NCA SECURITY REPORT   © Commonwealth of Australia 2006

INTRODUCTION

1. In one of the worst attacks on an Australian law enforcement agency, on 2 March 1994 a letter bomb exploded in the Adelaide office of the National Crime Authority, killing Detective Sergeant Geoffrey Bowen and leading to the loss of an eye by NCA lawyer Mr Peter Wallis. The Committee noted in its Annual Report 1996-97, tabled in September 1997, that it was a matter of disappointment to the Committee that there had not been a prosecution of the perpetrator of this vicious crime.

2. While the investigation of the crime is a matter for South Australia Police, the Committee is nonetheless required by its statutory duties to monitor and review the performance by the Authority of its functions.

3. It is clearly a function of the Authority to provide its personnel with an appropriate level of physical security so that they can pursue their important yet personally hazardous work in safety.

4. Only one member of the current Committee, Mr Paul Filing MP, was a member in March 1994. Thus, when in early 1996 the Committee received representations that security at the NCA's Adelaide office at the time of the bombing might have been deficient, the members of the current Committee felt that it was incumbent on them to examine the validity and integrity of the representations.

5. This report sets out details of advice received from the Authority in this respect.

COMMITTEE DELIBERATIONS

Evidence taken in 1994

6. The then Committee held a public briefing with representatives of the NCA in Sydney on 22 April 1994. The then NCA Chairperson, Mr Tom Sherman, was naturally circumspect about what he was prepared to say in public, not only because of concerns about discussing matters which he expected would be raised in future criminal proceedings but also because of the possible responses by aggrieved persons if deficiencies in NCA security were publicised.

7. Mr Sherman discussed the state of security preparedness in the NCA's Adelaide office and he indicated that the incident had prompted considerably increased attention to be paid to physical security of NCA offices throughout Australia. On the basis of Mr Sherman's evidence the then Committee and the general public would have been left with the impression that:

• the NCA's security system was roughly in line with similar law enforcement agencies at that time;
• that such attacks were previously unknown in Australia;
• that accordingly the security system that had been in place was now recognised as inadequate as it had failed to detect the bomb despite the following out of all procedures; and
• that a high priority would henceforth be given to security issues, subject to an assessment of the costs of different levels of protection against the levels of perceived threat.

Advice received in 1996

8. The current Committee was informed early in 1996 by a source other than the NCA that, in general, the NCA had less than satisfactory security arrangements in place prior to the bombing, despite the existence of both an ASIO report and internal security reports, the knowledge of which had been the source of concern to NCA personnel about their security.

9. The Committee sought comment on these claims from current NCA Chairperson, Mr John Broome. In advice provided to the Committee in October 1996 Mr Broome indicated that there had been no comprehensive security reports or risk reviews undertaken prior to the bombing. Mr Broome indicated that, apart from the engagement of ASIO to provide protective security advice in Melbourne in 1988, ASIO's involvement with the Authority had been in officer to officer level discussions on an ad hoc basis on such matters as approved equipment. Ironically, ASIO officers were visiting the NCA's Melbourne office on the day of the bombing in Adelaide to discuss the undertaking of a protective security review.

10. The only pre-bombing internal security report was said to relate to consideration of x-ray screening equipment. The equipment was not purchased as its overall dimensions restricted its strategic placement and, at $63,000 per unit, its cost was prohibitive.

11. Mr Broome confirmed that the Adelaide office had available for the inspection of mail a Postal Protection Unit, as used widely by Commonwealth agencies undertaking mail screening. Mr Broome added that the NCA was not aware prior to the bombing of any Commonwealth agency which passed mail through x-ray scanners.

Advice received in 1997

12. Articles in The Australian on 11 and 14 October 1997 discussed the events of 2 March 1994 and the level of the NCA's security preparedness, based on interviews with Peter Wallis and other former NCA personnel. The articles did not disclose information about the level of security at the time of the bombing of which the Committee was unaware. The second article did, however, reveal that NCA investigators had been required to leave their office cars in open public parking areas, a matter not previously raised by the Committee with the NCA.

13. Following the revelations in the media, Mr Broome provided the Committee with supplementary advice to his October 1996 advice based on an examination of the files.

14. The current advice contained a number of significant corrections to that provided previously. The thrust of the corrected advice was to the effect that there had in fact been several protective security reviews undertaken of the NCA's Adelaide office in the five-year period prior to the bombing.

15. It transpires that as early as 1990 a review by NCA security staff had recommended, inter alia, that a cost-effective screening device or x-ray equipment should be purchased. On that occasion, however, a staff committee appointed to discuss the report chose to take up one of the lower cost options mooted in the report. The later reviews also drew attention to the need for improved physical security measures, including the purchase of a new Postal Protection Unit at a cost of about $5500, to replace the 1989 model which was rarely used, with scanning being undertaken by a hand-held metal detector.

16. It appears that, mainly for funding reasons, no such purchase was made, although Mr Broome did note that at no stage prior to the bombing was there a perception of heightened risk.

17. The NCA's advice suggests that the bomb was unlikely to have been detected by any equipment which relied on metal detection and that both the Postal Protection Unit and hand-held metal detectors in use at the time of the bombing were not capable of detecting explosive devices which did not contain a reasonable amount of metal.

18. It will be a matter for the Coroner, if a coronial inquiry is held, to determine whether the precautions taken by the NCA in relation to physical security were appropriate in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.

19. The Committee notes that all incoming mail and deliveries to the NCA's offices are now x-rayed.

SUMMARY

20. The purpose of this report is not for the Committee, with the benefit of perfect hindsight, to be critical of the state of physical security in the NCA's Adelaide office prior to March 1994. It will properly be the role of the Coroner to examine the matter and to make any appropriate comments and recommendations.

21. The Committee is reporting to the Parliament its concern about the failure of the NCA to provide it with a fully reliable explanation of the state of security prior to the bombing. Given its statutory role as the body that monitors and reviews the NCA on the Parliament's behalf, the Committee was entitled to expect that the advice received from the NCA in October 1996 was reliable. Committee members are embarrassed to now learn that advice which they had specifically sought and on which they had relied was fundamentally flawed.

22. It is also a matter of concern that the revised advice was only prompted by revelations in the media, which suggests that there are recording or reporting problems in the NCA's Adelaide office.

23. The Parliament is informed that the Committee will be pursuing in detail with the Authority its explanation as to how this incident and such a gross misleading of the Committee could have occurred.

John Bradford MP

Chairman