effectively and I am confident that the
ACC will become a far more effective organisation moving forward.[261]
7.4
Detective Superintendent Gollschewski of the Queensland
Police described the ACC's role as integral to the national law enforcement
capability,[262] while the Queensland
Crime and Misconduct Commission said:
The history of cooperation between the CMC and the ACC has been
notable and allowed for some significant achievements in the fight against
organised crime.[263]
7.5
In this context, this chapter examines the development
of internal and external institutional arrangements, its criminal intelligence
capability, investigations and finally, the evolving issue of performance
measures.
Internal institutional arrangements
7.6
The first challenge for a new organisation is to both
establish the internal working arrangements and begin the process of building a
coherent sense of corporate identity and purpose. The former entails taking the
broad institutional frameworks created by the Act and developing the practical
relationships and procedures that make these frameworks into a functional
organisation. This is a significant challenge in itself, given the
organisational and political complexity of the ACC's governance environment.
The latter task was made particularly challenging by the need to bring together
three existing entities – the National Crime Authority, the Australian Bureau
of Criminal Intelligence and the Office of Strategic Criminal Assessments –
each with their own purpose, history and culture.
7.7
Mr Milroy
outlined his view of these challenges:
As the commission nears the completion of its third year of
operation, it has faced many challenges including the need to: ensure a smooth
integration of the structures, people and processes of its antecedent agencies;
establish a head office in Canberra; put in place an appropriate organisational
structure; identify its future menu of work; and progressively deal with a
range of difficult work force planning and management issues.[264]
7.8
According to Mr Keelty,
Chairman of the ACC Board:
The ACC has had to manage the transition from three distinct
existing agencies to a single new agency with new governance arrangements
involving a new act and a board with considerable powers vested in it. The
difficulty of this task alone cannot be underestimated.[265]
7.9
At a basic level, these tasks are reflected in the
production of a range of corporate documents, such as the Corporate Plan
2004-07, the Business Plan, the Professional Standards and Integrity Management
Plan, as well as the various Policies and Procedures documents.
Policy
capacity
7.10
The AFP also suggested the ACC could further develop its
capacity for policy development. As Mr Keelty told the Committee, this is an
area of high importance:
the demands placed on the ACC are quite distinct to the demands
placed, for example, on the AFP’s policy area, and the ACC, by virtue of its
role, will form a view as an organisation in areas of policy. I think for all
of us the current environment of policy making in law enforcement has been so
volatile and so voluminous that the ACC can value-add in those areas because it
does and will see things differently to how the AFP will see them. It needs to
be resourced in that area to enable it to make a positive contribution to policy.[266]
7.11
The AFP submission also referred to this, arguing that:
'The ACC's position in having multiple stakeholders across multiple agencies
further reinforces our view that the ACC should have a dedicated Policy
capability.'[267]
7.12
In response, the ACC advised that, as of 1 July 2005, there is now such a
dedicated unit, with policy responses and initiatives coordinated through the
Strategy and Governance area, and has also been strengthened with the creation
of a General Manager Strategic Policy.[268]
Relationship development
7.13
As a new nationally focused law enforcement agency, the
ACC faces the significant challenge of finding its place in the law enforcement
community, and avoiding the danger of counterproductive turf warfare.
