CHAPTER 3

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF BLINDING LASER WEAPONS AND LANDMINES
5th Report CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3

PROTOCOL IV

3.1     The additional or amended Protocol II, prohibiting and restricting the use of mines, booby traps and other devices, to the Inhumane Weapons Convention (IWC) was adopted by a conference of States' Parties including Australia on 3 May 1996.

3.2     The amended Protocol will come into force when it has been ratified by at least 20 countries, and Australia wishes to be in that group. [1]

3.3     There has been considerable and growing interest in the issue of banning landmines since the signing of this Protocol. For example, in his speech to the Australian Parliament on 20 November 1996, President Clinton of the United States of America referred to the need to pursue the remaining arms control agenda. This included a world wide ban on landmines, 'so that all our children can walk with confidence on the earth beneath them'. [2]

3.4     At the United Nations' (UN) General Assembly, Australia co-sponsored an historic resolution which 'urges States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible'. This was the first time the General Assembly had called for a total ban on landmines.

3.5     In January 1997, nations in favour of a global ban on landmines were reported to have expressed pleasure at a United States' decision to push for the ban at the UN-sponsored Geneva Conference on Disarmament. The report suggested that the determination among developing nations to move for total nuclear disarmament might work against the US' desire to accept negotiations on the subject at the Geneva Conference. [4]

Provisions of the amended Protocol in brief

3.6     Article 1 of the amended Protocol II restricts its scope to landmines, extends it to cover internal conflicts, preserves the sovereignty of States and guards against uninvited intervention in the internal or external affairs of a Party in the territory where there is a conflict.

3.7     Article 2 defines the key terms used in this Protocol.

3.8     Article 3 sets out general restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other devices: assigns responsibility to those who laid them; prohibits the use of devices which cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering; sets technical standards; prohibits anti-detection features; prohibits targeting the civilian population and indiscriminate use; prohibits the grouping of a number of targets as one target where they are interspersed in civilian areas; requires the taking of 'all feasible precautions' to protect civilians, and requires effective advance warning of emplacement to civilians 'unless circumstances do not permit'.

3.9     Article 4 prohibits the use of non-detectable anti-personnel mines.

3.10     Article 5 restricts the use of anti-personnel mines, other than remotely delivered mines, which do not self-destruct and self-deactivate outside marked areas. Where used inside perimeter marked areas, protection requirements for protection of civilians and clearance are specified. It also imposes constraints on the use of trip-wire operated Claymore mines.

3.11     Article 6 restricts the use of remotely-delivered mines, requiring them to be recorded, self-destructing and self-deactivating, and encourages advance warning of delivery.

3.12     Article 7 prohibits the use of booby-trapping of a wide range of items; prohibits the use of booby-traps on apparently harmless portable objects, and imposes constraints on their use against civilians.

3.13     Article 8 prohibits the transfer of banned mines; prohibits transfers of anti-personnel mines to States not bound, or not agreeing to be bound, by the Protocol; requires compliance during any period of deferral, and requires compliance pending entry of the Protocol into force.

3.14     Article 9 requires detailed recording of mined areas, retention of records and use to safeguard civilians; covers the sharing of information with the Secretary-General of the UN and with others who may be in possession of mined areas.

3.15     Article 10 requires removal of minefields and other devices without delay after the cessation of hostilities; covers provision of assistance from the State which laid mines and other devices to the State which controls an area after hostilities, and seeks the sharing of information which will help with clearance of an area.

3.16     Article 11 encourages the sharing of technology and information which will help humanitarian mine clearing and compliance with the Protocol, or reduce any period of deferral; seeks resources for such work, and outlines procedures for requesting assistance.

3.17     Article 12 requires provision of safeguards for peace-keeping missions, UN forces, UN humanitarian and fact-finding missions, missions of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other humanitarian missions.

3.18     Article 13 calls for the Parties to consult on issues related to the operation of the Protocol, and requires annual conferences to discuss the document and annual reporting to the depositary.

