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Chapter 3
Schedules 3, 4 and 5 of
the bill: provisions and views
Schedule 3—Collection
and disclosure of information
3.1
Schedule 3 of
the bill amends the Australian Prudential Regulation Act 1998, the Corporations
Act 2001, the Financial Sector (Collection of Data) Act 2001 (FSCOD
Act) and the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (the SIS
Act). It expands the coverage of Australian Prudential Regulation Authority's
(APRA) data collection, ensures the publication of data on MySuper products,
and improves disclosure for superannuation.[1]
3.2
The Cooper
Review noted in its final report that:
Transparency
and comparability are critical to the efficiency and operation of a market‐based savings system, even where
participation is compulsory. The Panel believes that there is presently a lack
of transparency, comparability and, ultimately, accountability in the
Australian superannuation system that can only be effectively improved through
targeted and proportionate regulation.[2]
3.3
The Panel
added:
There is
no standardised methodology for calculating and disclosing relevant fund or
investment option information. Members often rely inappropriately on historical
investment return data which gives no information about the risk attaching to
those returns.[3]
3.4
The Explanatory
Memorandum (EM) notes that MySuper products are intended to set a new benchmark
for superannuation in the level of transparency and comparability of key
performance information.[4]
Data
collection
3.5
APRA will
have an expanded role in the collection and publication of data on
superannuation entities. This data will allow members, employers, the industry
and other stakeholders with information to compare the performance of
superannuation products. As the EM notes, this will enhance the accountability
of trustees to their members.[5]
3.6
The bill
would amend APRA's secrecy obligations with the effect that the Authority's
decisions on the confidentiality of a document are streamlined. Currently,
under section 57 of the APRA Act, the Authority can make a determination on the
non-confidentiality of a particular reporting document required to be
given by a registered entity to APRA under the FSCOD Act. The bill would enable
APRA to make a determination on a class of reporting document that is
required to be given by a registered entity to APRA under the FSCOD Act. The EM
notes that under the proposed law, APRA will be able to determine that
information reported in specified line items of a particular reporting form is
non-confidential.[6]
APRA will thereby not be required to repeat confidentiality determinations for
each particular document.
3.7
The Cooper
Review panel recognised that currently, superannuation funds' information is
'to a fairly detailed level' disclosed to APRA under the FSCOD Act through the
APRA annual and quarterly returns. It noted that these returns capture a fund's
financial performance, financial position, derivative financial instruments,
transactions with associated parties, and membership and superannuation entity
profile.
3.8
However, the
panel also observed that while APRA returns contain more detail than the
audited financial statements:
...many
costs are not disclosed or are disclosed only in highly aggregated form. This
problem can arise because some of the costs are incurred in ‘downstream’
entities, rather than in the fund itself. This typically occurs when the
trustee owns a subsidiary administrator that provides all services for the
trustee as well as the fund; where the trustee is itself owned by an
administrator; or where all investment services for the fund are provided by a
third party, whether or not that third party is related to the trustee. Another
shortcoming is that some of the data is not publicly reported by APRA for confidentiality
reasons.[7]
3.9
The EM
presents a diagram to illustrate this case. It shows a member's assets earning
a return of 6.5 per cent from which an investment manager deducts a fee of one
per cent and the managed investment scheme deducts a fee of 0.5 per cent. An
investment return of 5 per cent is returned to the Registrable Superannuation
Entity (RSE) licensee that provides it to members. The licensee in turn charges
an explicit fee of 1 per cent to members. The member is only aware of this 1
per cent fee; the additional 1.5 per cent fee taken by the investment manager
and the managed investment scheme (MIS) is hidden.[8]
3.10
The bill
seeks to provide APRA with powers to examine the 'hidden' fee component,
ensuring that the full costs of investing the assets of members are provided to
APRA and to members. Proposed subsection 13(4A) of the FSCOD Act gives APRA
explicit power to require RSE licensees to provide investment information on
their assets (or assets derived from their assets) by:
- a related
body corporate of the licensee;
- a custodian
holding the RSE's superannuation assets; or
- a person
under a contract or arrangement with the licensee.
