At the Committee’s hearing on 10 October 2005, the ANAO identified a number of significant weaknesses in the Contract and DIMIA’s management of the provision of detention services.¹ Certain key issues will be discussed in this Chapter.

The Committee considers the PIP a necessary initiative by DIMIA to address many of these weaknesses. In particular, the Committee notes the engagement of a consultant for three months, Mr Mick Roche, ‘to review the compliance and detention functions within the Department and … to look specifically at the detention services contract and review the shape of the contract’.² At the hearing, DIMIA advised that Mr Roche will be contributing and working with the Department to implement proposals progressively during the three-month review period on matters such as health arrangements and detention services strategies. DIMIA also expects that Mr Roche will provide a more formal report on his review of the Contract at the end of the review period.³

In response to Recommendation 7. 6⁴ of the Palmer Report , DIMIA has committed to establishing, by the end of 2005, a Detention Contract Management Group of external experts to provide direction and guidance to DIMIA and the Minister on the management of the detention services contract.⁵ Recommendation 7.7⁶ originally envisioned the group of external experts undertaking a review of the Contract and detention arrangements. However, at the hearing, DIMIA advised that it considers the establishment of this group to be the next step in the review process. The Department advised that any changes made to the Contract and detention arrangements as a result of the review may impact on the areas of expertise required. The Department expects that Mr Roche may provide advice on the composition of the group of external experts.⁷

DIMIA working with the ANAO

The Committee is pleased to note that DIMIA has acted on the Palmer Report Recommendation 7.5⁸ that DIMIA work with the ANAO to review the current detention arrangements.

The ANAO advised the Committee that, in response to a request from DIMIA, a number of discussions have been held to discuss the ANAO audits of the management of the detention centre contracts, including but not limited to Audit Report No. 1 – Part B.⁹

An agreement has been reached that the ANAO will play a role in the review being undertaken by Mr Roche. It is planned that the ANAO will meet with Mr Roche and relevant DIMIA officers to discuss its audit findings, including its preliminary findings on the tender process audit.¹⁰

Committee Comment

The Committee supports the ongoing consultation between DIMIA and the ANAO. In particular, the Committee is pleased to note that the ANAO considers DIMIA to be ‘more receptive to [their] assistance’.¹¹ The Committee is hopeful that consultation with the ANAO, which focuses on addressing the issues identified in Audit Report No. 1 – Part B, will ensure that DIMIA is fully aware of the issues of concern and the options and approaches available to address the problems in the current arrangements.

Transition

An objective of the second audit was to examine DIMIA’s management of the transition to the new service provider GSL. The ANAO found that a successful transition was achieved without incident and with minimal disruption to detainees. However, this transition was achieved at the considerable cost of $6 million.¹²

An Operational Transition of Detention Centres (OTDC) report was produced by DIMIA outlining the transition procedures and circumstances arising at each detention centre during transition. The ANAO was confident that this report would provide a sound basis for future transitional undertakings.¹³ However, the Committee notes that the costs associated with the transition were not examined as part of the OTDC Report.¹⁴

Committee Comment

While the Committee commends DIMIA for the overall success of the transition to GSL, it believes that it is important for the costs associated with the transition to be examined to ensure it represents a sound investment in the transition process.

Ongoing Transition Issues

In Audit Report No. 1 – Part B, the ANAO identified areas in which arrangements were not finalised before the Contract was signed and transition occurred, including agreements with State agencies and the list of Commonwealth assets.

Commonwealth Assets

Discrepancies surrounding the ownership of certain assets¹⁵ at IDFs were of considerable concern to the ANAO in Audit Report No. 1 – Part B. The ANAO found that when the Contract was signed with GSL and the transition undertaken, DIMIA had not clarified the ownership of certain assets.¹⁶ These assets included such items as beds, mattresses, kitchenware, loose furniture, whitegoods and various electrical items, with an estimated value of $150,000.¹⁷

The ANAO’s Recommendation No. 4 of Audit Report No. 1 – Part B was that, as a matter of priority, DIMIA develop a ‘comprehensive asset register for all Commonwealth Equipment at each of the detention facilities’.¹⁸ DIMIA agreed with this recommendation and advised in its response to the report that progress was already underway.¹⁹

