Chapter 2 The Listings
The Criteria for listing
2.1
To be specified as a terrorist organisation for the purpose of paragraph
(b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in section 102.1 of the
Criminal Code, the Minister:
. . . must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the
organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning,
assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not the
terrorist act has occurred or will occur).
2.2
At the hearing on 1 February 2005 for the Review of the listing of six
terrorist organisations, the Director-General of ASIO advised the Committee of
ASIO's evaluation process in selecting entities for proscription under the
Criminal Code. Some of the factors included:
n engagement in
terrorism;
n ideology and links to
other terrorist groups or networks;
n links to Australia;
n threat to Australian
interests;
n proscription by the
UN or like-minded countries; and
n engagement in
peace/mediation processes.
2.3
The Committee continues to use these criteria as the basis of its
reviews of all listings.
Overview
2.4
This report is a consideration of the re-listing of Al-Shabaab, Hamas’
Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Kurdistan Workers Party, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and
Palestinian Islamic Jihad under the Criminal Code.
2.5
In past reviews of re-listings the Committee has stated its preference
to see information which relates to the activities of the organisation since
the last re-listing. Receiving information on activities since the last
re-listing, whilst not in itself conclusive, is an appropriate consideration in
the process of re-listing. Whilst historical background is important to
consider, and will be noted, evidence for a re-listing should focus on what has
changed since the last review. The issue of currency of evidence was raised in
the Committee's report, Review of the re-listing of Al-Qa'ida and Jemaah
Islamiyah (October 2006):
The re-listing of an organisation is a fresh exercise of
executive discretion and the Committee believes that there must, therefore, be
a sufficient degree of currency in the evidence to warrant the use of the
power.[1]
Al-Shabaab
2.6
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing Al-Shabaab is
at Appendix C.
2.7
This organisation was initially listed on 21 August 2009.
2.8
Al-Shabaab, or ‘the youth’, is the name generally applied to the Somali
militant group which was formerly the most prominent of the militia groups
comprising the militant wing of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). The
Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ethiopian forces ousted the
CIC in December 2006.
2.9
Al-Shabaab’s objective is the establishment of an Islamic state in
Somalia, based on Islamic law and the elimination of foreign ‘infidel’
influence. In pursuance of this objective, Al-Shabaab has conducted a violent
insurgency against the TFG, and foreign forces supporting the TFG.
2.10
Al-Shabaab encompasses a number of elements, ranging from those focused
solely on the domestic insurgency in Somalia to elements that support
al-Qa’ida’s global jihadist ideology. Estimates of Al-Shabaab fighters vary
from 3 000 to as high as 7 000, with most members being ethnic Somalis.
Al-Shabaab has long recruited members from Kenya. However, a small number of Al-Shabaab
fighters are from other countries including the US and Canada.
Engagement in Terrorism
2.11
The statement of reasons lists numerous attacks which are attributed to
Al-Shabaab, or for which Al-Shabaab claims responsibility. Attacks which have
occurred since the initial listing of the organisation include:
n 29 October 2011: at
least three African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers were
killed and an unknown number of others wounded when two Al-Shabaab suicide
bombers, including a United States (US) national, detonated explosives at an
AMISOM base in the Warshadaha Road area of Mogadishu.
n 4 October 2011: more
than 100 civilians were killed and dozens wounded when an Al-Shabaab militant
detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices (VBIED) targeting a building housing several government
ministries in the K4 area of Mogadishu. Al Shabaab spokesman Ali Muhammad Rage
subsequently claimed responsibility for the attack and stated: “We are
promising that attacks against the enemy will be routine, more in number, and
will increase day by day”.
n 1 October 2011:
French national Marie Dedieu, was kidnapped by suspected Al-Shabaab militants
from the island of Manda in Kenya's Lamu Archipelago, near the Somalia border
was then taken to Somalia. In mid-October, French intelligence and Ministry of
Foreign Affairs officials announced she had died in captivity in Somalia,
likely due to illness.