3.11
APRA would
have power to establish a reporting standard that requires information on
underlying investments and/or deductions on net returns by third parties. This
could be the assets invested in a MIS, which has in turn invested the assets in
financial products or property.[9]
Where these assets are invested under contract or other arrangement between the
RSE licensee and a person connected with the RSE licensee, the contract or
arrangement must have an implied term:
- requiring the
RSE licensee to notify the connected person that the assets are derived from a
RSE; and
- requiring the
connected person to provide the RSE licensee with the required information. If
the RSE licensee invests its fund's assets in an investment life policy issued
by a related life company, which in turn invests in a MIS in which another
related body corporate is the responsible entity, both the life company and the
responsible entity will be persons connected with the RSE licensee. APRA may,
therefore, have a reporting standard requiring the RSE licensee to report on
the underlying investments of the MIS and the deductions on net returns imposed
by the responsible entity and life company.[10]
3.12
The EM gives
the example of an RSE licensee investing in a MIS (that is not a related body
corporate of the RSE) through a custodian. In this instance:
- the RSE
licensee must notify the custodian the assets are its own;
-
the custodian
must notify the MIS that it is investing assets of the RSE licensee;
- the MIS must
provide the custodian details of the costs it deducts from the investment
return, and the custodian provides this information and details of the costs it
deducts from the investment return it received from the MIS to the RSE
licensee.[11]
The
product dashboard
3.13
The Cooper
Review noted that in order to make meaningful choices, or even to understand
their personal situation, members need to be able to make 'like with like'
comparisons between competing superannuation products. With a view to providing
transparency and more meaningful information, the Review argued that standard
product 'dashboards' and standardised investment performance reporting would
'lift the fog that has clouded this area so far'. It added:
[T]he new
'forward looking' investment option disclosure 'dashboard' would enable members
to examine likely future performance, rather than basing investment choice on
past investment performance. The Panel believes that this way of preparing and
disclosing investment option data will aid members in figuring out some of the
technical information that is associated with their super.[12]
3.14
The bill
would require that RSE licensees publish a product dashboard for each of the
fund's MySuper and choice products.[13]
This information should be made available on the RSE's website such that it is
accessible to the public at all times and updated as required.[14]
The bill would require that the following information is provided:
- the
investment return target;
- the number of
times the current target has been met in the last ten financial years (or for
the period the product has been offered if it has been offered for less than
ten financial years);
- the level of
investment risk;
- a statement
about the liquidity of the product, and the average amount of fees (excluding
activity fees, advice fees and insurance fees) in relation to the product; and
- other costs
such as embedded investment costs in relation to the MySuper product or investment
option during the last quarter, expressed as a percentage of the assets of the
fund attributable to the MySuper product or investment option.[15]
3.15
It will be an
offence for the trustee, who is required to publish a product dashboard, not to
do so (proposed subsection 1021NA(1) of the Corporations Act). It will be a
strict offence for a trustee to publish a product dashboard containing
defective information (proposed subsections 1021NA(2) and (3) of the
Corporations Act), fail to update the product dashboard as required and omit
information from the product dashboard or fail to update as required.[16]
3.16
Proposed
subsection 1021NA(5) of the Corporations Act does provide a defence where it
has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the dashboard was updated as required,
not misleading or deceptive, and contained no omissions.
3.17
The EM notes
that civil action against the trustee will be able to be taken by a person who
suffers loss or damage as a result of the trustee's product dashboard not
containing the required information, not being updated as required, containing
misleading or deceptive information, or if there is an omission.[17]
3.18
The bill
would exempt certain investment options within a choice product from publishing
a product dashboard. These options are:
- a capital guaranteed
life insurance policy, where the contributions and accumulated earnings may not
be reduced by negative investment returns or any reduction in the value of
assets in which the policy is invested;
- a life policy
providing benefits based solely on the realisation of a risk, and not related
to the performance of an investment; and
- an investment
account contract that is held solely for the benefit of that member, and
relatives and dependants of that member—to cover legacy products such as
endowment and whole of life policies.[18]
3.19
The requirement of publishing a product dashboard would also not apply
if the sole purpose of the investment option is the payment of a pension to
members, or if the assets of the fund are only invested in another single
asset, such as individual financial products offered on a platform (proposed
subsection 1017BA(4) of the Corporations Act).