7.14
Mr Milroy identified the need to acknowledge 'that this
is an area of responsibility for a lot of bodies.'[269] He also said that the organisation is
strongly focused on the need to establish and build the ACC's relationships
with law enforcement agencies. Mr Milroy
explained that:
we realised that there was clearly a need for us to improve our
relationship management. ... We realise we have to understand our partners and we
have to brief them on what we are trying to achieve for their benefit in
national criminal intelligence.[270]
7.15
This has seen the establishment of working groups at various
levels including groups such as joint management groups in each jurisdiction,[271] the National Criminal Intelligence
and Operations Forum and the National Information Sharing Working Group.[272] According to Mr
Milroy, as a result, the ACC has:
established productive and robust working relationships with its
board, national law enforcement partners and other stakeholders, including
private sector organisations; and developed robust investigative management and
accountability governance structures.[273]
7.16
These efforts have also been recognised by Mr
Keelty:
A key aspect of the ACC’s progress has been the practical
cooperation displayed between agencies represented on the board on a day-to-day
basis on matters that are major to law enforcement in this country,
particularly the area of the creation of multi-agency task forces.[274]
7.17
Similarly, Detective Superintendent Gollschewski
of the Queensland Police described how the ACC has:
established and maintained a close collaborative working relationship
with the Queensland Police Service in both the intelligence and investigative
areas.[275]
7.18
Strong working relations appear also to have been
developed with the Police Federation of Australia, which represents police at a
national level.[276]
7.19
The Committee also notes the ACC's endeavours in
building relationships with international agencies. Mr
Kitson told the Committee that:
I think one other thing that needs to be recognised is that the
development of the ACC has seen us build some very strong partnerships
domestically and peripherally in the international field. We have to continue
to strengthen those and we have to continue to be able to collect intelligence
from the widest range of areas. That is a process that is ongoing. We have
built some spectacularly strong relationships and we have had some very
encouraging returns from some of our partners. We must continue to build that
aspect, because it is that global reach and that global perspective that will
give us, I think, a true dimension and give meaning to our work in terms of
strategic criminal intelligence.[277]
Private
sector
7.20
The Committee is aware that the ACC has also been
working to establish dialogue and information sharing relationships with the
elements of the private sector.[278] It
is also clear to the Committee that this is likely to become an increasingly
important aspect of investigating organised crime, driven by the growing trends
in financial and insurance fraud, money laundering, and the use of high
technology communications.
7.21
The Insurance Australia Group submission also draws
attention to the need for enhancing the level of collaboration between law
enforcement agencies and the private sector to more effectively respond to
organised crime involvement in motor vehicle theft and re-birthing, and fraud.[279] Further, the Wheeler review observes
that Australia
appears to be 'lagging behind leading Western countries ...in integrating
intelligence exchange between the public and private sectors'.[280]
7.22
However, the Committee also notes the discussion in Chapter
3 of this report, which examines the legislative limits to the sharing of information
with the private sector.[281]
7.23
This is an interesting developing area. Clearly, given
current crime trends, the degree of cooperation and information exchange will
need to develop, whilst balancing the proper protection of privacy. The
Committee notes that as far as it has been possible, the ACC has ventured into
sharing expertise with the private sector. However, as noted in chapter 3,
priority should be given to resolving the policy and integrity issues which
arise from a public sector/private sector interface in order to further develop
this aspect of the ACC's operations.
Criminal intelligence
7.24
The core function of the ACC is the collection,
analysis and dissemination of criminal intelligence. In a quantitative sense,
the achievements of the ACC can be measured in the establishment of a series of
products, including the endorsement by the board of the National Criminal
Intelligence Priorities and the delivery of:
-
National criminal threat assessments
-
Picture of Criminality in Australia
-
Criminal Intelligence Reports[282]
-
Alerts
-
Illicit Drug Data Report[283]
7.25
These represent the products of the board approved
special investigations detailed earlier in the report.
7.26
Another important area of ACC activity is the
development and maintenance of key intelligence databases such as:
-
Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID)
-
Australian Law Enforcement Intelligence Network
(ALEIN)
-
Violent Crime Linkage Analysis System (ViCLAS)
-
Australian Identity Fraud Protection Registers
(AIPR)[284]
7.27
A second level of assessment is a qualitative one: how
useful and effective has all this criminal intelligence product been in
'reducing the incidence and impact of serious and organised criminal activity'
in Australia?
