Chapter 2 The Listings
The Criteria for listing an organisation
2.1
To be specified as a terrorist organisation for the purpose of paragraph
(b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in section 102.1 of the
Criminal Code, the Minister:
. . . must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the
organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning,
assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not the
terrorist act has occurred or will occur).[1]
2.2
At the hearing on 1 February 2005 for the Review of the
listing of six terrorist organisations, the Director-General of ASIO
advised the Committee of ASIO’s evaluation process in selecting entities for
proscription under the Criminal Code. Some of the factors included:
n engagement in
terrorism;
n ideology and links to
other terrorist groups or networks;
n links to Australia;
n threat to Australian
interests;
n proscription by the
UN or like-minded countries; and
n engagement in
peace/mediation processes.[2]
2.3
The Committee continues to use these criteria as the basis of its
reviews of all listings.
Overview
2.4
The Committee’s view is that, given their records and stated purposes,
all the organisations reviewed in this report fit the definition of a terrorist
organisation under the Act and for the purposes of the proscription power.
2.5
As in previous Committee reports into listings and re-listings of
terrorist organisations, this report identifies issues relating to the current
nature and reach of each of the organisations, with particular emphasis on
developments since the Committee last reviewed the listing of these
organisations. As previously stated by the Committee in its report, Review
of the re-listing of Al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah (October 2006):
The Committee believes that it is important that the
Parliament seek to establish as accurate a picture as possible of the nature,
size, reach, and effectiveness of organisations that are subject to section
102.1 of the Criminal Code and that these reviews should reflect the most
current information available about the organisations under review.[3]
The Organisations
2.6
The four organisations under review were initially listed as terrorist
organisations in 2003 under legislative arrangements which required that to be
proscribed organisations had to be on the United Nations list of terrorist
organisations. The organisations came up for review under new legislative
arrangements passed by Parliament in 2004. The Committee, therefore, reviewed
the first re-listing of these organisations in August 2005. Following this, the
Committee again reviewed these re-listings in June 2007 and in June 2009. This
is the fourth review of the re-listing of these four terrorist organisations.
Ansar al-Islam
2.7
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing Ansar al-Islam
is at Appendix B.
Engagement in Terrorism
2.8
Ansar al-Islam (AAI) (formerly Ansar al-Sunna) plans and conducts
attacks against foreign forces, Shia, Kurdish and Iraqi government interests. AAI’s
attacks most commonly target US and Iraqi security forces in Iraq using
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Indirect Fire (IDF) attacks.[4]
2.9
The Statement of Reasons lists over fifty attacks for which AAI has
indicated responsibility, by posting a video or media statement, in the period
since the last review. Their methods have included assassinations, the use of
small arms, thermal grenades, and IED and mortar attacks against Iraqi police
and military personnel and against US military patrols, bases and vehicles.[5]
2.10
The Statement of Reasons lists the following attacks carried out by the
AAI in the last year:
n In July 2011 AAI
claimed responsibility for a car bombing that killed two Iraqi government
officials in Baghdad in June;
n In May 2011 AAI’s
media unit released a video showcasing a number of the group’s recent attacks
against Iraqi security forces, referring to them as “agents of the United
States in its ‘proxy war’ on Iraq”;
n In April 2011 AAI
claimed responsibility for the March 2011 assassination of an Iraqi Army
officer in a car bomb attack in Baghdad; and
n In March 2011 AAI
released a video of two fighters recounting events from a clash with American
soldiers in Kirkuk province. [6]
2.11
Although outside the period currently being reviewed, it was AAI which
claimed responsibility for the suicide attack that claimed the life of
Australian ABC cameraman Paul Moran in Iraq in 2003. One of the group’s
founders and former leader, Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, “boasted about the suicide
squad he established which killed Moran.” [7]
2.12
Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (Jane’s) notes that on 15
February 2012, Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, alias Mullah Krekar, appeared before a
court in the Norwegian capital Oslo and was charged with making death threats
against a former government minister and with criminal incitement over remarks
he allegedly made to a U.S. television network in 2009, when he purportedly
called for attacks on U.S. soldiers in Iraq.[8]
2.13
The Statement of Reasons notes that AAI has released a number of
statements that advocate violent jihad and encourage Muslims to participate.
It lists sixteen such statements made during the period under review.
