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Chapter 2 - Prudential framework, industry trends and benchmarking international practice
Background
2.1
Since 1987 Australia has had a system of mandatory superannuation
contributions. The level of superannuation contributions an employer is
required to provide on behalf of employees is prescribed under some federal and
state industrial awards and the Commonwealth's superannuation guarantee (SG)
scheme. The scheme requires all employers to provide a minimum level of
superannuation contributions in each financial year for employees.[1]
From 1987 all employers were effectively required to contribute 3 per cent of ordinary
time earnings to a regulated superannuation fund. The rate of contribution
gradually increased to 9 per cent of wages in July 2002.
2.2
The compulsory SG scheme is one of three pillars of Australia's
retirement income system which aims to achieve a higher standard of living in
retirement than would be possible from the publicly-funded age pension alone.
The other two components are the means-tested, taxpayer-funded, age pension and
additional voluntary superannuation contributions usually via a salary
sacrifice, spouse contribution or co-contribution scheme.[2]
It is acknowledged that many people save outside of superannuation, including
but not limited to home ownership.
2.3
The introduction of the SG was accompanied by reform of the prudential
framework governing superannuation. The Superannuation Industry
(Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act) and supporting regulations, which came
into effect in July 1994, replaced the Occupational Superannuation Standards
Act 1987. The SIS Act remains the dominant legislative instrument setting
prudential standards and protecting superannuation fund members' interests.
Most superannuation contributions are made to funds (known as 'superannuation
entities') that have elected to comply with the provisions of the act in order
to obtain concessional tax treatment.
2.4
In 1996 the Government commissioned the Financial System Inquiry to
undertake a major review of the financial services sector regulatory framework to
ensure its continued effectiveness and efficiency. The report of that inquiry (the
Wallis Report) made a number of recommendations that had significant
implications for the structure of financial regulation.[3]
In accepting many of the report's recommendations, the government decided that
the best regulatory structure for the financial services sector would involve
two regulators: one responsible for the prudential regulation of any entity
that needed to be prudentially regulated; the other responsible for market and
disclosure regulation of any financial products being offered to consumers.
2.5
The 'twin peaks' model of regulation that the government eventually
adopted created two highly specialised agencies – the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA) – with clearly defined regulatory roles, or what ASIC Deputy
Chairman, Mr Jeremy Cooper, described as a 'division along functional lines'.[4]
Under the new regime, which came into effect on 1 July 1998, policymaking for prudential services moved to the Department of the Treasury, APRA became the new
prudential supervisory body assuming responsibility for policy implementation,
and ASIC assumed responsibilities for regulation, consumer protection for
financial services and enforcement.[5]
2.6
The institutional framework covering superannuation has also been
affected significantly by the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (FSR),
which addresses disclosure and consumer protection for the entire financial
services industry. The FSR Act amended the Corporations Act and ASIC Act to
provide for a single licensing regime for financial sales, advice and dealings
in relation to financial products; a consistent financial product disclosure
regime; and a single authorisation procedure for financial exchanges and
clearing and settlement facilities.
2.7
The remainder of this chapter examines how the regulation of the
superannuation industry is structured, and describes a number of industry-wide trends
that have seen superannuation savings across Australia rapidly increasing to
unprecedented levels. The committee then makes a few preliminary observations
regarding these broader structural issues and trends, taking into consideration
the views of the superannuation industry raised in evidence to this inquiry.
Prudential regulation
2.8
Prudential regulation aims to promote prudential behaviour by financial
institutions so as to ensure they will be able to meet their obligations to
their depositors, policyholders or members. Its primary concern is the quality
of regulated entities and their systems for identifying, measuring and managing
business risk.[6]
Although the regulation and prudential supervision of the superannuation
industry has undergone fundamental change over the past decade, a consistent
objective underlying the regulatory system has been to increase superannuation
savings and protect fund members' superannuation entitlements.[7]
2.9
The current prudential and disclosure framework applying to superannuation
was established by the Government in 1998 as part of its response to the
recommendations of the Financial System Inquiry. According to Treasury, the
prudential framework has two principal aims of ensuring that:
- entities are managed prudently so that they are able to meet
their financial obligations to consumers; and
- consumers are given adequate information and are kept informed of
the nature and performance of their investments.[8]
2.10
Prior to the mid-1980s the superannuation industry was largely self-regulated.
