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Chapter Five - Institutional investors
...the best strategy is for us to engage with companies over the long
term in an effort to improve their social, environmental, governance and
financial performance – to change the direction of the ship rather than jumping
ship[179]
5.1
Large institutional investors are in an unusual
position in the corporate responsibility debate. Notwithstanding the
opportunity to participate in Annual General Meetings, most small investors are
essentially passive, and have little capacity to influence the management of
the companies in which they invest. They are simply too small, and control too
little a shareholding, to have any such impact. Institutional investors,
however, control vast sums of money, and have both the capacity and the
occasion to exert direct and substantial influence over the operation of listed
companies. This gives institutional investors the capacity to influence
corporations' approaches to corporate responsibility including the management
of non-financial risks.
5.2
This chapter explores the role of institutional
investors in advancing corporate responsibility.
Characteristics of institutional investors
5.3
Before considering the role of institutional investors
in corporate responsibility, it is appropriate to describe what the committee
means by 'institutional investors' and to outline some of the characteristics
of such investors, and how they differ from individual retail investors.
5.4
Institutional investors, broadly, are institutions
through which investors collectively invest. Retail investors therefore invest
in the institutional investors, who in turn invest in listed companies (or
other investment products). This allows small investors to invest in a broad
range of shares, and to have their investment actively managed, under circumstances
where they may not have the time or expertise to do so themselves. Obvious examples
of institutional investors include superannuation funds and managed funds.
5.5
For the purposes of this report, institutional
investors have three important characteristics which set them apart from most
other shareholders. First and foremost, they are large scale investors with
massive funds at their disposal. Largely due to compulsory superannuation
arrangements, Australia
is the world's fourth biggest fund management market and the largest in the
Asia Pacific. In Australia
there is $955 billion under management[180]
with about $30 billion of new funds flowing in every year.[181] Consequently, institutional
investors are able to exert considerable influence over a company's operation. In
many cases, these large institutional investors may be able to influence the
membership of boards, therefore having a direct and immediate impact on the
decisions of directors.
5.6
The second important characteristic of institutional
investors is that they are able to invest in the long term. Because of their
size, and their ability to spread funds across a diverse range of investments,
institutional investors are able to take a longer term position in companies. Mr
Mnchenberg from the Business Council of
Australia put the proposition aptly and succinctly: 'If anyone has a long-term
interest, it is surely the superannuation funds.'[182]
5.7
As a result, large institutional investors may not be
constrained by the short-term investment market needs which, it has been suggested
elsewhere in this report, force companies to sacrifice corporate responsibility
in pursuit of immediate profit.
5.8
Finally, institutional investors generally invest as
trustees (in the general, rather than the legally specific, sense of the word).
They are investing other people's money. Consequently they have duties to their investors or members, which in
some ways parallel directors' duties, and attract the same concerns as were
discussed in chapter 4.
5.9
The rest of this chapter considers these features of
institutional investors, and their impact on corporate responsibility. The
chapter considers:
-
the impact of longer term investing on
institutional investors' perceptions of both risk and opportunity;
-
the ways in which institutional investors can
use their size and influence to promote corporate responsibility and better
management of non-financial risks;
-
the duties of institutional investors, and
whether these inhibit a commitment to corporate responsibility;
-
the extent to which institutional investors have
been active in promoting corporate responsibility; and finally
-
whether legislative changes are required in
order to support further involvement in corporate responsibility by
institutional investors.
Long term investment
5.10
As noted above, institutional investors are more likely
than retail investors to consider longer term investments. The 2003 Department
of the Environment and Heritage report Corporate
Sustainability – an Investor Perspective, put it as follows:
Long term investors such as superannuation and insurance funds
are most exposed to social and environmental risks embedded in the companies in
which they invest. The relative concentration of the Australian sharemarket and
the widespread use of benchmark indices in investment means that as they grow,
institutional investors increasingly become permanent owners of shares in
companies. Sustainability considerations particularly benefit these long term
investors.[183]
5.11
Of course, this does not mean that institutional
investors do not take advantage of short term, speculative investments too. However
most institutional investors have sufficient funds under management that they
can do both; while many retail investors lack this luxury.