3.20
The product
dashboard will not apply to defined benefit arrangements. To ensure that this
is the case, the bill would define a choice product as a class of beneficial
interest in a regulated superannuation fund, unless all the members of the fund
who hold the class of beneficial interest in the fund are defined benefit
members or the class of beneficial interest is a MySuper product.[19]
Disclosure
of remuneration
3.21
The bill
would require an RSE licensee to disclose the remuneration details of each
executive officer in cases where the licensee is a body corporate, or each
trustee if the RSE licensee is a group of individual trustees. This requirement
will be set out in the regulations.[20]
3.22
The Cooper
Review recommended that trustees should allow a beneficiary access to any
prescribed information or any prescribed documents. The EM notes that the
regulations will also specify certain documents that will have to be published
on the public section of the fund's website.[21]
These documents include the net returns of all MySuper and investment options
over the past ten years and the investment return target for all MySuper and
investment options for choice products. It also includes the fund's most recent
audited financial and actuarial report, product disclosure statements and
annual report. ASIC will be responsible for ensuring that trustees comply with
these disclosure requirements. Failure to publish up to date information on the
fund's website at all times will be a strict liability offence carrying a
penalty of 50 penalty units.
Consistent
information
3.23
The EM states
that inconsistent information provided through multiple means 'can cause
significant damage to members of superannuation funds and inhibit informed
decision-making'.[22]
The bill would also require RSE licensees to give any person information that
is calculated in the same way as required under APRA's reporting standard. Regulations
may prescribe an exemption to this requirement. Notwithstanding these, failure
to provide information calculated on the same basis will be a strict liability
offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
Portfolio
holdings
3.24
A further
area of disclosure set out in Schedule 3 of the bill relates to the requirement
for RSE licensees to disclose their portfolio holdings twice annually.
Licensees must publish this information on the fund's website within 90 days of
the reporting day (30 June or 31 December) and the information must remain on
the fund's website until it is updated. The key information requirements are to
disclose each financial product, the value of the RSE's investment in that
product.[23]
It will include financial products in which the assets are derived from assets
of the RSE, such as through multiple levels of pooled investments include MISs.[24]
3.25
The EM notes
that the regulations will be able to prescribe a materiality threshold for the
information that must be published on an RSE licensee's website. It notes that
the government will give consideration to this threshold 'to strike a balance
between the compliance costs and the benefits for members from portfolio
holdings disclosure'.[25]
3.26
The bill
would impose a penalty of 100 penalty units or two years' imprisonment or both
for an RSE licensee that fails to publish details of its portfolio holdings on
its website. It is a defence to show that the RSE licensee would have published
the information, but for the fact that the trustee was not provided with the
required information.[26]
The penalty for RSE licensees who knowingly publish misleading or deceptive
information, or information containing omissions, is 200 penalty units or
imprisonment for five years, or both. The bill has a corresponding strict
liability offence of 100 penalty units or imprisonment for two years or both.[27]
Obligations
on other parties on ensure disclosure of portfolio holdings
3.27
The bill's
requirement for disclosure of portfolio holdings is accompanied by obligations
on parties that acquire a financial product using the assets of an RSE. The EM
describes a situation where a person (the first party) enters into a contract
with another person (the second party) to acquire a financial product using the
assets (or assets derived from the assets) of an RSE. It notes that:
If a
financial product is acquired under the contract or arrangement, the second
party will have an obligation to provide the RSE licensee with information
sufficient to identify the financial product acquired and any financial
products or other property that the second party knows, or reasonably ought to
know, will be acquired using the assets, or assets derived from the assets, of
the RSE.[28]
3.28
The EM gives
the example of an RSE investing its funds through a custodian in assets in a
financial product provided by MIS 1. This MIS—a fund of funds—purchases units
in a financial product offered by MIS 2. In this case, the custodian must
notify MIS 1 that the assets invested are those of the RSE. Then:
- MIS 1 will
have an obligation to provide information to the RSE that is sufficient to
identify:
- its financial
product;
-
the financial
products it acquires with the assets that it acquires with the assets; and
- the value of
the RSE's investments.
- MIS 1 must
then notify MIS 2 that it is investing assets derived from the assets of the
RSE.
- MIS 2 will
subsequently have an obligation to provide information directly to the RSE to
identify:
- its financial
product;
-
the financial
products it acquires with the assets that it acquires with the assets; and
-
the value of
the RSE's investments.[29]
3.29
Parties who
do not notify another party that a contract or arrangement invests assets of an
RSE, or assets derived from the assets of an RSE, or who fail to notify other
parties of the details of the RSE licensee commit an offence. This offence
carries a penalty of 100 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years, or both.
3.30
Parties
commit an offence when they knowingly omit, or knowingly provide misleading or
deceptive, information when:
- notifying
another party that a contract or arrangement invests assets of an RSE;
- notifying
another party of the details of the trustee; or
-
notifying and
not providing the relevant information to the RSE licensee.