As a result of the dramatic increase in superannuation coverage and
contributions in the late 1980s and early 1990s (as a result of the 1986
national wage case and the introduction of the SG) major reforms were
undertaken in the regulatory framework. In 1987 the Insurance and
Superannuation Commission was established as a specific industry regulator.
This was followed in 1993 by the introduction of the SIS Act to regulate the
compulsory employer superannuation schemes. The stated objective of the Act is
contained in section 3:
...to make provision for the prudent management of certain
superannuation funds, approved deposit funds and pooled superannuation trusts
and for their supervision by APRA, ASIC and the Commissioner of Taxation.
2.11
In addition to the SIS Act, the main pieces of legislation that regulate
the superannuation industry are the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations
Act) and associated regulations, and to a lesser extent the Income Tax
Assessment Act 1936. The compulsory employer superannuation schemes are
regulated by the SIS Act, which:
- establishes APRA and ASIC as the regulators of the Superannuation
Retirement Industry;
- introduces statutory duties on trustees of such schemes;
- provides for disclosure of information to members;
- incorporates certain covenants into Trust Deeds;
- establishes a compensation mechanism for the protection of
members of superannuation funds in the event of theft and fraud (self-managed
funds are excluded);
- establishes wider reporting duties for auditors of superannuation
schemes;
- provides full vesting of employer contributions for the employee;
- prohibits borrowing by funds;
- codifies the prudent person and sole purpose test; and
- includes a restriction on in house investment of 5 per cent.
Regulators
2.12
The superannuation industry is regulated by three bodies: APRA, ASIC and
the Australian Tax Office (ATO). These are independent government agencies that
are responsible for different aspects of the regulation of the superannuation
industry.
2.13
The role of each is described in more detail below. A general
distinction in relation to superannuation is that APRA is responsible for the
prudential aspects of the SIS Act, promoting the stability and soundness of
superannuation funds; ASIC is responsible more broadly for corporations,
financial services and consumer protection; and the ATO regulates the
activities of self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) and enforcement of SG
payments. While each of the regulators is heavily involved in regulating
entities, only ASIC attends to the needs of consumers and beneficiaries. In
addition, Treasury has responsibility for formulating policy on the broad
features of the retirement income system, prudential regulation and consumer
protection.
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority
2.14
Prudential regulation seeks to reduce the likelihood that regulated
entities will fail and be unable to meet their contractual commitments.
Governments around the world have imposed prudential controls in the financial
services sector because of the critical role the sector plays in the financial
security of society and in a modern market economy. Prudential regulation is
designed to promote stability and soundness within the financial entities it
supervises. To this end, the SIS Act imposes duties and obligations on trustees
and provides APRA with supervisory and regulatory power. It also provides key
data on a range of superannuation fund statistics.
Recommendation 1
2.15
The committee recommends that APRA expand the information provided in
its quarterly superannuation statistics to include a regular representative
survey of the level of additional contributions above the 9 per cent
superannuation guarantee from both employer and employee (salary sacrifice) and
other forms of contribution. This should include analysis by income level and
gender.
2.16
APRA supervises complying superannuation funds worth approximately $808
billion, other than self-managed superannuation funds worth approximately $245
billion. However there is no prudential standard making power in respect of
regulated superannuation entities. Further, APRA provides guidance on the
manner in which it interprets and assesses compliance with the operating
standards contained in the law (for more on this issue see the discussion of
member investment choice in Chapter 4). APRA issues circulars and guidance
notes on its interpretation of the SIS Act, SIS regulations and related
matters. APRA's guidance on superannuation is non-binding.[9]
Nevertheless, in practice, particularly in the context of the re-licensing of
all superannuation funds, APRA has or is in the process of implementing various
guidance notes.
Australian Securities and Investments Commission
2.17
The Australian Securities and Investments Commission is responsible for
administering and enforcing the Corporations Act, the Australian Securities
and Investments Commission Act 2001 and parts of the SIS Act as they apply
to superannuation trustees and other financial service providers in the
superannuation industry. The main role of ASIC is to regulate the activities of
all corporate entities in Australia, including financial entities such as
superannuation funds. From 1998 it became responsible for consumer protection
in superannuation.