5.12
Longer term timeframes expose institutional investors
to both long term opportunities, and long term risks.
Longer term opportunities
5.13
Given the longer timeframes of institutional investors,
they can afford to support corporate strategies which may not yield immediate
profits, but which give companies the basis for longer term sustainable
profitability. It has been noted elsewhere in this report that many 'corporate
responsibility projects' fall into this category.
5.14
A director seeking to satisfy market and shareholder
demands for short term, short-sighted growth and profits will be unlikely to
see any 'enlightened self interest' in long term, responsible projects which do
not generate immediate profit. On the other hand, a director who is influenced
by longer term institutional investors may be emboldened to operate the company
in a socially and environmentally responsible manner, even if this means
sacrificing short term profits. This will be even more the case if those
institutional investors directly press for greater corporate responsibility, as
discussed below.
Longer term risks
5.15
One of the difficulties faced by social and
environmental campaigners is that they are promoting dangers and concerns which
are likely to be felt in the long term rather than the short term. Changes in
air quality, for instance, are not likely to be particularly noticeable on a
daily basis or even, in many cases, on a yearly basis. The ecological
impact of a reduction in biodiversity, while very real, is also going to occur
in imperceptible increments. From a social perspective, a slow decline in
literacy or a slow rise in alcoholism or depression might operate in the same
way.
5.16
For a short term investor, corporate strategies which
sacrifice an immediate profit in the current quarter, for the sake of better
air quality into the future, may well appear unattractive. If the desire is to
realise a profit within days or weeks, and the change in air quality in that
period of time is likely to be virtually nil, then the sacrifice will be too
great.
5.17
For the longer term investor, however, slow changes in
environmental and social conditions matter. While a short term investor only
wants to know what a mining company will produce this month, and what the
commodity price for its product is, the longer term investor wants to know
whether the company is exploring for further resources, whether its land
rehabilitation projects are sufficient that they will avoid regulatory
penalties, and whether the company is adept at managing its relationship with
its workforce, its local community and in many cases the Indigenous custodians
of local lands.
5.18
The BT Governance Advisory Service (BTGAS) submission
outlined this longer term approach to risk as follows:
Long term investors
expect organisational decision makers to have a regard for the interests of
stakeholders other than shareowners when those stakeholder interests have the
capacity to influence shareowners' interests. We believe that companies that
manage their stakeholders' interests are managing their shareowners' interests,
especially over the long-term. This arises from the fact that risks to
companies arise not just from typical financial risks but also from regulatory,
community and litigation risks.[184]
5.19
Long term risk is an even greater issue for the
insurance industry, which by its very nature is involved in the management of
long term economic risks. For these very reasons, the insurance industry has
been among the most progressive in terms of identifying long term environmental
and social risks, and supporting both investment and effort to avoid them. The
Insurance Australia Group (IAG) gave an example of this process in its
submission:
IAG is now exploring ... how our scale could best be utilised to
influence and benefit the broader range of IAG's stakeholders. This requires
understanding of long term shareholder value that can be derived from
integrating such an approach into the short-term financial imperatives (such as
costs).
For example, IAG understands that its long term business will be
impacted by human induced climate change, typified by an increase in the
frequency and ferocity of weather events that will result in increased
insurance claims and payouts. IAG is addressing how it might best leverage its
scale with its supply chain to address the primary cause of climate change,
greenhouse gas emissions. The use of IAG's scale could assist in leveraging
outcomes that both increase awareness of the impacts of climate change and
assist in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.[185]
Size of institutional investors
5.20
A simple reality of investment is that money talks. This
has been institutionalised in the Corporations
Act 2001 in paragraph 250E(1)(b), which gives members one vote at meetings,
for every share they hold. Those with more shares, have more votes. On a more
daily basis, large institutional investors have the capacity to affect significantly
the share price of companies in which they invest, because they can create significant
demand for a particular share, or alternatively (by selling their own shares)
can significantly increase supply into the market. Each of these can have an
obvious effect on the share price.
5.21
The size of institutional investors, with their
attendant market power, can be used to promote corporate responsibility in a
number of ways. Two related issues will be discussed below: the inclusion of
corporate responsibility factors in company research; and the subsequent demand
for better reporting.
