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Supplementary Report by Senator Andrew Murray
1. Introduction
1.1
The Australian Democrats have supported the
efforts of the government, both during this term and the previous term, to reform
and modernise Australian company law.
1.2
We actively participated in that process during
the passage of the Company Law Review Act 1998. The Senate successfully
amended that Bill to incorporate a number of changes which were sought by the
business community, shareholders and other groups, in particular concerning
improved corporate governance and accountability.
1.3
As with that Act, it is expected that this Bill
will improve the efficiency and understanding of company law and regulation.
1.4
There are a number of issues which relate to
corporate governance on which we wrote at length in our minority report on the
Company Law Review Bill 1997 (March 1998, page 20). We remind readers of those
issues and we note that we intend to revisit some of the relevant issues
arising from that report when the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Bill is
before the Senate. However, we will not restate those issues in this report.
1.5
There are also a number of issues, which have
arisen out of amendments which we were successful in making to the Company Law
Review Bill 1997, which may need to be reconsidered in light of subsequent
media comment about them. An example is the disclosure of directors’
remuneration.
2. Takeovers
2.1
The majority report of this Committee raises a number of issues in
relation to takeovers. I agree with the Committee’s deliberations in respect
of those issues except in relation to the following issues.
Consideration offered during a bid
2.2
Section 621 of the Bill deals with consideration offered during the bid.
Subsection 621(4) requires that where a bidder makes a cash-only bid, the
amount of the offer must at least equal the maximum consideration paid by the
bidder during the last 4 months. For various reasons set out in the majority
report, the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC) has recommended
that the subsection 621(4) be extended to all bids including bids which were
not cash-only bids.
2.3
I am concerned at the equivocation by the majority of this Committee in
their report and the suggestion that either the Bill could proceed in its
present form and an inquiry be conducted into this issue or that the government
could act on the CASAC recommendation. This is an issue which should be
resolved prior to the passage of the legislation.
2.4
I believe that the CASAC recommendation should be followed and that
subsection 621(4) should be extended to all bids. This is consistent with the
Australian Democrats general view that shareholders should be treated equally
and benefit equally from takeover activity.
2.5
Recommendation – that section 621(4) be amended to apply to
takeover bids which are not cash-only bids, so that regardless of the type of
consideration being offered, the minimum consideration on offer is at least
equal in value to the maximum paid during the 4 months before the date of the
bid.
Collateral benefits
2.6
Section 623 of the Bill deals with collateral benefits. The provision
of collateral benefits is prohibited (i.e. during the 4 months preceding the
bid, giving target company shareholders any benefit not provided to all
shareholders under the takeover bid).
2.7
A number of issues are outlined by the majority in their report. I will
not restate those issues here. Those issues need to be addressed prior to the
passage of this Bill.
2.8
I am again concerned at the equivocation by the majority of this
Committee in their report and the suggestion that the government ‘may therefore
care to accept that recommendation , or proceed with the Bill as drafted and
refer this matter to the Committee for further consideration.’ Again, this is
an issue which should be resolved prior to the passage of this legislation.
2.9
The adoption of the CASAC recommendation in relation to subsection
621(4) will allow the removal of subsections 623(2) and (3) while still
retaining the requirement of equal treatment between target shareholders.
2.10
Recommendation – that sections 623(2) and (3) be removed from the
Bill. This should only occur if the recommendation at 2.5 is accepted.
Bidder’s statement formalities
2.11
Section 637(1)(a)(ii) provides that where a bid is made other than on a
cash only basis, the bidder’s statement lodged with the ASIC must be approved
by a ‘unanimous resolution passed by all the directors of the bidder’. The
Australian Institute of Company Directors raised the issue of a problem arising
when directors are on the board of both offerer and target.
2.12
This problem needs to be corrected. It is not sufficient that the ASIC
has a power to exempt or modify the operation of the Part if necessary, and I
will elaborate on that issue later in this report.