DIMIA has acknowledged that GSL were forced to purchase assets from the former service provider that the Department had committed to provide. At the Committee’s hearing, DIMIA confirmed that stocktakes of all detention centres had been completed and the next step was to arrange the purchase of these assets from GSL. Once completed, these assets would be added to the list developed from the stocktakes and DIMIA would have a comprehensive list of Commonwealth assets at all IDFs.²⁰

Committee Comment

It is troubling that it has taken two years for DIMIA to resolve the ownership of these assets. The Committee is of the view that an issue so fundamental to the provision of detention services and Commonwealth interests should have been addressed and resolved sooner. The Committee is hopeful that once the comprehensive Commonwealth asset register is in place, this will not be an issue of concern in future detention services arrangements.

State Agreements

IDFs are located throughout Australia and as a result are subject to both Commonwealth and state specific legislation dealing with health, education, police services, child protection, youth and community affairs, and occupational health and safety. DIMIA is responsible for working in consultation with state agencies, organisations and stakeholders to develop Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) to provide IDFs and relevant agencies with guidelines to ensure that the provision of detention services in that State adheres to the relevant legislation.²¹

The Committee notes with concern the ANAO’s finding that although ‘ detention services have been delivered under outsourced arrangements for the past seven years, DIMIA is yet to finalise more than half of the relevant agreements with State agencies’.²² In particular, the ANAO expressed concern about the extent to which GSL could rely on agreements between DIMIA and other jurisdictions, when arrangements in many of those states had not progressed to a formalised MOU.²³

At the hearing, the ANAO acknowledged that seeking to finalise MOUs before entering into the Contract with GSL would not have been a realistic option.²⁴ In evidence to the Committee, the ANAO commented that any decision to delay would have to have been a conscious decision by DIMIA based on a good management rationale and risk assessment.²⁵

DIMIA has advised the Committee that at ‘the time of transition the Department considered that, given the significant complexity of the project, the costs and risks associated with delaying the transition process outweighed the benefits to be derived from such a delay’.²⁶

The Committee is pleased to note DIMIA’s response that:

The Department agrees that it would be beneficial to finalise the abovementioned arrangements before signing a contract with a new services provider.²⁷

The Committee notes that no specific completion dates have been set for finalising MOUs. DIMIA has advised that:

• an MOU with the South Australian Police was signed on 22 September 2005;
• as at 18 October 2005 seven MOUs were being actively progressed; and
• MOU requirements are being reviewed in light of recent policy changes, such as the requirement that women and children be detained as a last resort.²⁸

Committee Comment

The Committee acknowledges that not all arrangements are straightforward and able to be easily finalised. However, the Committee is hopeful that DIMIA, having experienced some of the difficulties associated with incomplete arrangements and recognising the benefits of finalising such arrangements, will address these issues before entering into another contract.

Insurance, Liability and Indemnity Regime

A number of the ANAO’s findings in Audit Report No. 1 – Part B were critical of the insurance, liability and indemnity arrangements between the Commonwealth and GSL.²⁹ In particular, the ANAO identified three significant shortcomings.³⁰

Firstly, the ANAO found that definitions of what constituted an incident (Incident) differed throughout the Contract, creating uncertainties with regard to assessing responsibility under the insurance, liability and indemnity arrangements.³¹

Thirdly, the Commonwealth’s interests are not adequately protected under the current insurance arrangements. The ANAO believes that the Contract lacks a prescriptive insurance regime which would let ‘both the Commonwealth and the Services Provider know, at the outset, the insurance obligations of the Services Provider’.³³

It is worth noting that since 2000, claims of approximately $16.9 million have been paid out or settled by the Commonwealth following disturbances that resulted in damage to the detention centres.³⁴ The ANAO concluded that:

…the terms of the liability, indemnity and insurance regime in the Contract are unclear to the point that it is not possible for the Commonwealth to know with any certainty what insurances are effected, what risks are covered, and to what extent the insurance cover that has been obtained is limited or qualified.³⁵

The ANAO’s Recommendation No. 1 was for DIMIA to review the insurance, liability and indemnity regime in the Contract. This would allow DIMIA, informed by a clear allocation of risks, to develop clearer mechanisms to apportion the cost of repairs to detention facilities and Commonwealth equipment following an Incident, and to determine GSL and Commonwealth indemnities and liabilities under the Contract for insurance purposes.³⁶

