Chapter 4 Interoperability
4.1
In his National Security Statement to the Parliament of Australia the
then Prime Minister of Australia the Hon. Kevin Rudd MP stated that:
I believe that Australia’s national security community is
highly effective and has proven highly adaptable. But in an increasingly
complex and interconnected security environment, we need a more integrated
national security structure that enhances national security policy
coordination.[1]
4.2
Following this statement the Counter-Terrorism White Paper stated that:
Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts are intelligence-led
and focused on prevention. This approach hinges on strong partnerships and
cooperation at the national level, effective engagement at the international
level, and effective information sharing. Over recent years, there has been
significant growth in Australia’s security, intelligence and law enforcement
agencies and the Government has taken steps to improve their capabilities and
enhance information sharing. The establishment of the National Intelligence
Coordination Committee has ensured that Australia’s intelligence effort, both
domestically and internationally, is better integrated into the new national
security arrangements. The creation of a new Counter-Terrorism Control Centre
will also ensure that we better integrate our overall counter-terrorism
intelligence capabilities.[2]
4.3
Given these statements the Committee thought it timely to ask that the
AIC report to it on issues of interoperability.
4.4
The Committee asked that a separate section of
each of the AIC agencies submissions address some or all of the following:
·
Areas of interoperability between the AIC and
any other Department or Agency;
·
Any e-security arrangements underpinning this
interoperability;
·
Memorandum of Understandings providing the basis
for interoperability;
·
Accommodation requirements;
·
Public relations and/or public reporting
requirements as result of interoperability arrangements;
·
Direction and strategic planning underpinning
interoperability;
·
How interoperability is being managed
administratively;
·
How interoperability is being managed
financially;
·
The effects of interoperability on performance
management and evaluation;
·
The effects of interoperability on recruitment
and training; and
·
Costs and benefit analysis of interoperability.
4.5
All of the agencies included information on
interoperability in their submissions to the Committee. Given that issues
relating to interoperability go directly to the operational priorities and
practices of the agencies evidence to the Committee on interoperability is
overwhelmingly classified SECRET and cannot be referred to in this report.
4.6
The Committee therefore outlines some of the publicly reportable
information on the interoperability of the AIC.
The National Intelligence Coordination Committee
4.7
The National Intelligence Coordination Committee (NICC) is chaired by
the National Security Adviser and comprises the heads of the Office of National
Assessments, the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, the Australian
Security Intelligence Organisation, the Defence Imagery and Geospatial
Organisation, the Defence Intelligence Organisation, the Defence Signals
Directorate, the AFP, the Australian Crime Commission, and Customs and Border
Protection. The departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Immigration
and Citizenship, and Attorney-General’s are also represented at the Deputy
Secretary level.
4.8
The NICC enhances the ability of Australia’s security agencies to share
information, coordinate effort and identify opportunities to improve the
whole-of-government response to terrorism and other national security
challenges.
4.9
The NICC oversees the operations of two sub-committees: the National
Intelligence Collection Management Committee (NICMC) and the National
Intelligence Open Source Committee (NIOSC). Both of these committees are
chaired by ONA.
The National Intelligence Collection Management Committee
4.10
The NICMC is responsible for setting specific requirements and
evaluating collection effort against each of the National Intelligence
Priorities set by the government.
The National Intelligence Open Source Committee
4.11
The NIOSC is responsible for enhancing the coordination and capabilities
of the National Intelligence Community’s open source efforts. Open source
collection is considered the first information source for meeting the
government’s intelligence and security requirements.
The National Threat Assessment Centre
4.12
The multi-agency National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) is located
within ASIO and assesses intelligence and information from a wide range of
sources to prepare threat assessments in relation to specific people, places,
and events. These assessments inform the risk management decisions made by
operational agencies, the implementation of protective security measures and
the travel advisories regarding potential threats when travelling overseas that
are prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for the Australian
public. ASIO also provides protective security advice to Australian Government
agencies and, with the approval of the Attorney-General, to state and territory
governments and private sector companies to protect vulnerable facilities.
National Interception Technical Assistance Centre
4.13
ASIO gave evidence to the Committee that it is working in partnership
with the AFP and other Commonwealth agencies to provide coordinated technical
assistance to other Australian intercepting agencies.
4.14
In 2010-11 ASIO will conduct a pilot study for the establishment of a
National Interception Technical Assistance Centre (NiTAC). The NiTAC is planned
to provide a central point of reference from which agencies can receive
technical assistance to help keep pace with the rate and scale of technical
change.
The Cyber Security Operations Centre
4.15
The Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) is a Defence Signals
Directorate capability that serves all government agencies.
4.16
The CSOC has two main roles:
n it provides
government with a comprehensive understanding of cyber threats against
Australian interests; and
n it coordinates
operational responses to cyber events of national importance across government
and critical infrastructure.
4.17
The CSOC serves all government agencies and has embedded representation
from a number of other agencies involved in assessing the threat to, and the
protection of, Australian interests from sophisticated threat actors. The CSOC
will also assist CERT Australia[3], in the Attorney-General’s
Department, to support industry that owns or manages critical infrastructure.
Conclusions
4.18
The Committee was pleased with the level of information given to it in
relation to interoperability and will continue to monitor this area to ensure
that interoperability management and budgetary structures are in place across
the AIC.