3.31
This offence
carries a penalty of 200 penalty units or imprisonment for 5 years, or both.
There is a corresponding strict liability offence of 100 penalty units or
imprisonment for two years or both.
3.32
It is a
defence to the charge of not providing relevant information to show that the
person took reasonable steps to ensure there would not be an omission in
providing the information. Alternatively, it is a defence to show that the
information was omitted because it would have been misleading or deceptive, and
that the person took reasonable steps to obtain information that would not have
been misleading or deceptive.[30]
Views on Schedule 3
The product dashboard
3.33
The majority of submitters' comments relating to Schedule 3 of the bill
concerned the product dashboard and in particular, the limitations of its
design and practical difficulties in interpreting the information.
3.34
The Law Council of Australia (LCA) told the committee that it would be difficult
to provide and calculate some of the product dashboard information. It also
expressed concern at the 'mismatch' between other published information,
particularly in product disclosure statements and the material that is on the
dashboard.[31]
3.35
The LCA argued that the information in the Product Disclosure Statement (PDS)
should 'in most instances be the most accurate estimate of what the annual fees
and charges are likely to be'. For instance, it noted that the PDS already
includes a historical figure reflecting total management costs, in percentage
terms, for the most recently completed financial year.[32]
3.36
Indeed, the LCA argued that the new information which would be required
to be included in the product dashboard could be significantly different from
the published data in the PDS including other fee information in the PDS. This
could cause confusion among members. It also observed that the new requirements
'seem to focus on fees and charges incurred in a quarter', which could create
confusion given that percentage-based fees are usually expressed on a per annum
basis.[33]
3.37
The LCA also expressed concern with the bill's obligations in terms of
'platform wraps' or 'superannuation wraps'. These are arrangements whereby a
member can have a large range of investment options (that are financial
products in their own right) that are typically provided by third party fund
managers. The LCA noted that it is likely that trustees will be 'heavily
reliant' upon those third parties to provide the dashboard data or actually to
prepare the dashboard.[34]
Given this, it argued that:
[T[he defences which protect trustees who take reasonable steps
to ensure that their dashboards are up-to-date and not misleading or deceptive
should be broadened so as to clarify that those defences will be available in
cases where trustees reasonably rely upon third parties in connection with the
preparation of dashboards. For example, beyond making due diligence enquiries,
a trustee is entirely dependent upon a third party fund manager to have
correctly calculated their historical performance and therefore in ascertaining
how many times the performance objective has been achieved.[35]
3.38
The Australian Institute of Superannuation Trustees (AIST) told the
committee that while disclosure is 'critically important', 'it must not be
misleading and it must be designed to provide members with a real, accurate and
useful understanding of a super product and assist comparisons with other super
products'.[36]
On this basis, it argued that there are problems with both the framework for
the product dashboard in the bill and the more detailed structure released by
APRA in a recent discussion paper. Accordingly, AIST recommended that:
...the product dashboard provisions should be excised from
this tranche of the legislation, subject to further consultation with the super
industry, and be reintroduced in a clearer, more consumer-friendly version in
the fourth tranche of the MySuper legislation.[37]
3.39
The Industry Super Network (ISN) also expressed concerns. Based on the early
indications from APRA consultations on the measures which began on 19 September
2012, it foresaw a 'serious risk of outcomes that could lead to members being
misled about products and trustees being encouraged to make sub-optimal
investment decisions'.[38]
Specifically, the ISN identified the following weaknesses:
- the investment return target (proposed subsection 1017BA(2)(a))
does not require that the target is net of all fees (investment and
administration) and as a consequence will overstate the level of returns to
which a member would actually be entitled;
- the risk measure (proposed subsection 1017BA(2)(c)) specifies the
likelihood of a negative return (exclusive of some costs) but provides no
guidance as to the quantum of such a negative return;
- the liquidity measure (proposed subsection 1017BA(2)(d)) is not
clearly defined and is likely to overstate the proportion of illiquid assets in
a product. The ISN suggested that this requirement be omitted from the bill and
considered in the subsequent tranche of reforms;
- a number of carve outs from the product dashboard (proposed subsection
1017BA(4)) are 'inappropriate'. The ISN criticised the exemption of pension
products and fund of fund investment options delivered through a platform
claiming consumers. It argued that consumers would benefit from their inclusion;
- the product dashboard measures will differ from those contained
in the new short PDS regime. The ISN shared the Law Council's concerns that consumers
could receive contradictory information and be misled depending on which
disclosure they rely on.