Corporate responsibility and
research
5.22
In order to be successful, institutional investors
invest a great deal of time and money conducting research into listed companies
in which they have an interest. This research might lead them to purchase
shares in companies where they do not hold shares; or to divest themselves of
shares they currently hold. This capacity to conduct research, and to invest
successfully based on that research, is in fact at the heart of the service
which institutional investors provide to their clients.
5.23
In the past, company research was primarily a financial
affair. The company's financial performance was analysed to determine its prospects
for growth and profit into the future. Along with this, matters which are
related to financial performance while not strictly financial, are taken into
account. These include matters such as corporate governance, and the company's
strategic position in its key markets.
5.24
In recent years, many institutional investors have
begun conducting research into corporate responsibility factors, on the basis
that a company's management of these has an impact on its longer term
profitability; and also on the assumption that a company which can successfully
manage its social and environmental impacts and risks, is also likely to manage
its overall business successfully.
5.25
Obviously the 'ethical investment' sector has this form
of research at its heart. For these investors, the environmental and social
performance of a company may rule it out of an investment portfolio, regardless
of its potential for economic success:
The ones who are ahead of the game are the sustainable
responsible investment analysts. They do look at between 100 and 200 extra
issues of analysis when they value a company. So they will look at financial
analysis but they will also look at all the issues—I would imagine that you are
all aware of the particulars in the [Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)]. When
you start comparing and contrasting performance against GRI indicators, you
start to get a much broader picture of a company's capability.[186]
5.26
Evidence before the committee suggested, however, that
even mainstream institutional investors, whose primary focus is well and truly
on financial performance, are beginning to take note of environmental and
social factors. This does not represent a rush of ethical concern, but rather a
realisation that social and environmental risks and opportunities can be material
to a company's future financial performance. In a recent UN report, investment
giant ABN AMRO stated:
Pricing 'non-financial risk' is difficult. It may be beyond our
present valuation metrics to give it an exact quantifiable value. However,
there are strong theoretical grounds for measuring these risks on a
company-relative basis and this may help to value the risks of a company relative
to its peers more accurately ... Furthermore, understanding CSR gives a deeper
understanding of the company and the business threats it faces. We believe
these types of risks warrant closer examination by analysts and should lead to
added value in investment decisions.[187]
5.27
By taking non-financial risk management into account
when assessing investment prospects, institutional investors are able to
provide a strong drive to 'enlightened self interest'. Corporations who wish to
attract investment from institutional investors will find themselves judged –
at least in part – on their social and environmental performance. Senior
managers, who are renumerated partially in shares or derivates, will find that
the value of their remuneration package is influenced by the market value of
their company, which in turn depends partially upon their corporate
responsibility.
5.28
Mr Brown
from ANZ Bank illustrated this form of remuneration package, although his
evidence was that corporate responsibility is not (currently) seen as an
important driver of overall remuneration:
All senior executives are now rewarded on an annual performance
basis. From memory, certainly for the more senior executives in the bank, the
weighting towards three-year performance objectives is now over half of their
annual remuneration. More than half of my total remuneration for a year is
based on two- or three-year out performance objectives for the organisation—the
performance objective being share price. I would not call it long term; it is
two or three years. ... It is basically an option package which is set out on
two- or three-year horizons. It will alter the further you go down in the
organisation. It has made a difference.[188]
Reporting
5.29
This rush of research interest in corporations'
environmental and social performance becomes a driver for better corporate
responsibility. Experts conducting research on behalf of institutional
investors argued before the committee that in many cases they lack adequate non-financial
information from the companies and so find it difficult to make accurate
judgments. For these researchers, 'greenwashed' social and environmental
reports, with glossy covers showing photos of smiling children and healthy
green tree frogs, will simply not be useful. Hard, verifiable data, comparable
between companies (at least within sectors) is required. Market driven demand
for this data is likely to be more effective than any government regulation in
producing this information.
