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Chapter 3
Views on the Bill
3.1
The committee received seven submissions on the Bill.
3.2
To the extent that submissions commented on Schedules 1 (taxation of
interest on unclaimed money) and 2 (reform of airline transport fringe
benefits), this comment was supportive of the measures.
3.3
Only one submission addressed the loss carry-back measures at Schedules
5 and 6, with Virgin Australia supporting the loss carry-back concept, but
arguing against the inclusion of a quantitative cap on the losses that could be
carried back.
3.4
Five submissions discussed the measures relating to transactions of
assets between SMSFs and related parties at Schedule 4.
3.5
None of the submissions received discussed Schedule 3, which relates to
the SRWUIP, or Schedule 7, which gives effect to a range of miscellaneous
changes to the tax and superannuation law.
Schedule 1: Taxation of interest on unclaimed money
3.6
The Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees (AIST) expressed
support for the measures contained in the Bill, suggesting the tax-free status
of interest paid on unclaimed superannuation moneys would help preserve the
value of unclaimed moneys in the period it remained out of the market.[1]
Committee view
3.7
The committee notes that while it only received two submissions
addressing Schedule 1, the unclaimed money reforms (including the government's intention
to exempt payments of interest on unclaimed moneys from income tax), have been
subject to earlier consultative processes. These processes included an inquiry
by the Senate Economics Legislation Committee on the Treasury Legislation
Amendment (Unclaimed Money and Other Measures) Bill 2012, where the
government made clear its intent to make interest paid on unclaimed money
tax-exempt.[2]
Schedule 2: Fringe benefits tax – reform of airline transport fringe
benefits
3.8
Virgin Australia expressed support for the reforms in its submission,
arguing that the measures in the Bill would 'modernise and simplify the current
legislation.' In particular, Virgin Australia suggested the Bill would reduce
the:
...current administrative burden associated with calculating
taxable values of our existing staff travel arrangements, which represent an
important benefit to our workforce. In our view, the valuation of these
benefits will remain consistent with the previous law, but compliance has been
simplified.[3]
3.9
In its submission, Qantas noted that it been consulted in relation to
the proposed amendments, and that the Bill as currently drafted 'addresses
concerns we had in relation to this initiative.'[4]
Schedule 4: Self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) – acquisitions and
disposals of certain assets between related parties
The need for an equitable treatment
of SMSFs
3.10
CPA Australia argued against the restrictions on the acquisition and
disposal of assets between SMSFs and related parties, as given effect in this
Bill. In particular, CPA Australia argued that it would be:
...inequitable to restrict SMSFs from transacting effectively
and efficiently off-market when there is no demonstrable evidence of abuse and
this avenue remains available to all other investors, including APRA [the
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority] regulated funds and individuals.[5]
3.11
While supporting the measures, SPAA also expressed concern that the
requirement to acquire or dispose of listed securities from a related party in
a prescribed manner would be limited to transactions involving SMSFs. SPAA
argues that, contrary to the observations of APRA, off-market transfers of
listed securities where the buyer and seller of the securities is essentially
the same entity also occur in the APRA regulated sector of the superannuation
industry. As such, the potential for transaction date or asset value
manipulation also exists in the APRA sector, and therefore the same regulations
should apply. This, SPAA argued, would ensure that:
...all superannuation funds are treated equitably, and one
sector of the superannuation market is not treated favourable over another,
ensuring an efficient level playing field for retirement income vehicles.[6]
3.12
The Cooper Review distinguished between the characteristics of SMSFs and
APRA-regulated superannuation funds. SMSFs are closely held entities where all
members must also be trustees or directors of a corporate trustee. The Review
noted that unless there is a countervailing public policy reason, trustees of
SMSFs should be free, as much as possible, from government intervention. It
also expressed some concern that part of the SMSF regulatory framework need to
be improved, and that the ATO needs a greater range of flexible penalties if it
is to achieve 'appropriate and proportionate regulatory outcomes'.[7]
The EM to the bill observed that the SMSF structure 'may provide the
opportunity for SMSF members to engage in behaviour that is inconsistent with
the Government's retirement policy that superannuation savings should be
invested for the sole purpose of providing an income in retirement'.[8]
Merger exception
3.13
The Bill provides an exception to the prohibition on a trustee or an
investment manager of a SMSF acquiring an asset from a related party of the
fund if the asset is acquired under a merger between regulated superannuation
funds and at market value, as determined by a qualified independent valuer.
