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Executive Summary
Introduction
Since 1987 Australia has had a system of mandatory
superannuation contributions. The level of superannuation contributions an
employer is required to provide on behalf of employees is prescribed under some
federal and state industrial awards and the Commonwealth's superannuation
guarantee (SG) scheme. The introduction of the SG was accompanied by reform of
the prudential framework governing superannuation. The Superannuation
Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act) and supporting regulations came
into effect in July 1994. The SIS Act remains the dominant legislative
instrument setting prudential standards and protecting superannuation fund
members' interests.
In early 2007 total superannuation assets reached the $1
trillion mark, backed by strong equity markets and a guaranteed flow of money
that some researchers estimate could double in size by 2015. This was up from
$761.9 billion in June 2005 and four times the value of superannuation assets
in June 1995. The significant growth in the level of superannuation savings
over the past decade should be viewed in the context of government attempts to
introduce choice and portability of superannuation and widen the eligibility
criteria for low income earners to receive the government co-contribution.
Choice of Fund has been a central part of the national
agenda to increase the level of retirement savings since 1996. The committee
acknowledges and supports the principle of people having the freedom of choice
of both superannuation fund and investment options, provided there is appropriate
prudential regulation and licensing to ensure people are protected from
unwarranted risk. The committee believes that in the long run (and with
appropriate safeguards in place) choice will increase competition, resulting in
efficiencies and improved returns on superannuation savings.
Regulatory framework and
international benchmarks
A common thread running through evidence from peak industry
associations and other stakeholders is that the laws and regulations governing
superannuation have become too complex, onerous and conflicting in some
instances and have not kept pace with industry developments. Some in the
industry expressed the view that the legislation is repetitive, clumsy, ambiguous,
and contains unnecessary definitions. There were calls for comprehensive change
to improve the law.
The committee shares these concerns. It believes that the
legislation needs to be as clear and concise as possible and fit the current
policy environment for superannuation. Above all, it should provide an
efficient and effective environment for the investment and management of
members' funds. The complexity and length of the legislation and the fact that
it has been subject to persistent and frequent change, has made it difficult to
master.
In the light of industry concerns about the complexity of
the SIS Act, the committee recommends that the government undertake a
comprehensive review of the laws and regulations governing superannuation to
identify how they may be rationalised and simplified. The review should be
carried out by Treasury.
The committee also looked to overseas jurisdictions,
especially the United Kingdom and the United States, to see if they shed any
light on Australia's superannuation industry. The lack of any internationally
agreed benchmarks suggests that it is difficult to compare Australia's
compulsory, privately managed and prudentially regulated system with the wide
variety of systems operating in other countries. Be that as it may, the
committee finds that while few in the industry openly contest the view that
Australia has a world class retirement income system that is the envy of many
other countries, this does not mean that other systems have nothing to offer or
that the government and the industry cannot learn from overseas developments.
The committee recommends that APRA, in consultation with
peak superannuation bodies and academics in particular, undertake empirical
research on the strengths and weaknesses of superannuation systems operating in
other OECD countries in order to develop a framework for benchmarking Australia's
superannuation system against international best practice.
Promotional advertising
and third party transactions
Issues pertaining to the reporting requirements of superannuation
funds are examined in Chapter 3. These include whether expenditure on
promotional advertising complies with the sole purpose test and should be
disclosed to fund members, use of the term 'not for profit' by industry funds
in the context of third party transactions with service providers and the
propriety and transparency of these relationships, and concerns about
inefficiencies and cost associated with regulatory overlap.
Promotional advertising is an inevitable consequence of
superannuation funds competing for business, which was one of the main
objectives of the government's Choice of Fund legislation. Industry support for
trustees to use member funds to advertise was widespread. It was argued that
promotional advertising plays a positive role in educating members about the
features of their fund, assists in retaining or attracting new members, and results
in economies of scale.
The committee believes that APRA and the superannuation
industry should strive to find common ground in compulsory and specific
disclosure by funds of expenditure on advertising and promotion. The committee can
see a potential application of Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB)
standards to the superannuation industry. Although the AASB has not yet
considered the accounting treatment and disclosure of promotional advertising
by superannuation funds, it expects to do so sometime in the future. The committee
recommends that peak superannuation bodies and APRA work with the AASB to form
appropriate compulsory accounting and disclosure by all funds for promotional
advertising, sponsorship expenses and executive remuneration.