2.14
Both the Statement of Reasons and Jane’s state that Ansar al-Islam
continues to engage in terrorist attacks of a high lethality and frequency. The
Committee is of the opinion that this organisation meets the definition for the
purpose of re-listing.
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.15
AAI’s initial objective was to counter the influence of the secular
political parties active in Iraqi Kurdistan, and to establish a local Islamic
administration consistent with their hardline Salafist interpretation of Islam.
However, following the US-led 2003 coalition invasion of Iraq, AAI's positions
were overrun, and the group’s cadres scattered. The group re-emerged later that
year under the name Ansar al-Sunna, with the new objective of expelling foreign
forces and countering the growing influence of Iraq’s Shia and Kurdish
communities.[9]
2.16
In November 2007, having established itself as one of the foremost Sunni
insurgent groups in the country, the group reverted to using the original Ansar
al-Islam name. Despite its renewed capabilities, AAI is not in a position to
achieve its objective of overthrowing the national government, and it is unable
to establish secure base areas even in its principal areas of operation.
Nevertheless, AAI is a sophisticated insurgent outfit, and it poses a
significant threat to government and security force personnel, particularly in
the north of Iraq.[10]
2.17
With the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq completed in late December
2011, Jane’s notes that AAI issued a statement on 1 January 2012 claiming that
the Iraqi government “was a puppet regime of the Iranian government”. The
statement further claimed that while the US still plays a significant role as
the “far enemy”, the group would “continue to fight the Iraqi government until
the implementation of sharia.”[11]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.18
AAI has no formal alliances with other Salafist groups in Iraq, and has
managed to retain a great deal of independence. AAI is, however, aligned
ideologically with al-Qa’ida.[12]
2.19
Al Shafi’I, one of the founders of AAI, trained at an al-Qa’ida training
camp in Afghanistan and was said to have close ties to Usama bin Laden and
Al-Qaeda. When captured by Iraqi and US forces on 3 May 2010, al Shafi’I
admitted to carrying out joint operations with al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). [13]
2.20
According to the Statement of Reasons, counter-terrorism operations
against AAI and AQI may eventually force the groups to cooperate on a more
regular basis in preparing for and conducting attacks to maintain their
respective capabilities.[14]
Links to Australia
2.21
There is no information on any direct funding or support links with
Australia in the Statement of Reasons.
Threat to Australian interests
2.22
The Statement of Reasons states that in the course of pursuing its
objectives in Iraq, AAI is known to have committed or threatened action with
the intention of creating a serious risk to the safety of sections of the
public globally.[15]
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.23
Ansar al-Islam is listed on the United Nations 1267 Committee’s
consolidated list. AAI is also listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by
the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and
Canada.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation processes
2.24
There is no information in the Statement of Reasons stating that Ansar
al-Islam has engaged in any peace or mediation processes and the Committee has
no information to indicate this organisation is engaged in peace or mediation
processes.
Recommendation 1 |
| |
The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list Ansar al-Islam as a terrorist
organisation not be disallowed. |
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
2.25
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistand (IMU) is at Appendix C.
Engagement in terrorism
2.26
The IMU is a militant Islamist group based and operating in Central and
South Asia. In 1999 and 2000 the IMU launched incursions into Uzbekistan and
southern Kyrgyzstan from the Tavildara area of Tajikistan, carrying out a
series of high-profile attacks that gained the group international notoriety.[16]
2.27
The group subsequently relocated to northern Afghanistan, where it
established relations with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, and allegedly became
extensively involved in narcotics trafficking. One of its founders, Namangani,
was killed during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and the remnants
of the IMU fled across the border to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) of Pakistan. Although its capabilities were severely degraded, the
following years saw the IMU regroup in the South Waziristan area of the FATA,
where it established close links to a number of Pakistani Taliban groups and
reportedly participated in cross-border attacks on the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.[17]
2.28
During the latter part of 2009, the IMU claimed that its fighters had
been engaged in four months of severe fighting in four northern provinces of
Afghanistan and in northwest Pakistan, and that the ranks of the IMU were being
filled on a daily basis by new volunteers.[18]
2.29
Notwithstanding increasing pressure from ISAF and Pakistani security
forces, reports throughout 2010 indicated that the IMU had re-established an
operational presence in northern Afghanistan, and the group also claimed
responsibility for a series of attacks in Tajikistan.[19]
