Chapter 2 The Listings
The Criteria for listing an organisation
2.1
To be specified as a terrorist organisation for the purpose of paragraph
(b) of the definition of terrorist organisation in section 102.1 of the
Criminal Code, the Minister:
.. must be satisfied on reasonable grounds that the
organisation is directly or indirectly engaged in, preparing, planning,
assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act (whether or not the
terrorist act has occurred or will occur).[1]
2.2
At the hearing on 1 February 2005 for the Review of the
listing of six terrorist organisations, the Director-General of ASIO
advised the Committee of ASIO’s evaluation process in selecting entities for
proscription under the Criminal Code. Some of the factors included:
- engagement in
terrorism;
- ideology and links to
other terrorist groups or networks;
- links to Australia;
- threat to Australian
interests;
- proscription by the
UN or like-minded countries; and
- engagement in
peace/mediation processes.[2]
2.3
The Committee continues to use these criteria as the basis of its
reviews of all listings.
Overview
2.4
The Committee’s view is that, given their records and stated purposes,
all the organisations reviewed in this report fit the definition of a terrorist
organisation under the Act and for the purposes of the proscription power. The
Committee would not have recommended disallowance of any of these organisations
had it been able to complete its review of these organisations within the
disallowance period.
2.5
As in previous Committee reports into listings and re-listings of
terrorist organisations, this report identifies issues relating to the current
nature and reach of each of the organisations, with particular emphasis on
developments since the Committee last reviewed the listing of these organisations.
As previously stated by the Committee in its report, Review of the
re-listing of Al-Qa’ida and Jemaah Islamiyah (October 2006):
The Committee believes that it is important that the
Parliament seek to establish as accurate a picture as possible of the nature,
size, reach, and effectiveness of organisations that are subject to section
102.1 of the Criminal Code and that these reviews should reflect the most
current information available about the organisations under review.
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula
2.6
This is the initial listing of Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).
2.7
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for listing AQAP can be
found at Appendix B.
2.8
On the basis of the Attorney-General’s statement of reasons and other
publicly available information, and taking into account evidence provided by
ASIO at a private hearing, AQAP has been measured against ASIO’s stated
evaluation process as follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.9
The statement of reasons states that ‘AQAP has been involved in a number
of terrorist attacks, continues to plan and conduct attacks in Yemen and has
claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks outside Yemen.’
2.10
Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (Jane’s) lists a number of other
attacks not listed in the statement of reasons, carried out by AQAP in 2010:
- On 26 April, an AQAP
suicide bomber targeted the convoy of the British ambassador to Yemen in the
capital Sanaa. Two security officials and a civilian were wounded in the attack
but the ambassador was unhurt.
- On 19 June, at least
11 people - seven security officers and four civilians - were killed and six
others were injured when alleged AQAP militants assaulted a building utilised
by intelligence officials in the al-Tawahi district of Aden in Aden
governorate. Several suspected militants were freed from custody during the
attack.
- On 14 July, AQAP
militants on motorcycles stormed a security and intelligence office in
Zinjibar, Abyan province, killing four people. In a subsequent statement, the
AQAP's Jamil al-Ambari Martyr Brigades claimed that the attack was conducted in
response to the killing of one of its members in Abyan.
- On 23 July, AQAP militants
ambushed a military patrol in Shabwah province, killing six soldiers.
- On 29 October, two
IEDs, sent from Yemen using international courier companies, were intercepted
in the in the UK and the United Arab Emirates. The devices were disguised as packages
and addressed to synagogues in Chicago. The packages were discovered at East
Midlands airport near the city of Nottingham in the UK, and at a FedEx sorting
facility in Dubai in the UAE. Both of the packages contained computer printer
equipment packed with explosive powder and attached to wires. US officials
stated that information provided by Saudi Arabian intelligence services helped
to identify the threat. In claiming responsibility for the attempted attacks,
AQAP further claimed to have been responsible for the downing of a UPS cargo
plane in Dubai in early September in which two crew members were killed.
However, this final claim could not be independently verified.[3]
2.11
Jane’s reports the following attack carried out by AQAP in 2011:
- Twelve soldiers were
killed when AQAP militants attacked three military vehicles in the city of
Lawdar in Yemen's Abyan governorate on 7 January, Al-Jazeera and Saba News
Agency reported. Two of the vehicles were completely destroyed in the attack. A
civilian passer-by was also wounded.[4]
2.12
In addition to the above attacks Jane’s reports the following attack
carried out by ‘suspected AQAP militants’ in 2011:
- A bodyguard was
killed and three others were wounded when suspected AQAP militants attacked the
convoy of a local government official in the Lawdar area of Yemen's Abyan
governorate on 7 January, Saba News Agency reported. The official, who was not
harmed in the attack, had been visiting the site of an earlier ambush in Lawdar
where 12 soldiers were killed.[5]
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.13
AQAP is a Sunni militant Islamist organisation which aims to:
. . . cleanse the Arabian Peninsula of foreign influence,
particularly Western military personnel and civilian contractors; and to
establish a single Islamic caliphate in place of the existing regimes in Yemen
and Saudi Arabia.[6]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.14
The statement of reasons does not point to any significant links to
other terrorist groups/networks.