3.19     Article 14 requires that 'all appropriate steps, including legislative' shall be taken to prevent and suppress violations of this Protocol. This includes penal sanctions against those who harm civilians by breaching it, and includes requiring armed forces to issue instructions and give training, and consultations with other Parties.

3.20     The Technical Annex sets out detailed standards on recording, detectability, self-destruction and self-deactivation and international signs for minefields and mined areas. At paragraph 2 (c), it includes the provision that allows a Party to defer compliance, for nine years, with the requirement that APLs produced after 1 January 1997 include material which can be detected with a response equivalent to a signal from eight grams of iron. [5]

Consultation

3.21     The National Interest Analysis (NIA) prepared for this Protocol stated that community groups had been consulted and informed of negotiations about the amended Protocol through a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) body, the National Consultative Committee on Peace and Disarmament. There was also close liaison with the Australian Network of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), an umbrella organisation which represents and coordinates the activities of a number of non-government organisations (NGOs) with an interest in banning mines. Sister Patricia Pak Poy, the coordinator of the Australian campaign, was an NGO representative on the Australian delegation to the conference which produced the amended Protocol.

3.22     NGOs were briefed regularly on preparations for, and developments in, the negotiating process at meetings and through a DFAT newsletter. As was clear during the public hearings on the subject, although NGOs and interested individuals were disappointed a total ban on landmines was not achieved, the amended Protocol has their critical support for ratification. The views of some of these organisations and individuals are set out below.

3.23     The obligations of the amended Protocol do not have implications for the States and Territories. They have been kept informed of the negotiations through the Standing Committee on Treaties (SCOT) process.

Withdrawal

3.24     Denunciation of the Protocols to the IWC is dealt with in Article 9 of that document. It takes effect one year after the Depositary, the Secretary-General to the UN, receives notification of the intention to withdraw from a Protocol.

Dimensions of the problem

3.25     As defined in Article 2 of this Protocol, mines or anti-personnel landmines (APL) are munitions placed on or near the ground and designed to be exploded by the presence or contact of a person. They can include blast mines, standard and directional fragmentation mines and bounding fragmentation mines, all of which can be activated by the victim. They were originally developed as a counter-measure against tanks and APLs were developed to keep enemy mine-clearers away from the larger, more easily found anti-tank devices. They can remain in the ground, to kill and maim indiscriminately, long after the conflict during which they were sown has ended. [6]

3.26     In addition to the different types mentioned above, mine technology has advanced so that there are now so-called 'dumb' and 'smart' mines. The latter are self-destructing or self-deactivating or self-neutralising. 'Dumb' mines do not have attached a self-deactivating or other device of the type specified in the Technical Annex to the amended Protocol and remain lethal indefinitely. [7]

3.27     APLs are cheap, easily available, low-technology items, made up of a casing, a detonator and material discharged by the detonation, which are cheap to make, buy and lay. In their simplest forms they can be made in kitchens, garages or fields. As was demonstrated convincingly at a briefing for Committee members on 6 December 1996, many of the simplest types would not be covered by the definition in the amended Protocol. [8]

3.28     Mines are not designed to kill people but to injure them. As Dr William Maley pointed out, a military force can be disabled much more effectively if it has a significant number of injured rather than dead. The latter are buried where they fall, whereas the injured are assisted by their comrades, and that can significantly hamper a force either by delaying it or by forcing it to abandon an objective. After conflicts are over, many of the victims are children. [9]

3.29     As the NIA pointed out, the past decade has seen growing numbers of instances where APLs have been used indiscriminately against civilians, despite restrictions placed on their use by the IWC in 198

3. Since the Second World War, an estimated 400 million APLs have been laid in various parts of the world. The US State Department estimated that there were more than 85 million uncleared mines scattered in 62 countries around the world. As many as another five million new mines may be laid each year. Based on UN programs in Cambodia and Afghanistan, it can cost between $US200 and $US1000 to clear each mine. [10]

3.30     The ICRC stated that for every mine cleared, 20 are laid. According to UN estimates, it would take 1100 years to clear the active landmines already in place and would cost about $US33 billion to rid the world of this scourge. [11]