DIMIA agreed to this recommendation. However, the Department opted to defer further consideration of the regime until the release of the tender process audit report (Part C) which will examine DIMIA’s process of risk identification in more detail.³⁷

The ANAO’s view is that any findings relating to the tender process are not a prerequisite for examining this issue and in fact ‘given the level of risk to the Commonwealth created by the current regime, DIMIA should act promptly to develop a more suitable insurance, liability and indemnity regime to better protect the Commonwealth’s interests’.³⁸

At the Committee’s hearing, DIMIA confirmed that no action had yet been taken to follow up the recommendation or to clarify the definition of an Incident. However, DIMIA indicated that this issue would be considered as part of the review of the current detention services contract being undertaken by Mr Roche.³⁹

Committee Comment

The Committee believes that DIMIA should take action to minimise risks to the Commonwealth in relation to its detention function. The Committee encourages DIMIA to ensure that the consideration of the insurance, liability and indemnity regime, occurring as part of Mr Roche’s review of the contract, addresses the issues identified by the ANAO.

Merit Points Scheme

The operation of this scheme also varies between IDFs. The ANAO suggested the development of provisions in the Contract that articulate DIMIA’s intended approach and take into account the relevant legislation.⁴¹

In its response to a question taken on notice, DIMIA advised the Committee that:

The Department is preparing to commence a policy review of the meaningful activities and merit points scheme. The ANAO’s comments … will be examined in this context.⁴²

Committee Comment

The Committee is pleased that DIMIA will be taking action to specifically address the issues identified by the ANAO as problematic in this scheme. The Committee is hopeful that DIMIA will be able to reach a solution which will ensure this scheme is conducted in accordance with the relevant legislation, as well as meeting the practical needs of detainees.

Performance Information and Contract Monitoring

The ANAO considers that:

The foundation for agency accountability and transparency in Commonwealth Government agencies is performance information, with measures and targets presented initially in the Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS) and results provided in an Annual Report … [and where] services have been outsourced, performance information should be set out in contracts with providers and also be linked through business plans to the outputs and outcomes specified in the PBS.⁴³

In DIMIA’s Portfolio Budget Statements, the contribution that detention makes towards the Department’s outcome is stated as ‘providing lawful, appropriate, humane and efficient detention of unlawful citizens’.⁴⁴ In terms of DIMIA monitoring, assessing and reporting on its own performance in relation to the detention function, the ANAO found:

• ‘the quality measures listed in DIMIA’s PBS … are activities rather than indicators against which performance can be assessed’;⁴⁵
• DIMIA ‘did not define, nor measure lawful, appropriate, humane or efficient detention’;⁴⁶
• ‘no evidence that DIMIA’s internal reporting arrangements monitored the extent to which expenditure under output 1.3.5 was contributing to the on-going achievement of VFM [value-for-money], while assisting in the achievement of the overall outcome’;⁴⁷ and
• the use of terms such as ‘marked reduction’ in the Department’s Annual Report is ‘not a clear measure of performance’.⁴⁸

As part of its response to Recommendation No. 2⁴⁹ of Audit Report No. 1 – Part B, DIMIA stated that the implementation of the 2005-2006 Governance Framework would ‘address several of the ANAO’s concerns relating to divisional planning and performance information identified through this report’.⁵⁰

DIMIA’s governance framework provides an ‘overarching structure’ for planning and risk management processes in relation to its detention function.⁵¹ The review of the detention function’s governance framework revealed a number of areas for improvement within the existing framework. The Department advised the Committee that:

The development of a new governance framework will incorporate the outcomes of the review, ANAO recommendations, additional advice from internal and external stakeholders, and a departmental review of business planning (in light of the recent organisational restructure) to ensure consolidated improvements in business planning processes within the detention function. ⁵²

In particular, the Committee is pleased to note DIMIA’s advice, that as part of the broader review of the components of the governance framework:

Performance measures for the detention function are being reviewed in the context of the recent organisational restructure, the review of the DSC, and the ongoing review of business requirements in light of the Government’s response to the Palmer inquiry.

