Chapter 2 Administration
2.1
This is the first full review of administration and expenditure of the
six intelligence agencies carried out by the Committee of the 43rd
Parliament. The Committee looked at all aspects of the administration of the
agencies including human resource management, organisational structure,
security clearances and breaches, accommodation issues, workforce diversity and
growth management.
2.2
This chapter reports broadly on the areas discussed during hearings and/or
in submissions relating to the administration of the six agencies within the Australian
Intelligence Community (AIC). During private hearings and from the submissions
the Committee took a substantial amount of classified information which cannot
be included in this report however, the following discussion outlines the
evidence without including any classified information.
Organisation of agency structure
2.3
As reported in previous Administration and Expenditure reports, most of
the intelligence agencies went through some organisational restructuring in
2007-08, then focussed on consolidating and monitoring those changes in 2008-09.
2.4
In 2009-10, most of the agencies did not make extensive organisational
changes but continued to review and refine organisational structures following
the significant growth which they experienced to varying degrees over previous
years. Only DSD reported substantial growth during the reporting period.
2.5
ASIO reported that in 2009-10, its Senior Management group reviewed the
organisation’s structure so that by improving efficiency and functional
alignment it would be well-positioned to meet future challenges. The new
structure was implemented just outside the reporting year, that is on 1 July
2010.[1]
Impact on agencies of recent legislative changes
2.6
During 2009-10 several legislative changes were relevant to the work of
the intelligence agencies.
2.7
Significant legislative amendments were made during 2009-10 to the Telecommunications
(Interception and Access) Act 1979. Agencies told the Committee that these
amendments will benefit agency operations.
2.8
The Freedom of Information Act 1982 and the Archives Act 1983 were
both amended during the period under review and both amendments will impact
intelligence agencies. The Archives Act contains an open access regime for
records 30 years old or more. Intelligence agencies are not exempt from this
Act. Over the next five years, the open access period will reduce from 30 to
20 years. This means that intelligence agency documents will be subject to a
disclosure regime sooner and therefore the number of new records available for
public access over the next 10 years will significantly increase.[2]
2.9
DIO told the Committee that during 2009-10 it received 175 Public Access
Requests and responded to 104 with work continuing on the remaining case load.
Consequently, at the close of 2009-10, it had enlarged its Public Access
Requests area to three staff which is a significant increase from one part-time
staff member during previous reporting periods. DIO is also reallocating staff
resources to meet increasing demand for access to records.[3]
2.10
In 2009-10, DSD received 40 requests for public access to material under
the Archives Act 1983. In 12 cases the material was no longer regarded
as sensitive and was released by DSD. A further 25 requests contained
sensitive information, and these requests were agreed to with partial
exemptions. The remaining three requests had not been finalised at the time of
the Committee’s inquiry.[4]
2.11
On 3 February 2010, Cabinet requested that the Attorney-General’s
Department lead a review of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (ISA) and
the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act) to
address the issues of interoperability and intelligence sharing amongst
Australian intelligence agencies. ASIS, DSD, DIGO and ASIO worked with the
Attorney-General’s Department and Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) on
these reviews. A number of recommendations were made which aim to improve
interoperability and intelligence sharing between intelligence agencies. Agencies
told the Committee that they believe these amendments will benefit agency
operations. (The implications of these recommendations for the
interoperability of intelligence agencies are discussed further in Chapter 4.)
The Parliament passed the Intelligence Services Legislation Amendment Act
2011 in respect of these changes on 4 July 2011.
2.12
The Taxation Legislation Amendment (2010 Measures No.3) 2010 Act
made changes to tax legislation to allow the Directors-General of ASIS and ASIO
to declare certain payments made in the performance of functions exempt from
taxation.
2.13
Other legislative changes which affected ASIO included the Anti-People
Smuggling and other Measures Act 2010 and the Crime Legislation
Amendment (Serious and Organised Crime) Act 2010.[5]
Litigation
2.14
Only two agencies reported involvement in litigation or legal
proceedings to the Committee.
2.15
ASIO was involved in over 40 litigation matters during the reporting
period, including criminal (in particular terrorism) prosecutions, judicial and
administrative review of Security Assessments, and a range of civil actions
among which:
Particularly complex litigation proceedings to which ASIO
contributed include the Sydney and Melbourne Pendennis and Operation NEATH
terrorism prosecutions.
ASIO was also involved directly in two legal matters initiated by Mr Mamdouh
Habib, a number of challenges to its Security Assessments, and former ASIO
officer James Seivers’s appeal against his conviction for the unauthorised
communication of intelligence.[6]
2.16
The other agency reported to the Committee that during the reporting
period it worked with the National Archives of Australia in relation to claims
for access to its classified material under the Archives legislation and with the
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) to assist with the release, or
partial release, of material in the course of litigation involving DFAT.