3.31     While many states have fenced and signposted mine-affected areas, the problem remains acute in Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Iraq and the states of the former Yugoslavia. The problem is less acute in El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala and Rwanda. During the Vietnam War, huge numbers of mines were scattered over Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and are still there. [12]

3.32     In such countries, APLs continue to maim and kill civilians indiscriminately long after hostilities have ceased: about 30 people per day are killed and up to 60 a day are maimed. For example, Libyans still die from mines laid during the Second World War. Between 1945 and the mid-1970s in Poland, some 4000 civilian deaths and 9000 injuries were attributed to mines although some 15 million had already been cleared at great expense. [13]

3.33     From time to time, DFAT issues Consular Travel Advices through travel agents to travellers to specific countries, warning of the need to 'exercise due care and personal security awareness'. Information should be included in Advices for particular countries, suggesting that travellers stay on roads and clearly marked paths because of the prevalence of mines.

Photograph of land mine victem

Humanitarian consequences

3.34     APLs inflict horrendous injuries on the innocent, such as children playing games or searching for firewood, or farmers ploughing fields for crops needed to avoid starvation. The presence of mines, marked or otherwise, often prevented the use of land needed for crops. Photographs taken in Afghanistan by Dr Khaled Dik of the World Health Organisation (WHO), provided by Dr Maley and reproduced here, are two examples among countless others which could be used to demonstrate the terrible injuries which can be inflicted. At the hearing on 2 December 1996, a short and moving video was shown on the plight of some young victims. [14]

Photograph of land mine victem

3.35     Quite apart from the devastating impacts on victims, their families and their immediate communities, there are national consequences for the countries involved because of the effects of mines on general development. Significant resources, often needed for other purposes, have to be diverted to identifying and surveying minefields, clearing APLs, treating and rehabilitating victims. [15]

3.36     He told of the deliberate laying of mines in a zigzag pattern outside the main entrance to the Aliabad Hospital in Kabul in Afghanistan. He also pointed out that the existence of a minefield denied locals the use of land for economic purposes or for travel. It did not matter whether there were 500 mines in a field or only one mine, as they all had to be surveyed and cleared. [16]

3.37     Dr Maley stated that mines tended to blow non-sterile material up a limb much further than the immediate point of the blast. Earth and other material was embedded into wounds and tended to create massive secondary infections. Amputations needed to be high above the knee, creating problems for fitting prostheses. Because children's bone and flesh grows at different rates, this is a particular problem and it can take successive operations to stabilise a stump for the fitting of a prosthesis. All this increased the pain and general suffering of the victims and, although of no importance to victims and their families, also added significantly to the long-term and indirect costs of APLs to nations.[17]

Australia's position

3.38     On 15 April 1996, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence jointly announced support for a global ban on production, stockpiles, use and transfer of APLs. The Government also decided to suspend immediately the operational use of APLs by the ADF, to be reviewed only in the case of 'a substantial deterioration' in our strategic circumstances. [18]

3.39     Australia participated in the first review of the IWC which led to the signing of the amended Protocol on 3 May 1996. These negotiations were difficult because of the positions of some Parties which continue to produce and export APLs. To gain the agreement of these Parties, the nine year deferral was included in the Technical Annex. The NIA states that this was 'an unfortunate decision', but necessary to gain the adoption by consensus of the amended Protocol. [19]

3.40     During his tabling speech in October 1996, the Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that Australia was disappointed that the review process had not produced a stronger Protocol, taking greater steps towards a total ban on APLs. He also believed that arguments in favour of early ratification of the amended Protocol were overwhelming. [20]

3.41     As mentioned above, Australia co-sponsored with the US a resolution in the UN General Assembly which called for 'an effective, legally binding agreement' to ban APLs. The resolution also called for completion of negotiations on the treaty to be completed 'as soon as possible'. [21]

3.42     In January 1997, the Minister told the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva of Australia's suspension of the ADF's operational use of landmines This had been done not because the ADF was responsible for the APL crisis but as 'a moral gesture intended to hasten the end of the carnage'. He outlined recent and continuing contributions to mine clearance and rehabilitation work in Afghanistan, Mozambique, Angola, Laos and Cambodia. [22]