5.30
For instance, Professor
Coghill and his colleagues stated:
A central issue for superannuation trustees is access to
information to identify material issues and to incorporate such information
into investment decision-making. Most of those interviewed held the view that
information on material risks is unavailable or difficult to obtain.[189]
5.31
The BTGAS made a similar comment:
The current reporting
requirements for publicly listed companies do not give investors sufficient
information to understand the extent to which companies are managing social and
environmental risks. While we do not advocate prescriptive legislation that
would increase compliance costs for companies, we do believe some companies
lack guidance on what information should be reported to long term investors. If
a simple voluntary framework could be provided to at least give investors
insight into the governance processes in place to assess social, environmental
and corporate governance risks, investors could make up their own mind on these
processes' sufficiency.[190]
5.32
The
Ethical Investment Association of Australia set out the problem as follows:
At present the disclosure required of corporations is inadequate
for the financial markets to determine the entire operational, strategic and
managerial capacity of a company. There are two reasons for this, and one is
that many issues currently regarded as non-financial are not required to be
reported on. I speak here, of course, about the company's environmental
impacts, its impact on the health and wellbeing of society, its attitudes and
practices regarding industrial relations management and human resource
management, its practices in the communities in which it works, its practices
in countries to which it outsources, its systems regarding adherence to a code
of ethics, its governance procedures and so on.
This information is not currently available in a format that is
of use to analysts, unless they are specialised researchers in the area such as
fund managers and analysts who specialise in sustainable responsible
investment. While it may be plain to many that these issues do and will have an
impact on the company's profitability, it is more likely that issues of this
nature will take slightly longer to reach the bottom line than many other
operational issues. The current structure of the financial markets and the
corporate sector is such that long-term thinking goes unrewarded and is often
penalised.[191]
5.33
Finally, as noted below, pressure for increased
corporate responsibility disclosure is one of the UN's Principles for
Responsible Investment. It is clear from this evidence that increased corporate
responsibility reporting is not just a good for its own sake: it will allow
markets to more adequately assess the risks and opportunities accruing to a
company by virtue of its environmental and social positioning.
Duties of institutional investors
5.34
In chapter 4 of this report, the committee discussed
the directors' duties found in the Corporations
Act 2001, and the argument that these might preclude or at least inhibit
corporate responsibility. The committee concluded that the Corporations Act
itself does not preclude corporate responsibility.
5.35
Legislation places similar duties on those who operate
institutional investment funds. The responsible entity of a managed fund, for
instance, must 'act in the best interests of the members and, if there is a
conflict between the members' interests and its own interests, give priority to
the members' interests...'[192]
5.36
For regulated superannuation funds, the duty of the
fund trustees is set out in section 62 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993. The section is
quite long and detailed, but in essence it provides for the 'core purposes' of
providing various (financial) benefits to members[193] and 'ancillary purposes' of
providing a somewhat wider range of (financial) benefits.[194]
5.37
Unsurprisingly, the duty placed on responsible entities
by section 601FC of the Corporations Act was not raised in evidence before the
committee. On its face, section 601FC does not limit the responsible entity to
acting in the best financial
interests of the members. Rather, the members are left to determine for
themselves, through their constitution, what the best interests of the fund are
to be.
5.38
The 'sole purpose test' was, however, raised before the
committee. It was suggested that the sole purpose test operates to restrict
superannuation trustees in the same ways in which directors' duties were said
to constrain directors:
A key barrier appears to be the interpretation of the sole
purpose test with respect to CSR, as many of those interviewed felt that
evidence of a material financial risk would be required to provide protection
to fiduciaries if an investment decision is taken on CSR performance.[195]
5.39
A contribution by Blake Dawson Waldron to a 2005 UN
Report stated that:
Traditionally, Australian superannuation fund managers have
taken the view that the sole purpose test precludes them from undertaking
investment decisions based wholly or primarily on [corporate responsibility]
considerations.[196]
5.40
The Financial Services Institute of Australasia
(Finsia) submitted that to clarify the position between the sole purpose test
and SRI investments, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) should
issue detailed guidelines in order to give superannuation trustees more
confidence in allocating investments to SRI fund managers.[197]
Committee
view
5.41
The committee is not persuaded by a restrictive view of
the sole purpose test. In chapter 4, the committee outlined its view that the
argument does not stand in the case of directors' duties; it is even less
compelling with respect to superannuation trustees. As the committee points out
above, the very nature of superannuation investment is long term.