2.18
The ASIC submission described the regulator's main functions as:
- granting Australian Financial Services (AFS) licences and
imposing and changing licensee conditions on superannuation trustees, advisers
and other financial services businesses in the superannuation industry;
- maintaining public registers of, among other things, AFS licence holders
and authorised representatives of AFS licence holders;
- issuing policy statements, guides, information sheets and answers
to frequently asked questions to explain how the law works and compliance
obligations;[10]
- modifying the application of many parts of the Corporations Act
and SIS Act, and granting exemptions from some parts of the Corporations Act;
- monitoring how the superannuation industry complies with the law;
- enforcing the law by taking action against inappropriate advice
about superannuation and misleading or deceptive and unconscionable conduct in
relation to superannuation products and advice; and
- educating consumers in order to promote the confident and
informed participation of investors and consumers in the financial system.[11]
Australian Tax Office
2.19
The Australian Tax Office is responsible for ensuring the effective
management of assets invested in self-managed superannuation funds and SG
compliance. Its main role is ensuring that SMSFs comply with the SIS Act and
regulations. According to the ATO submission: 'Our focus is on whether fund
investments are in accordance with trustees' stated investment strategies and
in accordance with the SIS Act, but it is not our role to look at the overall
soundness of the investments from a business perspective'.[12]
It also pointed out that as more people with an SMSF retire from the workforce
these funds are maturing into long term, intergenerational retirement vehicles.
Prudential framework
2.20
The Treasury submission identified four main elements that comprise the
prudential regime for superannuation: the trust structure, minimum entry
requirements (licensing), the sole purpose test, and investment management
requirements. A brief summary of the first three elements is provided below. The
investment obligations on trustees under the SIS Act are examined as part of
the committee's consideration of member investment choice in Chapter 4.
Trust structure
2.21
Regulated superannuation entities generally operate under a trust
structure for the benefit of members and beneficiaries. The assets of the
superannuation entity must be kept separate and distinct from the assets of the
trustee of the entity, the members, or any related employer-sponsor of the
fund.
2.22
According to the Treasury submission:
Under general trust law, the trustee must take ultimate
responsibility for the entity and is obligated to manage the assets of the
entity with competence, diligence, prudence and honesty, and to act in good
faith for the benefit of all of the members of the entity. These governance
principles also underpin the SIS Act, most notably being reflected in the
duties – or covenants – contained in section 52 of the SIS Act.[13]
2.23
According to the Chairman of the Corporate Superannuation Association,
the overriding and strongest feature of a trust structure is that it reinforces
the no conflict rule and the principle that trustees act for the benefit of the
beneficiaries and not for their own profit.[14]
Trustee licensing
2.24
Since 1 July 2004, trustees have been operating under a universal
framework of licensing and registration to ensure trustees satisfy certain
minimum requirements before operating in the market. The licensing regime came
into effect with the Superannuation Safety Amendment Act 2004 that
amended the SIS Act to require all trustees operating an APRA regulated superannuation
entity to hold a Registrable Superannuation Entity (RSE) Licence. Existing
trustees were granted a transition period of two years from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2006. This licensing process has resulted in market rationalisation
(see paragraph 2.27). By this time 307 trustees responsible for around 600
superannuation funds had obtained a RSE licence. A further 6300 small APRA
funds (those with fewer than five members) were also licensed by the completion
of the transition period. Trustees that have been granted an RSE licence manage
combined assets of $566 billion out of a total of approximately $1 trillion in
super funds.[15]
2.25
In order to obtain a licence trustees must, among other things, meet
minimum standards of fitness and propriety and have adequate financial, human
and technical resources, an adequate risk management framework and systems to
manage the outsourcing of any material business activities.[16]
2.26
It is important to highlight that an RSE licence is not the same as an AFS
licence, which is issued by ASIC to providers of financial products under the
Corporations Act. While an RSE licence enables the licensee to conduct business
operations different from those holding an AFS licence, holding an AFS licence
is still a requirement for undertaking certain types of business activities
under an RSE licence; for example, where the trustee is dealing in a financial
product or providing advice about financial products.[17]
2.27
APRA is currently undertaking two supervisory tasks following the
completion of the licensing transition period. The first is resolving issues
created by the large number of funds and trustees that have recently exited the
superannuation system. Over 140 trustees that had not completed the wind up of
their funds by 30 June 2006 have entered into enforceable undertakings to do so
within a specified period. The second task is monitoring the undertakings made
by licensed trustees in regard to the policies and procedures put in place
prior to licences being granted.[18]
Sole purpose test
2.28
The trustee of a regulated superannuation fund must comply with the sole
purpose test as set out in section 62 of the SIS Act. According to the relevant
APRA circular, a regulated superannuation fund must be maintained solely for:
- at least one of the legislated 'core purposes', which are the
provision of benefits on or after the member's retirement; and
- for one or more of the prescribed or approved 'ancillary
purposes', which are the provision of employment termination insurance, salary
continuance (on a member ceasing work because of ill health), reversionary
benefits and other approved benefits on or after an appropriate condition has
been met.[19]
2.29
The main objective of the sole purpose test is to ensure that
superannuation assets are maintained solely for the purpose of or providing
some form of retirement benefit to members. The test is meant to achieve this
objective by prohibiting the use of tax concessions for purposes such as
providing pre-retirement benefits to members, benefits to employer sponsors or
facilitating estate planning.[20]
The committee's main interest in the sole purpose was to examine whether
expenditure on promotional advertising by superannuation funds, especially
since the advent of Choice of Fund on 1 July 2006, is consistent with the sole
purpose test. The views of APRA and other industry stakeholders on this issue
are examined by the committee in Chapter 3.