2.30
The Statement of Reasons lists eight terrorist attacks for which the IMU
has claimed responsibility, or which have been reliably attributed to the IMU,
during the period under review, the most recent being:
n 19 September 2010 when
the IMU claimed responsibility for an ambush of Tajik troops in the Rasht
Valley, east of Dushanbe, Tajikistan, killing 25 soldiers and wounding 20
others; and
n 3 September 2010 when
the Tajik government blamed the IMU for a suicide car bombing outside the
office of the anti-organised crime police unit in Khujand, Tajikistan, killing
two police officers and wounding 25 others.[20]
2.31
In March 2011, the IMU released a video recording “apparently showing a
series of attacks on Coalition forces in July-August 2010 in the Chahar Dara
District of Afghanistan’s Kunduz Province.” [21]
2.32
On 15 October 2011, two security guards were killed and two others were
wounded when a militant detonated a suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive
device (SVBIED) targeting a US military and Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) base in the Rukha area of Afghanistan’s Panjshir province. The attack was
claimed by both the IMU and the Taliban, and represented the IMU’s first
alleged involvement in a suicide attack in Afghanistan, as well as the first
suicide attack in the province since the start of the conflict in Afghanistan.[22]
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.33
IMU was founded in Tajikistan in 1997 by two Uzbek nationals — Juma
Namangani and Tahir Yuldashev — with the primary objective of overthrowing the
government of President Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan and installing an Islamic
state under sharia (Islamic law).[23]
2.34
In 2001, the IMU expanded its territorial focus to encompass an area
stretching from the Caucasus to China’s western province of Xinjiang, under the
new banners of the Islamic Party of Turkestan and the Islamic Movement of
Turkestan. Despite the name changes, the group’s name continues to be reported
as the IMU.[24]
2.35
A video-taped statement by Yuldashev in 2004, praising the actions of
militant Islamists against the US occupation in Iraq, underlined the IMU’s
embrace of a more global jihadist ideology with specifically anti-US elements.
Nevertheless:
despite cross-pollination with the broader jihadist movement
through contacts in Afghanistan, the IMU retains a strong regional focus thanks
to its roots as a movement committed to what it considers to be a religiously
justified violent struggle against what it views as the apostate regime of
Uzbek President Karimov.[25]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.36
As mentioned above, when the group relocated to northern Afghanistan, it
established relations with the Taliban and al-Qa’ida, and allegedly became
extensively involved in narcotics trafficking.
2.37
The Statement of Reasons notes that the IMU members fight alongside the
Taliban and al-Qa’ida against Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistani
forces in Pakistan and senior IMU leaders have held positions in the al-Qa’ida
hierarchy.[26]
2.38
However, it has been suggested that the relationship between the IMU and
the Taliban is not particularly strong. A senior US military intelligence
source told Jane’s in 2010:
‘That relationship [between the Taliban and the IMU] has been
waning for a while [and] it wasn’t that close to begin with.’ The source
attributed this trend to the differing objectives of the two groups, with the
Taliban focused only on Afghanistan and the IMU more regionally-focused.
Nonetheless, the IMU’s expansion into northern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011 -
and its control from there of narcotics trafficking routes into Central Asia -
could not have been achieved without at least the tacit support of local
Taliban forces, potentially undermining reports of a deteriorating
relationship.[27]
Links to Australia
2.39
There is no information on any direct funding or support links with
Australia in the Statement of Reasons.
Threats to Australian Interests
2.40
The Statement of Reasons contains no information on this matter.
Australian citizens, including ADF personnel and Australian interests may be
threatened as a result of IMU’s support for the insurgencies in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.41
The IMU is listed on the United Nations 1267 Committee’s consolidated
list. The IMU is also listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the
governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation processes
2.42
The Statement of Reasons contains no information on this and the
Committee has no information to indicate this organisation is engaged in peace
or mediation processes.
Recommendation 2 |
| |
The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under
the Criminal Code section 102.1, to list Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
as a terrorist organisation not be disallowed. |
Jaish-e-Mohammad
2.43
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing
Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is at Appendix D.
Engagement in terrorism
2.44
The Statement of Reasons indicates that the JeM is based in Pakistan and
operates primarily in Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK). JeM operatives have
been involved in attacks against civilian and military targets in Afghanistan,
India and Pakistan. JeM attacks have included suicide bombings in 2001 and 2003
with most attacks since that time involving grenades and firearms.