As Mr Lenihan, a former senior officer of the NCA, points out, judging the
quality of the intelligence depends on the views of the users of that
intelligence, who are primarily the police services.[285]As has been noted elsewhere in the
report, the lack of response from the many of the police services limits the
capacity of the Committee to form a view. However, what evidence the Committee
has received suggests that the recipients of the ACC's intelligence products are
satisfied with their quality, timeliness and content. Mr Jordana, a Deputy
Secretary in the Attorney General's Department, told the Committee that:
The ACC is meeting its objectives by enhancing national law
enforcement capacity through improved criminal intelligence collection and
analysis, setting clear national criminal intelligence priorities and
conducting intelligence-led investigations into nationally significant criminal
activity. Through its criminal intelligence function, the ACC is fulfilling an
important role of supporting and informing whole-of-government policies and
decision making on nationally significant criminal threats.[286]
7.28
The Department also detailed the useful contribution
the ACC's intelligence has made to national policy development in areas such as
firearms, people trafficking for sexual servitude, and illicit drugs.[287]
7.29
Detective Superintendent Gollschewski
of the Queensland Police Service described the ACC product as 'easily read and
easily understood' and one that is based on a useful template and methodology
that the Queensland Police are themselves adopting.[288]
7.30
The Committee also notes that Mr Keelty described 'the
areas is the streamlining of the intelligence reporting, the breadth of its
dissemination and also the quality of the reports' as one of 'two key areas
where the ACC has really moved beyond our expectations'.[289] The Committee commends the ACC for
these achievements, and also notes the commitment by the ACC to publish a
public version of the Picture of Criminality in Australia.
This document will make an important contribution to the national public debate
on the emerging trends in organised crime and the extent of the threat it
poses.
Strategic
intelligence capacity
7.31
Evidence to the inquiry has raised two issues in
relation to the ACC's criminal intelligence services: the extent of its
strategic intelligence products and the extent of the use of core ACC systems
by partner agencies.
7.32
Mr Keelty,
perhaps speaking more in his capacity as Commissioner of the AFP, told the
Committee that he wishes to see the ACC further develop its strategic criminal
intelligence capabilities:
One of the things I think we have to maintain within the ACC – because
nobody else is doing it to the level that the ACC can – is that
over-the-horizon view[.]
7.33
He noted the emergent trends of identity crime and
people-smuggling without it having being predicted:
I think that the over-the-horizon product is critical and will
be more important to us in the future, particularly when you consider how the
funding processes operate in cycles and how we need to be very prepared for new
policy initiatives to be in the cycle of the budgetary process in order to
acquire resources in time to have an impact. In law enforcement one of the
problems is that we are always lagging because of that process.[290]
7.34
The importance of this role was accepted by Mr
Milroy:
the responsibility for us to have an over-the-horizon-capability
is warranted. It is one of the major roles that the ACC should be involved in.[291]
7.35
However, according to the Australian Federal Police
Association, it is a role that has been neglected, pointing to the disbanding
of the Emerging Issues section within the intelligence directorate, and the
discontinuance of the futures forecasting previously undertaken by OSCA.[292]
7.36
The ACC reject this criticism, arguing that while the
form of strategic reporting has changed, the function has not. As Mr
Kitson, the Director of National Criminal
Intelligence explained:
It has not endured in the way that might make it immediately
visible if you were to inspect our structure or organisation charts today; you
might not readily recognise the capacity that is there. That is because we have
taken an approach that integrates it across a number of our functional areas.
An outcome of that is that we have embedded that outlook capacity in documents
like Picture of Criminality. [293]
7.37
A component of the Picture of Criminality report is the
Strategic Environment for Law Enforcement which focuses on likely patterns and
trends that might occur in criminal markets over the next five years. The
principal strategic intelligence products are the Strategic Criminal
Intelligence Products (SCIAs), which generally relate to an issue identified in
the Picture of Criminality report. The Board endorses a program of these each
year, with twelve planned for 2005-06.[294]
7.38
At an organisational level, the ACC created a new
section in August 2005, with responsibility for preparing the Picture of
Criminality report, the SCIAs, and developing a strategic warning program. This
capability is further enhanced by the creation of a newly formed research area.[295]
7.39
These organisational changes represent 'quarantined'
resources working on a predetermined menu of work:
We set a menu of strategic criminal intelligence reports which
is endorsed by the board. That is our over-the-horizon product. That is a menu
of work that we propose to the board each year, with a rationale for each piece
of work that is in there. ...