3.14
The Law Council suggested that along with the exception applying to the
acquisition of an asset through a merger, a mirror exception should be added at
paragraph 66B(3) so that the same arrangement applies regarding the disposal of
an asset to a related party via the merger arrangement. The Law Council suggested
this would be appropriate, given that 'if the transferee fund will be acquiring
an asset from a related party (which is likely to be an SMSF) then the transferor
fund will also be disposing of an asset to a related party via the merger
arrangement.'[9]
3.15
The Law Council further argued that the requirement that an asset
acquired through a merger must be acquired at market value is problematic, as
it would imply that an:
...amount would be paid or other consideration given to the
transferor fund – however, this is most unlikely in a merger situation as the
transfer will typically be made for nil consideration as the transferee fund
takes on the liabilities with respect to benefits payable for the members of
the transferor fund.[10]
3.16
As such, the Law Council recommended that instead of the Bill requiring
that an asset be 'acquired' at market value, it require that an asset be
'recognised' by the transferee at market value, as determined by a qualified
independent valuer.
3.17
The committee sought Treasury's response to the Law Council's argument
that a mirror exception be added to apply to the disposal of an asset to a
related party via the merger arrangement. Treasury noted that proposed
paragraph 66B(3)(f) provides a general exception for assets that are disposed
of to a related party for market value, as determined by a qualified,
independent valuer. It argued that a specific mirror exception is not required
as the disposal of an asset in a merger situation is covered by this general
exception.[11]
Money exception
3.18
The Bill includes exceptions to the prohibition on a trustee or an
investment manager of an SMSF acquiring or disposing of an asset from a related
party of the fund if 'the asset is money' (at proposed new paragraph 66A(3)(f) of
the SIS Act for acquisitions, and 66B(3)(c) for disposals).
3.19
The Law Council suggested that to ensure consistency with the current
exclusion in the SIS Act of the acceptance of money from the definition of
'acquire an asset' (paragraph 66(5) of SIS Act) the exceptions in the proposed
new paragraphs 66A(3)(c) and 66B(3)(f) should be replaced with new sections
stating that the 'acquire an asset does not include acceptance of money' and
'dispose of an asset does not include payment of money.'[12]
3.20
The Explanatory Memorandum states that the money exception, as currently
worded in the Bill:
...is not intended to operate or apply in a different manner to
SMSFs than the way that the current section 66 allows a regulated
superannuation fund to accept the money from a related party, for example, in
the form of contributions.[13]
3.21
Treasury informed the committee that it has consulted on the money
exception with the ATO, and is confident that the Bill as currently drafted
will operate in a manner that is consistent with section 66 of the SIS Act.
