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Chapter 5
Issues arising during franchise agreements
Challenges to the working relationship
5.1
Many franchise agreements result in successful and profitable ongoing
business relationships between franchisee and franchisor, with both parties benefiting
substantially from the arrangement.
5.2
However, there is an inherent potential for tension during the
relationship. While an individual franchisee's priority is the profitability of
their unit franchise or franchises, the franchisor's aim is to grow and protect
the overall network of franchises in order to maximise returns. Although most
of the time both parties are likely to be working towards complementary goals,
there will be occasions when what is best for the network as a whole, from a
franchisor's perspective, is potentially detrimental to the business of an
individual franchisee.
5.3
In particular, difficulties may arise when franchisees feel that operations
or expectations during the life of the franchise agreement are contrary to what
was disclosed to them before the agreement was signed and that these changes
put them at a material disadvantage.
5.4
A range of issues raised with the committee about the realities of being
in a franchise agreement are discussed in more detail below.
Unilateral variation of franchise agreements
5.5
The committee received submissions expressing concern that the
Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code) does not prohibit unilateral variation
of contracts. As explained by the Motor Trades Association of Australia (MTAA):
The purpose of disclosure is to provide franchisees with
sufficient information to decide whether or not to enter into the business
agreement proposed by the franchisor. It is on the basis of that disclosure
that the potential franchisee assesses the financial rewards and risks associated
with the business. The ability of the franchisor to subsequently vary the terms
of the agreement in a unilateral manner may, therefore, result in a
circumstance whereby the revised terms of the agreement are materially
different to those contained in the original agreements. In such circumstances,
it is possible that the franchisee may not have entered into the agreement had
the revised terms been included in the original agreement.[1]
5.6
Acknowledging that there may at times be sound commercial reasons for requiring
changes to business practice and franchise operations, the MTAA suggested the
following:
While MTAA acknowledges that franchisors may need to amend
certain elements of the agreement in response to marketing and trading
conditions, the Association is firmly of the view that such changes should only
be made after the franchisor has consulted with its franchisees and they have
consented to the proposed changes. This approach, in MTAA's view, is necessary
to ensure that franchisors do not materially alter the terms of the franchise
agreement in a manner that may have a significant detrimental impact on the
viability of a franchisee's business. It also ensures that the nature of the
business arrangements do not vary materially from that disclosed by the
franchisor in its disclosure document (upon which the franchisee made its
decision to invest in the business).[2]
5.7
Other submitters emphasised that the power to vary contract terms lies
almost exclusively with the franchisor and that, relative to the franchisee,
the franchisor has a limited range of contractual obligations—many of which are
to be carried out at the franchisor's discretion.[3]
Compliance with the operations manual
5.8
The committee heard similar concerns relating to the widespread practice
of including a clause in franchise agreements stipulating that a franchisee
will comply with an operations manual supplied by the franchisor, the contents
of which are subject to change at any time.
5.9
From a franchisee's perspective, this can have the effect of changing
the conditions that were in place at the time the franchise agreement was
signed:
There can be no better example of systemic problems in
franchising if ... (b) There exist Service or Operational Manuals which have the
effect of materially altering the costs of compliance to the advantage of the
franchisor but the disadvantage of the franchisee.[4]
5.10
Some submitters indicated that such variations should be prevented:
The Franchising Code should prohibit the unilateral variation of
Franchise Agreements and variations effected by changes to Operations Manuals...
... A change to that manual, say in relation to the shopfit
requirements can be in effect a major change to the franchise agreement and a
major cost. Any directive that incurs costs changes the financial basis of the
decision to enter that franchise and can have significant consequences. This would
be avoided if unilateral contract variation was outlawed including variation to
an operations manual which incurs franchisee costs.[5]
5.11
However, others submitted that the ability to make unilateral variations
or change the operations manual is essential to ensuring that business
practices and expectations evolve to fit a changing market. The Federal Chamber
of Automotive Industries (FCAI) explained:
As a relational contract, it is clear that various commercial
elements of a franchise agreement will need to be modified from time to time in
order to reflect the dynamic nature of a franchise business system. The concept
of "unilateral variation" could be capable of extending to changes in
programs, strategies, presentation, policies, models and brands and other
elements essential to the efficient operation of a franchise system.