2.15
Somali Government Officials have suggested that AQAP has links to Hizbul
Islam[7] however Jane’s states
that ‘. . .there is currently no evidence to suggest any tangible operational
co-operation between the groups.[8]’
Links to Australia
2.16
The statement of reasons gave no information on any specific link to
Australia. However, in February 2011 it was claimed on the ABC’s Foreign
Correspondent television programme that Yemen is ‘Al-Qaeda’s new frontier
and a launching pad for Jihadi-inspired terrorism’ and that the leader of AQAP,
Anwar Al-Awlaki, is drawing recruits ‘from many nations around the world,
including Australia’.[9] The International Centre
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) has confirmed
this.[10]
2.17
ASIO told the Committee at a private hearing that:
AQAP has released four editions of the quarterly
English-language magazine Inspire, aimed at radicalising and mobilising
Muslim youth in the West. Australia was mentioned twice in the second edition,
once as a suitable country for attacks.[11]
Threat to Australian interests
2.18
The statement of reasons gave no information on any specific threats to
Australia. However, the role played by AQAP in the failed 25 December 2009
attempt to blow up Northwest Airlines flight 253 over Detroit in the United
States indicates that the group now poses a tangible threat beyond the Arabian
Peninsula and are a general threat to Australians who may be travelling
internationally and become caught up in attacks elsewhere.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.19
The statement of reasons notes that AQAP is listed by the United States
as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation under Section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.
2.20
At the private hearing the Committee heard that AQAP was proscribed by the United Nations on 19
January 2010 and that it has also been listed in the United Kingdom and Canada.
New Zealand has also listed AQAP as a terrorist organisation.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.21
The statement of reasons provides no information on this matter.
Al-Qa’ida
2.22
Al-Qa’ida (AQ) was initially listed as a terrorist organisation under
the Criminal Code on 21 October 2002. This is the fourth re-listing of the
organisation.
2.23
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for re-listing AQ can be
found at Appendix C.
2.24
On the basis of the Attorney-General’s statement of reasons and other
publicly available information, and taking into account evidence provided by
ASIO at a private hearing, AQ has been measured against ASIO’s stated
evaluation process as follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.25
The statement of reasons states that ‘Al-Qa’ida has directly or
indirectly engaged in a number of terrorist attacks, including assassinations,
suicide bombings, aircraft hijackings and attacks using improvised explosive
devices (IEDs) including vehicle-borne and vessel borne’. Specific evidence
related to these categories is listed in a series of dot points. The Committee
notes that these end on 20 September 2008.
2.26
In addition to these attacks, AQ ‘franchises’ such as AQAP and AQIM also
carry out terrorist attacks.
2.27
Jane’s states that:
. . .Al-Qaeda currently has four major theatres of operation:
Afghanistan-Pakistan, the Middle East, North Africa and Europe. There is also a
small Al-Qaeda presence in East Africa, primarily operating alongside Somali
insurgents, and the group has expressed support for Uighur separatists in
China, although there has been no indication of any Al-Qaeda presence on the
ground in China.[12]
2.28
Jane’s gives a striking description of the methodology favoured by AQ:
Trademark Al-Qaeda attacks involve multiple, simultaneous or
near-simultaneous suicide bombings using conventional explosives. Al-Qaeda took
the concept of suicide attackers driving vehicles rigged with explosives and
adapted it for air and maritime operations. In October 2002, Al-Qaeda attacked
the USS Cole using an explosive laden boat and has planned similar maritime
attacks. No explosives were needed when Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four
airliners on 11 September 2001 and crashed them into the World Trade Centre and
the Pentagon.[13]
2.29
There is some evidence to suggest that Al-Qaeda planners continue to
develop new ways to circumvent the security measures introduced since 11
September 2001, but suicide bombers, whether on foot or driving vehicles,
remain the simplest and therefore most likely form of attack.[14]
2.30
ASIO gave evidence that:
Despite a reduction in attacks in recent times, AQ has made
numerous statements calling on supporters to undertake acts of terrorism and
continues to provide encouragement to affiliated and line groups around the
world.[15]
Ideology
2.31
Founded in 1988, AQ is a radical Sunni Muslim group which subscribes to
Salafist ideology.[16] Jane’s illustrates
Al-Qa’ida’s ideology in further detail:
Al-Qaeda's long-term aim is the creation of a pan-Islamic
global Khalifa (Caliphate) based on its interpretation of the Quran. The
organisation's initial focus was on attacking US interests, ostensibly in an
effort to force it to withdraw its military forces from Muslim countries. It
now supports the establishment of an 'Islamic State of Iraq' and an 'Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan' that can operate as bases for an ongoing jihad against
its infidel and apostate enemies. The overthrow of Arab regimes, especially the
Saudi royal family, remains a stated priority, as does the destruction of Israel.