The outcome of this review is intended to give the Secretary, the Minister and the Australian community greater assurance that the department is planning its work robustly and can account for its performance effectively.⁵³

Contract Performance Information

A recurrent criticism throughout Audit Report No. 1 – Part B is that the standards and performance measures for monitoring GSL’s performance lack clarity and consistency.⁵⁴ The ANAO considers it ‘important to clearly define service requirements and standards to ensure there is a common understanding of the services required’.⁵⁵

The ANAO concluded:

Lack of clarity in the performance standards and measures in the Contract means it is difficult for DIMIA to systematically monitor and assess the Services Provider’s performance.⁵⁶

In response to ANAO’s criticisms, DIMIA stated:

For the most part, the issues highlighted by the ANAO with the standards and measures (which flow through to monitoring and reporting) are not deficiencies but in DIMIA’s view are reflections of the inherent complexity and variability of the services required.⁵⁷

DIMIA maintained that ‘it is not possible to define these requirements in simplified ways, and that it was a misconception that services, standards and reporting can be simply and inflexibly stated’⁵⁸, and that ‘flexibility in the terminology of the IDS provides discretion to the Department to consider service delivery within the necessary context’.⁵⁹ The ANAO indicated in evidence to the Committee that it is not satisfied with DIMIA’s response.⁶⁰

At the Committee’s hearing, DIMIA conceded that ‘a clear description of definitions and very clear key performance indicators’ were needed,⁶¹ and informed the Committee that as part of its review of the detention services contract, the ANAO’s comments on this issue would be considered. While DIMIA did express doubt that precise quantitative measures were feasible, it noted that other ranges of standards may be possible.⁶²

The Committee notes that at the hearing the ANAO acknowledged that there is no simple approach, but emphasised the need for a workable monitoring regime.⁶³ The ANAO has also suggested that ‘performance information should be based on a mix of indicators to provide a balanced view of the detention services, and not focus on only a narrow aspect of performance’.⁶⁴

Committee Comment

The Committee is hopeful that when DIMIA considers the issue in the course of the review being undertaken by Mr Roche and other PIP initiatives, the Department will explore and build upon the range of suggestions made by the ANAO for improving the clarity and consistency of standards and performance measures.

Contract Performance Monitoring

The arrangements for monitoring and reporting on GSL’s delivery of detention services focus on the reporting of Incidents, to highlight instances of the IDS not being met; in other words, an exceptions-based approach to reporting.⁶⁶

At the hearing, the ANAO observed that while an exceptions-based approach may be a relatively cheaper option, there are repercussions in selecting this approach to monitor the performance of GSL and its subcontractors.⁶⁷ The ANAO identified two main weaknesses to the exceptions-based approach.⁶⁸

Firstly, the ANAO found that DIMIA officials, at a number of points in the reporting and monitoring process, exercise considerable discretion over the Incidents that are reported.⁶⁹ A consequence of this discretion is that both negative and positive performance outcomes could be overlooked.⁷⁰

When a report of an Incident is substantiated as a breach of an IDS, clause 18.1.23 of the Contract provides for sanctions (negative points) that can be offset by rewards (positive points) on what is effectively GSL’s performance scorecard. Schedule 3 of the Contract lists the performance points per occurrence against the measure.⁷²

The ANAO made the troubling observation that the maximum ‘penalty points generally apply to failure to report an Incident, rather than outright failure in critical services such as food and health’.⁷³ The ANAO found that a single breach of food or health IDS could incur up to minus 10 points in contrast to a failure to report a breach could attract up to minus 25 points.⁷⁴ This raises serious questions regarding DIMIA’s priorities and the implied direction to GSL and its subcontractors.⁷⁵

The Palmer Report found that exceptions-based reporting ‘provides no information to management until the system has failed’.⁷⁶ The ANAO and Mr Palmer share the view that DIMIA’s approach lacks quality assurance.⁷⁷ The ANAO notes that other comparable jurisdictions, such as prisons, have focused on quality assurance rather than exceptions-based reporting.⁷⁸

The Monitoring Plan

As part of its response to Recommendation No. 2⁸⁰, DIMIA stated that in January 2005, the Department implemented a ‘comprehensive contract monitoring regime’ to proactively monitor the delivery of service at detention facilities in a systematic and objective way. DIMIA advised the Committee that the focus of their monitoring arrangements was to ‘sustain a systematic approach to assessing performance’.⁸¹ The Department stated:

The 2005 Monitoring Plan provides for a proactive and systematic approach to monitoring, drawing upon a range of monitoring tools including National Office monitoring reports, performance reports from DIMIA immigration detention facility staff, expert panel reviews and GSL self reporting.⁸¹

As the 2005 Monitoring Plan was implemented in January 2005, the ANAO was not able to assess the effectiveness of this new monitoring regime in Audit Report No. 1 – Part B.⁸³

DIMIA has advised the Committee that informal reviews of the Monitoring Plan have occurred since its implementation. The Department found that:

Overall findings from the [internal] audits have been largely positive. The checklists completed by both DIMIA staff from National Office and at the IDFs have highlighted areas where GSL’s actual service delivery has in some way varied from agreed standards as set out in the contract and approved Operational Procedures. Checklists now provide for DIMIA staff to advise GSL of their findings and GSL comment on these findings.

While work will continue on refining the framework, the Department considers that the Monitoring Plan is already proving effective in bringing greater consistency to the monitoring of service delivery across all centres.⁸⁴

Committee Comment

The Committee shares the ANAO’s view that the nature and complexity of the detention services environment warrants a more proactive approach to performance monitoring, to ensure that detainees’ needs are met and that there is some degree of quality assurance in the delivery of detention services. The Committee is hopeful that the host of reforms outlined in the PIP will facilitate a more proactive management and monitoring role by DIMIA.

The Committee notes that a formal review of the 2005 Monitoring Plan has commenced.⁸⁵ The Committee will request a briefing from DIMIA on the outcomes of this review and, in particular, to hear about specific examples of DIMIA’s ‘proactive and systematic’ approach to performance monitoring.

Duty of Care

The Contract (clause 4.1.2 of Schedule 2) ‘imposes particular responsibilities on the Commonwealth [exercised through DIMIA] with regard to duty of care for each and every person in immigration detention, and beyond the individual, to ensuring the safety and welfare of all detainees in a detention facility…While not absolving itself of these responsibilities, the Department, in turn, exercises its duty of care commitments through the engagement of a competent Service Provider’.⁸⁶

The ANAO found that the Contract lacked a clear delineation of actual responsibilities and accountabilities when it came to determining and meeting detainees’ day-to-day needs. The ANAO expressed concern that this lack of guidance could lead to misunderstandings of what was expected and, as a consequence, the needs of detainees and duty of care obligations not being met.⁸⁷

The ANAO found that DIMIA and GSL use separate determinations of detainees’ day-to-day needs.⁸⁸ The 2005 Monitoring Plan includes 25 audit checklists that are provided for use by DIMIA officers when examining a range of matters, such as detainee welfare, education, food, emergencies and assaults, food, health care, meaningful activities, searches and transport. However, DIMIA advised that while GSL staff are familiar with the content and format of these checklists from discussions with DIMIA officers, they are not formally provided with copies of these checklists.⁸⁹

The ANAO’s concerns have been supported by the finding in the Palmer Report that the case of Cornelia Rau revealed ‘a manifest failure of DIMIA’s duty of care’⁹⁰ and the judgement in the case of S v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 549 ( 5 May 2005). At paragraph 257 of the judgment, Finn J stated:

It was the Commonwealth’s duty to ensure that reasonable care was taken of S and M who, by reason of their detention, could not care for themselves. That duty required the Commonwealth to ensure that a level of medical care was made available to them which was reasonably designed to meet their health care needs including psychiatric care. They did not have to settle for a lesser standard of mental health care because they were in immigration detention.⁹¹

In its response to questions on notice, DIMIA stressed that this case was a confirmation of the position held by the Department for a number of years, that ‘the Commonwealth retains the ultimate duty of care for all immigration detainees.’⁹² DIMIA also acknowledged that its duty of care ‘does not end with selecting a competent service provider.’⁹³

The Committee notes that both DIMIA and GSL have agreed that ‘there is scope for a more integrated approach to both GSL and DIMIA audits’ and relevant discussions are underway.⁹⁴ DIMIA advised:

The day-to-day needs of detainees in immigration detention facilities, and the services required to meet these day-to-day needs, will be reviewed in the context of Mr Roche ’s review of the DSC. ⁹⁵