2.17
The Committee is satisfied that those agencies which were involved in
litigation during 2009-10 dealt with these matters in an appropriate manner.
Human resource management within the agencies
Management of growth
2.18
Across most AIC agencies in 2009‑10 staffing levels were stable.
2.19
DSD was the exception. It reported that it experienced significant organisational
growth which was associated with additional funding. The growth posed some
challenges for the agency, and in particular workforce management issues,
including training and recruitment.[7]
2.20
ASIO aimed for significant growth during 2009-10 but it did not reach
its ‘ambitious recruitment targets’ for the year due to employment market
conditions combined with the necessarily stringent and lengthy security vetting
of potential new staff.[8]
2.21
Another AIC agency reported to the Committee that it became apparent
during 2009-10 that due to the growth of the agency over the past several
years, the organisation did not have sufficient senior executive service
personnel and, consequently, has made it a priority to expand that area of the
agency.[9]
Recruitment
2.22
As in previous years, recruitment remained a high priority for the
agencies, in order to continue to attract high calibre staff with the necessary
skill sets. Agencies provided information to the Committee on how they recruit
staff.
2.23
The Committee also heard that some of the AIC agencies are now taking a
more collaborative approach to both recruitment and security vetting.
Discussions are taking place between some agencies to determine if there are
opportunities to collaborate during recruitment processes for mutual benefit. It
was said that AIC agencies are ‘all fishing from the same pond’.[10]
2.24
As mentioned above, ASIO did not reach its recruitment targets in
2009-10 and recruitment will be a priority for the agency in 2010-11. ASIO told
the Committee that it has developed new people management strategies to assist
in meeting ‘the higher net recruitment targets necessary to build and sustain a
more effective national security intelligence capability’.[11]
2.25
ONA’s new recruits during 2009-10 included the appointment in July 2009
of Mr Allan Gyngell as Director-General. Also during the reporting period, ONA
developed a memorandum of understanding with PM&C to facilitate the
short-term secondment of employees between the agencies. ONA sees this arrangement
as valuable in exposing its staff to the policy environment and provides a
gateway for exchange of ideas and the building of productive networks.[12]
2.26
DSD told the Committee that it continues to attract and retain talented
staff by focusing on the provision of a work environment that offers continuous
professional development, opportunities for career diversity or specialisation,
and a clear link between work outputs and mission success.[13]
2.27
The Committee heard from at least one agency that while its recruitment
goals were very successful in the early years of its growth because it sought a
broad set of job skills, in 2009-10 recruitment success has become more
difficult because the skill sets the agency now seeks are much narrower and
therefore, in a tight and competitive labour market, people with those skill
sets are highly sought after.[14]
2.28
Competition in a tight labour market notwithstanding, the Committee is
satisfied that each of the agencies continues to devote the necessary resources
to ensure that their future recruitment needs have the best chance of being
met.
Workplace diversity
2.29
As for the previous year, all three Defence agencies demonstrated
to the Committee that they are committed to the principles of equity and
diversity. DSD, for example, had eight equity advisers within the organisation
during 2009-10 and no complaints were made during this period.[15]
2.30
The three non-Defence agencies also demonstrated their commitment to
equity and diversity in the workplace. ASIS told the Committee it maintains a
Workplace Diversity Policy which adopts the spirit of Section 18 of the Public
Service Act 1999. The policy encourages employees to reach their full
potential in a workplace that welcomes a diversity of personal styles, ideas,
solutions and innovation.[16] ONA told the Committee
that it continues to support and recognise the diversity of people within the
agency through the implementation of its disability action plan, workplace
diversity program and development of its reconciliation action plan.[17]
Similarly, ASIO has implemented recruitment and people management strategies
intended to create an inclusive working environment that recognises and
utilises the diversity of the workforce, while seeking to recruit a range of
people that reflect the Australian community as much as is practical. ASIO
noted that its staffing profile compares favourably with that of the broader
Australian Public Service.[18]
Training and development
2.31
All the AIC agencies demonstrated to the Committee that they continue to
invest heavily in training and development of staff.
2.32
Commencing in January 2010, ASIO implemented an enhanced approach to
training and developing intelligence professionals. The new approach supports
greater engagement with partner agencies, academia, and the private sector. It
also increases the level of skill and competence upon graduation and provides
access to modules for non-intelligence officer staff working in related areas.[19]
2.33
Since 1 July 2009, the responsibility for general professional
development training for staff from all three Defence intelligence agencies rests
with the consolidated Defence I&S Group agency.[20]
2.34
DSD told the Committee that it actively participates in National
Intelligence Community (NIC) Training programs to increase awareness of NIC
capabilities. Within DSD, 275 staff attended the NIC Orientation Program during
2009-10. Additionally, 22 DSD executive level staff attended the NIC Senior
Officers’ Course in 2009-10. This program gives participants an understanding
of whole-of-government approaches to intelligence needs and provides a more
advanced discussion on requirements and liaison opportunities.[21]
Linguistic skills
2.35
For most AIC agencies linguistic capability is critical and finding and
retaining staff with appropriate language skills is a vital aspect of workforce
planning. Agencies draw from a variety of sources to recruit and train staff.