The committee considered whether industry funds' use of the
phrase 'not for profit' is legitimate in the context of contractual
arrangements with service providers. The key issue relates to the propriety and
transparency of these arrangements, in particular related party arrangements
where a competitive tendering process for service provision has not been
undertaken. While the committee agrees with ASIC that use of the 'not for
profit' label by itself is not misleading as a consequence of payments to third
party service providers, the more significant issue is whether members are
getting a reasonable deal on these transactions, they are conducted at arms length
and overpricing is not occurring.
The committee received no evidence of impropriety in
relation to related party service agreements. However, the decision by Industry
Super Network not to provide answers to any questions it agreed to take on
notice was unhelpful and therefore fails to allay concerns about the cost of
third party transactions with service providers. The committee is concerned
that fund members cannot be fully informed when investing superannuation
savings if industry funds do not disclose the true cost involved in their
administration. This is why the committee recommends that the government
develop an effective disclosure policy to address deficiencies in reporting
related party transactions, and that trustees of superannuation funds publicly
tender key service provision agreements.
Member investment choice
The committee considered whether superannuation savings are
safeguarded under the existing prudential framework, and whether potential
risks to savings are adequately addressed in the current regulatory
environment. Chapter 4 examines this issue through the lens of member
investment choice and the role of the trustee. The committee focused on criticisms
of APRA's interpretation of investment choice and a strongly held industry view
that further regulatory clarity is needed on the role of the trustee.
There is widespread agreement that the trustee's
responsibility in a member investment choice situation should be to its core
statutory duties, including to act in the best interests of all members,
implement the fund's investment strategy in accordance with the SIS Act and
ensure proper disclosure. However, this gives rise to different interpretations
of law and policy. While investment choice is ultimately the member's decision,
the dividing line between the trustee's and member's responsibility may be
legally unclear.
There is concern that APRA's interpretation may prevent
trustees from offering real investment choice to those members who want it.
This was balanced by evidence from APRA and Treasury that member investment
choice is not unlimited choice. Trustees are not permitted to allow an
individual member's investment choice if that would not be suitable for the
fund as a whole.
A widely held view in the industry is that APRA's written guidance
and the legal advice on which it is based appear to have created more uncertainty
for some trustees and their advisers, not less. However, the committee finds that
this uncertainty reflects an underlying systemic problem, which is that the SIS
Act has not kept pace with industry developments, government policy or even
community standards.
Be that as it may, a strong case was made for APRA to clarify
the trustees' specific obligations under the SIS Act in order for it to better
accommodate the existence of member investment choice. The committee recommends
that APRA release its legal advice on the role of the trustee in a member
investment choice situation and consult further with industry to clarify the
duties of trustees that offer member investment choice. It recommends that APRA
review its written guidance and further clarify its interpretation of the role
of the trustee to ensure that the reality of investment choice and the
obligations of trustees under the SIS Act are better integrated. The committee
also recommends that funds should be permitted to provide simple, standard
advice to members at their request about the appropriateness or otherwise of
non-standard default investment options within the fund.
Safeguarding
superannuation savings
Another theme examined by the committee is the importance of
trustees addressing operational and governance risks before a fund experiences
major difficulties that could threaten members' savings. The superannuation industry
has placed a great deal of emphasis on prevention, which is a major premise of
the current trustee licensing system. A number of issues fall under the
umbrella theme of safeguarding superannuation. These include capital
requirements and unit pricing, APRA's standards, funding arrangements for
prudential regulation, compensation arrangements, and lost superannuation and
portability.
The superannuation industry on the whole is opposed to the
introduction of uniform or universal capital requirements. There is widespread
agreement that any change to the existing rules on capital adequacy for
trustees of superannuation funds is unnecessary and inappropriate and is
unlikely to bring additional benefits to fund members. Evidence from industry
funds highlighted that APRA licensing has imposed a uniform and comprehensive
system of risk management across all superannuation funds, requiring funds to
demonstrate the adequacy of their resources.
The accuracy and method of fund asset valuation is critical
to the integrity of the investment process and ultimately investor confidence.