n 10 June 2011: TFG
Minister of the Interior, Abdishakur Sheikh Hassan, was killed in Mogadishu
when a female Al-Shabaab suicide bomber detonated her explosive vest inside his
residence.
n 9 September 2010: at
least 14 people-including at least five militants-were killed during a
sophisticated multi-mode attack on Mogadishu airport utilising VBIEDs, suicide
vests and small arms. Among the victims were four Somali police officers, two
Ugandan peacekeepers, and three civilians. An Al-Shabaab statement the
following day claimed the attack had targeted a high-level meeting of UN, AU
and Somali representatives.
2.12
Further examples are provided within the statement of reasons and
confirmed in the research documents consulted by the Committee.
2.13
The Committee is satisfied Al-Shabaab continues to be engaged in
terrorist activity.
Ideology and links to other
terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.14
Al-Shabaab’s primary objective remains the creation of an Islamic state
in Somalia, administered according to its own radical interpretation of sharia
(Islamic law). In pursuit of this objective, it is committed to expelling all
foreign forces, overthrowing President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed’s
Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and purging the country if any practices
it considers un-Islamic.[2]
2.15
Although primarily focused on Somalia, Al-Shabaab is increasingly
presenting its Somalia campaign as a front in the global jihad. In October
2009, Al-Shabaab’s spokesman Sheikh Ali Muhammad Rage stated:
Geographical boundaries between peoples are just artificial
fabrications. Our ultimate goal is to have the land of Allah ruled by means of
strict Islamic laws.
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.16
Al-Shabaab remains linked with al-Qa’ida through leadership and
training. The Committee notes the advice from the statement of reasons that:
On 9 February 2012 a public statement by Al-Shabaab leader
Mukhtar Abu al-Zubair included a pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida and in a
reciprocal message al-Qa’ida leader Ayman al‑Zawahiri announced that Al-Shabaab
had joined al-Qa’ida.
Links to Australia
2.17
Since the initial listing of Al-Shabaab, three Australian citizens
affiliated with Al-Shabaab have been charged and convicted with terrorist
related activities. The statement of reasons note:
In late 2011 Al-Shabaab-linked Australian citizens Saney Edow
Aweys and Nayef El Sayed were convicted of conspiring to plan a terrorist
attack in Australia. Aweys was also convicted of aiding and abetting another
person to engage in hostile activities in Somalia under s6 of the Commonwealth Crimes
(Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978 in December 2010. Australian
citizen Hussein Hashi Farah was also implicated in terrorist activity
associated with Al-Shabaab.
Threat to Australian interests
2.18
The statement of reasons does not specifically address this matter, but
does note the following statement which includes reference to Australia as a
possible country for Al-Shabaab activities:
Abdisalam Ali—an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber—published a
martyrdom video prior to killing himself on 29 October 2011 in Mogadishu
stating "my brothers and sisters, do Jihad in America, do Jihad in Canada,
do Jihad in England [and] anywhere in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, in China, in
Australia — anywhere you find kuffar [infidels]. Fight them and be firm against
them.
Proscription by the UN or
like-minded countries
2.19
The statement of reasons advises that since the initial listing
Al-Shabaab has been listed in New Zealand in February 2010, Canada in March
2010, the United Kingdom in May 2010, and by the European Union in April 2010.
As noted in the Committee’s consideration of the initial listing, the group was
listed as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the United States in March
2008.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation
processes
2.20
The statement of reasons notes Al-Shabaab does not participate in the
Somali political system, despite AMISOM appeals to the group to lay down their
arms and join the Somali peace process.
Conclusion
2.21
The Committee found that Al-Shabaab engages in activities that satisfy
section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. The Committee does not recommend
disallowance of the regulation.
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Recommendation 1
The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organisation
not be disallowed.
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Hamas' Izz al-Din al-Qassam
Brigades
2.22
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing Hamas' Izz
al-Din al-Qassam Brigades is at Appendix D.