It also continues to plot attacks against Western countries to force them to
withdraw their troops from Iraq and Afghanistan, and to withdraw their support
from Arab regimes targeted by Al-Qaeda and its allies. In an audio message
released by the group in January 2010, the speaker - purported to be Osama bin
Laden - highlighted the liberation of Palestine and the ending of US support
for Israel as a key objective. Al-Qaeda also serves as an inspirational model
for others seeking to protect Muslims, retaliate against perceived oppression
and to eject non-Muslim influences from Islamic societies.[17]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.32
The statement of reasons notes that AQ provides international
inspiration and influence to a large number of affiliated and aligned groups
around the world, two of which, JI and AQIM, will be reviewed later in this
report.
2.33
Jane’s states that:
Al-Qaeda has been linked to nearly every Sunni Islamist group
over the years and it is often difficult to assess the strength of these ties.
However, the group's closest and most important alliances are with the Afghan
Taliban and like-minded Pakistani groups. These groups effectively provide the
Al-Qaeda leadership with its primary basing area. Al-Qaeda operatives are also
operating in support of Shabab insurgents in Somalia.[18]
2.34
These links to affiliated terrorist organisations are also reinforced by
AQ’s propaganda statements:
….the main way the [Al-Qaeda] leadership imposes some control
and uniformity of purpose is through its broadcasts and web postings. These
have attained increasing sophistication and follow a clear pattern, promoting
recruitment, keeping local groups motivated and providing overall protection.[19]
Links to Australia
2.35
The statement of reasons gives no information on any specific link to
Australia.
Threat to Australian interests
2.36
The likelihood that AQ has shifted some of its focus from Iraq to
Afghanistan makes it probable that Australian troops in Afghanistan confront
armed forces linked to AQ.
2.37
ASIO gave evidence that AQ does pose a direct threat to Australia and
Australian interests worldwide:
The interest of AQ in undertaking attacks against Australian
interests is clearly indicated by Osama bin Laden and other Islamist extremists
and through the circulation of press articles regarding Australia’s activities
in areas of militant jihad.[20]
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.38
The statement of reasons states that AQ is proscribed by the United
Nations and by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the
United States and is also listed by the European Union for the purposes of its
anti-terrorism measures.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.39
The statement of reasons provides no information on this matter.
Jemaah Islamiyah
2.40
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was originally specified as a terrorist
organisation for the purposes of section 102.1 of the Criminal Code on 27 October 2002. This is the fourth re-listing of this organisation.
2.41
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for re-listing JI can be
found at Appendix D.
2.42
On the basis of the statement of reasons and other publicly available
information, and taking into account evidence provided by ASIO at a private
hearing, JI has been measured against ASIO’s stated evaluation process as
follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.43
The statement of reasons lists one anti-Western attack committed by JI
in South-East Asia since the last re-listing. Bombing attacks against the
Marriott and the Ritz Carlton on 17 July 2009 killed seven civilians including
three Australians.
2.44
The statement of reasons also point out that:
[I]nformation and materiel seized in operations against JI
linked individuals since 2008 demonstrate JI retains the capability and intent
to use violence to achieve its goals – and networks linked to JI continue to
plan to conduct terrorist attacks in Southeast Asia.
2.45
Jane’s states that JI remains a threat although more and more splits
have appeared as it struggles to cope with arrests of senior figures and
widespread infiltration by Indonesian security forces:
The JI 'mainstream' continues to focus on consolidation and
rebuilding; a small group of more militant younger members appears to be under
government surveillance. The head of a JI splinter faction, Noordin Mohammad
Top, suspected by Indonesian security forces of responsibility for the 17 July
2009 Jakarta hotel bombings, was killed by police during a raid in September.
To the extent that any mainstream JI members are committed to ongoing jihad in
Indonesia, they are more focused on local targets - 'apostate' officials and
non-Muslims in conflict areas. There is a general consensus in the group that
attacks on foreigners have been counter-productive. JI remains committed to
providing military training for members and amassing weapons for a future jihad
but finds itself hard-pressed to do either. A new organisation formed by former
JI leader Abu Bakar Baasyir in September 2008, Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid, may eat
into JI's membership.[21]
2.46
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) states that JI has
continued to evolve since the first Bali bombings catapulted the group to international
prominence in 2002:
As several studies have shown, the main JI faction has in
recent years limited its direct support for violent activities and has also
suffered from a loss of supporters following years of arrests and internal
discord.
However, the emergence of hardened, experienced militants
from the conflict in the southern Philippines and the recent release of JI
cadres from prisons in Indonesia, who have become ostracised by the mainstream
JI group, are breeding a new generation of radicalised fringe groups. Together
with regional countries such as Australia, the Indonesian Government, religious
and community leaders will need to take effective action in order to stem the
emergence of these radical movements.[22]
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.47
The statement of reasons states that the primary objective of JI is the
establishment, through armed struggle, of an Islamic state in Indonesia and a regional Islamic caliphate.
