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Appendix 3
Conflicted remuneration: technical amendments requested
Organisation and reference
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Argument
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Amendment
requested
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Financial Planning Association, Submission 62, p.
21.
(discussed further below)
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Clarification on fee-for-service
In order to provide clarification and
certainty that all forms of ‘fee-for-services’ arrangements are permissible
provided there is client consent, irrespective of how the payment is
facilitated the FPA recommends that s963B(1)(d) is amended.
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The benefit is given to the licensee or
representative by, or with the agreement consent or authority of a retail
client in relation to:
i) The issue or sale of a financial
product by the licensee or representative to the client;
ii) Financial product advice given by
the licensee or representative to the client;
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Australian Bankers Association, Submission 67, p.
31.
(discussed further below)
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Ensuring ADI carve-out applies to
employees
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Section 963D should be amended to
clarify that the carve-out relates to a benefit paid by a licensee or
representative to their “employee”.
Additionally, the Explanatory Memorandum
should be amended to clarify that “work carried out” relates to all forms of
salary including wages and entitlements, either nondiscretionary or
discretionary, as stipulated in the contract or agreement of the “employee”.
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Westpac Group, Submission 64, p. 28.
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Third party IT software will not be considered exempt
In the case where a product manufacturer
has a third party create software on their behalf, the software should be
considered exempt from the bans on conflicted remuneration.
Some product issuers do not have the
relevant skills or expertise in IT, or may not be able to build the software
as efficiently as an external supplier. So in some circumstances, outsourcing
the software or IT support services may be more prudent.
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The IT exemption be amended so that the
exemption apply whether the product issuer builds the software itself or uses
a third party supplier.
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AMP Financial Services, Submission 43, pp 22-23;
Financial Services Council, Submission 58, p. 81;
Australian Bankers Association, Submission 67, p.
37.
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Licensees cannot directly provide
software and support to their representatives
The wording of the Bill seems to
preclude licensees from providing IT support and services as a benefit to
their representatives as the carve-out is limited only to the 'benefit
provider'.
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The Bill should be amended to remove 'by
the benefit provider'.
Additionally, paragraph 2.39 of the
Explanatory Memorandum should be expanded to refer to “representatives” and
not only “authorised representatives” in order to clarify that a licensee can
provide professional development to all of its representatives without
breaching the conflicted remuneration provisions.
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Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees, Supplementary
Submission 18, p. 5.
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Licensee 'loophole'
Payments are only banned from being made
when they flow from employer to employee, from licensee to authorised
representative and from product issuers to licensees or representatives.
Licensees who are not product issuers or
sellers will still be able to pay conflicted remuneration (the ‘licensee
loophole’) and this opens the way for artificial structuring of remuneration
arrangements where an entity is interposed.
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Law Council of Australia, Submission 5, p. 9.
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Definition of conflicted remuneration
too general
Any fee or charge may be conflicted
remuneration under the general definition in section 963(1) if the licensee
or its representative provides financial product advice to a retail client
which could have the necessary influence. For example, a product issuer who
provides general financial product advice (for example in the form of a
product disclosure statement), could be prohibited by the ban on conflicted
remuneration from receiving a management fee as the fee could be interpreted
as being capable of influencing its general advice to investors. It could
also prevent trustees of superannuation funds paying fees based on assets
under administration or the number of members to fund administrators.
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Product and service fees accumulated as
a result of general advice be specifically excluded from the definition of
conflicted remuneration in the forthcoming regulations.
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Westpac Group, Submission 64, p. 25;
Financial Services Council, Submission 58, pp
60-61.
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Definition of Funds Manager
The definition of “funds manager”
includes any licensee or RSE licensee that deals in a financial product to
which the platform is related. As a result “funds manager” includes, for
example, both general and life risk insurers.
In effect, the elements of the
definition of “funds manager” in section 9641(1) are sufficiently broad to
capture any financial services licensee or RSE licensee including for example
an insurer.
The definition would capture a licensee
even if the licensee does not:
The definition would capture a licensee
even if the product is not:
- Any other kind of
investment product.