2.23
This organisation was initially listed on 9 November 2003, re-listed 5
June 2005, 7 October 2005, 10 September 2007 and 8 September 2009.
Engagement in Terrorism
2.24
While the Brigades are reported to have killed more than 500 people in
more than 350 separate terrorist attacks since 1993, the statement of reasons
notes that since 2005:
the majority of the terrorist activity conducted by the
Brigades has consisted of small-arms fire and rocket and mortar fire directed
at Israeli military assets and communities in the vicinity of Gaza.
2.25
Recent attacks attributed to the Brigades include:
n 7 April 2011: an
anti-tank missile struck a school bus near the Gaza strip, destroying the bus
and resulting in the death of an Israeli teenager. The Brigades took
responsibility for the attack, although they claimed they had not intended to
target Israeli schoolchildren, and had mistaken the bus for one carrying
Israeli military personnel.
n 1 September 2010: a
group of Brigades members wounded two Israeli settlers near Ramallah. A
subsequent statement by the Brigades threatened a wave of attacks against
Israelis.
n 31 August 2010: four
Israeli settlers were shot dead by the same members of the Brigades near the
West Bank city of Hebron.
2.26
The statement of reasons further advises the Brigades
control supply lines to Iran, where it sends fighters for military training. These
same supply lines are used by Palestinian Islamic Jihad for procurement and
training. With this arrangement the Brigades are indirectly assisting
Palestinian Islamic Jihad in committing terrorist acts.
2.27
The Committee is satisfied the Brigades continues to be engaged in
terrorist activity.
Ideology and links to other
terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.28
While much of the Hamas movements popular mandate stems from its
widespread political and social activities, its armed wing – the Brigades – is arguably
the most organised and effective militia in the Palestinian Territories.
2.29
Politically, Hamas aims to apply the rule of Islam throughout Palestine,
from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean. Its charter, published in August
1988, defined this land as an eternal Islamic endowment that could not be
compromised under any circumstances. The Brigades engage in military activity
in support of these political objectives.
2.30
The statement of reasons notes of the Brigades:
Their essential aim is the unification of Israel and the
Palestinian Territories under Islamic rule – a goal which entails the
destruction of Israel as a political entity. Due to the disparity between
Israel and Hamas’ respective military resources, the Brigades have adopted
terrorist tactics in their bid to defeat Israel. Most famously, they adopted
the use of suicide bombings, describing them as the “F-16” of the Palestinian
people
Links to other terrorist
groups/networks
2.31
The statement of reasons does not address this matter. As Jane’s notes:
In principle, Hamas has always favoured co-operation with
other Palestinian and Islamic factions, based on the common goal of jihad for
the liberation of Palestine. However in reality, relations with other
Palestinian factions have been determined by a number of calculations,
primarily the struggle for power within Palestinian society.[3]
Links to Australia
2.32
The statement of reasons notes there are no known links to Australia. The
Committee has no information to indicate this organisation has any links to Australia.
Threat to Australian interests
2.33
The modus operandi of the Brigades’ attacks shows disregard for the
potential harm to civilians of any nationality. The Brigades therefore pose a potential
threat to Australian interests and Australians present in the vicinity of the
Brigades’ field of operations.
Proscription by the UN or
like-minded countries
2.34
The Brigades are proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the
governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Hamas (including the
Brigades) has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the governments of
the United States and Canada. Hamas is also listed by the European Union for
the purposes of its anti-terrorism financing measures.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation
processes
2.35
The statement of reasons advises there are no current peace negotiations
being conducted including the Brigades.
Conclusion
2.36
The Committee found that Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades engages in
activities that satisfy section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. The Committee does
not recommend disallowance of the regulation.
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Recommendation 2
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The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list Hamas’ Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades as
a terrorist organisation not be disallowed.
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Kurdistan Workers Party
2.37
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing the Kurdistan
Workers Party is at Appendix E.