2.48
ASPI asserts that:
JI’s immediate goal is the Islamisation of Indonesia, a
vision that dates back to DI [Darul Islam] and its assertion that the only
legitimate basis for the state was one that fully embodied the Muslim faith as
its sole foundation. JI took this original conception and enshrined it as a
fundamental component of a broader ideological vision that viewed Daulah Islamiyah as the necessary catalyst for the restoration of Islamic
governance across Southeast Asia.[23]
2.49
This ideological view must be understood in the context of JI’s enduring
intent to restore Islamic governance through force of arms. ASPI states:
An enduring theme highlighted throughout PUPJI [Pedoman Umum
Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah or General Guide for the Struggle of JI] is the idea of
acting as a distinctly ‘military outfit’…..the frequent use of the terms
intelligence and recruitment (tajnid) and the detailed exposition of how to
execute armed operations are prominent throughout the manifesto. Those elements
together with an increasing orientation towards martyrdom–which is vindicated
as a force equaliser and the most visible means of establishing a true
pioneering vanguard to champion the Islamic faith–are strong indicators that
JI’s conception of jihad is one that is explicitly aimed at combat (qital), as
opposed to diplomacy or dialogue.[24]
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.50
Jane’s lists Al-Qa’ida and the MILF[25] as organisations with
which JI has alliances. Jane’s asserts:
Within Indonesia, JI has close communication with other
jihadist groups such as Mujahidin KOMPAK, and Ring Banten (a West Java-based
Darul Islam faction that co-operated with JI on the first Bali bombing and with
Noordin on the Australian embassy bombing).
Two suspected JI militants were killed in Jakarta on 9 March
2010. Security officials alleged that the suspects had links to an organisation
identifying itself as Al-Qaeda in Indonesia, against whom security officials
had launched a series of operations in Aceh province in the preceding week.
However, the extent to which this newly identified group exists as a distinct,
operational outfit is uncertain.[26]
2.51
The International Crisis Group (ICG) frames JI as part of a broader
South Asia jihadi movement that is influenced by global Islamic extremist
trends:
…jihadi ideology has taken root and has spread beyond the
groups known to have used violence in the past. Some thirty JI-affiliated
schools continue to educate the children and younger siblings of JI members and
recruit new leaders for the organisation. Contacts with South Asia continue,
particularly in Pakistan and Bangladesh…the Taliban resurgence on the
Pakistan-Afghan border eventually could draw in Southeast Asians.
….Above all, it is important to underscore that the jihadi
movement is dynamic, always adapting, and mutating….the greater danger may lie
in groups or individuals….that may emerge and be able to draw on dissatisfied
members of JI and other organisations.[27]
Links to Australia
2.52
No reference is made in the statement of reasons to any links to
Australia.
Threat to Australian interests
2.53
The threat to Australians travelling in Indonesia is still present. Australia continues to issue travel warnings to Australians travelling to Indonesia.
2.54
At the private hearing ASIO gave evidence that ‘JI represents an
enduring threat to Australian interests in South-East Asia, particularly
Indonesia.’[28]
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.55
JI is proscribed as a terrorist organisation by the United Nations and
by the governments of Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United
States.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.56
The Statement of reasons contains no information on this.
Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
2.57
Al-Qa’ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), formerly known at
the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), was initially listed under the
Criminal Code as a terrorist organisation, in 2002 following their listing by
the United Nations Security Council. The Committee first considered the
listing of the GSPC in 2004 after the Committee’s role in the Criminal procedure
had been established. This is the fourth re-listing of GSPC/AQIM.
2.58
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for re-listing AQIM can be
found at Appendix E.
2.59
On the basis of the statement of reasons and other publicly available
information, and taking into account evidence provided by ASIO at a private
hearing, AQIM has been measured against ASIO’s stated evaluation process as
follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.60
Jane’s states that AQIM has maintained a high operational tempo since
its emergence under this name in January 2007:
... targeting the Algerian military and security services in
non-suicidal ambushes, kidnappings, and bomb attacks. In addition, the group has
claimed responsibility for carrying out a handful of suicide attacks. In August
2008, it was reportedly involved in nine separate attacks on a range of targets
which resulted in nearly 80 people being killed and many hundreds injured.[29]
2.61
The statement of reasons’ comprehensive list of terrorist attacks
provides substantial evidence of recent engagement in terrorist activity by
AQIM. These attacks are independently verified by Jane’s.[30]
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.62
The GSPC was founded in 1998 and was re-named AQIM in January 2007. Its
immediate objectives are:
. . . to overthrow the Algerian regime and to replace it
with an Islamic state under sharia (Islamic law). It seeks to achieve
this by attacking regime targets including the military, police and security
services.[31]
2.63
The statement of reasons concludes that since:
. . . GSPC’s merger with al-Qa’ida in late 2006 and name
change to AQIM in early 2007, the group increasingly has adhered to al-Qa’ida’s
extremist ideology and has declared war against foreigners and foreign
interests.