Various language training facilities were discussed with the Committee as were
strategies used by the agencies to ensure they maintain suitable linguistic capability.
2.36
The Committee received detailed classified evidence on the importance
that appropriate linguistic skills play in operational capabilities within the
AIC.
Separation rates and retention strategies
Separation rates
2.37
The average separation rate across the Australian Public Service (APS)
for 2009‑10 was 6.5 per cent.[22] However, the Committee
heard that this relatively low separation rate is not necessarily desirable for
all organisations within the AIC. While some organisations within the AIC are
actively working to lower their separation rates, one of the smaller agencies
considers a separation rate well in double figures to be right for it in order
to keep ‘people moving through [the agency]’. The agency told the Committee
that ‘otherwise you can become calcified very easily [and thus the organisation
aims] to get the right mix between continuity and change.’[23]
Another intelligence agency told the Committee that it aims to achieve a
retention rate of around 10 per cent in order ‘to keep the organisation vibrant
and healthy and growing.’[24]
2.38
The average separation rate during this period for the three Defence
intelligence agencies was 7.0 per cent.[25]
2.39
DSD has actively worked to lower its separation rate and informed the
Committee that in 2009-10, the most cited reasons for individuals leaving DSD
included following a spouse in a new job, increased family responsibilities,
and undertaking study or seeking a change in career/lifestyle. Separations
cited as ‘other’ showed a downward trend from 17.3 per cent in 2007-08 to 9.6
per cent in 2009-10. DSD found that the increase in staff leaving for the
private sector may be attributable in part to external factors such as changes
in the job market. Specifically, it seems likely that the continued strength of
the Australian economy and employment market provides more competition for DSD.[26]
2.40
ASIO’s separation rate for 2009-10 increased to five per cent compared
with 4.5 per cent in the previous year. ASIO offers separating staff the
opportunity to participate in a voluntary exit interview to help ASIO identify
reasons for departure and to address concerns requiring a management response.[27]
2.41
Within intelligence agencies, it is believed that there is a higher
separation rate among intelligence officers than among technical officers and,
therefore, assessment agencies will demonstrate a higher separation rate than
agencies which have a high technical personnel component.[28]
Retention strategies
2.42
The Committee took evidence from all agencies regarding their retention
strategies and the resources they commit to these strategies.
2.43
DSD told the Committee that it has directed considerable resources to
recruit and retain the right people. One of the initiatives that DSD has
implemented is to broadband advancement through a Unified Structure to retain
staff with critical technical and specialist skills. This provides employees
with the opportunity of advancing from one level to the next within a broadband
if they can successfully demonstrate that they meet certain advancement
requirements.[29]
2.44
ASIO is developing Human Capital Framework programs and initiatives such
as career management, leadership development and a contemporary employment
framework to facilitate the retention of its staff.[30]
Security issues
2.45
All intelligence agencies provide their staff with initial and on-going
security training. For example, all new DSD staff attend an Introduction to
Security seminar within the first three months of their commencement and,
following initial training, DSD provides ongoing security training for all
staff with its Security Refresher seminar. It is mandatory for all staff
to attend the refresher at least once every two years.[31]
All other agencies have similar security training programmes.
2.46
The Committee discussed with the relevant intelligence agency an
internal breach of procedures by an individual which had occurred during the
reporting period. After some discussion about the ensuing investigation and
remedial action the Committee was satisfied that the investigation into the
breach was handled in a timely and appropriate manner. This was the only
internal security breach within the AIC during the reporting period.[32]
Cyber security
2.47
Electronic interference is a growing security concern for all AIC
agencies. The agencies described to the Committee a range of risk mitigation
strategies which are being used to protect their systems from cyber attacks.
2.48
Following a recommendation in the 2009 Defence White Paper, the
Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) was established within DSD in late
2009. This is a multi-agency initiative to coordinate work against growing e-security
threats. Personnel from ASIO, the Attorney-General’s Department and the
Australian Federal Police work in the Centre with DSD to identify developing
cyber threats to critical infrastructure and determine appropriate responses.