3.43     He also pointed out that Australia's decision to suspend the use of APLs and support the negotiation of a global ban was not taken without 'considerable soul-searching' about our strategic situation. He asked members of the Conference to consider how particular national security interests may be accommodated within the framework of the international instrument the world needs to meet this urgent humanitarian crisis. [23]

3.44     Landmines are dealt with in both the prohibited imports regulations and the prohibited export regulations. Details of Australia's controls on the export, import or transfer of defence-relevant and strategic goods, and of a review of these controls, are set out in Chapter 2 above. [24]

Use of landmines by the ADF

3.45     The last time the ADF used APLs in operations was during the Vietnam War. Currently, there are only three mine types in the inventory: the small M14 blast anti-personnel mine, the M16 jumping fragmentation mine and the Second World War vintage British Mark 5 anti-tank mine. [25]

3.46     Australia also has stocks of the M18A1 Claymore mine: a munition which is normally fired electrically by the user. If used with a trip wire, however, it conforms to the definition of a landmine in the amended Protocol, as it would be detonated by the victim.

3.47     The only mine currently held by the ADF which does not comply with the detectability standard in the amended Protocol is the M14. It is detectable with modern mine detectors, but does not meet the new signal requirement of eight grams of iron. Thus, provided these mines are not used, they meet the new standard. Should there be the type of change in our strategic situation referred to in the joint Ministerial Statement, evidence was given that it would be simple and cheap to make M14 mines detectable and use them in accordance with the provisions of the amended Protocol. [26]

3.48     It was stated that disposing of the current stockpile of APLs would be a 'relatively simple' but major task: they would have to be removed from boxes in storage and blown up or burnt in controlled situations. It would be vital to ensure that all were detonated. [27]

3.49     During this inquiry, there were no suggestions that the ADF had ever behaved irresponsibly in the past about the usage and mapping of mines. Tributes were also paid to the skills and training shown by ADF personnel in the dangerous work of mine clearance. [28]

3.50     The ADF's existing training abides by the revised Protocol and exceeds it in protecting the civilian community from the effects of APLs. In all areas it either complies with or exceeds the Protocol's requirements. With the exception of the detectability of the M14 mine, a small change in the design of minefield marking signs and new requirements for Claymores operated by trip wires, Australian Army doctrine meets or exceeds these requirements. The actual changes affecting training are limited. Some other aspects, resulting from changes to Government policy, will be evaluated and will be incorporated in doctrine over the next two to three years. [29]

3.51     Although there were some difficulties in making live mines available for mine awareness training this matter appears to have been resolved, and evidence was given that the constraints imposed by the amended Protocol would have little impact on the ADF. If there were to be an impact, it would be in ensuring the provisions of this Protocol were passed down to all levels. [30]

3.52     The Government's announcement did not mention the disposal of the existing stockpile of APLs. Nor did it ban the use of live mines for training, but the ADF believed that it was consistent with that policy to reduce use during training. There will be no difference in the training provided, other than the inability to buy stocks of mines the ADF does not have and which it might otherwise have used in training. [31]

3.53     The ADF has to have a stockpile sufficient to maintain an operational APL capability and remain current in use and clearance training. To fulfil only the training commitment, stocks would need to be 'fairly modest'. To maintain a clearance capability, rather than an ability to use mines, that stockpile would need to be greater but still 'reasonably modest'. To remain current, larger numbers of some mines already held would need to be carried. If the ADF were to maintain expertise to clear mines internationally, only 'very modest' stocks would be required. [32]

3.54     It was also pointed out that a capability to use mines cannot be developed quickly if it is required urgently. For one thing, while it has no replenishment plans, the ADF's ability to buy APLs in the current environment would be 'almost zero'. [33]

Australia's contributions to de-mining activities

3.55     Evidence was given of Australian support for demining, mine awareness and rehabilitation programs. In 1995/96, $A7.4 million was given, if work on unexploded ordnance was included, to five countries through the Australian International Agency for International Development (AusAID):