Modifications of this kind are a necessary part of the business relationship
between the franchisor and the franchisee.[6]
5.12
The FCAI also submitted that there are sufficient remedies in the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (TPA) to cover situations where a unilateral change
introduced by a franchisor is seriously detrimental to a franchisee.[7]
5.13
IndCorp Franchisees' Association of Australasia put the issue in the
following terms:
IndCorp accepts and recognises the importance of a strong brand
and the need for the franchisor to have the power to establish the strong
guidelines and the criteria by which prospective and existing franchisees can
operate a store. Where the issues arise for IndCorp's members are, to use a
slight sporting pun, when the goalposts keep shifting. An operations manual
sets out the standard by which franchisees must operate the franchises.
Compliance with the operations manual is a mandatory term of the franchise
agreement. There is a level of acceptance and knowledge and acknowledgement
that the operations manual is an intrinsic part of a franchise agreement and
the way franchises work. The issue is when a franchisor reserves the right to
change it at any time and with very little negotiation or communication with
the franchises.[8]
5.14
Rather than preventing franchisors from using a mutable operations
manual, IndCorp suggested that one way to balance the interests of franchisees
and franchisors in this matter would be to insert into the Code an obligation
on all parties to the agreement to act in good faith:
Our submission is the good faith requirements would be needed to
stop a franchisor from being able to completely alter the very nature of the
initial agreement into which a franchisee has entered.[9]
5.15
It is IndCorp's submission that an 'underpinning legal right' to good
faith will assist in mediating disputes arising out of changes to the operations
manual which are, in a franchisee's opinion, unreasonable.[10]
5.16
The pros, cons and implications of including an explicit obligation in
the Code for franchisors, franchisees and prospective franchisees to act in
good faith are discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
Opportunism
5.17
The committee received submissions from franchisors indicating that, in
some cases of opportunistic behaviour by franchisees, the balance of power in a
franchising relationship actually lies with the franchisee. For instance,
Fibrecare Australia submitted that:
Much will be written and said about the "poor"
franchisee and the "all powerful" franchisor...nothing could be further
from the truth. Most franchisors are like me – small businesses, often family
businesses, trying to compete in the marketplace.
They contended that:
There are laws to protect franchisees from every conceivable
wrong. The balance is firmly in the favour of franchisees. Indeed I believe the
current system encourages franchisees to pursue spurious claims because it is so
easy to make broad allegations that sound credible but don't stand up to
scrutiny.[11]
5.18
However, the committee also received many submissions from current and former
franchisees outlining situations in which franchisor opportunism had allegedly disadvantaged
them and their business. In particular, submitters discussed churning—a practice
in which a franchisor sells and re-sells a unit franchise, making a profit each
time the business changes hands regardless of the profitability of the unit
franchise.[12]
5.19
Since 1 March 2008, franchisors have been required to disclose more
information about past franchisees (except where franchisees have requested in
writing that their details not be passed on). The intent of this provision, in
part, is to assist franchisees in discerning whether churning may have been
taking place:
...the level of movement in and out of the franchise system and
the reason for that movement is also likely to be relevant to a prospective
franchisee.[13]
5.20
It is too soon for the committee to judge the efficacy of this change to
the Code in reducing churning. The potential to address opportunism in
franchising more broadly by introducing a good faith obligation into the Code is
examined in Chapter 8.
Restraint of trade clauses
5.21
Franchise agreements commonly include restraint of trade, or
non-compete, clauses that oblige franchisees not to engage in business beyond
the franchise agreement that operates in direct competition with the
franchisor. As Yum! Restaurants Australia explained to the committee:
In common with all industries, we have restraints of trade in
our contracts that prevent our business partners from competing directly
against us.
...
It is common. As you would be aware, restraints are common
across all types of arrangements, and franchising is no different. So,
employment contracts would contain an element of prohibition against
competition as well. I think that is recognised. They are so prevalent because
it is recognised as justified as a legitimate business interest...Bearing in mind
that the law on restraint of trade is quite clear—that is, it is enforceable
only to the extent that it is reasonable...[14]
5.22
For a franchisee, one practical consequence of such a restraint of trade
clause is that, if it extends beyond the life of the franchise agreement, it
may limit their ability to directly transfer the industry-specific skills,
knowledge and assets they have developed through operating a franchise unit
into an independent business of their own.