2.13
I believe that in circumstances where a person is a director of both the
offerer and target companies, he or she should not vote on the approval of the
bidder’s statement and a unanimous resolution of all other directors should be
sufficient for the operation of section 637.
2.14
Recommendation – In relation to approving bidder’s statements;
where a person is a director of the offerer and target companies, he or she
should not vote on a resolution to approve the bidder’s statement, regardless
of the type of consideration being offered. The determination of whether the
resolution is passed or not should be made as if the person was not a director.
Scope and powers of the Panel
2.15
Section 657G deals with applications for enforcement of orders where an
order of the Panel is contravened. Applications for enforcement may only be
made by the ASIC.
2.16
The Australian Institute of Company Directors expressed dissatisfaction
with that limitation and took the view that any party who can apply to the
Panel for an order should be able to apply for enforcement. The Australian
Democrats agree with that argument. Whilst curbing the ‘egregiously litigious
nature of Australian takeover activity’ is undoubtedly one of the objectives of
the legislation, I am of the view that allowing enforcement applications to be
made by persons other than the ASIC will:
(a)
not result in any substantial increase in litigation, given that there
must first be an order on foot and a contravention of that order before an application
can be made; and
(b)
relieve the ASIC of the need to become involved in litigation which is
essentially between private citizens.
2.17
Recommendation – that section 657 of the Bill be amended to allow
any of the following persons to make an application for enforcement of an
order:
- any person to
whom the proposed order relates;
- each party to
the proceedings; and
- the ASIC.
Compulsory Acquisitions
2.18
The introduction of proposed section 664A into the Corporations Law
is, in the view of the Australian Democrats, entirely unsatisfactory at this
stage.
2.19
I agree with the summary of evidence by a majority of the Committee in
their report and with the view that consideration must be given to both
minority and majority shareholders. However, I do not agree that the imposition
of a 6 month time limit on the use of the new compulsory acquisition power is
an adequate safeguard for minority shareholders.
2.20
The limited power of the Court to intervene, i.e. where the majority
holder cannot establish that the consideration is ‘a fair value’ is also
unsatisfactory. This is further compounded by the capital gains tax problem;
specifically that this compulsory acquisition can burden a person with a CGT
liability when that person may be vehemently opposed to selling their shares.
2.21
I agree with the majority of Committee that some form of rollover relief
should be provided in relation to both compulsory acquisitions and scrip for
scrip takeovers.
2.22
Recommendation - The Australian Democrats cannot support this
power of compulsory acquisition until:
- the problems relating to CGT are resolved;
- the power of a Court to intervene are extended and are not
limited only to the fairness of the consideration offered; and
- additional safeguards for minority shareholders are considered.
3. Appointments to Accounting Standards Bodies
3.1
My concern in relation to the new regime for the creation of accounting
standards relates to the appointment of members of the Financial Reporting
Council (FRC) and the appointment of the chairman of the Australian Accounting
Standards Board (AASB).
3.2
The Democrats are concerned to ensure that wherever appointments are
made to the governing organ of public authorities, whether they be institutions
set up by legislation, “independent” statutory authorities or quasi-government
agencies, that the process by which these appointments are made is, and is seen
to be, transparent, accountable, open and honest.
3.3
The adage of “jobs for the boys” should be an anachronism in 1999.
Notwithstanding this, there is a widespread public perception that very little
of substance has changed. Many appear to believe that Government appointments
result in patronage to handsomely remunerated positions. This perception can
damage the reputation of these bodies, as in the public eye they are then seen
as being controlled by persons who lack the appropriate independence and who
may not be as meritorious as they might be.
3.4
The Democrats are of the opinion that whilst this is often not so, and
many outstanding appointments have been made by both the previous and present
Governments, nevertheless this is a matter which has to be addressed.
3.5
In truth, there is little empirical evidence that can be brought to bear
to rebut this perception. It is still the case that appointments to statutory
authorities are left largely to the discretion of the Minister with the
relevant portfolio responsibility. In the absence of “umbrella” legislation to
correct this situation in a systematic fashion, the Democrats will have to
argue for each piece of legislation dealing with these bodies to include
standard provisions setting out an accountable regime governing such
appointments made by Ministers.