3.22
Treasury also told the committee that the transfer of assets under a
merger of regulated superannuation funds may occur for no consideration however
the market value requirement of the exception can still be satisfied. It noted
that in Self Managed Superannuation Funds Ruling SMSFR2010/1, the Commissioner
provided guidance to trustees of SMSFs as to how an asset may be acquired at
market value in these circumstances.[14]
Anti-avoidance
3.23
The Law Council notes that the new anti-avoidance measures in the Bill
relating to acquisitions of disposals do not require any intention to enter
into a scheme to circumvent the prohibitions under sections 66A (acquisitions)
and 66B (disposals). The Law Council suggested there is potential scope for
SMSF trustees to unknowingly contravene the prohibitions, and be subject to
civil penalty under the anti-avoidance measures. Moreover, there is potential
for an innocent contravention to cause an SMSF to be treated as a non-complying
fund.[15]
3.24
In contrast, the anti-avoidance measures in paragraph 66(3) of the
current SIS Act, which sets out anti-avoidance measures in relation to the
acquisition of certain assets from members of regulated superannuation funds,
operates so that a contravention would only occur if an intention to defeat or
circumvent the prohibitions can be established. As such, the Law Council
recommends that section 66C of the Bill be drafted to be consistent with the
terms of the existing paragraph 66(3).[16]
3.25
Similarly, SPAA argues that the prohibition on asset certain acquisitions
and disposals between SMSFs and related parties should only apply to
transactions that knowingly and intentionally involved related parties:
This is especially relevant due to the complexity of the
definition of related party in the SIS Act which can result in entities being a
related party of a fund, even where there is little evidence of a direct link
between the fund and the entity.[17]
Treasury's response
3.26
The committee asked Treasury to comment on the Law Council's observation
that section 66C could be innocently and unknowingly contravened. Treasury
responded that a:
contravention of the current subsection 66 is an offence and
carries a maximum penalty of 1 year imprisonment, and therefore it is
appropriate that the provision contains an element of intention. In contrast,
the proposed section 66C is a civil penalty provision and the consequences of
contravention are outlined in the general civil penalty regime contained in
Part 21 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act). The
result of a civil penalty order is a declaration of contravention and where
appropriate, a monetary penalty as determined by a court (up to a maximum 2,000
penalty units). Further, section 221 of the SIS Act provides for relief from
liability for contravening a civil penalty provision where the court is
satisfied that the person acted honestly and in the circumstances the person
ought fairly to be excused from the contravention.[18]
3.27
Treasury also told the committee that for criminal sanctions to be
imposed under the general civil penalty regime, the Director of Public
Prosecutions is required to establish that a civil penalty provision was
contravened dishonestly and intending to gain, whether directly or indirectly,
an advantage for another person or intending to deceive or defraud someone.[19]
3.28
Treasury also responded to the Law Council's concern that there is
potential for an innocent contravention to cause an SMSF to be treated as a
non-complying fund. Treasury argued that contravention of a regulatory
provision does not lead to a fund automatically becoming non-complying. Rather,
the Commissioner of Taxation will only make that decision after considering a
number of factors which are set out in ATO Practice Statement Law
Administration PS LA 2006/19.[20]
Allowing valuations of transferred
assets by trustees in certain situations
3.29
CPA Australia suggested that if the measure is introduced, section
66B(3) should be amended so that in instances where there is no underlying
market and a trustee is unable to obtain an independent valuation, the trustee
'is able to use their own valuation provided they can demonstrate a reasonable
basis for it and it is documented.'[21]
3.30
AIST, however, questioned the appropriateness of 'funds holding assets
obtained from related parties where valuations are unable to be obtained, and
so do not support such transfers'.[22]
3.31
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) recommended that
proposed subsection 66B(3) be expanded to include an 'in-specie' transfer of the
asset to a member in consideration for the payment of a benefit from the fund.
However, the amount of the benefit paid must be equal to the market value of
the asset transferred. In addition, ASFA argued that given the obligation to
use a qualified independent valuer:
...there could now be additional classes of assets where
acquisitions from or disposals to related parties could be permitted without
material systemic integrity risk. Those assets could include, amongst other
things:
- shares in unrelated unlisted
public companies; and
- unlisted fixed interest type
securities issued by listed public companies, unlisted public companies,
governments and government authorities, such as debentures and bonds.[23]
Regulations governing off-market
transactions
3.32
The Self Managed Superannuation Funds Professionals' Association of
Australia (SPAA) was supportive of the measures in Schedule 4, but encouraged
the government to expedite the release if the draft regulations prescribing how
SMSF off-market transfers of listed securities are to operate.
3.33
SPAA suggests that 'the best approach to governing SMSF off-market
regulations is via a Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994
(SISR) operating standard.'[24]
3.34
Treasury has informed the committee that it is currently consulting with
the Australian Securities and Investment Committee to develop the regulations.
Treasury anticipates a standard consultation process will follow the release of
the draft regulations, allowing interested stakeholders to provide input on the
regulations.[25]
Committee view
3.35
Given the different structure, investment choices and regulatory
framework applying to SMSFs, the committee does not believe that the bill
inequitably restricts SMSFs from transacting effectively and efficiently
off-market. The Cooper Review was concerned with these off-market acquisitions
and disposal of assets between related parties and SMSFs. The committee
believes that the bill is a proportionate response to these concerns.