5.23
While franchisees arguably have the opportunity to negotiate with regard
to the inclusion of such clauses before signing an initial contract or a
renewal agreement, in practice the disparity in bargaining power between the
parties makes this difficult. This may lead franchisees into signing 'take
it or leave it' contracts that contain provisions they consider to be unfair.[15]
Committee view
5.24
While the committee recognises the commercial arguments underlying the
application of restraint of trade clauses during the time in which a franchisee
and franchisor have a working relationship, it is the view of the committee
that it may not be appropriate in all circumstances for such restraints to
apply once the franchise agreement has ended. The committee notes the severe
restrictions that such restraints might impose on the ability of former
franchisees to generate income as independent businesspeople.
Confidentiality clauses
5.25
Franchisors have a genuine need to maintain confidentiality around
certain commercial information, in order to protect and advance the interests
of the franchise as a whole. However, the committee heard that some franchise
agreements contain confidentiality clauses preventing franchisees from
discussing pertinent details of business arrangements or of mediation outcomes
with their fellow franchisees.[16]
The ACCC suggested that some such clauses do not serve a legitimate commercial
purpose:
To be quite frank, we have seen confidentiality clauses that do
not seem to have any real commercial purpose...other than preventing franchisees
from being able to discuss some fairly important details of their franchise
arrangement with other franchisees.[17]
5.26
Again, while franchisees have a theoretical ability to negotiate with
regard to such clauses if they consider them unfair, in practice franchisees
are most likely to enter into standard form, 'take it or leave it' contracts as
provided to them by the franchisor.
Advertising funds
5.27
The committee received submissions from franchisees and former
franchisees expressing dissatisfaction with the management of advertising
funds. In some cases, franchisees can see no apparent marketing in their area.
For example:
Only when we were part of the Franchise Group we were ... made
aware of the many problems within the group. There were many disgruntled
franchisees because they felt there was no support given to the group in
general. They believed they paid excessively high royalty and marketing fees
with little support and minimal to nil national marketing to show for it. Sales
had been in decline since mid 2005...It was apparent that no business plan existed,
marketing plan or anything...that would improve the brand and bring clients
through the door. Many...had asked for Audited marketing and Sales reports over
the years but no one in the franchise community has ever received a copy...[18]
5.28
The committee notes that, depending on their background and experience
in business, franchisors are not necessarily well equipped to conduct efficient
or effective marketing campaigns. What franchisees perceive to be a lack of
returns on their contributions to advertising funds may be a result of poorly
conducted marketing, rather than a simple failure to advertise at all.
5.29
Another submission described a situation in which some franchisees were
allowed to opt out of paying the advertising levy, presumably because their
stores were underperforming. This had a detrimental effect on other franchisees
in the system who continued to pay their advertising fees but did not receive
adequate advertising outcomes in return.[19]
5.30
Following changes to the Code which took effect on 1 March 2008, franchisors are now required to provide relevant audited financial statements within
four months of the end of the financial year to franchisees who make payments
into marketing or other cooperative funds.[20]
It is too soon for the committee to judge the efficacy of these amendments.
Committee view
5.31
When negotiated and resolved in a reasonable and timely matter, disagreements
between franchisor and franchisee need not interfere with the long-term success
of a business relationship. However, the issues raised in this chapter are
clear examples of the sources of tension that may lead a franchisee and
franchisor into dispute (discussed further in Chapter 7), termination or
non-renewal (discussed in Chapter 6) or, in worst-case scenarios, litigation
(discussed in Chapter 9).
5.32
The committee recognises that there are enormous practical difficulties
with trying to regulate specific elements of conduct by parties to a franchise agreement,
particularly the various manifestations of opportunistic conduct that franchising
arrangements can foster. This is why the inclusion of an overarching standard
of conduct in the Code may be useful. This matter is discussed in the context
of good faith in Chapter 8.
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