2.45
JeM continues to concentrate its efforts against Indian security forces
(military and police), government installations and civilians in the disputed
territory of IAK. In addition, JeM has broadened its operational focus to join
the Afghan Taliban in attacks against government and Coalition forces in
Afghanistan. [28]
2.46
The Statement of Reasons notes that Pakistan-based militants, including
members of JeM, continue to cross the Line of Control into IAK for the purpose
of engaging in acts of terrorism and are often involved in clashes with
security forces. Five incidents are listed which can reliably be attributed to
JeM since the last re-listing of the group, including:
n February 2010: A
Pakistani militant captured in Dhaka, Bangladesh, admitted to working as a JeM
coordinator in that country and as a recruiter for operations in India. Four
other JeM militants were also apprehended;
n December 2009:
Security authorities arrested six people for their links to JeM and for planning
a terrorist attack in Sargodha, Pakistan;
n October 2009:
Suspected JeM militants attacked a police facility in Srinagar, IAK, killing
one policeman and injuring two others; and
n June 2009: Police in
Lahore, Pakistan, claimed to have arrested seven terrorists linked to JeM and
the Pakistani Taliban and recovered explosives and weapons.[29]
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.47
Established in 2000, JeM was founded by the radical Islamic scholar and
jihadist leader, Maulana Masood Azhar.
2.48
JeM’s aim is to unite the IAK with Pakistan under a radical
interpretation of Islamic law, and it has openly declared war against the
United States and other nations for perceived violations of Muslim rights. It
is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam's
Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). Pakistan outlawed JeM in 2002. By 2003, JeM had
splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar, and Jamaat ul-Furqan
(JUF). Pakistan banned KUA and JUF in November 2003.[30]
2.49
The Statementof Reasons indicates that, despite splintering into
factions, JeM is still regarded as a single entity in most reporting.[31]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.50
The statement of reasons notes that extremists in Pakistan often mix
across multiple networks and groups, especially at the lower levels, and there
is probably an overlap in personnel linked to JeM and other extremist groups
including Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Harakat
ul-Mujahideen (HuM).[32]
2.51
JeM conducts joint operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan with groups
such as Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Harakat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI), LeJ and
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). In addition, JeM remains closely associated
with al-Qa’ida and the Afghan Taliban. [33]
2.52
The statement of reasons also reports that many JeM operatives have
benefited from HuM training programmes, which reportedly were devised by
Pakistan’s ISI. JeM reportedly trains its members in Bangladesh, Nepal and the
Middle East. Many JeM operatives are believed to be veterans of the wars in
Afghanistan.[34]
Links to Australia
2.53
The statement of reasons mentions no direct JeM link to Australia.
Threats to Australian interests
2.54
The statement of reasons contains no information on this matter.
Australian citizens, including ADF personnel and Australian interests may be
threatened as a result of JeM’s support for the insurgency in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.55
The JeM is listed on the United Nations 1267 Committee’s consolidated
list. The JeM is also listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand,
India and Pakistan.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.56
The statement of reasons contains no information on this matter and the
Committee has no information to indicate this organisation is engaged in peace
or mediation processes.
Recommendation 3 |
| |
The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) as a terrorist
organisation not be disallowed. |
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
2.57
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is at Appendix E.
Engagement in terrorism
2.58
Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre states that LeJ activities have
been curbed following the arrest of key leaders and the particular focus of the
military and police authorities on the group, resulting in the arrest of
hundreds of activists.[35]
2.59
Jane’s states that while the group remains a significant threat to Shia,
Western, Pakistani Christian and Pakistani government targets, LeJ militants
have increasingly begun to act under the umbrella of the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), raising questions as to the extent to which the LeJ can be
considered to continue to exist as an independent, structured organisation.