Committee view
2.30
A thread running through evidence from peak industry associations and
other stakeholders is that the laws and regulations governing superannuation
have become too complex, onerous and conflicting in some instances and have not
kept pace with industry developments. Even the Productivity Commission's
detailed review of the SIS Act and regulations noted the complexity and length
of the legislation and that it has been subject to persistent and frequent
change, thus making it difficult to be familiar with: 'As a result, there is
reason to consider how it might be improved, including whether comprehensive
changes might be justifiable'.[21]
2.31
The committee agrees with this assessment, although it did not receive
much evidence in relation to the operation of the SIS Act and regulations. Some
in the industry expressed the view that the legislation is repetitive, clumsy,
ambiguous and contains unnecessary definitions that, in the words of Trowbridge
Deloitte consultant Mr Anthony Asher: '...makes life very difficult for anyone
working in the industry'.[22]
Trowbridge submitted further that the SIS Act and regulations contain
counter-intuitive definitions and compare unfavourably with other acts
administered by APRA as well as some international legislation such as the Canadian
Pension Benefits Standards Act (1985). The submission made a number of
practical suggestions to simplify the legislation, including:
- transferring those parts and sections administered by the ATO and
ASIC to legislation they administer;
- rationalising APRA's powers under the licensing regime to enable
it to issue prudential standards that specifically cover operating risks and
fiduciary standards;
- removing the distinction between superannuation funds and
approved deposit funds, pooled superannuation trusts and retirement savings
accounts; and
- removing 'member protection' that prevents administration charges
exceeding investment earnings for accounts of less that $1000.[23]
2.32
Strongly worded criticism of the superannuation legislation came from
Mercer Human Resource Consulting. It argued that the worst examples of
complexity and ambiguity are found in recent legislation such as the
Corporations Law, which is '...just unintelligible'. Moreover:
Once you have waded through [the Corporations Law], you then
have to check whether there is an ASIC policy statement or class order that may
override the regulations. In some cases we have legislation that is written so
ambiguously that the various regulators cannot even agree on what the
legislation means. In other cases it is the inconsistencies in the legislation
that are a problem.[24]
2.33
The committee believes that the level of concern expressed by industry
stakeholders about the complexity of the SIS Act would justify the government
undertaking a comprehensive review of superannuation laws. This should be
carried out by Treasury.
Recommendation 2
2.34
The committee recommends that Treasury conduct a review of the laws and
regulations governing superannuation to identify how they may be rationalised
and simplified.
2.35
Other concerns with the SIS Act and Corporations Act and those acts that
cover the regulators generally fall within one of four main areas:
- regulatory overlap between APRA and ASIC, especially in the areas
of data collection, reporting and notification of change;
- confusion over the status of APRA's guidance with regard to how
it interprets and assesses compliance with the operating standards set out in
the SIS regulations;
- additional complexity for trustees and the financial planning
industry, especially meeting the product disclosure requirements of FSR
legislation; and
- rapidly increasing compliance costs that are passed on to the
consumer that have made it difficult for many fund members to receive
cost-effective financial advice.
2.36
In relation to the 'twin peaks' model of regulation, the committee notes
that while the responsibilities of the three regulators (ASIC, APRA and the
ATO) are specified in law, in practice there is some administrative overlap and
duplication of functions. This emerged as a consistent theme in evidence to
this inquiry. The issue of duplication of information gathering between APRA
and ASIC was highlighted by CPA Australia, specifically in relation to the
recent transition period for trustee licensing:
...we had Australian finance services licensing two or three years
ago and we have just gone through the two-year transition period for trustee
licensing under APRA. There were a lot of the same questions and a lot of the
same requirements, although perhaps couched a bit differently. The trustees had
to jump through the same hoops again, providing the information to APRA, when a
lot of it could have been shared in the first place. Because we have that
separation, we end up with a lot of duplication.[25]
2.37
The committee notes that while steps have been taken by the regulators
to address this issue, for example by entering into memoranda of understanding
to define responsibilities more clearly, some sections of the superannuation
industry support a review of the 'twin peaks' system to overcome what is
perceived to be conflict involving different regulatory perspective and objectives.