A strong case was made for a mandatory unit pricing methodology for public
offer funds. Fund choice and portability rules have contributed to inter-fund
membership flows, which increases the need for funds to accurately price members'
savings. The committee agrees that unit pricing is the most appropriate way to
allocate investment earnings and appears to be the best way to ensure equity
for members who move between funds. The committee recommends that the
government mandate a uniform unit pricing methodology for all public offer
superannuation funds, including any necessary transitional arrangements. It
also recommends that where unit pricing is utilised improved operational risk
parameters are identified and implemented by APRA.
The committee accepts that there must be accountability to
ensure that revenue collected from superannuation funds to pay for the
regulation of the industry is matched as closely as possible to the actual cost
of supervision. The committee finds that current funding arrangements ensure
transparency, relative equity and ease of administration by APRA. The committee
does not believe another review of the levy issue is warranted at this point in
time.
The committee accepts that it is impossible for the superannuation
industry to completely insulate itself against the fraudulent activities of
unscrupulous operators. A high degree of community confidence in the compulsory
superannuation system is nevertheless important. The committee finds that
existing compensation arrangements for theft and fraud are sufficiently robust to
deal with instances of criminal activity. The committee is comfortable with the
current levy arrangements, the amount of which is determined after an event has
occurred. The committee believes that a so-called 'pre-event' levy would be
difficult to determine and could potentially impose unacceptably high costs on
the industry.
Portability and consolidation have become increasingly important
issues for fund members under the Super Choice regime. The committee is
concerned at anecdotal evidence that some funds are deliberately slowing the
process of transferring funds and placing administrative hurdles in the path of
fund members. It encourages APRA to be conscientious in enforcing the new 30
day limit on funds transfers. The committee also heard evidence of the
potential for exit fees to undermine competition. The committee recommends
prohibiting prospectively all exit fees that exceed the administrative cost of
transfer.
The committee notes that there are 30 million superannuation
accounts currently in existence, which is an average of 3 per employed person. The committee is concerned that of these
some 5.7 million are lost accounts containing almost $10 billion. This
represents a major structural weakness and inefficiency in the superannuation
system that requires an active default solution. The committee expects lost
superannuation will remain a real problem for large numbers of members. Good
data collection and reporting by regulators and funds will be essential in
order to devise further relieving strategies in the future. The committee
recommends that where a tax file number is attached to a lost account it should
be automatically consolidated or rolled together into a member's last active
account using the tax file number system.
Financial advice
The central issue raised in evidence relates to the role of
financial advice. Legislative barriers to cost-effective advice and how to
overcome them in order to find a balance between consumer protection and
accessibility of advice are examined in Chapter 6. How advisers are remunerated
and debate over conflicts of interest associated with commission-based
remuneration models are the focus of chapter 7.
Cost and accessibility
The advent of Super Choice and the autonomy it provides
superannuation fund members have drawn attention to the role of funds and
professional advisers in helping consumers navigate their way through the
options they now face. The committee finds that most fund members will not seek
individually tailored financial advice on superannuation, particularly on
choosing their own investment strategy. A combination of apathy, inertia and a
perception of those with low or moderate fund balances that the cost and effort
would not justify the benefits are the principal reasons. Also important is a
belief that the fund managers are experts and will do a good job. While the
committee acknowledges that there is merit in the argument that all members
would benefit to some extent from personal guidance on superannuation, the
reality is that people cannot be coerced into taking such an active role in
managing their superannuation affairs.
There was broad consensus over the inadequacy of current
regulatory arrangements for the provision of basic, limited advice on
superannuation. Criticism of the legislative framework for the provision of
financial advice focused on the breadth of the definitions of 'financial
product advice'. It was argued that definitions have restricted fund members'
access to advice on issues where consumer protection should not, on the face of
it, be a serious concern. Reforms to protect consumers have captured too many
advice situations to the detriment of accessibility.
The committee considered possible remedies to enable the legislative
framework to achieve greater proportionality between consumer protection and
accessibility of advice. The committee supports the government's proposed
measure to exempt advisers from providing a Statement of Advice where personal
advice is provided that does not involve recommending a product or remuneration
for the advice. The proposal to introduce a threshold for disclosure on a
superannuation investment of less than $15,000, where the advice recommends
consolidating investments or making additional contributions, is also supported
by the committee. The committee recommends further regulatory guidance to
remove uncertainty associated with funds communicating with their members. The
objective is to enable funds to provide targeted information to different
categories of membership and provide benefit projections to their members.