In the current cycle of work proposed for strategic assessment,
we have some ambitious projects in areas that are perhaps seen by some as
almost peripheral to law enforcement – issues of wider labour exploitation,
potential criminal exploitation of international trading systems and the
potential impact on criminality in Australia,
of democratic patterns and shifts.[296]
7.40
An important point was made by Mr
Kitson, that 'strategic' in this context
means no more than around five years out:
the nature of crime does not change in its broad sweep; it
changes in its minute detail. It changes in its method of operation rather than
in its actual style. So I think it is more useful to concentrate on saying:
‘This is how we see it in the next five years. This is how law enforcement
needs to adjust its focus in that period.’ I think it is useful nonetheless to
speculate on some of the issues that might confront us beyond the immediate
five-year period, and indeed our Picture of criminality does do that. For
example, it touches on the potential of, say, a pandemic to significantly
affect regional and global dynamics in economic, political and social contexts.
Our capacity to explore that in a criminal environment that has meaning for our
readership is really rather limited.[297]
7.41
The Committee commends the ACC for these initiatives
and is satisfied that the issues raised are being addressed.
Use of ACC
intelligence products
7.42
An area of concern to the Committee is the limited extent
to which the core ACC products, such as ACID/ALEIN are being adopted for use by
other state and federal agencies.
7.43
While information from State police was generally not
available, Detective
Superintendent Stephan Gollschewski from the Queensland Police Service told the
Committee:
We are a little
different from most other jurisdictions in that we use the Australian Criminal
Intelligence Database, ACID, as our primary intelligence database. We are in
fact the only jurisdiction that does that. So the ACC’s role in maintaining
that database and in collecting intelligence is pivotal to how we do business.[298]
7.44
It is unclear why only one state has adopted ACID as
its principle database, and whether it is due to a lack of faith on the part of
the other states in the information contained in ACID – although Queensland appears quite satisfied – or whether the
other states have their own well established systems. In either case, it
appears to the Committee to be a matter that warrants further inquiry.
7.45
Of greater concern to the Committee though, is the
willingness of the other jurisdictions to contribute information to the ACC's
intelligence systems. The AFPA submission observed that: 'A number of Board
agencies have been remiss in not providing information on which they are the
Australian experts to the ACC'[299] and that the quality of the information
contained on ACID may have suffered because:
The ACC has been
unsuccessful in convincing most law enforcement agencies to contribute
meaningfully [sic] data in an ongoing capacity to [ViCLAS and ACID] [300]
7.46
This problem appears to reflect the earlier
difficulties experienced by the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence.
According to Mr Lenihan:
The Bureau's greater
difficulty ... was that most forces would not give it current information and
intelligence, so that it was nearly always a long way behind the game.[301]
7.47
He notes further that;
Some jurisdictions do
not contribute to the serial sexual and violent offenders database (ViCLAS).
There can hardly be any operational considerations preventing such
contributions – as there may be in other areas – and the unwillingness to share
such information is puzzling and disturbing.[302]
7.48
Mr Bob Bottom also identified a lack of willingness to
share information on the part of some agencies:
I think it is a bit of
jealousy between agencies and the like. But this is why this organisation is so
important. Police forces are like that; they are territorial.[303]
... a lot of the things
the royal commissions recommended and police chiefs promised et cetera are not
being delivered.
7.49
It seems self-evident to state that the capacity of the
ACC to fulfil its statutory role as a national criminal intelligence agency
depends on the willingness of its partner agencies to place their own
information holdings in the shared national databases. The Committee is
concerned that the reluctance of most jurisdictions to use these shared
databases as their principal systems may be a symptom of a persisting reluctance
to engage fully with a national approach. If this is the case, it is extremely
disappointing that this remains a problem three years after the inception of
the ACC, particularly given the participation of each of the police
commissioners on the ACC Board.
7.50
So long as individual jurisdictions maintain their own
hermetically sealed information streams, any effective national response to
organised crime will continue to be hamstrung by criminals that operate freely
across jurisdictional boundaries. The Committee considers this to be a matter
deserving close scrutiny in the coming year.