2.49
ASIO told the Committee that maintaining information technology systems
that have the necessary controls and security to communicate at the TOP SECRET
level is expensive, both in the cost of security and the associated resource
costs in people:
Considerable personnel, security infrastructure and policy is
required, which can present a significant barrier to new members of the
national security community in building and maintaining these capabilities.[33]
2.50
The Committee is satisfied that all AIC agencies are taking the
necessary steps to address cyber security concerns within each organisation.
Cyber security is further addressed in Chapter 4.
Security clearances
2.51
The process of completing security clearances for newly recruited
personnel continues to consume large amounts of time and resources for AIC
agencies. Average vetting times lead to significant delays between candidates
being interviewed and commencing work. This delay impacts the agencies’
ability to accurately predict start dates for candidates and good candidates
are frequently lost to other employment as a result.
2.52
In 2009-10, the Defence intelligence agencies worked towards the
implementation of recommendations made by the IGIS following the Inquiry
into the Organisational Suitability Assessment policy and procedures.
Implementing the recommendations had implications for how the agencies carry out
their security clearances and during 2009-10 agencies were adjusting their
procedures in order to implement the recommendations. In some cases adjusting
to the new procedures meant a slight increase in processing time.
2.53
The Committee explored the reasons why some of the intelligence agencies
continue to do their own security vetting rather than join the new joint
vetting agency. The Committee heard that the agencies which continue to do
their own vetting also assess the candidate’s suitability to hold the
particular role when the security assessment is made:
It is very difficult to separate those judgments and
assessments throughout that process. For that reason, it was not appropriate
to outsource the security vetting role for the intelligence service.[34]
2.54
The Committee heard that although the vetting process is lengthy by
nature, agencies are looking at ways that vetting could be done better and they
hope to see some improvements in the process during the next year.[35]
Changes may include, as mentioned above, taking a more collaborative approach
to security vetting by some of the AIC agencies. Benefits envisaged of a
collaborative approach may include shortening the time vetting takes without
diminishing the quality of vetting.[36]
Visa Security Assessments
2.55
Any person applying for a visa to travel to, or remain in Australia may
have the application referred by the Department of Immigration and Citizenship
(DIAC) to ASIO for a Security Assessment.
2.56
In 2009-10, ASIO completed 38,438 visa Security Assessments including
989 assessments for protection visa applicants.[37]
During this period, ASIO issued adverse Security Assessments for nineteen
individuals seeking entry to Australia. Fourteen of these adverse assessments
were issued on counter-terrorism grounds and five were issued on espionage or
foreign interference grounds.[38]
2.57
In most visa categories, a visa may not be issued (or must be cancelled)
where ASIO determines the applicant to be directly or indirectly a risk to
‘security’ (as defined in the ASIO Act).[39]
2.58
The Committee received submissions from several refugee and asylum
seeker advocacy groups. Representatives of some advocacy groups gave evidence
to the Committee at the public hearing. All advocacy groups acknowledged the
importance of the visa security assessment process[40]
[41]
but they also raised their concerns about the process, including:
n the length of time
being taken by ASIO to conduct visa security assessments for refugees and
asylum seekers;
n that there is no obvious
reason why the process being applied to visitors who seek refugee status could
not be applied to asylum seekers who are currently subject to indefinite
mandatory detention;[42]
n concern that because
ASIO is prioritising assessments of people in detention, this results in
further delays for asylum seekers who are living in the community; [43]
n that people who have
had an ‘incredibly prolonged and very negative detention experience’ and are
eventually found to be owed protection will take into the community mental
health issues which ‘are going to undermine their capacity to be a productive
people within Australia.’;[44]
n that there are inappropriately
long periods between DIAC granting refugee status and ASIO completing the Visa
Security assessment; [45]
n that there should be
a means of risk assessing those who are least likely to prove problematic, with
a view to getting them out of detention much faster;[46]
n that ASIO’s
assessment processes are not transparent and asylum seekers who receive adverse
security assessments often do not know why an adverse decision was made;[47]
n that full disclosure
by ASIO of the non-statutory criteria it uses in undertaking visa security
assessments would be in the interest of ‘consistency, transparency and to
ensure that findings are free from bias and error’;[48]
n that there is no
right of appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for non-citizens who
receive adverse visa security assessments; [49] [50]
n that ASIO does not
always return important documents belonging to the asylum seekers[51],
and
n that the allocation
of resourcing of visa security assessments may not be sufficient to ensure that
assessments are done in a timely way. [52]
2.59
ASIO told the Committee that during 2009-10, managing visa security
assessments for the increased number of people coming to Australia via
Christmas Island has been a ‘particular challenge’ for the organisation. In
2008-09 ASIO carried-out two hundred security assessments on people arriving in
Australia seeking protected visas but in 2009-10 the figure jumped to nearly
3,000. This sharp increase has placed ASIO under considerable ‘resource
pressure’ and ASIO outlined to the Committee a number of steps it has taken to
address the situation, including improved processes.[53]
2.60
ASIO told the Committee that it works closely with DIAC:
... to prioritise caseloads, with an emphasis on detention
cases (including Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMAs)) and compassionate or
compelling cases, including identified by DIAC as vulnerable. [54]
2.61
In 2009–10, ASIO diverted significant resources to undertake security
assessments of IMAs for DIAC. Consequently, the resources available to assess
protection visa and other refugee referrals were limited and this caseload
experienced delays. ASIO said that it continues to work very closely with DIAC
to ensure visibility of the overall visa security assessment caseload and
agreed priorities.[55]
2.62
ASIO told the Committee that any person applying for a visa to travel
to, or remain in, Australia may have the application referred by DIAC to ASIO
for a Security Assessment:
Given the large volume of visa applications, it is not
practical for each one to be assessed by ASIO. A risk managed referral
framework has, therefore, been developed so that applications more likely to be
of concern are drawn to ASIO’s attention. Still, ASIO assesses many thousands
of visa applications annually.