3.36
The committee is also satisfied that the general exception for assets
disposed of to a related party in proposed paragraph 66B(3)(f) is well drafted.
The general exception is adequate and a specific mirror exception is not
required.
3.37
In terms of the Law Council's concerns with the wording of the money
exception, the committee is presented with no evidence for it to believe that
the Bill will operate in a manner inconsistent with the current section 66 of
the SIS Act.
3.38
With regard to concerns raised by the Law Council and SPAA concerning
the absence of a requirement for intention to be demonstrated in instances
where civil penalty provisions are applied, the committee notes that section
221 of the SIS Act sets out circumstances in which a person can be wholly or
partially of liability for contravention of the provisions. Specifically, if,
in eligible proceedings against a person that has, or may have, contravened a
civil penalty it appears to the court that a person has acted honestly, the
court may relieve that person of liability for the contravention. The committee
further notes that section 323 of the SIS Act provides further relief from
civil penalties where the contravention was due to a reasonable mistake or
reasonable reliance on information supplied by another person.
3.39
The committee notes the points made by SPAA regarding the
yet-to-be-released regulations governing off-market transactions. The committee
further notes that Treasury intends to conduct a consultation process after the
draft regulations are released.
Schedules 5 and 6:
3.40
Virgin Australia argued that the quantitative cap on the tax loss a
company could carry back would limit the benefits to small-to-medium sized
enterprises:
In Virgin Australia's view, the advantages of these measures,
such as greater certainty for profitable companies to be able to utilise a loss
from an investment and the associated cash flow benefits, should be available
to all corporate taxpayers, including companies with large capital requirements
such as airlines. The removal of the quantitative cap would extend the benefits
of the measures of the measures to large businesses, driving greater investment
and innovation in the Australian economy. Importantly, it would not impact on Government
tax revenue in the long-term, as tax losses which are carried back will not be
available to be carried forward.[26]
3.41
Virgin Australia argued that given the ability to carry back losses will
be limited in terms of time (to the two previous tax years) and franking
account balance, the further quantitative cap of $300,000 (that is, the
corporate tax paid on $1,000,000) is not appropriate. According to Virgin
Australia, the use of the franking credit regime as a capping mechanism already
ensures that tax credits from previous years have not already been distributed
to shareholders.[27]
3.42
Virgin Australia also noted that Australia's Future Tax System Review
did not suggest a quantitative cap be placed on losses that could be carried
back.[28]
3.43
Finally, Virgin Australia challenged the idea, as contained in the
Explanatory Memorandum, that small and medium businesses are not able to take
advantage of the consolidation regime's loss utilisation rules, wherein the
losses of one member of a corporate group can be offset against income earned
by other members. Virgin Australia notes that there are, in fact, 'no
restrictions on applying the consolidation rules for small and medium business
that have more than one entity in their corporate structure.
3.44
The Regulation Impact Statement (RIS) prepared by Treasury (and included
in Explanatory Memorandum), explained that the quantitative cap has two
purposes:
(a) reducing integrity concerns by reducing the value of the deduction that
is available, and thereby reducing the incentive to tax planning; and
(b) targeting the option to carry back losses to small and medium
businesses.
3.45
Explaining further how the cap helps target the measure to small and
medium businesses, the RIS argued that these businesses 'don't have the same
access to losses as diversified business and corporate groups,' which can use
profits from other activities to absorb losses.[29]
3.46
The RIS also argued the cap would 'reduce the exposure of the Government
to very large losses incurred by individual businesses.'[30]
Committee view
3.47
The committee is satisfied the quantitative cap on the losses that can
be carried back is an effective and appropriate means to target the measure at
small and medium businesses, and recognises that these businesses generally do
not have access to losses as large companies and consolidated groups with
diversified activities.
3.48
While the committee only received one submission that addressed the loss
carry-back measures (from Virgin Australia), the committee is aware that the
changes have already been subject to extensive consultative processes. These
consultative processes were covered in more detail in the previous chapter.
Recommendation 1
3.49
The committee recommends that the Bill be passed.
Ms Deborah
O'Neill MP
Chair
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