Investigations
7.51
In the almost three years of the ACC's operations,
there has been significant investigative work done through the formation of
task forces and joint investigations. Mr
Milroy told the Committee that:
The integration of intelligence functions with the ACC’s
investigative capability through national taskforces and joint tactical
operations has been instrumental in disrupting the criminal activities of some
of the country’s key organised crime syndicates and individuals. The strategic
placement and unique role of the ACC’s criminal intelligence investigative
functions, supported by its coercive powers, have allowed the commission to
develop informed positions on nationally significant criminal matters beyond
the capacity of single law enforcement agencies.[304]
7.52
Detective Superintendent Gollschewski
explained the significance of this operational activity for Queensland:
With respect to operational collaborations, to date the QPS has
conducted 21 joint investigations with the Australian Crime Commission. The
majority of the investigations have been complex, long-term, protracted
investigations resulting in significant criminal networks being disrupted,
numerous persons being arrested and charged with serious criminal offences and
the seizure and restraint of assets valued at multimillions of dollars. Over
this period 332 coercive examinations have been conducted and 221 notices to
produce have been issued for jointly investigated matters.[305]
7.53
The ACC Annual Report gives further details of a number
of other significant investigations that have operated across areas of drug
trafficking, money laundering and illegal firearms. The ACC concludes that it
has 'made a significant impact, particularly on serious and organised crime
groups ... through its investigative role'. Evidence of this claim is provided by
a table summarising operational results since 2003.[306]
Measuring performance
7.54
The final consideration in this chapter is to return to
the issue of how to measure performance. This has been a matter of perennial
interest to most of the ACC's governance bodies and the ACC itself. The
Intergovernmental Committee directed the ACC through its board, to conduct
further work on refining and improving the ACC performance reporting measures,
while this Committee discussed issues relating to performance measurement at
some length in its report on the last ACC Annual Report.[307]
7.55
At that time, the Committee warned of the dangers of a
focus on the wrong performance measures, which can create perverse incentives
that drive the organisation in the wrong direction.
7.56
According to Mr Keelty,
these matters have been the subject of considerable efforts by the ACC, such
that performance reporting is 'one of two key areas where the ACC has really
moved beyond our expectations.'[308]
This work has involved collaboration and comparison with other agencies to
incorporate the best elements of all these systems into the ACC model.[309]
7.57
The difficulties inherent in performance reporting for
an organisation such as the ACC, were addressed by the Families and Friends for Drug Law Reform (FFDLR). The submission
suggests that the performance criteria for the ACC should not be activity
focused, but should instead assess effectiveness by measuring the 'extent to
which law enforcement effort reduces the quantity of drugs needed to satisfy
the demand of the Australian market.'[310] Pointing to a wider range of indicators of
supply and demand factors such as price, purity and availability, they argue
that much more accurate measures of the effectiveness of law enforcement
activities directed against the drug trade are possible.
7.58
The submission discusses this extensively, providing
illustrations and examples, including a 1996 study which states that
interdiction and reduction in availability are important measures of
effectiveness in dealing with illicit drugs.
7.59
The Committee agrees with much of this submission,
however does not wholly agree with its conclusion. A full assessment of all the
variables raised by the FFDLR is certainly appropriate and necessary to permit
a sensible understanding of the illicit drug problem in Australia and should underpin the assessment and
ongoing refinement of Australia's anti-drugs policies.
7.60
Applying these measures to the ACC as performance
criteria is more problematic. The ACC's tasks are set by government policy, and
the agency has little scope to vary that policy. Measures such as those
proposed by the FFDLR – while of great relevance to policy formulation – are
largely outside the control of the agency. As such, the agency can only be
judged on their success in carrying out government policies, and their use of
public resources to do so. To that extent, activity levels summarised by the
numbers of arrests, prosecutions, seizures, etc, are a relevant performance
measure.
7.61
Nevertheless, the analysis proposed by the FFDLR should
be done and published, and – as the FFDLR suggest – the ACC may be an ideal
agency to perform this task in the context of its intelligence assessments and
the Illicit Drug Data Report.
7.62
The Committee commends the agency for the work it has
done on developing performance measures and will continue to monitor the
evolution of performance indicators for the ACC.
Conclusion
7.63
The three years since the establishment of the ACC have
seen extensive changes in the criminal law environment, and there is no
evidence that this will alter in the near future. The challenge for the ACC is
to keep the medium to long term future well within view, as its continuing effectiveness
will be determined in large part by its ability to anticipate future trends in
organised criminal activity and position itself accordingly.
7.64
The ACC has shown itself to be a flexible and
responsive organisation of rapidly developing capabilities that seems well
placed to meet these challenges.
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