In most visa categories, a visa may not be issued (or must be
cancelled) where ASIO determines the applicant to be directly or indirectly a
risk to ‘security’ (as defined in the ASIO Act). The enabling legislation in
this instance is the Migration Act 1958, specifically the Migration Regulations
1994 and public interest criterion 4002.
Separately to visa application referrals from DIAC, ASIO’s
security intelligence investigations will from time to time determine that the
holder of a valid visa to Australia (who is sometimes already in Australia, and
other times overseas) presents a risk to Australia’s security. In such circumstances
ASIO may provide to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship an adverse Security
Assessment, which would lead the Minister to cancel the visa.[56]
2.63
At the private hearing ASIO told the Committee that to ‘do assessments
properly, they require considerable time and effort.’ [57]
ASIO explained to the Committee that security assessments take as long as they
will take and cannot be speeded up or have a statutory timeframe put on them.
If an IMA comes onshore in Australia without identifying documentation and
gives one story to a DIAC officer and another story to ASIO these stories must,
in ASIO’s words, be ‘de-conflicted’.
2.64
The Committee is advised that IMAs regularly throw identity documents
overboard making the job of ASIO more difficult.
2.65
The process of de-conflicting stories without the ability to refer to
documents such as identity card or passports can make the security assessment
process a lengthy one.
2.66
Regarding the number of people currently waiting for a visa security
assessment, the Director-General told the Committee that:
... at the present time there are about 6,000 irregular
maritime arrivals in some form of detention, be it detention within the
community or otherwise. Of that number, currently ... there are 522 people
awaiting a security assessment ... [including] some people who have been
awaiting an assessment for a very long time. The reason for that is partly that
over the previous 18 months—certainly prior to the beginning of March this
year—ASIO was doing its security assessments according to priorities set for it
by DIAC. Those priorities were being set ... with the objective of trying to
move as many people out of detention as possible.[58]
2.67
The Committee asked ASIO for their response to concerns about withheld
original documentation. ASIO told the Committee that it ‘does not request or
take possession of documents belonging to Irregular Maritime Arrivals. On
occasion, Irregular Maritime Arrivals have offered ASIO photocopies of
documentation.’[59]
2.68
Although outside the 2009-10 scope of the inquiry, the Committee notes
that with effect from 1 March 2011 ASIO introduced a risk-managed
intelligence-led framework for security assessments. Application of the
framework has caused significant changes to the process. Now ASIO does not begin
to assess people until DIAC advises that they have reached a category called
‘1a met’, meaning that they are in the process to qualify for refugee status.
This will avoid spending time assessing people who were not going to be granted
refugee status. Also, with the risk-managed approach, ASIO is able to focus on
the more complex cases which require full investigation. Many of the 522 cases
mentioned above are complex cases from the previous year and, ASIO told the
Committee, it now has the ability to focus a very substantial part of its
resources on those complex cases.[60]
2.69
Since introducing the new risk management referral framework, all
arrivals are still subject to some form of assessment but most occur very
quickly.[61]
2.70
When asked by the Committee why ASIO cannot meet the Government’s
objective of completing all security assessments within three months, Mr Irvine
told the Committee that:
The first reason throughout most of last year was the sheer
number and the requirement to conduct a full investigation into every
individual who was not a minor during that process. Once that issue was
resolved with a much more risk management based process, we are still
confronted with the same sorts of issues that we had to address last year. The
first has been the identity issue. The fact is that people do need some form
of identity document to have got to Malaysia or Indonesia in most cases, before
they come to Australia, gut they do not arrive with them. This creates a whole
series of issues for us. Secondly, ... information provided is not always
accurate or truthful on some occasions and that sort of thing needs to be
checked.[62]
2.71
Regarding suggestions taken in evidence that ASIO ‘conducts its security
checks and makes its assessments based on information provided by the
government of the country from which that immigrant has come,’[63]
Mr Irvine said that he can give a categorical assurance that:
... ASIO’s policy, in accordance with government policy and
with Australia’s international obligations, does not refer the names of
individuals who have sought asylum in Australia to the host government. We just
do not do it. So our decisions are not, therefore, made on the basis of
information provided about an individual from the host government.[64]
2.72
The Director-General of ASIO responded to a question about the adequacy
of the resources it directs to the visa security assessment process, saying:
There is a real tension between the resources I would love to
have to put on to this process and the number of qualified people that I have
to do it. Some people will say “just get the government to give you more money
and you can go out and recruit more people and they can rush off and do it”.