The issue of regulatory overlap are matters of real concern for the committee
and are examined in Chapter 3. It is noteworthy that the industry as a whole,
including some of those levelling criticism at the legislation, believe the
regulatory framework for superannuation created by the SIS Act, for all its
faults, continues to provide an efficient and effective legislative framework
for the prudent management of superannuation funds.
Industry trends: A snapshot
Growth in superannuation savings and industry composition
2.38
In early 2007 total superannuation assets reached the $1 trillion mark,
backed by strong equity markets and a guaranteed flow of money that some
researchers estimate could double in size by 2015.[26]
This was up from $761.9 billion in June 2005 and four times the value of
superannuation assets in June 1995 ($250 billion).[27]
2.39
During the March 2007 quarter superannuation assets grew by $44.7
billion or 4.4 per cent, to $1.1 trillion, which represents a 17.1 per cent
increase over the 12 months to March 2007.[28]
According to APRA's media release:
Industry funds showed the strongest growth during the quarter,
with assets increasing by 6.2 per cent ($10.6 billion) to $182.7 billion.
Public sector fund assets grew by 5.1 per cent ($8.0 billion) to $165.8
billion, retail fund assets by 3.7 per cent ($12.4 billion) to $343.9 billion
and corporate fund assets by 2.6 per cent ($1.7 billion) to $69.4 billion.[29]
2.40
The shifts that have occurred within the superannuation industry over
the past decade have seen the emergence of four distinct streams of
superannuation funds (of which the first three are APRA-supervised funds):
- corporate funds that are sponsored by a single employer or group
of related employers and cover their employees;
- industry funds that cater for members as a result of an agreement
between parties to an industrial award. Some industry funds offer their
products to the public at large, like retail funds;
- retail funds that are public offer superannuation funds
that members join by purchasing investment units or policies that are sold
through intermediaries such as financial planners; and
- Self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs).[30]
2.41
At March 31 2007, retail funds held the largest proportion of
superannuation assets, accounting for 32.6 per cent of total assets, followed
by self-managed superannuation funds with 23.3 per cent, industry funds 17.3
per cent, public sector funds 15.7 per cent and corporate funds 6.6 per cent.
Small APRA funds held 0.3 per cent of total assets.[31]
2.42
The committee notes that while the level of superannuation assets in
Australia has overtaken $1 trillion, there remains a high level of industry
concern that many people's expectations of their living standards in retirement
greatly exceeds what their superannuation savings will actually provide. This
is commonly referred to as the retirement savings gap. There is also concern
with the poor level of overall financial literacy in the community and the high
level of disengagement over retirement savings and superannuation issues, especially
among younger people.
Choice of Fund
2.43
The significant growth in the level of superannuation savings over the
past decade should be viewed in the context of government attempts to introduce
choice and portability of superannuation and widen the eligibility criteria for
low income earners to receive the government co-contribution.[32]
Government policy to give employees the right to choose which superannuation
fund receives the superannuation guarantee contributions was first articulated
as part of the 1997-98 budget process. Attempts by the government to pass
choice of superannuation legislation in 1997 and 1998 were unsuccessful.
However, the policy was implemented by the Superannuation Legislation
Amendment (Choice of Superannuation Funds) Act 2004. The Choice of Fund
regime commenced operation on 1 July 2005 for federal awards and 1 July 2006 for state awards.
2.44
Where an employee does not choose a superannuation fund, the employer
may choose a complying fund provided it is an 'eligible choice fund'.[33]
Various groups of employees are excluded from the coverage of the choice of
fund legislation, including Commonwealth public sector employees, employees
covered by state awards and employees covered by a certified agreement or an Australian
Workplace Agreement that stipulates the superannuation fund to which
contributions are to be made on behalf of the employees.[34]
2.45
Choice of Fund has been a central part of the government's agenda since
1996. The main arguments in support of choice of fund arrangements are that it gives
employees greater control over their superannuation savings, a greater sense of
ownership of these savings and increases the competitiveness of the market for
superannuation products.[35]
The committee acknowledges and supports the principle of people having the
freedom of choice of both superannuation fund and investment options, provided
appropriate prudential regulation and licensing is in place to ensure people
are protected from unwarranted risk. The committee believes that in the long
run (and with appropriate safeguards in place) choice will increase
competition, resulting in efficiencies and improved returns on superannuation
savings. It is still early in the new regime's operation and, as yet, there is
no evidence that operational costs have been reduced.