2.38
The PKK, also known as Kongra Gel, was initially listed on 17 December
2005, and re-listed 27 September 2007 and 8 September 2009.
Engagement in Terrorism
2.39
The statement of reasons notes that the PKK has continued to have
extensive, direct involvement in most terrorist acts occurring in Turkey since
the group was last listed in 2009.
The group has been particularly active since February 2011
when it ended a unilateral ceasefire in place since April 2009. Most attacks
appear to be very specifically targeted, for example, armed assaults against
Turkish military forces using small-arms fire. However, there also have been
several indiscriminate, mass-casualty attacks employing both suicide bombings
and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IED). While most attacks have
targeted Turkish security forces in the southeast, a number have targeted
places frequented by civilians or tourists, including a shopping area in Ankara
and a major shopping, tourist and leisure district in Istanbul. The PKK also
was responsible for a ferry hijacking in the Marmara Sea, near Istanbul.
2.40
The statement of reasons provides an extensive list of significant
recent attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by or reliably
attributed to the PKK. Such incidents include:
n 1 March 2012: Fifteen
police officers and a civilian were wounded in a remotely controlled IED attack
by suspected PKK militants targeting a police bus in the Imrahor Street area of
Istanbul. The explosion reportedly occurred as the bus passed the headquarters
of the ruling Justice and Development Party.
n 24 November 2011:
Three Turkish employees of a Canada-based energy company were killed by PKK
militants in an attack targeting the Selmo oil field at Kozluk, Batman
province.
n 11 November 2011: A
PKK militant carrying a suspected explosive device hijacked a passenger ferry
and took hostage 18 passengers and six crew members in the Marmara Sea, near
Istanbul.
n 29 October 2011: At
least two people were killed and as many as 20 others wounded when a suspected
PKK suicide bomber detonated her explosives outside a teahouse near the office
of the Justice and Development Party in the town of Bingol in Bingol province.
n 27 September 2011:
PKK militants kidnapped a total of eight teachers and a village guard in five
armed attacks in the Pulumur district of Tunceli province; in the village of
Gundogdu in Elazig province; and in the villages of Ciftlibahce, Dolunay and
Cavundur in Diyarbakir province.
2.41
The Committee is satisfied the PKK continues to be engaged in terrorist
activity.
Ideology and links to other
terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.42
The Committee notes that in February 2005, the organisation redefined
its theoretical objectives and announced that it was fighting to establish a
Kurdish Democratic Federation. In practice, however, Jane’s notes:
. . . the PKK’s immediate objectives are greater cultural
and political rights for Turkey’s Kurdish minority, including the amendment of
the Turkish constitution to include an explicit recognition of a Kurdish
identity, a comprehensive amnesty for PKK militants, including allowing the
organisation's leadership to participate in political activities in Turkey, and
an easing of the conditions of imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan leading
eventually to his release.[4]
Links to other terrorist
groups/networks
2.43
The statement of reasons notes:
The PKK maintains close links with its Iranian affiliate, the
Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK). Like the PKK, PJAK has training camps in
northern Iraq. Iran has designated the PKK as a terrorist organisation and both
Iran and Turkey are reported to have conducted probable coordinated military
operations against both groups in their shared border areas.
Links to Australia
2.44
The statement of reasons records no known PKK links to Australia, but
notes it is likely that elements of Australia’s Kurdish community remain
sympathetic to the Kurdish nationalist cause.
Threat to Australian interests
2.45
The statement of reasons advises there are no known direct threats from
the PKK to Australian interests. The Committee notes, however, that the indiscriminate
targeting of tourist locations is a threat to civilians of any nationality.
Proscription by the UN or
like-minded countries
2.46
The Committee notes the PKK is listed as a proscribed terrorist
organisation by many governments, including the United Kingdom, Canada and New
Zealand, and is proscribed by the United States government under the name of
Kongra Gel. The PKK is listed by the European Union for the purposes of its
anti-terrorism measures.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation
processes
2.47
The statement of reasons advises the PKK is not known to be engaged in
any peace or mediation processes.