Superannuation funds, perhaps more than any other group of investors, are
placed to take advantage of long term opportunities, and are most exposed to
long term risks. In the committee's view, consideration of social and
environmental responsibility is in fact so far bound up in long term financial
success that a superannuation trustee would be closer to breaching the sole
purpose test by ignoring corporate responsibility.
5.42
The committee can see no sensible interpretation of the
sole purpose test which would constrain trustees from researching and
considering companies' environmental and social performance, and making
investment decisions influenced by that consideration.
5.43
To clarify the position for institutional investors the
committee supports Finsia's suggestion that the APRA should issue detailed
guidelines regarding the sole purpose test, to clarify for superannuation
trustees their position in relation to allocating investments to ethical
investment fund managers.
Recommendation 2
5.44
The committee recommends that the Australian Prudential
Regulation Authority issue detailed guidelines on the sole purpose test to
clarify for superannuation trustees their position in relation to allocating
investments to sustainable responsible investment fund managers.
How active have institutional investors been?
5.45
Given that the committee has identified the potential
of institutional investors to have a major impact on corporate responsibility,
it is appropriate to consider how active they have been to this point. Evidence
before the committee suggests that the picture for institutional investors is
similar to that for corporations more broadly: attention to corporate
responsibility issues is small but growing:
Most of those interviewed believed that CSR would become an
increasingly important factor in their roles over time. An indicative comment
in this regard: 'It's on the radar and corporates are more nervous about it'. Advisers
to the superannuation industry also commented on the growing importance of CSR,
in one case noting that '[capabilities in CSR investment applications] are
likely to be a factor for super funds in selecting advisers.'[198]
5.46
As discussed earlier the main reason for the lack of
interest in this area on the part of institutional investors is the lack of
non-financial information. Another reason identified for this relative lack of
interest is that the economy has not yet suffered a major shock which is directly
attributable to social or environmental factors. The report prepared by Ernst
& Young for the Department of the Environment and Heritage, entitled The Materiality of Environmental Risk to
Australia's Finance Sector, stated that their consultations had:
... revealed a notable absence of known examples in Australia
where finance sector participants are aware of having suffered substantial
financial losses due to environmental exposures. This is considered one of the
main reasons why the debate on materiality or significance of the environmental
risk to Australia's
finance sector is not as advanced as the UK,
Europe and USA.[199]
5.47
Major shocks have, however, been forecast. The committee
is aware that the Senate Rural and Regional and Transport References Committee
is currently conducting an examination into future oil supply, and is examining
the forecast 'peak oil' crisis. If predictions are correct, then world oil
production will shortly peak, then begin a long term decline, resulting in ever
increasing prices (and therefore lower productivity for those companies which
rely heavily on oil). Will it take a major shock to make markets aware of the
potential impact of social and environmental factors? The committee hopes not. The
recommendations contained in this report aim at making this less likely.
Assisting institutional investors
5.48
In chapter 4, the committee considered whether to make
consideration of environmental and social factors a requirement for company
directors. It concluded that this was the wrong approach, for three reasons: the
duty cannot be expressed in law with appropriate clarity; it may lead to a
simple, compliance-based exercise; and there are potentially successful non-regulatory
measures which can be implemented. Those same arguments lead the committee to
conclude that it would be inappropriate to try to use regulations to force
institutional investors to take greater account of social and environmental
factors.
5.49
The committee received evidence of several market
drivers that have the potential to raise the importance of risk and corporate responsibility
in the investment community. Finsia submitted that these are:
- superannuation
choice – there are many more people, especially Generation X and Y, who are making
investment decisions for the first time;
- emerging
research that demonstrates SRI funds can offer equal, or superior, performance
to mainstream funds;
- greater
understanding of the consequences of environmental risk to individual companies
and whole industry sectors;
- increased
community expectation that corporations will not merely focus on short-term
profits, but have regard to other stakeholders affected by their operations,
and the potential impact on future generations; and
- the
deepening pool of superannuation funds under management – the structure of
super investments provides the longer-term perspective that is considered to be
required for CSR.[200]
5.50
In addition, more and more institutional investors are
obtaining expertise in the assessment of social and environmental risks and
opportunities. When investing in overseas financial markets institutional investors
are also increasingly exposed to corporate responsibility practices. These
funds are making social and environmental assessment a mainstream element of
their company research. The question for the committee is how to encourage and accelerate
this growth.