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.64
In relation to its name change Jane’s says of AQIM that;
The name change is indicative of the group’s desire to
transform itself into an Al-Qaeda regional affiliate, expand its aims beyond Algeria to create a regional caliphate and adopt a pan-Islamic, as opposed to
nationalistic, jihadist ideology.[32]
2.65
The above statement shows that AQIM is concerned with forging links with
other terrorist organisations.
2.66
Jane’s states that:
It is possible that AQIM's Al-Qaeda branding could help it
attract support from across the North Africa region and even co-opt other
national groups such as the Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM) and the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), thereby extending the group's operational
reach. Similarly, AQIM is likely to seek to transform North African Islamist
cells in Europe into attack cells capable of perpetrating an attack similar to
the Madrid train bombings of March 2004.[33]
Links to Australia and threats to Australian interests
2.67
The statement of reasons lists no links to Australia and no specific
threats to Australian interests, however, at the private hearing ASIO stated
that:
AQIM has not specifically threatened Australia or Australian
interests in the Sahel or the Magreb, but AQIM openly states its desire to
attack Western interests, and Australia, as a Western country and ally of the
United States, is therefore a legitimate target. [34]
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.68
AQIM is proscribed by the United Nations and by the United States. Canada
and the UK still list the AQIM as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat
(GSPC).
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.69
The statement of reasons lists no engagement in any peace/processes by
AQIM.
Jamiat ul-Ansar
2.70
Jamiat ul-Ansar (JuA) was originally listed in 2002 under the Criminal
Code as a terrorist organisation following its listing by the United Nations
Security Council. This is the fourth re-listing of JuA.
2.71
JuA is also known as Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), having changed its
name to Jamiat ul-Ansar in 2003. The United States, the United Nations, Canada and the United Kingdom all list it as HuM. Jane’s also refers to the organisation as
HuM.
2.72
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for re-listing JuA can be
found at Appendix F.
2.73
On the basis of the statement of reasons and other publicly available
information, and taking into account evidence provided by ASIO at a private
hearing, JuA has been measured against ASIO’s stated evaluation process as
follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.74
The statement of reasons states that JuA has been involved in a number
of terrorist activities over the past eleven years, including hijacking,
bombings, abductions and training. In 2002 JuA member Ahmed Omar Sheikh was
convicted of the abduction and beheading of US journalist Daniel Pearl. In
February 2009, members of a terrorist cell with links to JuA and reportedly
responsible for six attacks in Kabul, Afghanistan, were arrested. In February
2010, two JuA members were among five militants killed by Indian security
forces in Sopore, Kashmir. The militants blew up two houses in the battle with
security forces.
2.75
Jane’s provides the following assessment of JuA’s engagement in
terrorist activities:
HuM has conducted raids on Indian security positions and
terrorised Muslim and Hindu communities in the IAK [Indian Administered
Kashmir]. It has murdered Kashmiri Muslims accused of not supporting union with
Pakistan, as well as targeted Hindus in a bid to force them from the territory.
The HuM, sometimes under the name of al-Faran, has also conducted a number of
kidnaps of foreigners (some have been murdered) in a bid to free imprisoned
leaders of the organisation.[35]
2.76
In the Committee’s previous inquiry into the re-listing of JuA, the
Committee found that JuA’s involvement in terrorist activity might have
decreased since 2002. However, Jane’s noted at the time that some of JuA’s
former members had joined other groups, such as the Pakistani Taliban, or they
were operating under various guises which allowed them to remain highly
dangerous, especially in Pakistan. Jane’s also noted that during 2008 unconfirmed
reports suggested that the JuA was regrouping.[36]
2.77
The Indian press reported in April 2008 that the group, along with
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Al-Badar, had set up new offices, with JuA planning to
change its name to Ansar-ul-Umma. Another separate media report suggested that
the JuA had resurfaced as the Al Hilal Trust in Pakistan's port city, Karachi. More
recently Jane’s has advised that:
In recent times ... the group's support base has grown
steadily and it is now believed to have several thousand fighters in
Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PAK) as well as India's southern Kashmir and
Doda regions. [37]
2.78
In March 2010 an Indian official claimed that there were 45 JuA cadres
operating in Assam.[38]
2.79
At the private hearing ASIO noted that JuA has redirected its main
efforts from Kashmir to supporting the Afghan insurgency ‘including recruiting
and training volunteers from JuA-run madrasahs to suicide operations against
coalition forces.’[39]
2.80
The Committee is satisfied that JuA continues to be a an organisation
that is actively and directly preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering
the doing of terrorist acts.