Conclusion
2.48
The Committee found that the Kurdistan Workers Party engages in
activities that satisfy section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. The Committee does
not recommend disallowance of the regulation.
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Recommendation 3
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The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list the Kurdistan Workers Party as a
terrorist organisation not be disallowed.
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Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
2.49
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is at Appendix F.
2.50
This organisation was initially listed on 9 November 2003, re-listed 5
June 2005, 7 October 2005, 10 September 2007, and 8 August 2009.
2.51
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) is a Pakistani militant Islamist group based in
Pakistan and operating in India, and is one of the most capable and
high-profile militant groups currently active in South Asia. It was formed in
1990 with the specific objective of waging irregular warfare in the disputed
territory of India-administered Kashmir (IAK).[5]
Engagement in Terrorism
2.52
The statement of reasons notes the LeT is one of the most active of the
Pakistan-based Kashmir-focused militant groups, directly engaging in, preparing
and planning numerous terrorist attacks, including bombings, assassinations and
kidnappings against Indian security forces (military and police), government
assets, transport and civilians in the disputed territory as well as in India.
2.53
Recent activities attributed to or claimed by the LeT include:
n October 2011: An LeT
militant killed a policeman in Srinagar. Police arrested the gunman, who
claimed during his interrogation that LeT had revived plans to assassinate
police officers;
n January 2011:
Suspected LeT militants kidnapped two girls from their home and then killed
them in Sopore, IAK; and
n August 2010: An
Indian soldier and three suspected LeT militants were killed in a two-day gun
battle in IAK.
2.54
The Committee is satisfied the LeT continues to be engaged in terrorist
activity.
Ideology and links to other
terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.55
The statement of reasons advises that the LeT’s stated objective is to:
[unite] Indian administered Kashmir (IAK) with Pakistan under
a radical interpretation of Islamic law. LeT’s broader objectives include to
establish an Islamic Caliphate across the Indian subcontinent, and to reclaim
all ‘occupied Muslim lands’ in southern Spain and the Balkans. To this end, LeT
intends to pursue the ‘liberation’, not only of Muslim-majority Kashmir, but of
all India’s Muslim population, even in areas where they do not form a majority.
LeT has declared that democracy is antithetical to Islamic law and that LeT’s
jihad requires it to work toward turning Pakistan itself into a purely Islamic
state.
Links to other terrorist
groups/networks
2.56
The statement of reasons notes:
LeT maintains links to the Afghan Taliban and several
Pakistani Islamist extremist groups, including the Kashmir-focused terrorist
group Jaish-e-Mohammed and the Sunni sectarian group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. LeT is
reported to have been involved with militant Islamists in other places where
conflict involving Muslims have arisen, including Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo and
Afghanistan.
Links to Australia
2.57
The Committee notes the statement of reasons advice that:
Several individuals with links to LeT have been arrested in
Australia, the US, and Canada since 2003 for allegedly planning terrorist
activities. In March 2007, a French court convicted a French national, Willie
Brigitte, for planning terrorist attacks in Australia in 2003 in conjunction
with suspected LeT chief for external operations, Sajid Mir. Brigitte’s
Australian associate, Faheem Khalid Lodhi, was also convicted of planning acts
of terrorism by a New South Wales Supreme Court jury in June 2006; in June
2008, Lodhi lost an appeal to the High Court of Australia to have his case
overturned.
Threat to Australian interests
2.58
LeT’s attacks show a reckless disregard for civilians of any nationality
as evidenced by the November 2008 attack on the Indian financial hub, Mumbai, in
which LeT members killed more than 170 people (including two Australians).
2.59
The Committee concludes the LeT therefore pose a threat to Australian
interests and Australians who may be unwittingly caught in a LeT attack.
Proscription by the UN or
like-minded countries
2.60
The statement of reasons notes the LeT is listed in the UN 1267
Committee’s consolidated list and as a proscribed terrorist organisation by the
governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan and
India.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation
processes
2.61
The statement of reasons advises the LeT is not engaged in any peace or
mediation process.