Such an alliance, according to Jane’s, may also see a broadening of LeJ’s
traditional targeting of the Shia community, as was seemingly evidenced by the
October 2010 arrest of seven LeJ militants who had allegedly planned to
assassinate Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, as well as launch attacks on
dams, bridges and military installations. [36]
2.60
Nonetheless, Jane’s expects that, even with the eradication of
high-profile leaders, individual acts of terrorism will continue to be directed
by the LeJ against Shia Muslims and Christians. The continuing threat posed by
the group was underlined by a double suicide attack in Kohat district in April
2010 which left at least 44 civilians dead. The attack, which targeted refugees
at a camp for internally displaced persons, was claimed by the Al-Alami faction
of the LeJ who cited the presence of Shia Muslims in the camp as the motive for
the attack. The group also claimed responsibility for the 1 September 2010 attack
in Lahore in which 37 people were killed and 241 others injured, as well as the
7 December suicide attack in Quetta targeting the Chief Minister of Pakistan’s
Balochistan province, Nawab Muhammad Aslam Khan Raisani, during which 10 people
were wounded.[37]
2.61
Following the killing of al-Qa’ida leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011,
the LeJ vowed to conduct a series of retaliatory attacks. To this end, a
spokesman for the LeJ, identifying himself as Ali Sher Haidri, released a
statement in mid-May threatening to avenge Bin Laden’s death by targeting not
only government ministers and security force personnel but also Shia Muslims
from the ethnic Hazara community in Pakistan. [38]
2.62
The LeJ followed through with these threats with a series of significant
attacks in and around Quetta between May and July 2011. On 6 May, eight
civilians were killed and 15 others were wounded when suspected LeJ militants
in two vehicles opened fire on them with small-arms and rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs) in the town of Hazara on the outskirts of Quetta. Then on 18
May, seven civilians were killed and six others were wounded in a small-arms
attack in Quetta, while on 16 June suspected LeJ militants shot dead the Deputy
Director General of the Pakistani Sports Board, Syed Abrar Hussain Shah, in the
city. All the victims in these attacks were ethnic Hazaras. The apparent
sectarian campaign by LeJ militants continued with three ethnic Hazaras,
including two police officers, shot dead in Quetta on 10 July and a further 11
people killed in a small-arms attack by suspected LeJ militants targeting a bus
transporting Hazara Shia Muslims in Hazara on 30 July. [39]
2.63
LeJ operations targeting Shia Muslims from the Hazara community
continued in late 2011, and 28 people were killed and six wounded in two separate
attacks in the Quetta region on 20 September. In the first incident, 26 people
were killed and six seriously wounded when between eight and ten gunmen
intercepted a coach in the Ghuncha Dori area near Quetta, segregated the
Hazaras, and then machine-gunned them. Meanwhile, in the Mastung area, three
further Hazara civilians were killed when gunmen riding a motorcycle opened
fire on their vehicle. The LeJ subsequently claimed responsibility for the
attacks. [40]
2.64
The statement of reasons lists twelve acts of terrorism attributed to or
suspected of being perpetrated by the LeJ, including some as listed above,
since its last re-listing.
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.65
The LeJ aims to establish an Islamist Sunni state in Pakistan based on
Sharia law, by violent means if necessary. The group also seeks to have all
Shias declared kafirs (non believers; literally, one who refuses to see the
truth). Its wider objective is to assist in destruction of all other religions.[41]
2.66
The LeJ was founded by Mohammed Ajmal (aka Akram Lahori), Malik Ishaque
and Riaz Basra, senior members of the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) who broke
away following disillusionment that the SSP’s leaders were not following the
ideals established by its founder Maulana Haq Nawa Jhangvi, who was
assassinated in 1990, almost certainly by Shia extremists.[42]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.67
As mentioned above, Jane’s states that LeJ militants have increasingly
begun to act under the umbrella of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Such an
alliance, according to Jane’s, may see a broadening of LeJ’s traditional
targeting of the Shia community.[43]
2.68
The statement of reasons states that LeJ, as part of the Sunni militant
community, has linkages with LeT, JuA/HuM, HuJI and JeM and also notes its
strong links to TTP. Additionally, the statement of reasons notes its close
relationship with the Afghan Taliban, stating it fought with them against the
Northern Alliance and participated in Killings of Shias during the rule of the
Taliban in Afghanistan.[44]
Links to Australia
2.69
The statement of reasons mentions no direct LeJ link to Australia.
Threats to Australian interests
2.70
Whilst the statement of reasons contains no information on this matter,
it can be inferred that, through LeJ’s support for the insurgency in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Australian citizens, including ADF personnel and
Australian interests may be threatened.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.71
The LeJ is listed in the UN 1267 Committee’s consolidated list and as a
proscribed terrorist organisation by the governments of the United Kingdom, the
United States, Canada, New Zealand and Pakistan.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.72
The statement of reasons contains no information on this matter. The
Committee has no information to indicate this organisation is engaged in peace
or mediation processes.
Recommendation 4 |
| |
The Committee recommends the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ) as a terrorist organisation
not be disallowed. |
Hon Anthony Byrne, MP
Chairman