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.81
The JuA began in 1985 as a militant group intent on ridding Afghanistan
of the Soviet invader, and later turned its attention to attacking what it and
other groups of religious extremists regard as Hindu domination of IAK. JuA
supports radical Islamist organisations across the world but, according to
Jane’s, its effectiveness in this regard is minimal. The JuA rejects democracy
of even the most Islamic-oriented style, and wants to establish a caliphate
based on sharia (Islamic law), in addition to achieving accession of all
Kashmir to Pakistan. [40]
2.82
The JuA espouses transfer of Pakistan's nuclear and weapons technology
to other Muslim states (although its stance on such proposed action concerning
Shia Iran is not clear), and advocates the use of Pakistan's nuclear weapons
against India. It opposes efforts to normalise relations between Pakistan and
India claiming that the differences between the two countries are territorial,
religious and ideological. [41]
2.83
The statement of reasons notes that JuA has pledged support for Afghan
militants fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Additionally, some
elements within JuA have wanted to re-focus their activities and bring them
more into line with Osama bin Laden’s global jihad against the US and Israel
and their allies.
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.84
The statement of reasons states that JuA has cooperated with other
militant groups operating in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Pakistan such as
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaish-e Muhammad, and Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan. Furthermore, JuA leader Khalil has strong ties to the Taliban and
al-Qa’ida and in 1998 signed Usama bin Laden’s fatwa calling for attacks on the
US and its allies.
2.85
It is clear to the Committee that JuA is deeply entrenched within the
global Jihadi movement. JuA has also been closely linked with the Al-Qaeda
network and has provided training and religious instruction to other associated
terrorist organisations and individual Jihadists from around the world.
Links to Australia
2.86
The statement of reasons mentions no direct links to Australia.
Threats to Australian interests
2.87
As mentioned above, the statement of reasons notes that JuA has pledged
support for Afghan militants fighting Coalition forces in Afghanistan. As part
of the Coalition forces in Afghanistan, JuA poses a direct threat to Australian
Defence personnel and other Australians in Afghanistan.
2.88
The statement of reasons makes no reference to any direct threat to
Australia. However JuA’s close links with and support of Al-Qaeda indicates
that JuA and associated groups within Pakistan pose a threat to Australians in
Pakistan.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.89
The JuA is listed under the name Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HuM) by the
United Nations and is also listed by the governments of Canada, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Pakistan.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.90
The statement of reasons provides no information on this matter.
Abu Sayyaf Group
2.91
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was initially listed under the Criminal Code as
a terrorist organisation in 2002 following listing by the United Nations
Security Council. This is the ASG’s fourth re-listing.
2.92
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for re-listing the ASG can
be found at Appendix G.
2.93
On the basis of the statement of reasons and other publicly available
information, and taking into account evidence provided by ASIO at a private
hearing, the ASG has been measured against ASIO’s stated evaluation process as
follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.94
According to the statement of reasons the ASG has been responsible for the
planning and conduct of terrorist attacks against a wide range of targets, but
particularly the Philippine government, and Christian and Western interests.
The statement of reasons notes that ASG attacks in the past few years have to a
large degree been motivated by financial gain rather than purely political,
religious or ideological purposes – but the proceeds of these attacks are used
to support the ASG’s operations.
2.95
In February 2010, ‘a group of approximately 70 ASG militants led by Commander
Puriji Indama attacked the village of Tubigan on the island province of
Basilan. At least 12 civilians were killed and 17 others were wounded in what
was reported as the worst attack on civilians in nine years.’[42]
The statement of reasons says that these were revenge attacks following the
death of ASG sub-commander Parad who was killed during a Philippine military
operation a week earlier.
2.96
In April 2010, the ASG further demonstrated their capacity to carry out
mass casualty operations when the group carried out an attack involving a
series of bomb explosions in the city of Isabela in Basilan province, in which
15 people - six civilians, four security force personnel, and five alleged ASG
militants - were killed and 17 others, 13 civilians, two soldiers and two
police officers, were wounded:
The attackers, reportedly wearing military uniforms,
detonated the first device apparently targeting a government building, which
left six civilians dead, followed by a second device targeting a Catholic
church, which wounded 13 civilians, while a third device was destroyed, with no
casualties, in a controlled explosion at a bus terminal. An armed clash between
suspected militants and local police then ensued at a security checkpoint in
the city during which the remaining casualties were sustained. Security
officials alleged that one of the militants killed was Benzar Indama, the
brother of a suspected senior ASG leader in Basilan. [43]
2.97
Jane’s states that these attacks prove that the ASG is still a viable
force.
2.98
In September 2009, when two US soldiers and one Filipino marine were
killed in the southern Philippine island of Jolo when their vehicle rolled over
a land mine, analysts immediately blamed the ASG for the attack.[44]
2.99
The ASG has been involved in a number of kidnap for ransom operations. ASPI
reported that in 2000 the kidnapping of western tourists for ransom is believed
to have earned the ASG an estimated $20 million in ransom payments.[45]
2.100
On 8 June 2008, a senior ABS-CBN reporter was kidnapped with a ransom
demanded for her release. Prior to this, a brutal incident in April 2007
occurred when the ASG kidnapped seven local workers on the southern Philippine
island of Jolo, beheading them when ransom demands were not met.
2.101
The statement of reasons states that the ASG views kidnap-for-ransom
ventures as a profitable operational tactic – along with extortion and related
activity – and these attacks have been a trademark of ASG since its creation
and represent the main funding mechanism for the ASG
and subordinate groups.