3.6
This Bill restructures the accounting standard setting process.
Proposed new section 235A of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission
Act 1989 will provide the Minister with an unqualified discretion to
appoint members of the FRC. Those persons will hold their positions on the
terms and conditions determined by the Minister. The Minister will also be
empowered to appoint the chairman of the AASB. A useful but insufficient
requirement is that the appointee must have knowledge of business, accounting,
law or government. By and large the Minister is given broad, unstructured
discretion. These provisions are an example of the unjustified latitude given
to executive government in making key personnel appointments.
3.7
The Nolan Committee, which reviewed the processes for making public
appointments in the United Kingdom, set out the following principles to guide
and inform the making of such appointments:
- A Minister should not be involved in an appointment where he or she has
a financial or personal interest[1];
- Ministers must act within the law, which includes its safeguards against
discrimination on grounds of gender or race[2];
- All public appointments should be governed by the overriding principle
of appointment on merit[3];
- Except in limited circumstances political affiliation should not be a
criterion for appointment[4];
- Selection on merit should take account of the need to appoint boards
which include a balance of skills and backgrounds[5];
- The basis on which members are appointed and how they are expected to
fulfil their roles should be explicit[6];
- The range of skills and backgrounds which are sought should be clearly
specified[7].
3.8
These guidelines provide only a basic framework for ensuring that proper
practices are followed in the making of appointments. They do not necessarily
represent “best practice”, rather they set out what should really be taken for
granted in a modern system of accountable government. Indeed, the UK Government
accepted fully the Nolan Committee’s recommendations on public appointments.
The office of Commissioner for Public Appointments was subsequently created
(with a similar level of independence from the Government as the Auditor
General) to provide an effective avenue of external scrutiny. The Commissioner
subsequently developed a Code of Practice for Public Appointments which came
into force on 1 July 1996. The Code regulates, inter alia, appointments
to non-departmental public bodies. It sets out seven principles upon which such
appointments must be based: Ministerial Responsibility; Merit;
Independent Scrutiny; Equal Opportunity; Probity; Openness and Transparency;
and Proportionality. The Code provides mandatory guidelines for the application
of these principles.
3.9
A comparison of these reforms with the current practice of government in
the Federal sphere in Australia shows clearly that we lag well behind the UK in
this respect. We lack not only the external scrutiny mechanism in the form of
the Commissioner for Public Appointments, but more fundamentally we do not have
even basic procedural safeguards. This should be redressed as a matter of
public importance, with a far higher priority attached to it than has hitherto been
the case.
3.10
The public must have trust and confidence that a Minister will not allow
improper or irrelevant considerations or personal interests to influence public
appointments. Indeed this relationship is in some respects analogous to those
of a fiduciary nature, such as trustee and beneficiary, in that it is founded
on a high degree of trust and confidence. Yet where a breach of duty occurs in
a fiduciary relationship, the person to whom the duty is owed has access to a
range of equitable remedies. This is not the case where a Minister acts for
improper purposes in making an appointment.
3.11
There is no law to prohibit a Minister from doing this or, where the
appointment has been made, to make the appointment voidable. This omission is
addressed in the recommended amendments to the Bill which require that all
appointments be made in accordance with a published code of practice.
3.12
The code of practice is intended not to act as a mere “guideline” to the
Minister in making appointments, but to regulate by law the way in which the
Minister exercises the power of appointment. The content of the code of
practice is designed to accommodate those principles designated as fundamental
by the Nolan Committee and the UK Commissioner for Public Appointments, as set
out above.
3.13
A further provision requires that even where the code of practice has
been adhered to in determining an appointment, the Minister will be further
obliged to consider the impact of the appointee on the overall complexion of
the Authority. This provision is aimed at ensuring “capture” of the Authority
by any particular interest group cannot occur. It is essential that Boards are
genuinely representative of the inevitably divergent views of those groups
affected by their actions. Without this requirement the potential remains for
appointments to be made to Boards of persons that are well qualified, but who
all hold similar views on key areas of policy. This must be avoided not simply
because it is good public policy practice to do so, but to maintain the credibility
of the Authority in its area of operation.