3.56     Since 1991, the total contribution has been $A24.5 million which includes two other substantial programs. In his tabling statement on 15 October 1996, the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a $A12 million, three year de-mining program for Laos and Cambodia, announced in May 1996. A further three year, $4 million program for Cambodia and Mozambique has also been announced for 1996/97 by the Minister. This would make Australia one of the major donors to the UN-sponsored de-mining and ordnance clearance efforts in the region. [35]

3.57     As well as de-mining activities, Australia supports mine awareness training, particularly in local communities and schools in rural areas. Assistance is also provided to the victims of landmines, especially in Cambodia. [36]

3.58     Details of expenditure in this area by a number of nations showed that Australia's contributions were comparable. There appears to be a growing awareness among other donor nations of the need to include mine programs in aid and humanitarian defence programs. [37]

3.59     While assistance with demining in Cambodia is carried out under the Defence Cooperation Program (DCP), the Department of Defence confirmed that the DCP does not fund the purchase of landmines for Papua New Guinea, or any other recipient country. [38]

Developments in mine clearance technology

3.60     As the Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out in his speech tabling the text of the amended Protocol, Australia is interested in working with other countries to improve technology to increase the rate and scale of de-mining. During his speech to the Conference on Disarmament in January 1997, the Minister referred to the development of technology which has the potential to make mine detection faster and more reliable in countries like Cambodia which have highly mineralised soils. [39]

3.61     A submission from the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) gave details of a research program into the detection, neutralisation, vehicle protection, simulation and database development related to APLs. DSTO has investigated a wide range of technologies, and for three years has collaborated with the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) in a program to detect and identify small plastic landmines which only have small amounts of metal. CSIRO contributed a high resolution ground penetrating radar, and DSTO enhanced the performance of this radar to distinguish targets from other metallic objects nearby. DSTO believes there has been a break-through in the detection of plastic mines in its program with CSIRO, and with private industry. [40]

3.62     A witness from DSTO explained that Minelab Electronics Pty Ltd, a manufacturer of metal detectors for gold prospecting, has developed an enhanced metal detector capable of overcoming the interference caused by mineralised soils. Its F1A4 model detects plastic mines with low metal content, and cancels the effect of these soils. It has exceptional sensitivity: tests by mine clearance teams in Cambodia and Laos have assessed it as superior to detectors in service. [41]

3.63     DSTO is putting together CSIRO's ground penetrating radar and Minelab's electro-magnetic detection hardware to combine their data in an enhanced visual display. The combined device detects and identifies mines which could not previously be detected, but it can not detect mines with no metal content. The US Army, it was stated, had invested heavily in similar technology, but the resulting equipment was not as sensitive as the Australian device. [42]

3.64     The ADF has used the Minelab equipment in trials and has found it detects the Chinese M72A mine 'reasonably well'. Considerable stocks of this mine are held around the world and existing Western equipments in service are not able to detect it. While detecting mines is one problem, the other is determining what has been detected, and advances in the synthesis of metal detection, ground probing radar and other capabilities to discern what has been detected are the areas of the break-throughs. [43]

3.65     The question which needs to be addressed is not, however, the equipment which might be developed or used, but whether an APL meets the standard of detectability in the amended Protocol. [44]

3.66     DSTO believed that government assistance would assist the development of the devices from CSIRO and Minelab into a piece of equipment which could be deployed. It stated that the Australian Army and other armies were 'very interested' in acquiring this type of equipment. Humanitarian organisations working in Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique and Angola would also be potential users. [45]

The need for additional legislation

3.67     Australia's policy is only to enact legislation needed for the ratification of international instruments where existing legislation, State or Commonwealth, is found to fall short of the international obligations concerned. The NIA stated, and a witness from the Attorney-General's Department (AGs) confirmed, that Australia would not be required to introduce any new legislation to implement the amended Protocol II. [46]

3.68     Evidence was given by AGs that the compliance requirements are set out in Article 14 of the Convention itself, and these are divided into requirements for legislation and for other types of implementation measures. Each contracting Party 'shall take all appropriate steps' to implement parts of the Protocol and it has been decided, for example, that legislation is not needed for the ADF to stop using APLs in operations. [47]

3.69     Paragraph (2) of Article 14 refers to penal sanctions against those who wilfully kill or cause serious injury in an armed conflict, contrary to the provisions of the amended Protocol. AGs believed that State and Territory criminal law would adequately cover such actions taken within Australia. Such legislation is not specific about the type of weapon used and would be relevant if a landmine was used in a murder, an assault or causing grievous bodily harm.