The security assessment discipline requires very extensive training, and I am
very confident and personally convinced that, whatever their age—and the
demographic of ASIO is that, because we have grown so quickly, we have a lot of
young people in ASIO—the degree of training that we put people through to
qualify them to conduct this sort of security interview process will contribute
significantly to the integrity of that process. Yes, sure, they work under
pressure, they have to get through a lot of cases and so on, but I am confident
that what we are doing we are doing well and under appropriate conditions.[65]
2.73
The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) told the
Committee that, during 2009-10, she saw a significant increase in the number of
complaints from members of the public who were concerned about ‘the timeliness
with which ASIO processes security assessments in relation to visa
applications.’ The IGIS received ‘...
a total of 1015 new complaints about security assessments in 2009-10, compared
to 153 in 2008-09.’[66]
2.74
The IGIS is not able to direct ASIO to change the priority of a case, or
make the process quicker for a particular applicant but the IGIS can look at
individual complaints to see whether they indicate systemic problems. The IGIS
told the Committee that:
We continue to have discussions with senior ASIO staff about
its approach to security assessments for persons in this situation and have
looked at ASIO’s handling of a large number of these security assessments. In
considering these assessments we have found no evidence that ASIO had acted in
anything other than a proper and legal manner.[67]
2.75
Several advocacy groups noted that non-citizens who receive adverse visa
security assessments do not have a right of appeal to the Administrative
Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The Committee is aware that in 1998-1999, the IGIS
recommended to the Attorney-General:
... that the government introduce legislation to provide a
determinative review process for refugee applicants where appropriate
Australian authorities find that the applicants have a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to their country of origin.[68]
2.76
In the 2006-07 Annual Report of the IGIS, Mr Ian Carnell reiterated the recommendation
made by his predecessor in 1999.[69]
2.77
Whilst not expressing a view on the IGIS’ recommendation, the Committee
is of the opinion that it is timely for the Independent National Security
Legislation Monitor to examine the recommendation made by the IGIS in 1999 and
again in 2007, subject to having adequate resources.
2.78
At the public hearing, the Director-General of ASIO was asked about
resource implications should non-citizens be granted right of appeal to the AAT
if they receive an adverse security assessment. The Director-General said he
thought that ‘there would be significant resource implications’.[70]
2.79
The Committee notes the request by some advocacy groups for ASIO to
declare its non-statutory criteria for making visa security assessments. The
Committee believes that making non-statutory criteria publicly available could
have an adverse effect on national security and therefore does not support this
suggestion.
2.80
The Committee notes that since the previous Administration and
Expenditure inquiry, ASIO’s visa security assessment workload has increased
significantly. Processes for doing visa security assessments have been placed
under considerable strain and, in some cases, assessments have taken longer to
do than is desirable.
2.81
The Committee also notes that advocacy groups which are dissatisfied
with ASIO’s processes can contact the Independent National Security Legislation
Monitor.
2.82
The Committee notes that the IGIS has stated that ASIO is doing its job
in a “proper and legal manner”.[71]
2.83
The Committee takes very seriously the concerns put before it by various
refugee and asylum seeker advocacy groups but it also recognises that the job
ASIO has is a very difficult one. Therefore, the Committee welcomes the
efforts, introduced by ASIO on 1 March 2011, to streamline the process of
security assessments in an attempt to clear the backlog and to process future
assessments in less time. The Committee is satisfied that the current regime
for visa security assessments is the correct one.
ASIO personnel Security Assessments
2.84
ASIO undertakes personnel security assessments at the request of other
Australian Public Service agencies to determine if an individual can have
access to national security classified material.