3.40
ISN thereby recommended that proposed amendments to sections
1017BA–1017BE of the Corporations Act be omitted from the bill.[39]
Committee view on the product
dashboard
3.41
The committee believes that the case for introducing a product dashboard
for each of a fund's MySuper products is compelling. The Cooper Review found
there is a lack of transparency, comparability and accountability in the superannuation
system. Further, portfolio disclosure in Australia does not meet global best
practice. A product dashboard would introduce a standardised methodology for
calculating and disclosing relevant fund or investment option information. It
would rightly provide information on the investment return target, the
investment risk, the liquidity of the investment and the average amount of fees
and costs in relation to the MySuper product in the last quarter.
3.42
Schedule 3 of the bill would establish this basic framework in
legislation. The committee supports its passage through Parliament and believes
the carve-outs in proposed section 1017BA(4) of the Corporations Act are justified.
3.43
However, it is true that the real benefit from this dashboard to both
trustees and members will depend on how the details are put in place. The
committee notes that the negotiations with APRA that began in September 2012
appear to have uncovered several areas of potential difficulty and confusion.
It urges APRA in further consultations with stakeholders to examine these
issues carefully. The prime consideration must be the usefulness of the
information to members and to ensure that any confusion that may arise from
information through other sources is minimised.
Recommendation 1
3.44
The committee recommends that the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority continue its consultation with stakeholders on the product dashboard
with a view to considering:
- a requirement that the investment return target be net of investment
and administration fees in proposed subsection 1017BA(2)(a) of the Corporations
Act 2001;
- how best to quantify the likelihood of a negative return as part
of the risk measure in proposed subsection 1017BA(2)(c) of the Corporations
Act 2001;
-
a clear definition of the liquidity measure in proposed subsection
1017BA (2)(d) of the Corporations Act 2001; and
-
the options to minimise discrepancies between the information in
the product dashboard and the information contained in the new short product
disclosure statement regime.
Views on publishing information
about underlying holdings
3.45
Proposed section 1017BB of the Corporations Act would require the
publication of investment information. The LCA observed that a trustee may not
have all of the information and may not be in a position to comply fully
because it is reliant on action from other entities.[40]
It stated in its submission:
The provision is extremely unclear and potentially very
onerous. Just as an example, it requires trustees to identify:
...each of the financial products or
other property in which assets, or assets derived from assets, of the entity
are invested...
It is intended to create some kind of flow-through into
underlying investments, but the language is very unclear. It also raises the
problem of double counting, which could arise if you had to delve through many
layers of investments. A small but important point is that this information is
required to be disclosed on a whole-of-fund basis, whereas members' interests
are usually calculated by reference to their investment options. We query why
you would not want this kind of information on a per-investment-option basis.[41]
Views on the strict liability
provisions
3.46
The LCA was also critical of the strict liability provisions for
trustees in relation to the failure to provide the requisite information on the
product dashboard. It argued that a better option would be to have an offence
where the trustee has failed to use best endeavours to comply with provisions. It
viewed this provision as preferable to forcing a trustee into a position where
they are in breach 'and then have to defend what may well be completely
reasonable'.[42]
3.47
The Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) also
expressed concern with the strict liability provisions in Schedule 3 of the
bill. It also proposed amending the strict liability offences to 'at fault'
provisions. ASFA noted that this amendment would recognise the need for there
to be an offence with respect to deliberate or systemic failures, but also that
liability will be a function of undesirable behaviour or conduct as opposed to
inadvertent administrative or operational errors or omissions. If 'at fault'
provisions are not legislated, ASFA argued that consideration should be given
to introducing explicit reasonable steps, or safe harbour defences.[43]
Committee view on strict liability
offences
3.48
The committee emphasises that the strict liability provisions in
relation to the product dashboard reflect the benefit of these disclosures for
consumers and the importance that trustees maintain a level of vigilance to
ensure that the information is provided in an accurate and timely manner. It
also notes that the strict liability offence is the same as similar offences
that apply to other disclosures such as a product disclosure statement.
3.49
The committee also highlights that a trustee will have a defence where
it has taken reasonable steps to ensure that the dashboard was updated as
required, was not misleading or deceptive, and contained no omissions. Again,
this is consistent with defences for other disclosure offences.