Other remedies considered by the committee relate to the
regulation of accountants and product disclosure information. The committee
does not believe accountants should be exempt from holding an AFS licence when
providing financial product advice. However, the committee recommends that
accountants be able to advise clients on altering their superannuation
contribution levels and consolidating superannuation investments into an
existing fund, without requiring an AFS licence.
The readability of disclosure material is vital for
consumers to be able to readily access information and advice on superannuation.
Unfortunately, this is seldom the case as most product disclosure statements
(PDS) are too long and complex and unsuitable for general consumption. While
the industry agrees that consumers would benefit greatly from shorter, more
comprehensible and comparable product disclosure statements, the means to
achieve this are in dispute.
The committee believes that the readability of PDS' could be
improved by ensuring important information is prominently displayed, in summary
form, at the front of the document. This would enable a comparison between
products to be made without the need for the entire document to be read. The
committee strongly encourages superannuation product issuers to improve their
PDS' in this fashion. If this cannot be achieved by the industry of its own
volition it should be mandated by government. The committee recommends that the
government conduct market research on the readability of superannuation with
the goal to introduce simple, standard, readable documentation.
Remuneration, education and financial literacy
The effect of different remuneration models on the standard
of superannuation advice was a major issue raised during the inquiry. The
committee considered evidence in relation to potential conflicts of interest in
commission-based remuneration models, payment of ongoing trailing commissions and
use of approved product lists and 'tied' adviser relationships. The committee considered
possible remedies to improve the quality of superannuation advice, including
banning commissions and shelf fees, improving disclosure of conflicts of
interest, mandating a higher standard of advice and facilitating the provision
of fee-for-service advice.
The committee accepts the view that commission-based
remuneration generates conflicts of interest for advisers that can lead to
inappropriate advice, as demonstrated by ASIC through its shadow shopping
survey. Furthermore, trailing commissions potentially lead to significant sums
being paid to advisers throughout the life of a financial product without a
commensurate return in the form of ongoing superannuation advice.
However, the committee does not recommend the prohibition of
commissions on superannuation products, as argued by industry funds. Many consumers cannot afford to pay for
up front fee-for-service advice on their superannuation. This situation is
compounded by the unresolved problem that the current disclosure regime causes
advice to cost more than its inherent value. Furthermore, banning commissions
will not remove all potential conflicts of interest in the industry.
Superannuation funds, including industry funds, have other remuneration
practices such as bonuses and incentive plans for sales people that may give
rise to conflicts.
The committee is more concerned about the effect of shelf
fees. Shelf fees can be anti-competitive and may encourage products to be listed
and subsequently recommended that may not be in the best interests of the
client. Unlike commission-based remuneration, shelf fees cannot be said to
facilitate access to advice by making it more immediately affordable to those
without discretionary funds to pay up-front fees. As the industry is
progressively moving from commission-based to fee-based advice fees, so it
should move from shelf fees to a more competitive means of meeting the cost of
product listings. Ultimately, the industry should move towards fees for advice,
payment for funds management and payment for administrative services. The
committee recommends that ASIC work with the industry to provide investors more
effective and detailed disclosure of shelf fees.
The disclosure of conflicts of interest needs to be more
effective to ensure consumers are better able to measure their likely effect on
the quality of advice they receive. The committee believes that disclosure must
be effective and meaningful rather than a perfunctory process undertaken to
comply with legislative requirements. However, the committee does not support a
proposal to raise the threshold of the standard of financial product advice
from 'appropriate' to 'best'. The reality of providing financial advice within
the constraints imposed by approved product lists renders this an unobtainable
objective.
The committee is of the opinion that disclosure will not be
effective unless the nomenclature attached to financial advisers accurately
conveys to consumers the adviser's relationship with, and interest in, the
superannuation products they recommend. Accordingly, the committee recommends
that the government should investigate the most effective way to develop with
the industry appropriate nomenclature where the product recommendation advice
available to consumers is limited by sales imperatives.