Demise of defined benefit funds
2.46
Superannuation funds normally fall in to one of two categories: defined
benefit (DB) funds and defined contribution (DC) funds, which are widely known
in Australia as accumulation funds. Defined benefit schemes calculate the final
benefit based on a predetermined formula unrelated to the fund's performance,
which may take into account a members' final salary, length of service and
salary averaged over a period or at a particular point in time, rather than the
investment earnings of the fund. Thus if market returns decline to leave the
fund in deficit, the fund's sponsor is required to contribute money to ensure
members receive their promised entitlements. Under the SIS Act, DB funds are
required to undergo periodic actuarial reviews to maintain its assets at an
adequate level to meet the obligation to pay current and future benefits.[36]
In Australia, DB funds have generally been managed by individual companies and
employers through their corporate pension fund, or as public sector schemes.
2.47
Defined benefit funds stand in stark contrast to accumulation funds
where the end benefit is made up of contributions to the funds plus any
investment earnings less costs. Under this arrangement, the financial risk of
retirement saving is borne by the fund member. Employers simply pay an agreed
amount into their employee's fund. This regular payment fully discharges the
employer's obligations, while fund members receive a final amount determined by
their contributions plus investment earnings.[37]
2.48
The Treasury submission made the following important distinction between
the structure and funding arrangements of DB and accumulation funds (which are
reflected in the SIS Act):
As a defined benefit entitlement is not linked, or only
partially linked, to market reforms, it is the employer-sponsor who bears the
financial risk of ensuring the fund is able to meet its benefit promises to
members. In contrast, an accumulation fund pays benefits to members equal to
the amount accumulated in the fund in respect of the member, being made up of
contributions and investment earnings, less fund expenses. Consequently,
members directly bear the investment risks in accumulation funds, including the
risk of investment losses.[38]
2.49
Of the two, accumulation funds are overwhelmingly the most common
variety in operation in Australia in 2007. However, this was not the case three
decades ago. Prior to the major reforms of the superannuation system beginning
in the mid-1980's, superannuation schemes covered only 45 per cent of employees
and were primarily of the defined benefit variety.[39]
In 1982-83, 82 per cent of superannuation fund members were in defined benefit
funds. By 1999-00 the figure had dropped to 14 per cent.[40]
2.50
The gradual decline in the number of defined benefit funds is shown in
Table 1. The committee notes that the closure of many defined benefit
schemes and their replacement with accumulation-style funds is a global trend.[41]
According to a Parliamentary Library research paper:
Demographic trends and reforms to pension systems towards the
privatisation of pension savings, will most likely reinforce the creation of
more and larger pools of investment capital that will be managed via
[accumulation] schemes.[42]
Table 1: Changes in
Superannuation Benefit Structure - September 2003 and June 2005
Benefit Type
|
Number of Funds 2004
|
Number of Funds 2006
|
Assets 2004 $ bn
|
Assets 2006 $ bn
|
Accumulation
|
290,659 |
327,214 |
388.7 |
511.9 |
Defined Benefit and
Hybrid entities
|
529 |
299 |
180.3 |
356.3 |
Source: APRA Annual Superannuation
Bulletin June 2004 & June 2006
2.51
The committee notes that the decline is likely to be a long term trend.
Evidence before the committee pointed to a number of possible reasons for the
trend. The complexity associated with DB funds has been accompanied by the problem
of unfunded liabilities accrued during periods where market returns fall short
of benefits owed to members. While this was not a pressing issue for defined
benefit funds during the 1990's, many were abruptly reminded of the financial
risk they were bearing when market returns declined after the technology bust
and global instability that characterised the early part of the decade. An
analysis of many corporate funds' unfunded liabilities in 2003 found that:
In the 1990's, defined benefit funds largely took care of
themselves, with strong returns allowing many companies to have contribution
holidays during the bull market. But this has changed over the past four years,
with sharp falls in nearly all major stockmarket indexes.[43]
2.52
There was considerable concern at the time that many companies would
have to contribute a proportion of their profits to rectify fund deficits. In
March 2003 APRA released the results of its survey on the health of DB funds.