3.70     Not all Australian citizens abroad would be subject to Australian Government jurisdiction and control. Under existing legislation, such as the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982, members of the ADF could be dealt with for breaches of this Protocol whether or not they are in Australia.

3.71     Section 7 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1957 deals with a person who commits or aids the commission of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions, including wilful killing and injury, whether inside Australia or not. The Geneva Conventions allow for the defence of military necessity while the amended Protocol II does not and, thus, some situations would not be covered.

3.72     Other Acts cover specific activities abroad. The Crimes (Foreign Incursions and Recruitment) Act 1978, for example, proscribes and makes a criminal offence of engaging in hostile activity in a foreign state.

3.73     If gaps in legislation are discovered, they will become apparent with operational use of the Protocol. Amendments to an existing Act, or a new Act as appropriate, could be introduced to deal with any deficiencies. [48]

Previous Parliamentary involvement

3.74     The use, effects and export of APLs has been dealt with, generally and specifically, in a number of reports by Parliamentary committees and delegations. Several of these reports were by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JCFADT), from 1993 the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT). Committees have also received briefings, at private meetings, from a range of experts on the world wide problem of APLs, and individual Parliamentarians have also raised the matter in their respective House.

3.75     In a 1991 report, the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade referred to Australian Army engineers seconded to the United Nations Mine Clearance Training Team in Pakistan (UNMCTT). It also noted the need to provide adequate training to ensure an awareness of high risk environments, including awareness of mines and booby traps. In the context of the experience of participation in the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia in 1989-90, the Senate Committee pointed out that this was the first time since the Vietnam War that Australian soldiers had had to breach live minefields. [49]

3.76     In its 1992 report, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, the JCFADT considered review procedures for defence exports. It recommended that a direct link be established between military exports and human rights violations so that:

3.77     In its September 1994 report The Implications of Australian Defence Exports, the JSCFADT referred to the large number of civilian casualties caused by landmines, and to Australia's attempts to strengthen the IWC. It noted that APL counter measures and expertise in de-mining were defence exports and could be expanded. [51]

3.78     The JSCFADT's 1994 review of human rights endorsed the recommendations in the report on Australia's defence exports, mentioned above, and referred to Australian participation in UNTAG and the UN's Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992-1993 which included mine clearing operations. Referring specifically to the world wide problem of landmines, it recommended the Australian Government consider ways in which a number of propositions could be put forward internationally for the better control of APLs:

3.79     The JSCFADT's December 1994 report Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping also referred to the Army engineers deployed on rotation with UNMCTT in Pakistan and Afghanistan from July 1989 to December 1993 and the Australian contributions to UNTAG, as well as to UNTAC. [53]

3.80     The JSCFADT report briefly examined the decision to withdraw the Army engineers from UNMCTT because of a perceived threat to their security and a supposed lack of support at the time from the people of Afghanistan. Having reviewed the matter and the various claims, the JSCFADT was 'surprised' at the decision to withdraw the team. Dr Maley also commented on this decision. [54]

3.81     This report also mentioned that training for peacekeeping operations should include information on such things as the threats from mines, how to identify likely mine sites, how to deal with mines and how to treat their victims. [55]

3.82     The report of a Parliamentary delegation which visited Cambodia in January 1996 described the work of the Cambodian Mine Action Centre. Australia has contributed substantially to the Centre, but it has been estimated that more than 10 million mines were laid in Cambodia in the past two decades, and that it will take up to ten years to clear existing minefields. It has also been estimated that up to 300 people are killed or injured by mines in the country every month. [56]