5.51
The biggest impediment at present appears to be access
to adequate, verifiable information about social and environmental risks. In chapter
7 of this report, the committee considers the adequacy of environmental and
social reporting. That chapter contains recommendations which will support
movement towards the provision of useful, verifiable, comparable information
about a company's approach to corporate responsibility. The provision of such
information reduces the time and complexity of research into corporate
responsibility; and the increased reliability and comparability of the
information makes it more likely that it can be included in an institutional
investor's calculus for assessing companies.
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment
5.52
The United Nations has for some time been considering
the role of institutional investors in driving corporate social and
environmental responsibility. A result of this process has been the development
of the recently-released UN Principles
for Responsible Investment (the UN Principles). The Principles are as
follows:
- We will incorporate [corporate responsibility][201] issues into investment analysis and
decision-making processes;
- We will be active owners and incorporate [corporate
responsibility] issues into our ownership policies and practices;
- We will seek appropriate disclosure on [corporate
responsibility] issues by the entities in which we invest;
- We will promote acceptance and implementation of the
Principles within the investment industry;
- We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in
implementing the Principles;
- We will each report on our activities and progress
towards implementing the Principles.
5.53
On the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment
internet site each principle is accompanied by suggested activities which
institutional investors might undertake in order to implement the UN Principles.[202]
5.54
Unlike many UN activities, in which nation states are
the signatories, the UN Principles are signed and adopted by institutional
investors. As at 14 May 2006,
investors from countries as diverse as Sweden,
France, Thailand,
Japan and the USA
had signed up to the UN Principles. Just three Australian funds had done so: the
Catholic Superannuation Fund, Christian Super,
and Portfolio Partners Limited. The committee notes that the UN Principles
are only very new, and considers that many other Australian institutional
investors are likely to become signatories. The committee wishes to
congratulate those three funds which have already done so.
Recommendation 3
5.55
The committee recommends that institutional investors
in Australia
seriously consider becoming signatories to the United Nations Principles for
Responsible Investment.
5.56
The committee notes the establishment by the Australian
Government in February 2006 of the Future Fund – a dedicated financial asset
fund to meet unfunded superannuation liabilities of the Commonwealth.[203] The committee considers that with
the establishment of the Future Fund, the Australian Government has an
opportunity to show significant leadership in the area of corporate
responsibility. While the committee recognises that the fund will be managed at
arm's length from government, it remains appropriate for the Australian Government
to set out general principles for the fund to follow. This point was
acknowledged by the Senate Economics Legislation Committee which inquired into
the Future Fund Bill 2005. The Economics committee stated: 'it may be
appropriate to include principles in the directions to be given to the Board
provided for under the investment mandate provisions of the Bill.'[204] The committee notes that such
principles could include signing up to the UN Principles.
Recommendation 4
5.57
The committee recommends that the Future Fund should
become a signatory to the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment.
Conclusions
5.58
The committee considers that institutional investors
are in an excellent position to drive corporate responsibility in Australia.
Because institutional investors often have long term investment timeframes,
they are positioned to take advantage of long term opportunities, and are
exposed to long term risks. Through improved non-financial risk management,
institutional investors are also one of the likely beneficiaries of increased
adoption of corporate responsibility.
5.59
In previous chapters in this report, the evidence
presented has been that there is often an underlying assumption of
incompatibility between the interests of shareholders and the interests of
other stakeholders. For institutional investors, activities which maximise
corporate responsibility are likely to be in their long term interests, as much
as those activities are in the interests of the environment or communities
connected to the corporation. If the interests of institutional shareholders
parallel the interests of other stakeholders, enlightened self-interest should
suggest that there is no reason for corporations to shy away from corporate
responsibility.
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