It concluded that while larger funds remained generally solvent, the capacity
of a majority of smaller funds to meet their present and future obligations had
declined by more than ten per cent. APRA encouraged employer sponsors to, where
applicable, 'contribute to their funds at the actuarially recommended rate'.[44]
Although subsequent buoyant market conditions alleviated those immediate
solvency concerns, the prospect of uncertainty over business profits when
markets are trending down is a strong disincentive for companies to manage
defined benefit funds.
2.53
Other reasons were also identified. The cost of obtaining a licence in
terms of time, resources and funding, together with the progressive adoption of
new international financial reporting standards for APRA-regulated reporting
entities from 1 July 2005, have been driving the recent decline in the number
of DB funds. While these are comparatively new factors, other likely reasons
for the decline in DB funds in Australia have been identified:
- the recent trends in public finance has been to reduce long term
liabilities. This may have led to the reduction in the number of public sector
defined benefit schemes;
- the move away from corporate defined benefit schemes is part of
modern corporate management practice. Corporate sponsors recognise that the
provision of superannuation benefits is not part of their ‘core’ business – it
is less trouble to outsource this part of their activities;
- the introduction of Australian rules that immediately vest
superannuation benefits in a member means that corporations cannot use the
availability of superannuation benefits as a means of ensuring an employee's
loyalty. Thus, corporate superannuation benefits have become far less important
as a factor in a corporations' industrial relations, and
- accumulation funds are relatively simple to operate and the size
of their benefits is very easy for members to understand.[45]
2.54
As previously noted, through its Super Choice regime the government has
encouraged a competitive and efficient market in superannuation fund products
by allowing consumers almost unlimited choice in the marketplace. In theory,
the investment risks borne by accumulation fund members should be compensated
by the ability to choose funds that offer the most suitable arrangements and/or
best returns. Consequently, superannuation funds that perform below a
reasonable standard will be uncompetitive when held against better performers.
Benchmarking international practice
2.55
The committee's term of reference number 13 refers to benchmarking Australia
against international practice and experience. During the early stages of the
inquiry, the committee sought assistance from the Parliamentary Library and
requested that it prepare a research paper on this issue, with particular
attention to be given to two of the most relevant overseas jurisdictions: the
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). The paper provided background
on a number of issues in the terms of reference by comparing relevant features
of the retirement income systems of Australia, the UK and the US.[46]
2.56
While the paper found that Australia's superannuation industry overall compares
favourably with that of the UK and the US, it emphasised there are no agreed international
benchmarks on the structure of superannuation systems and their regulation and
supervision. The committee notes that APRA has been working closely with OECD
working groups on the international stage in the development of guidelines on
regulation, supervision, investment practices and other related subjects from
which international benchmarks may eventually emerge.[47]
2.57
The APRA submission described the regulator's contribution, as a
foundation member of the International Organisation of Pension Supervisors (IOPS),
to the development of the IOPS Principles of Private Pension Supervision.[48]
These principles were approved by the organisation's governing membership at
its annual general meeting held in December 2006. According to the final
document:
The main objective of private pension supervision is to promote
the stability, security and good governance of pension funds and plans, and to
protect the interests of pension fund members and beneficiaries. Pension
supervision involves the oversight of pension institutions and the
enforcement...and promotion of adherence to compliance with regulation relating
to the structure and operation of pension funds and plans, with the goal of
promoting a well functioning pensions sector. In addition, achieving stability
within the pension sector is an important part of securing the stability of the
financial system as a whole.[49]
2.58
There are currently ten IOPS principles of private pension supervision.
These include:
- objectives: national laws should assign clear and explicit
objectives to pension supervisory authorities;
- independence: pension supervisory authorities should have
operational independence;
- adequate resources: pension supervisory authorities require
adequate financial, human and other resources;
- adequate powers: pension supervisory authorities should be
endowed with the necessary investigatory and enforcement powers to fulfil their
functions and achieve their objectives;
- risk orientation: pension supervision should seek to mitigate the
greatest potential risks to the pensions system;
- proportionality and consistency: pension supervisory authorities
should ensure that investigatory and enforcement requirements are proportional
to the risks being mitigated and that their actions are consistent;
- consultation and cooperation: pension supervisory authorities
should consult with the bodies they are overseeing and co-operate with other
supervisory bodies;
- confidentiality: pension supervisory authorities should treat
confidential information appropriately;
- transparency: pension supervisory authorities should conduct
their operations in a transparent manner; and
- governance: the supervisory authority should adhere to its own
governance code and should be accountable.[50]
2.59
APRA submitted that these principles could facilitate benchmarking
across different superannuation systems, at least within countries that are
members of IOPS.[51]
To facilitate this process, APRA is currently involved in a joint IOPS and OECD
working party project on private pensions relating to the development of
licensing guidelines.