For example, the definition of “funds
manager” would include a financial planner who is arranging for an insurance
product to be issued to a client.
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Westpac suggest a new definition of
funds manager:
“funds manager means a responsible
entity of a registered scheme or an RSE licensee who issues their financial
products to retail clients through the platform operator’s custodial
arrangement by having them available on the investment menu of the custodial
arrangement.”
FSC recommend that s964 should define
the terms used in s964A as follows:
a) “funds manager”
means the issuer or manager of an investment product available through a
custodial arrangement, excluding an issuer or manager who is in the same
wholly owned corporate group as the platform provider
b)
“funds manager’s
financial products” means financial products issued by the funds manager that
are held by or through the custodial arrangement by or on behalf of retail
clients .
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MLC and National Australia Bank, Submission 61, pp
9-10.
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Individuals caught up in group life insurance
The precise definition of ‘group life
policy’ at s963B(2), could result in ‘individual’ arrangements being captured
by the ban. It should be noted that the terms ‘group insurance’ and/or ‘group
life policy’ are not explicitly defined in law. Thus, while they typically
refer to an arrangement purchased for a group of persons (such as an employer
group or an industry association), they may also refer to arrangements
entered into with superannuation trustees which enable access for individual
members to insurance benefits. For example, group life policies (or master
policies) may be issued to the trustee for an individual member in the Fund.
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A new section 963B(2A) be inserted:
An insurance arrangement within a group
life policy:
a) that is an insurance
interest issued in respect of an individual member at the request of that
individual member; and
b) that insurance
interest is not part of or an increase to a benefit to the member referred to
in 963B(3)(b),
is deemed not to be a group life policy
for members of a superannuation entity for the purposes of section 963B(1).
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Law Council of Australia, Submission 5, p. 12.
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Unintended consequences for
superannuation trustees
A platform operator is defined by
reference to custodial arrangement, many superannuation trustees will
be deemed as platform operators under this definition.
It appears that fund managers are not
able to offer wholesale asset management fees to platform operators unless
the difference between the wholesale rate and the “rack” rate paid by other
investors can be justified as a reasonable assessment of the costs the fund
manager will save by offering its product through the platform.
As a consequence, this means that any
rebates which have been negotiated by these superannuation trustees would be
prohibited under the new legislation, especially if the amount of the rebate
exceeds any efficiency savings of the kind referred to in section 964A(3)(b).
In this regard, it is critical to note that some large superannuation funds
are able to negotiate very favourable rebate arrangements which in some cases
will far exceed mere efficiency savings. The crucial distinguishing factor in
the context of superannuation funds (as opposed to other platform operators)
is that superannuation trustees are required by law to hold all rebates for
the benefit of their members and cannot retain those rebates for their
personal benefit.
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The Bill should specify that any
discounts or rebates be passed on to the consumer and that trustees of
superannuation funds be excluded from the definition of platform operators.
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Financial Services Council, Submission 58, p. 62.
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General and life risk insurance caught
in volume based shelf space fees
Section 964(1) of the legislation has
the potential to catch general insurance and life risk insurance payments
which fit the broad definition of a volume based shelf space fees. This ban
is contrary to announced policy in the April 2011 announcement where the
Government stated that the ban on volume payments “will not apply to pure
risk insurance”.
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The definition applicable to s964A be
expressly narrowed to a fund manager and platform/custodial arrangement.
Alternatively, life risk and general
insurance should be carved-out from the ban on volume based shelf space fees
(similar to the carve-out for conflicted remuneration).
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Financial Services Council, Submission 58, p. 77.
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Additional or expanded exemptions for
both monetary and non-monetary benefits
Further clarity is required in the
wording of the Bill
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The ban on conflicted remuneration
should expressly not apply to:
a) Benefits that are:
- caught but
grandfathered.
for example, fee for service amounts
paid by the client based on funds under advice are not caught by the
prohibition (nor should it be). However, a bonus scheme paid by the licensee
or employer that was based on the aggregate of such fee for service revenues
generated by the adviser would be banned because it depends in part on funds
under advice.
b) Exempt benefits: any advice about
general insurance, basic banking products and exempt life insurance,
regardless of who is giving the advice or paying the benefit. Currently,
advice remuneration on these products is only exempt when the advice or the
benefit is provided by the product issuer. There is no policy reason why
these exemptions should not extend to where a benefit is paid by someone
other than the product issuer in respect of general insurance or the
specified life insurance – particularly given that those advisers are likely
to be less conflicted than the product issuers themselves.