3.14
Recommendations - The Australian Democrats recommend that the
Bill be amended in the following manner:
(a) In Schedule 2,
page 345, proposed new subsection 235A(1)
After “writing” insert: “in
accordance with a code of practice determined under Section 235D”.
(b) In Schedule 2, page
346, after proposed new section 235C, insert
235D Procedures for
appointment of members
- The Minister must by writing
determine a code of practice for appointments to the Council and for appointing
the chairman of the AASB that:
- sets out general principles on which appointments are to be made, including,
but not limited to:
- merit; and
- independent scrutiny of
appointments; and
- probity; and
- openness and transparency;
and
- sets out how these principles are to be applied to the selection of members.
- The code of practice must include principles relating to
the appointment of any selection committee constituted under this Act.
- The code of practice must include a requirement for any
person appointed to make a declaration if he or she is a member of a political
party.
- After determining a code of practice under subsection
(1), the Minister must publish the code in the Gazette.
- Not later than every third anniversary after a code of
practice has been determined, the Minister must review the code.
- In reviewing a code of practice, the Minister must
invite the public to comment on the code.
- A code of practice determined under subsection (1) is a
disallowable instrument for the purposes of section 46A of the Acts
Interpretation Act 1901.
235E Independence of
the Council
In appointing members of the
Council, the Minister must ensure that the balance of interests on the Council
is such that no one interest may dominate the Council or derogate from its
independence.
(c) Schedule 2,
page 347, proposed new subsection 236B(1),
After ‘AASB’ insert: ‘in
accordance with a code of practice determined under Section 235D’.
4. Other Issues
4.1 I would like to raise
the issue of abdication of the power of the Parliament to ASIC. The majority
of the Committee refer, in four separate parts of their report, to the power of
the ASIC to make orders modifying or exempting persons from compliance with the
Corporations Law, as providing a mechanism to alleviate possible
problems that may be caused by the new provisions. Specifically, and
extracting from the report of the majority of this Committee, the power of the
ASIC will mean it will be able to:
-
‘relieve a person from the obligation to proceed with a mandatory bid...’ (in relation to the mandatory bid rule)
- ‘modify the law in this respect if necessary’ (in relation to bidder’s
statement formalities)
- ‘provide a second avenue through which any problems which arose could be
addressed’ (in relation to placements)
- ‘grant an exemption or modification of the law should it be necessary’ (in relation to new listings and investor protection).
4.2 This power seems to be
viewed as some sort of a ‘fix all’, so that the problems raised before the
Committee somehow are alleviated because the ASIC can always modify the law if
a problem arises. At one point the majority’s report actually states:
In light of these factors [which includes the ASIC power of
modification and exemption] the Committee does not believe that the possible
problem identified by the ASX is sufficient to justify watering down this
protection.
4.3 The ability of the ASIC to
modify the law should not be taken into consideration by the Committee as a
factor in determining whether the Parliament should address an issue or correct
a problem.
4.4 We somewhat cautiously
accept that the power which the ASIC will continue to have to modify the law or
exempt certain persons from the operation of the law is possibly justified, and
we are not therefore necessarily opposed at this time to the continuation of
the existence of that power. However, it is the role of the Parliament to deal
with issues when they are identified rather than to simply rely on the fact of
the grant of these powers to the Executive or to autonomous bodies.
4.5 Recommendation – that
the powers delegated to ASIC be the subject of a review and a report to the
Parliament in five years.
5. Conclusion
5.1
The Australian Democrats are conscious that a number of matters in
submissions have not been satisfied or addressed by the majority report. We
have not had the opportunity to write a review of the relevant issues raised.
We would expect there may be further issues which we will need to take up in
the course of debate on the Bill.
Senator Andrew Murray
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