Conclusion
2.62
The Committee found that Lashkar-e-Tayyiba engages in activities that
satisfy section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. The Committee does not recommend
disallowance of the regulation.
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Recommendation 4
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The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list the organisation Lashkar-e-Tayyiba as a
terrorist organisation not be disallowed
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Palestinian Islamic Jihad
2.63
The Attorney-General’s Statement of Reasons for re-listing Palestinian
Islamic Jihad is at Appendix G.
2.64
This organisation was initially listed on 3 May 2004, re-listed 5 June
2005, 7 October 2005, 10 September 2007 and 8 August 2009.
2.65
PIJ is a Sunni Islamist Palestinian militant organisation committed to
the destruction of the state of Israel.
Engagement in Terrorism
2.66
The statement of reasons notes PIJ claimed responsibility for more than
30 suicide bombings between 1987 and 2006 but since that time the majority of
its attacks have consisted of indiscriminate rocket and mortar fire into
southern Israel from Gaza.
Its attacks are generally indiscriminate in nature, seeking
to maximize casualties. Some recent examples include:
n 29 October 2011: PIJ
launched a number of rockets into several areas of Israel’s Southern District,
killing one Israeli civilian and wounding two.
n 20 August 2011: PIJ
militants launched a series of rockets into Israel’s southern district, killing
one Israeli civilian and injuring seven.
n 8 January 2011:
suspected PIJ militants fired two mortar rounds into an area of Israel’s
Southern District, wounding two Thai nationals.
2.67
Jane’s further notes that:
On 2 March, the Al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), issued a statement in which it claimed that
the group’s militants had fired at least 41 Grad missiles, 20 home-made
projectiles, six mortar rounds, and three 107 mm rockets towards Israeli
targets so far in 2012.[6]
2.68
The Committee is satisfied the PIJ continues to be engaged in terrorist
activity.
Ideology and links to other
terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.69
The statement of reasons notes PIJ’s goal is the
establishment of a sovereign Islamic state within the geographic borders of the
pre-1948 British mandated Palestine. PIJ promotes the military destruction of
Israel as the only viable means to attain this goal. Accordingly, PIJ refuses
to participate in the political process and rejects the possibility of a
negotiated settlement to the Israel/Palestine problem.
Links to other terrorist
groups/networks
2.70
The statement of reasons notes PIJ was inspired by and remains
ideologically supportive of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and maintains close ties
with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Hizballah.
2.71
This is corroborated by Jane’s analysis that “the PIJ's most stable
alliances are with Hizballah and Iran, with whom it shares an ideological and
in the former case organisational affinity as well.”[7]
Links to Australia
2.72
The statement of reasons notes there are no known links between PIJ and
Australia. The Committee is unaware of any such links.
Threat to Australian interests
2.73
While the statement of reasons advises PIJ has confined
its attacks to the Levant and has not deliberately targeted Western interests,
the Committee notes the potential threat to Australians which arises from the
indiscriminate nature of the rocket attacks undertaken by the PIJ.
Proscription by the UN or
like-minded countries
2.74
The statement of reasons advises the PIJ is proscribed as a terrorist
organisation by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and
the United States. PIJ is also listed by the European Union for the purposes
of its anti-terrorism financing measures.
Engagement in Peace and Mediation
processes
2.75
As noted above, PIJ promotes the military destruction of Israel as the
only viable means to attain this goal and accordingly rejects the possibility
of a negotiated settlement to the Israel/Palestine problem.
Conclusion
2.76
The Committee found that Palestinian Islamic Jihad engages in activities
that satisfy section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. The Committee does not
recommend disallowance of the regulation.
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Recommendation 5
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The Committee recommends that the regulation, made under the
Criminal Code section 102.1, to list the organisation Palestinian Islamic
Jihad as a terrorist organisation not be disallowed.
The Hon Anthony Byrne MP
Chairman
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