2.85
ASIO completed 22,343 personnel Security Assessments in 2009-10. Among
these, ASIO issued one adverse and one qualified personnel Security Assessment.[72]
2.86
The majority of ASIO’s Security Assessments are resolved based on
material provided by the requesting agency. If there are issues of potential
security concern, ASIO undertakes further investigative actions.[73]
Counter-terrorism security assessments
2.87
ASIO conducts counter-terrorism checks at the request of AusCheck and
the Australian Federal Police. In 2009-10, ASIO completed 98,086 counter-terrorism Security
Assessments. Ninety-nine per cent of these were completed in five days.[74]
Breaches of security
2.88
All agencies assured the Committee that they continue to foster and
maintain very strong security cultures within their organisations. Organisational
security plans provide strategies to mitigate security risks and provide
frameworks for staff to practice sound security in daily business. ONA, for
example, reported to the Committee that it participates in inter-agency
security-related forums, and implements changes based on revised security
guides and bulletins issued by the forums. Additionally,
in order to further reduce the number of security breaches, it has introduced a
new security breach policy.[75]
2.89
DSD told the Committee that it continually monitors internal
infringement trends to assess and target security training needs and maintain
an appropriate security culture.[76]
2.90
ASIO noted that its security policies meet or exceed the standards laid
down in the Australian Government Protective Security Policy Framework. Its Security
Plan 2009-12 and Security Breach Policy provide strategies to
mitigate security risks and provide a framework for staff to ensure that sound
security is practiced in daily business. ASIO’s senior executive is briefed on
security breaches every quarter, and senior managers are notified of breaches
occurring within their divisions and branches.[77]
2.91
All other agencies reported that their policies also meet or exceed the
standards laid down in the Australian Government Protective Security Policy
Framework.
2.92
Agencies discussed with the Committee where security breaches had
occurred and what remedial action was taken. The Committee is satisfied that
breaches of security, where they occurred during 2009-10, were properly
investigated and appropriate remedial action was taken.
Staff surveys
2.93
All the AIC agencies conduct staff surveys annually or biennially. During
the reporting period surveys were used to capture key drivers and overall
levels of employee engagement in the agencies. Most agencies reported that
they performed above the Australian benchmark average for overall staff/agency engagement.
Some described changes to the Committee which had been or will be implemented
in response to findings from staff surveys during 2009-10.
2.94
DSD told the Committee that its staff survey was administered online
and, after presentation to the DSD Executive, results were presented to all
staff. The DSD survey consisted of 57 core questions, split across 11
categories. There was an option for anonymity and free-text space for
additional comments. DSD achieved a response rate of 69.4 per cent and an
overall engagement rate of 47 per cent.[78] DSD reported to the
Committee that when benchmarked against Australian Central Government Agencies
it is performing above average across all survey categories. However, it noted
opportunities to improve in the areas of change management, career development
and learning and development.[79]
2.95
ONA engages external consultants at least every two years to conduct a
staff attitudinal survey to measure corporate health and how staff members
think ONA is performing across a range of areas. ONA’s most recent survey was
conducted in November 2010 which, although outside the reporting period of
2009-10, enabled ONA to report to the Committee that results indicated that 80
per cent of ONA employees are fully engaged and external benchmarking indicates
that ONA ‘is performing well above the Australian government and Australian
workforce averages on all survey items and categories and set new benchmark
highs for most categories surveyed’.[80]
Accommodation
ASIO’s new central office
2.96
As at 30 June 2010, the base building architectural design work had been
completed for ASIO’s new central office on Constitution Avenue in Parkes,
Canberra. At this time, the fit-out design was 85 per cent complete and so was
the excavation work.
2.97
Construction of the building commenced in September 2009 with
construction of levels one, two and three well underway at the end of the
reporting period.
2.98
During 2010-11, construction activity will include the completion of the
erection of the facade and continuation of the interior fit-out. At the time of
writing their submission, ASIO reported that construction was progressing on
schedule for the building to be handed over to ASIO in mid-2012, with the main
relocation of ASIO staff to commence from late 2012.
2.99
The building is being designed and constructed in partnership with the
Department of Finance and Deregulation (Finance). ASIO told the Committee that
close financial management against the project schedule by ASIO and Finance
(through a jointly chaired Steering Committee), has ensured that the project is
proceeding on time and within budget and scope. However, given the nature of
the security environment and the pace of technological change, it is inevitable
that additional capabilities will need to be added to the new building to
maintain ASIO’s capacity to provide sound advice to Government on issues of
national security.[81]
Other agencies
2.100
Each agency updated the Committee on accommodation issues. In some cases
accommodation is satisfactory, in other cases agencies are finding that they
are reaching capacity in accommodation terms. Agencies described the
strategies being adopted to solve accommodation pressures where they exist.
2.101
ONA reported that it was planning to move into new premises in June 2011.