3.83    The delegation recommended that technical and financial support continue at present levels, and that the Australian Government seek wider international action to overcome this continuing human tragedy. [57]

3.84     In a chapter titled 'Special Issues', the JSCFADT dealt with the humanitarian issues of landmines in a recent report on Australia's relations with Southern Africa. It surveyed the problem in the Southern African Development Countries (SADC) which were the subject of the report, and also dealt with Australian aid to Southern Africa for demining. It recommended that Australia continue:

Views of interested organisations and individuals

3.85     A number of NGOs and individuals were invited to give evidence at public hearings and some also provided submissions and other written material, listed in Appendices 2 and

3. Many similar views were expressed and not all will be set out below.

3.86     For the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), Ms Janet Hunt acknowledged the change in Government policy on APLs which had led to the suspension of their operational use by the ADF. She argued, however, that unless Australia abandoned the use of APLs it would not be able to develop the moral force required internationally to prevent other countries from using these weapons. She also mentioned that many people in the ICBL were reluctant in their support for the amended Protocol. While it was the only international legal instrument available to control APLs, and recognised as stronger than the previous version, it was seen to be 'far from adequate'. [59]

3.87     ACFOA would like to see the adoption of a ban on any use of APLs by Australia, except for their use in mine clearance training. It also suggested that only mines using new, detectable technologies should be used and that, apart from training stocks, the existing Australian stockpile should be destroyed. Failure to destroy this stockpile, she argued, could indicate a willingness to use APLs. Ms Hunt drew attention to the fact that the mines in this stockpile did not have the detectable metal content required by the amended Protocol, a point acknowledged by the ADF, nor did they have the necessary self-destruct mechanisms. [60]

3.88     This umbrella NGO supported the Ottawa Declaration, a Canadian initiative and challenge, which seeks to have the amended Protocol II signed by December 1997 and implemented by 2000 as an agreed international treaty. To this end, Canada would host a conference in December 1997. It has also announced it will destroy two-thirds of its stockpile of APLs. [61]

3.89     Ms Hunt also noted that some members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had not signed this Protocol, and suggested that Australia could profitably discuss the matter with those nations. China, India and Pakistan were strong in their opposition to a total ban, and bilateral discussions with these nations would be important. [62]

3.90     The ICRC's enthusiasm for the Protocol was 'muted', according to Ms Shaun Hoyt. She welcomed the increased restrictions, but considered the document to be 'woefully inadequate' because the limitations were 'very modest'. Regulations covering detectability and self-destruction were seen to be weak and overly complex, and it included the nine year deferral for complying with the detectability provisions. [63]

3.91     Positive features included extension of the Protocol to non-international conflicts, clear assignment of responsibility for clearance to those who laid them, improved recording requirements and improved protection for humanitarian workers.

3.92     The ICRC, with Dr Maley and the Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW), was also concerned that the new measures were the first international instrument which implicitly promoted the use of smart mines. Ms Hoyt believed that the amended Protocol was only a step along the way to the goal which must be the total stigmatisation and elimination of APLs. [64]

3.93     She referred to ICRC plans for various regional conferences to consider the amended Protocol, and to planning for such a conference in Manila, tentatively scheduled for August to October 1997. DFAT advised that, while the Philippines would not actually co-host this gathering, it may provide some resources. The conference's focus would be the military usefulness of APLs, as well as humanitarian consequences of their use and legal issues. The agenda had not been finalised but could include:

3.94     Ms Hoyt also mentioned talks with the Australian Government about such a conference, which should include the South East Asian region. [66]

3.95     Mr Gideon Boas of the Australian Red Cross (ARC) did not want to see Australia use the nine year period to move towards the new, self-destructive, self-deactivating technology required by the Protocol. He said Australia should encourage its regional neighbours to adhere to the Convention, and to the amended Protocol [67]

3.96     Mr Boas also referred to an ICRC study on the military usefulness of APLs, stating that it concluded there was no circumstance where landmines had stopped an advance and that there were other means to achieve the purposes for which APLs were employed. In particular, it showed that the humanitarian devastation they caused outweighed their military usefulness. [68]