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Financial Services Council, Submission 58, p. 79.
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Sale of a financial adviser business
While the sale of a business is the sale
of an asset, that asset includes a register of clients and their product
holdings. The valuation therefore has a connection with the number of
products held by those clients. Such connection should be divorced from
application of the definition of conflicted remuneration by way of a specific
exemption. A financial planner should be able to sell their business to their
licensee without that sale and any subsequent sale by that licensee, being
considered conflicted remuneration simply because the nature of the business
involves financial products.
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The purchase and sale of financial
planning businesses as between licensee and its authorised representatives be
specifically exempt from 963B.
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Australian Bankers Association, Submission 67, pp
35-36.
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Fee-for-service arrangements do not
include client to bank exchanges
Subsection 963B(1)(d) aims to exempt
payments agreed directly between a client and the adviser. The EM clarifies
that the provision intends to exclude benefits “given” by:
- A retail client
directly;
- By another party at
the direction of the retail client; or
- With the clear
consent of the retail client.
The expanded interpretation of “given”
contained in the EM should be contained in the Bill. Additionally, where the
“adviser” is employed by a bank, the payments will be made to the bank, not
directly to the adviser. Therefore, the Bill should recognise that the
benefits may be given by the client to the employee indirectly.
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Subsection 963B(1)(d) should be amended
to clarify that the benefits may be given by the client to the employee
indirectly so that asset based fees are not conflicted remuneration even
where the fees are paid through an investment facility. Specifically, the law
should be redrafted as follows: “the benefit is given to the licensee or
representative by, at the direction or with the clear consent of, a retail
client...”
Subsection 963B(1)(d) should be amended
to clarify that the benefits may be given directly or indirectly to an
“employee”. Specifically, the law should be redrafted as follows: “the
benefit is given to the licensee or representative by, at the direction or
with the clear consent of, a retail client in relation to: the issue or sale
of a financial product by the licensee or representative to the client; or
financial product advice given, whether directly or indirectly, by the
licensee or representative to the client.”
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Australian Bankers' Association, Supplementary
Submission 67, p. 9
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Sophisticated businesses
Many businesses which meet the
requirements to be considered as a “retail client” often require products in
order to facilitate day-to-day business operations (i.e. foreign exchange
contracts, derivatives and commodity products within the agricultural
industry and manufacturing industry). Therefore, these products are not
investment products, and are not used for speculative purposes. Instead,
these products are used by business customers for risk management and hedging
purposes, e.g. managing a financial risk to their business which they may be
exposed to as a result of undertaking the business (i.e. fluctuations in prices
and interest rates).
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For certainty a subsection should be
inserted into section 963B to deem that a payment made in relation to a
transaction for the purposes of hedging/risk management is not conflicted.
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Australian Bankers Association, Submission 67, pp
34-35.
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Business to business transactions:
white-labelling
White labelling, as a commercial
arrangement, tends to relate to agreements that a bank may have with other
providers – typically other banks or subsidiaries of other banks – to provide
the system or infrastructure that underpins the provision of a financial
product.
prohibiting legitimate
business-2-business payments that relate to the distribution of products
and/or services via white labelling arrangements (internally within a
conglomerate banking group and externally) is unnecessary. In the instances
of these white labelling arrangements, such advice is unlikely to occur
because the customer does not receive personal advice, the payment of fees is
not related to the provision of personal advice, and the customer has a
choice to use the system or facility, or not.
The ABA is concerned this would likely
result in these important services being remodelled or withdrawn given the restriction
on such business-2-business payments.
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The provisions should be drafted to
exempt general advice given by way of general market information, such as
marketing material, market reports and market data
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