It entered into a lease based on a market commercial rent with the Industry
Superannuation Property Trust (ISPT) for the former Patent Office at 2 National
Circuit, Barton. ISPT was fully refurbishing the heritage building in
accordance with a conservation management plan. Following some unexpected
delays which were outside ONA’s control or responsibility, at the time of
speaking to the Committee, the estimated completion date was June 2011.[82]
2.102
ONA expects its new offices to ‘provide significant environmental
benefits for ONA’. Design efforts met the 4.5 start National Australian Built
Energy Rating System mandated by the Energy Efficiency in Government Operations
policy.[83]
2.103
DSD told the Committee that its workforce expansion has placed
significant pressure on its accommodation. DSD informed the Committee about its
management of these accommodation issues.[84]
Performance management and evaluation
2.104
Each agency within the AIC demonstrated to the Committee that
performance management and evaluation, both at the organisational level and at
the level of individual employees is a key element of strategic planning and
organisational growth.
Organisational performance management
2.105
During 2009-10, ASIO made changes to its internal performance reporting
mechanisms. According to ASIO these changes:
... have provided the Organisation with an improved tool to
measure its performance against pre-determined benchmarks. The new reporting
format captures performance indicators, outcomes and risks centrally, which has
resulted in more focused discussion and pro-active decision-making by ASIO’s
Corporate Executive.[85]
2.106
ONA reported to the Committee that its system for regularly reviewing
organisational performance has been useful in identifying resource and skills
gaps as well as assessing other performance-related factors.[86]
Individual performance management
2.107
During 2009-10 ASIO formulated its Human Capital Framework which
‘integrates all people functions into a single, strategic system directed
specifically at building people capability rather than a discrete set of
fragmented administrative processes’.[87]
2.108
DSD told the Committee that management and leadership capability development
remains of high importance to DSD. In 2009-10, the organisation continued to
invest in leadership and management development through the Executive
Leadership Development Program and Middle Management Development Program. Both
programmes are conducted for staff in the Defence I&S Group.[88]
2.109
All ONA staff members participated in ONA’s Performance Development
Framework (PDF) during 2009-10. The PDF focuses on each individual’s role,
specific priorities and broader behaviour and capability expectations
consistent with the APS Integrated Leadership System. ONA told the Committee
that each employee and their manager are required to meet and discuss
priorities for the year ahead, and to document their agreement. The PDF
requires participation in biannual performance reviews and a rating process
which determines annual remuneration outcomes for individual employees.[89]
Issues raised by the IGIS
2.110
In her submission to the Committee, the IGIS raised two issues relating
to ASIO: complaints about the timeliness of ASIO visa security assessments and
archives-related complaints. [90] The timeliness of ASIO visa
security assessments was discussed above under the sub-heading Visa Security
Assessments. Archives-related complaints are discussed below.
Archives-related complaints
2.111
The IGIS told the Committee that to assist with general monitoring of
ASIO’s overall archives performance, the Director-General of Security provides
IGIS with quarterly progress reports.
2.112
The IGIS ran an inquiry into an archive related matter which concerned
the adequacy or otherwise of the transfer of historical cinefilm records to VHS
cassette format and the subsequent destruction of the original cinefilm in the
early 1990s. The inquiry confirmed that the storage arrangements were inadequate
and are contributing to the degradation and destruction of the cinefilm. To
minimise further damage, ASIO undertook to relocate the film to an appropriate
location, in negotiation with the National Archives of Australia. This
relocation was delayed and at 30 June 2010 the cinefilm remained in inappropriate
storage conditions. However, the IGIS was notified that the transfer of the
film was completed in December 2010.[91] The issue concerning
archive–related complaints has therefore been satisfactorily resolved.
2.113
The IGIS had no further issues to raise with the Committee relating to
the Administration and Expenditure of the AIC agencies during the period 2009-10.
Conclusions
2.114
Extensive organisational growth and change over the last few years has
presented challenges to all AIC agencies but the Committee is satisfied that
all agencies are overseeing their administrative functions satisfactorily and
mostly to a high standard.
2.115
Recruitment continues to be a high priority and a resource intensive
activity for the AIC. Attracting staff of high calibre with the necessary
skill sets is difficult and resource intensive but the agencies demonstrated to
the Committee that each continues to seek new and/or better ways of approaching
this challenge.
2.116
AIC agencies continue to invest heavily in the training and development
of their staff and the Committee believes that new approaches supporting improved
engagement between AIC agencies, academia and the private sector are
appropriate. The Committee will examine the results of this engagement in its
next Administration and Expenditure Review.
2.117
The Committee notes that two issues were raised by the IGIS in relation
to ASIO, and is satisfied that both are being or have been addressed.
2.118
The Committee is satisfied that overall the administration of the six
intelligence and security agencies is currently sound.