Committee view
2.60
The committee notes that no attempt has been made by the government to
benchmark Australia against international practice and experience. It is
difficult to compare Australia's compulsory, privately managed and prudentially
regulated system with the wide variety of systems operating in other countries.
The Parliamentary Library research paper found that when comparing the
Australian industry and regulation with that of the UK and the US: 'due
allowance has to be made for the significant differences between the retirement
savings systems of each country'.[52]
One particular area of difficulty relates to retirement savings products and
the methods of charging for those products. The Association of Superannuation
Funds of Australia (ASFA) submission noted that in some countries the
remuneration of financial planners is bundled into the fees attached to
retirement savings products, while in others the two are quite separate.[53]
2.61
There are currently no internationally agreed standards upon which to
draw any firm conclusions. According to the Treasury submission, the difficulty
arises in part because of '...the diversity of policy objectives, regulatory
structures and historical development and the absence of internationally agreed
standards upon which to base any international comparison'.[54]
This is arguably the main reason why the committee received almost no evidence
that addressed term of reference 13. The committee assumes that Treasury
monitors international trends, especially through OECD processes. However, the
government rightly relies on ASIC and APRA as the main regulators to focus on
international trends and activities, which they do.
2.62
The committee notes APRA's view that there is nothing in the prudential
regulation of superannuation in Australia that is contrary to trends in best
practice that are beginning to emerge internationally, as reflected for example
in the recently agreed IOPS principles. Treasury noted that Australia's 'three pillar'
retirement income system is consistent with the multi-pillar design approach
that the World Bank has endorsed as a more efficient and effective approach to
deliver retirement incomes.[55]
However, the committee believes that comparing Australia's superannuation
system favourably with other systems is no excuse for the government or
industry to discount international trends in superannuation policy. While few
would contest the widely held view that Australia has a world class retirement income
system that is the envy of many other countries, this does not mean that other
systems have nothing to offer or that the government and the industry cannot
learn from overseas developments.
2.63
ASFA highlighted one area where Australia does not score very highly on
the international rankings, that being retirement income adequacy:
Australia's retirement income system delivers relatively good
protection against poverty, but current and even prospective replacement rates
of income and expenditure in retirements are not high by international
standards. There would appear to be both scope and need to boost effective net
contribution rates to superannuation so as to improve outcomes.[56]
2.64
The Parliamentary Library research paper also identified areas of Australia's
retirement savings system that do not compare favourably with the equivalent UK
and US systems. These include:
- the provision of retirement advice by advisers closely associated
with the superannuation fund provider;
- superannuation fund trustees' responsibility to prudently manage fund
assets in an environment of member investment choice;
-
possible restrictions on employing foreign nationals on a
temporary basis, arising from Australia’s lack of a social security and
superannuation agreement with other countries, notably the UK;
- whether Australian standards for a fit and proper person to be a
superannuation fund trustee should include standards relating to prior or
future convictions for offences against another person, or offences in relation
to prohibited substances;
- whether the trustees of a superannuation fund should have the
obligation to report missing contributions from an employer, instead of the ATO
discovering this omission during its routine operations or having the matter
raised by the affected individuals; and
- whether those trustees who only hold a Registrable Superannuation
Entity licence should be required to maintain an appropriate internal dispute
resolution mechanism, in the same way that trustees who are holders of an AFS
licence are required to do.[57]
2.65
The committee is surprised that there has apparently not been any
empirical research undertaken by either the industry or APRA on the
superannuation systems of other countries. While the industry as a whole views
Australia as setting international benchmarks in superannuation and retirement
incomes policy, no attempt appears to have been made at an academic, regulatory
or industry level to assess the retirement income systems of other countries in
detail, and identify any features that might be relevant to Australia's
superannuation system.
Recommendation 3
2.66
The committee recommends that APRA, in consultation with peak
superannuation bodies and academics in particular, undertake empirical research
on the strengths and weaknesses of superannuation systems operating in other OECD
countries, and that the findings be made publicly available. The aim is to
develop a framework for benchmarking Australia's superannuation system against
international best practice.
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