2.102
Since the expulsion of the ASG from Mindanao and the subsequent death of
senior leaders, the ASG has continued to fragment, leaving the ASG clan groups
largely confined to their home islands in the Sulu archipelago and under
significant operational constraints compared to its first decade of existence,
according to the statement of reasons.
2.103
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with US military logistical
support, has continued to mount operations against ASG groups in the Sulu
archipelago and still consider the group to be a significant threat,
particularly when acting in concert with other Philippines-based militant
groups, including the MILF.
2.104
Jane’s reports that a series of joint US/Philippine military and
political actions - particularly Operation 'Ultimatum' in 2006-2007 -
substantially degraded the ASG's capabilities and reduced its area of
operations. However since the start of 2008, the ASG has increased its kidnap
for ransom operations and is increasingly emerging as a resurgent force:
The group is therefore likely to continue posing a limited
threat to civilians, and to security forces deployed in the area, for the
foreseeable future, but is unlikely to emerge as a significant threat to the
state itself. [46]
2.105
The threat that the ASG poses stems from its ability to de-stabilise the
southern Philippines and the fragile peace process there. This may pose a threat to Australian
interests in the Philippines and overall regional stability.
2.106
The Committee is satisfied that the ASG is currently engaged in
terrorist acts and/or in supporting terrorist acts.
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.107
ASPI reports that the ASG, which means ‘Bearer of the Sword’, was
established on Basilan Island in the Sulu Archipelago, southern Philippines in
1991 under the leadership of Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani. Janjalani was a young
preacher in the mosques and madrasas of Basilan and Zamboanga who opposed peace
talks between the Philippine Government and the Muslim residents of the south.
2.108
The ASG’s traditional strongholds have been the Mindanao, Basilan, Jolo
and Tawi-Tawi Islands in the Sulu Archipelago in the southern Philippines. It consists primarily of young Tausug Filipino Muslims from the Sulu
archipelago, but it also attracts poverty-stricken unemployed young Muslims from
across the southern Philippines.
2.109
Influenced by radical Wahhabi thought, the ASG’s objective is the
creation of an Islamic state in Mindanao and the eradication of all Christian
influence in the southern Philippines. Despite this goal, and unlike other
regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, the ASG has never espoused
a clear strategic plan as to how it would establish this ‘pure’ Islamic state.[47]
2.110
According to the ICG, the ASG is best understood not as an insurgency in
the same sense as the MILF or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), or even a
clearly delineated organisation:
It is best understood as a network of networks, an alliance
of smaller groups around individual charismatic leaders who compete and
cooperate to maximise their reputation for violence.[48]
2.111
The statement of reasons states that the ASG’s activities – including
the targets chosen for kidnapping and extortion operations – remain heavily
influenced by the religious, political and ideological considerations as
originally dictated by Janjalani. Westerners and other wealthy foreign
nationals, as well as local politicians and business people feature among the
targets.
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.112
The statement of reasons notes that according to the Philippine
authorities ‘ the ASG
has links to al-Qa'ida and Indonesia-based terrorist networks
including JI and they attribute bombings in key areas in Mindanao and in Manila
to ASG.’
2.113
Indonesian extremists, under the protection of the ASG, continue to support
terrorist operations by the ASG and the MILF in the Philippines and also
provide bomb-making training to Philippines-based militant networks.
2.114
The statement of reasons has found that the current primary association between
the ASG and other anti-Western terrorists is its provision of safe haven to JI-linked
fugitives, ‘which was first seen in 2003 and occurs to this day.’
2.115
These links with JI position the ASG as a credible terrorist threat. JI
is a proscribed organisation and has targeted Australian interests and people
in the past.
Links to Australia
2.116
The statement of reasons mentions no direct ASG links to Australia but
ASIO told Members at a private hearing that ‘its indiscriminate method of
terrorism operations results in a high level of incidental collateral harm.’ [49]
Threats to Australian interests
2.117
As stated previously, the ASG engages in kidnapping of foreigners,
demanding millions of dollars in ransom. These kidnappings have occurred at
resorts, including those off the coast of Malaysia. DFAT has issued a travel
warning advising Australians not to travel to the southern Philippines. It also advises that kidnapping is a significant threat for foreigners
throughout the Philippines not just in the south.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.118
The ASG is proscribed by the United Nations and by the governments of
Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.119
In 2009, the Philippine presidential spokesman said the ASG is a
criminal organisation rather than an insurgent group and could therefore not be
offered any kind of amnesty deal:
... while the government has been prepared to deal with
separatist organisations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the idea of
dealing with the ASG has become anathema to Filipino ministers.[50]
2.120
The statement of reasons provides no information on this matter.
2.121
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was first listed in 2005 under the name Tanzim
Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Biiad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR). This is the third re-listing of
the group since the initial listing.
2.122
The Attorney-General’s statement of reasons for re-listing AQI can be
found in Appendix H.