Subcontracting Arrangements

Intimately linked to DIMIA meeting its duty of care obligations is ensuring that the Department has adequate control over the delivery of services by subcontractors. In Audit Report No. 1 – Part B, t he ANAO found that ‘the Contract does not clearly specify mechanisms for the ongoing monitoring of subcontractor arrangements’.⁹⁶

The ANAO noted that there was considerable scope for DIMIA to improve the management of risks associated with the contractual arrangements with subcontractors.⁹⁷ Food, maintenance, health and psychological services at IDFs are delivered through subcontractors.⁹⁸ The ANAO considers food, health and psychological services to be central to detainee welfare.⁹⁹

DIMIA advised the ANAO that it ‘does not have a direct contractual relationship with any subcontractor employed by GSL’.¹⁰⁰ The Contract does not provide for DIMIA to review the terms and conditions of any subcontract. In 2004, DIMIA had to seek GSL’s agreement to engage the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS) to review the subcontracts. The AGS found that the rights and obligations in the subcontracts differed substantially in a number of areas and in the case of psychological services, IDS and performance measures were not applied.¹⁰¹ The ANAO viewed this with concern since ‘the extent to which DIMIA retains control of resources can be a determinant of overall service quality’.¹⁰²

The ANAO stress that DIMIA is ultimately responsible for service delivery, and ‘if a subcontractor does something untoward, the department is still accountable’.¹⁰³

The ANAO noted that DIMIA informally considered food and health services to be areas of risk.¹⁰⁴ While ANAO did not examine every food and health standard, it found that generally these standards and associated measures lack clarity; contain provisos that make it difficult to prove whether the standard is met; in some cases would require expert assessment; or the evidence required to substantiate cases of standards not being met would be difficult to collect.¹⁰⁵

Food Services

The ANAO found that the provision of food services at the Baxter IDF is an area in which DIMIA and GSL have experienced difficulty exercising control over the subcontractor. The quality, quantity and appropriateness of food served at Baxter had been the subject of complaints since the commencement of the Contract.¹⁰⁶

The Palmer Report examined the issue of food at Baxter and found that ‘generally the concern was not about the food’s quality or adequacy; rather, it was that for many detainees the food is boring … [and incidents]… such as storing food in their rooms against the rules were simply ways of expressing individuality’.¹⁰⁷

At the hearing, DIMIA advised the Committee of a number of measures being put in place to improve the delivery of food services at Baxter, and indicated that any consideration and alteration of food standards would be subject to the longer term review of the Contract.¹⁰⁹

Mental Health Services

At the hearing, the ANAO stated that DIMIA had taken a ‘purely financial view’ of the provision of psychological services.¹¹⁰ The cost of the subcontract was under $3 million, and so DIMIA was not required to undertake certain financial and probity checks.¹¹¹ The ANAO indicated that it would have been desirable for DIMIA to more closely examine the arrangements for the provision of psychological services to detainees.¹¹²

The Palmer Report found that the detainee population ‘requires a much higher level of mental health care than that required by the Australian community as a whole’¹¹³ and that in the case of Cornelia Rau, the mental health care delivered was inadequate.¹¹⁴

In paragraph 257 of the judgment on S v Secretary, Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 549 ( 5 May 2005), Finn J stated:

The Commonwealth entered into a complex outsourcing arrangement for the provision of mental health services which left it to contractors and subcontractors to determine the level of services to be supplied … The Commonwealth now foreshadows more by way of auditing and monitoring. Nonetheless, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Commonwealth’s own arrangement for outsourcing health care services itself requires review. Its aptness is open to real question.¹¹⁵

The ANAO recognises that DIMIA’s outcomes focus is a good approach in the setting of health standards, however considers that the Department failed to balance this with workable performance measures.¹¹⁶

The PIP includes the establishment of a Detention Services Taskforce to develop a long term detention health services delivery strategy.¹¹⁷ This strategy aims to enhance the mental health and well-being of IDF detainees through an ‘improved physical and social environment for immigration detainees [and] improved organizational and increased professional inputs into monitoring and assessment of detainees’.¹¹⁸

At the hearing, DIMIA advised that they ‘have put in place some improved health standards within the Baxter immigration detention centre which do have some more specific measures around them, such as the time in which a detainee will be seen and assessed by a health nurse and a psychiatric nurse after entering into a detention services facility’.¹¹⁹ These measures put in place at Baxter will be trialled, refined and then replicated in other IDFs.¹²⁰