Schedule 4—Modern
awards and enterprise agreements
3.50
Currently,
most modern awards specify a particular fund or funds to which employers must
make compulsory superannuation contributions for the benefit of employees
covered by the award who have not chosen a fund. Employers who fail to make
contributions for employees to a 'default fund' listed in the award are in
contravention of the award, and liable to penalties under the Fair Work Act
2009 (FW Act).[44]
3.51
The bill
proposes that from 1 January 2014, only a fund that offers a MySuper product
may be nominated in a modern Award or enterprise agreement. As the Minister
explained in the Second Reading Speech:
[T]his
will ensure that employees that have their contributions directed to a fund
nominated in a modern award or an enterprise agreement will benefit from having
their contributions placed in a MySuper product if they do not wish to choose
another superannuation product.[45]
3.52
An 'exempt
public sector superannuation scheme', within the meaning given by the SIS Act,
will also be permitted to be included as a default fund in a modern award.
Exempt public sector superannuation schemes are not regulated by APRA and
therefore cannot be authorised to offer a MySuper product.[46]
3.53
A term of a
modern Award will be invalid if it does not nominate a fund that offers a
MySuper product as a default fund. Fair Work Australia (FWA) will be required
to conduct a 'one-off' process to ensure that on 1 January 2014 modern awards
do not purport to nominate default funds that are not authorised by APRA as a
MySuper product.[47]
The object of this process is to avoid confusion for employees and employers.
3.54
The EM also
notes that there will also be an ongoing obligation on FWA to remove any
invalid references to non-compliant funds in modern awards 'as soon as
practicable' after receiving a written notification from APRA that a fund has
ceased to offer any MySuper product (or ceased to be an exempt public sector
superannuation scheme and does not offer a MySuper product).[48]
The onus will be on APRA to notify FWA if a fund is no longer authorised to offer
a MySuper product.
3.55
The EM
clarifies that if the authorisation of a fund to offer a MySuper product is
cancelled, a term in a modern award will be invalid to the extent that it
nominates that fund as a default fund from the time of the cancellation. The EM
clarifies that this will ensure that employers are not obligated to make
contributions to a fund under the terms of a modern award when they would be
subject to penalties under the SG Act for doing so.[49]
3.56
The bill
would require FWA to include a new term in modern awards that permits employers
to make contributions to a fund for an employee who is a defined benefit member
of that fund. This will allow contributions to defined benefit schemes even if
the fund is not specified in the modern award and does not offer a MySuper
product.[50]
3.57
The bill
would amend the FW Act such that an enterprise agreement approved by FWA on or
after 1 January 2014 will only be able to nominate a default fund (or scheme)
that is either:
- a fund that
offers a MySuper product;
- a fund that
only receives contributions in respect of employees of the relevant employer
who have not chosen a fund if such employees are defined benefit members; or
- an exempt
public sector superannuation scheme.[51]
Schedule 5—Defined
benefit members
3.58
A defined benefit
fund is a superannuation fund that pays a final benefit based on a formula that
takes into account an employee's final salary and the number of years worked.
The bill would allow for defined benefit arrangements to be used by an employer
as a default fund, regardless of whether the fund offers a MySuper product. In
terms of defined benefit members, there will also be an exemption to the
trustee's obligation to pay contributions into a MySuper product for members
that have not given the trustee an election in writing that their contributions
are to be paid into a specified choice product.[52]
3.59
Under the
MySuper Core Provisions Bill, employers are required to make contributions for
employees that do not have a chosen fund to a fund that offers a MySuper product.
Schedule 5 of the Further MySuper bill allows for employers to make
contributions to a fund for employees that do not have a chosen fund but are a
defined benefit member of that fund, regardless of whether it offers a MySuper
product. Accordingly, trustees will not be limited to which product they pay
contributions to for defined benefit members.[53]
3.60
However, the
bill would also provide that defined benefit members are not able to be counted
for purposes of determining whether an employer is a 'large employer' to gain
authorisation of a MySuper product under section 29TB of the MySuper Core
Provisions Bill. The EM states that defined benefit members will 'generally not
have any contributions held within a MySuper product, and therefore, should not
be counted for the purposes of working out whether an employer can be offered a
separate MySuper product'.[54]
3.61
The EM notes
that regulations may be made to prescribe whether a member of a superannuation
fund is, or is not a defined benefit member for the purpose of certain
provisions of the Superannuation Guarantee Act and the Superannuation
Industry (Supervision) Act 1993.[55]
3.62
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Further MySuper Bill received little comment in
this inquiry. The committee supports both the principles underlying these
amendments and the drafting of the provisions.
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