2.123
On the basis of the statement of reasons and other publicly available
information, and taking into account evidence provided by ASIO at a private
hearing, AQI has been measured against ASIO’s stated evaluation process as
follows:
Engagement in terrorism
2.124
The statement of reasons contains a comprehensive list of significant
attacks for which responsibility has been claimed by, or reliably attributed to
AQI. Since the Committee last reviewed the AQI in November 2008, the group has
been involved in at least seven more large-scale terrorist attacks. These
attacks are independently verified by Jane’s.[51]
2.125
In its last report on this group, the Committee noted that the AQI gained
a significant foothold in Iraq after the 2003 invasion, but then its appeal
diminished due to the level of violence and massacres it carried out against
ordinary Iraqi people. Jane’s writes of AQI:
. . . through their actions they marginalised themselves
from the population and became alienated to the point where they are
increasingly irrelevant.[52]
2.126
However, despite experiencing some setbacks, including consequences
resulting from the ‘US surge’, Jane’s notes that the group remains dangerous
and active:
The renewed series of mass-casualty attacks perpetrated by
the group demonstrates its continued ability to exploit weaknesses in the Iraqi
national security apparatus. [53]
2.127
When the US military withdrew from Iraq's urban areas under the Status
of Forces Agreement in June 2009, Jane’s found that AQI managed to seize back
operational momentum, in part due to the withdrawal but also because the group
has exploited increasing ethnic and religious tension in the country to its
advantage.[54]
2.128
The Washington Post reported recently that AQI activity has ‘been
strangled in Baghdad’ but it has moved its attention to the northern city of
Mosul where multiple suicide bombers and gunmen have carried out attacks,
demonstrating ‘... the renewed determination of al-Qaeda in Iraq to operate in
Mosul.’[55]
2.129
The statement of reasons notes that AQI has recently been engaged in
several campaigns which involved small attacks aimed at inciting sectarian
violence and it also disrupted democratic processes during the March 2010
election period.
2.130
The Committee is satisfied that AQI is currently engaged in terrorist
acts.
Ideology and links to other terrorist groups/networks
Ideology
2.131
AQI is a Sunni Islamic extremist group that operates within Iraq. The
statement of reasons states that AQI networks are based primarily in Sunni
areas and regions where other groups engaged in sectarian violence are located.
2.132
Jane’s states that AQI is ‘difficult to categorise’ and that the:
. . . Salafist jihadist focus on the ethical duty of
fighting jihad makes it difficult to categorise alongside ethno-nationalists
and other types of insurgents. This is because it is not a purely
political-military organisation.[56]
2.133
Jane’s goes on to note that since October 2004:
AQI has been a recognised affiliate of the Al-Qaeda movement,
owing fealty to Osama bin Laden and, less directly, to Ayman al-Zawahiri. The
connection between AQI and the Al-Qaeda board of governors is difficult to
characterise definitively and the subject of contentious debate. [57]
2.134
The statement of reasons notes that whereas AQI’s key religious, political
and ideological aims were originally to expel foreign forces from Iraq and to
establish an Islamic caliphate under strict Sharia law in Iraq, the withdrawal
of US troops from urban centres in mid-2009 has reduced the reasons for
targeting, and opportunity to target, foreign forces and hence AQI recently has
been focused more on targeting the Iraqi government.
2.135
By importing Jihadist elements into Iraq, AQI poses a direct threat to
the stability of the fledgling Iraqi democracy and to the coalition forces and
foreign citizens, including Australians, in Iraq.
Links to other terrorist groups/networks
2.136
AQI has ‘formed a series of umbrella organisations in an apparent
attempt to assimilate other Sunni jihadist groups, while distancing itself from
its image of being an organisation dominated by foreigners, rather than Iraqis.’ [58]
2.137
The statement of reasons indicates that AQI receives ideological support
from, or has promoted ideological support for, several other terrorist
organisations, including:
- Al-Qa’ida (AQ),
- Al-Qa’ida in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
- Salafists in Gaza,
and
- Al-Shabaab.
Links to Australia
2.138
The statement of reasons lists no links to Australia.
Threats to Australian interests
2.139
At the private hearing ASIO told the Committee that AQI considers
Australia ‘a legitimate target for attack, as demonstrated by its claim of
responsibility for an attack on an Australian Defence Force convoy in Baghdad
in October 2004. AQI also claimed an attack near the Australian Embassy in
Baghdad in January 2005.’[59] ASIO asserts that Australians
in Iraq continue to be in danger of attack by elements of AQI.
Proscription by the UN or like-minded countries
2.140
AQI, under its various aliases, is proscribed as a terrorist organisation
by the United Nations and by the governments of New Zealand and the United
States.
Engagement in peace/mediation processes
2.141
The statement of reasons provides no information on this matter.
Conclusion
2.142
The Committee is satisfied that the one organisation listed and the six
organisations which have been re-listed continue to engage in activities that
satisfy section 102.1 of the Criminal Code. The Committee would not have recommended
disallowance of the regulations if it had reported within the disallowance
period.
Hon Anthony Byrne MP
Chairman