With an aim towards improving communication and developing a closer working relationship with GSL and its subcontractors, DIMIA has created two subcommittees (health and infrastructure) to bring together core people from DIMIA, GSL and the relevant subcontractors on a monthly basis to discuss issues, find solutions, and progress activities.¹²¹ The Committee notes that the Health Services Delivery Group, made up of senior representatives from DIMIA, GSL Health Management, and IHMS and PSS (GSL’s subcontractors) is developing ‘health service performance measures for immigration detention facilities that will provide a comparable level of monitoring to those that are applied in the mainstream health sector’.¹²²

DIMIA maintains that subcontracting can work effectively if properly managed.¹²³ DIMIA has acknowledged that ‘it maintains an obligation to monitor the performance of GSL and its subcontractors and to actively ensure that necessary services are provided to agreed standards’.¹²⁴

The Committee is pleased to note DIMIA’s advice at the hearing, that issues related to the use of subcontractors would be closely examined as part of the contract review being undertaken by Mr Roche.¹²⁵

Committee Comment

The Committee acknowledges that the action already taken and the action planned in relation to improving food and mental health services at IDFs go some way towards addressing ANAO’s concerns over DIMIA meeting its duty of care obligations.

The Committee is satisfied that DIMIA is aware that action needs to be taken to address the ANAO’s concerns regarding the subcontracting arrangements at IDFs. The Committee is hopeful that the findings of the contract review by Mr Roche will enable DIMIA to take a more proactive role in managing its relationship with GSL and its subcontractors to ensure that the services provided are meeting detainees’ needs.

Value-for-Money

The Department’s decision in 2001 to re-tender the detention services contract was influenced by the difficulties it experienced in determining whether the then service provider, ACM, was providing the best value-for-money service.¹²⁶ Similar concerns persist under the current Contract with GSL. In Audit Report No. 1 – Part B, the ANAO found that there is ‘insufficient information about the quality of services being delivered and their costs to allow a value-for-money calculation’.¹²⁷

DIMIA advised the Committee that it pursued a value-for-money outcome in 2002 when evaluating tenders for the current contract and ‘continues to pursue a value for money balance in the detention environment’. The Department acknowledged that recent ‘amendments to the detention environment, for example the removal of razor wire, have resulted in increased costs to the Commonwealth. However … considers that such expenditure has also produced a better quality of services and environment within immigration detention facilities’.¹³⁰

DIMIA agreed with the ANAO’s Recommendation No. 3¹³¹, to review the financial and non-financial performance information for the detention centre function. The Committee notes that this review ‘is intended to assess how the department can best measure performance within the detention function, in both qualitative and quantitative measures [and that the]… ANAO’s comments … will be considered in this review process’.¹³²

Committee Comment

The Committee shares the ANAO’s concern that DIMIA could not demonstrate whether or not the increased investments in contract administration are producing greater levels of operating efficiency.¹³³

Concluding Comments

The Committee recognises that DIMIA acknowledges the need to addresses a range of issues in the management of the detention services contract. The Committee does not underestimate the significant task that the Department is facing in reviewing and improving the operation of its detention function.

The Committee notes that a consultant has been engaged to review the functions and operations of detention and compliance activities and the detention services contract, and that this review will consider many of the issues raised by the ANAO in Audit Report No. 1 – Part B. However, the Committee is concerned that the three-month period allocated for the review may be too short a time for the significant task that Mr Roche is undertaking. The Committee does note DIMIA’s advice that provision can be made to continue to liaise with Mr Roche depending on the issues that arise from the review.¹³⁶

The Committee acknowledges the ANAO’s optimism that DIMIA’s willingness to work with the ANAO,¹³⁷ the improvements already made to health and food services at Baxter, the development of the PIP and the $230 million committed to its implementation, will result in the issues identified by the ANAO being addressed. The Committee looks forward to the progress report on the PIP expected in September 2006 and which is expected to be tabled in Parliament on its release.¹³⁸

Don Randall MP

Chairman

Mrs O’Connell and Mr Doherty, Transcript of Evidence, p. 22. Back

DMIA, Submission No. 2, p. 5. Back