The committee is concerned about insufficient transparency
with regard to the relationship between advisers, their licensees and
superannuation product providers. It is apparent clients may not be aware of
the integration of superannuation product supply and sales advice and the
incentives that stem from such an arrangement. The committee, therefore,
recommends that financial advisers should be required to disclose the ownership
structure of the licensee he or she is operating under.
Arming consumers with the skills to interpret the quality
and independence of the advice they receive is a priority issue. The shift from
passive superannuation investments in which employers bore investment risk, to
today's competitive market in superannuation products where investment risk is
transferred to employees, has left consumers more vulnerable to the vagaries of
the marketplace than previously. This transfer of risk has left superannuation
fund members with the responsibility for taking decisions that were previously
not required of them. As such, measures need to be taken to enable consumers to
adapt to their new responsibility.
The committee believes this challenge can effectively be
addressed by improving the accessibility of advice for those already in the
system, from funds and licensed financial advisers, and ensuring that future fund
members are provided with appropriate guidance during their school years. The
committee notes with approval the government's Better Super television and
radio advertisements designed to inform and educate people about the reforms to
superannuation that came into effect on 1 July 2007. The committee also
supports the government's Financial Literacy Foundation initiatives and
recommends that they be reviewed when their effectiveness is able to be
measured against clear performance benchmarks.
Self-managed
superannuation funds
Self-managed superannuation funds are a significant part of
the Australian superannuation landscape. They have become an increasingly
popular way for people to hold retirement savings. The SMSF sector accounts for
over 99 per cent of the total number of superannuation funds and represents 23
per cent of total superannuation savings.
The committee finds there is general agreement in the
industry as to the reasons for the dramatic rise in the number of SMSFs.
Self-managed funds enable members to control their investments, earn higher
returns and diversify their assets. The popularity of SMSFs is also attributed
to the absence of fees charged by professionally managed superannuation funds,
the ability to invest in assets not otherwise available in a regulated fund and
the provision of advice from accountants and financial planners.
The committee considered a number of regulatory and
compliance issues associated with SMSFs. Trustees
residing overseas for periods in excess of two years risk having their fund
deemed non-complying, on the basis that the active member test for an
Australian superannuation fund requires a resident active member's accumulated
benefit to be greater than 50 per cent of the total accumulated benefit for all
active members. The committee finds that the active member test is unnecessary
because its objectives are met by other applicable laws and recommends that it
be removed from the definition of an Australian Superannuation Fund.
The wisdom or otherwise of imposing a minimum balance on the
operation of SMSFs was raised in evidence. The committee sees problems with the
imposition of a statutory viability limit, particularly in light of its likely
effect on younger investors. The highly individualised advice provided by
accountants and financial advisers is an appropriate safeguard for investors
seeking to establish an SMSF without viable seed funding. The committee,
therefore, makes no recommendation in regard to minimum thresholds.
The committee heard evidence that the current limit of four
individuals who can own and manage a SMSF should be increased in response to
the prevalence of family businesses and funds that operate over two or more
generations. It appears that the problem that exists now, on whatever scale, particularly
affects funds seeking to operate across multiple generations, as well as
co-owners of small businesses seeking to invest together. The effect of this
restriction is likely only to worsen in the future, and should be addressed
sooner rather than later. The committee recommends that the ATO consider
raising the maximum number of trustees for any one SMSF from four to ten, in
line with current and future demand.
In relation to the regulation of SMSFs, the committee accepts
the argument that greater reliance should be placed on safeguards offered by
accountants as the key interface between members and the regulatory and compliance
system. In view of the current and future growth of SMSFs, it is important to
ensure that the right balance is struck to minimise the regulatory burden of
administration while also maintaining financial and legal integrity. The
committee recommends that SMSFs run by qualified accountants be audited
annually for three years from their commencement and, subject to no
irregularities, thereafter every five years.
The ability of recognised accountants that hold appropriate
qualifications to provide advice to their clients on a decision to acquire or
dispose of an interest in an SMSF, without the need to be licensed under
financial services regulation, was a central issue raised in evidence. Consistent
with its findings and recommendations from previous inquiries, the committee supports
the argument by peak accounting bodies that the exemption should be extended to
include general structural advice on all superannuation funds. The committee
recommends that the exemption be broadened to enable accountants to provide
advice on the structure of superannuation funds, rather than being limited to
advising on SMSFs.
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