3.97     Discussing the likelihood of a total ban, Ms Hoyt noted that very few countries used to be in favour, whereas over 40 now supported the idea, and 50 had supported the Ottawa Declaration on banning and eliminating APLs. The ICRC was very optimistic about this momentum, with other nations, including Australia, changing their positions. The more countries which support a total ban, the more difficult it would be to import mines. International pressure on this issue should not be ignored. [69]

3.98     For Austcare, Mr Eric Ellem referred to the burden that the slow clearance of mines placed on the development of nations which have problems with large numbers of APLs from previous conflicts. Austcare also supported a total ban and, as did other organisations and individuals, saw the amended Protocol only as the first step towards that goal. [70]

3.99     He reported that Austcare was holding discussions with a group of engineers who are trying to develop a mine detection unit. If this work were to be successful, Austcare would be seeking government support for the development of these units. He also believed that greater pressure should be placed on manufacturing countries than on those who used APLs: if they were not available, they would not be used. [71]

3.100     Caritas Australia's Mr Laurie Halloran referred to the impact on development caused by landmines, and supported a total ban on APLs and ratification of this Protocol as a first step. He was aware of a number of shortcomings in the document, but expressed support for the demining work undertaken by the ADF. Reference was also made to what was seen as an inconsistency in Australia's approach: setting aside funds for demining, at the same time as mines were allowed to be made and laid around the globe. [72]

3.101     Dr Ian Buckley of the MAPW stated that the world wide trade in and deployment of APLs was an abhorrent situation which any civilised nation would do its utmost to stop. He said that it was vital that APLs be stigmatised as totally unacceptable items of commerce and that there was already in international law a firm foundation for this position: as indiscriminate weapons, they were prohibited under existing customary international law irrespective of the treaty commitments of the States involved. [73]

3.102     Dr Sue Wareham of the MAPW, referring to statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, tabling the text of the amended Protocol, found the position taken was 'quite weak'. She believed that quite forceful, ethical statements in favour of a total ban were followed by the re-statement of the intention to retain the stockpile, thus demolishing the earlier argument. [74]

3.103     The MAPW believed that through promotion of appropriate international treaties, countries such as Australia which sincerely wished to solve the problem must redefine their military practices and, through promotion of treaties, support and strengthen existing humanitarian law. The Association drew attention to the 'gross inadequacies' in the amended Protocol, noted by a number of UN bodies and other NGOs. [75]

3.104     The 'most objectionable and totally inappropriate' feature of the amended Protocol was, according to the MAPW, that it promoted the continued use of APLs. It encouraged the use of smart mines, providing that these may be delivered aerially, and permitted nations to continue to produce, sell, export and deploy as many mines as they pleased providing some rules were followed. These features, together with the nine year deferral and military exigency provisions, the MAPW believed, did not hold out any hope for the current and future victims of landmines. [76]

3.105     This organisation was encouraged by the Canadian initiative which it saw as having a humanitarian rather than a trade orientation and therefore having exciting prospects for success. It supported Australian participation in follow-up conferences, especially that to be hosted by Canada in December 1997. The MAPW pleaded that, to ensure full effectiveness, the Protocol should prohibit production, stockpiling, sale, transfer, and deployment of APLs. The document should provide for registers of production plants, offshore and domestic, and of stockpiles to allow for inspections and sanctions. The MAPW hoped that manufacturers and governments responsible for the mines presently deployed would be obliged under the Protocol to assist with and bear the cost of mine clearance. [77]

3.106     Finally, the MAPW asked that an increased proportion of Australia's defence budget be given to landmine clearance in the Third World. ACFOA and Dr Maley supported this view because it would commit more Defence resources, human and material, to humanitarian causes, as well as providing the ADF with significant training benefits. [78]

3.107     Sister Patricia Pak Poy said the Australian Network of the ICBL comprised a wide range of humanitarian aid agencies, refugee groups, ethnic communities, churches, church groups, service groups, students, workers, the young and the old. It called for a total ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use of APLs. It also called on Australia to give generously to mine clearance and to programs for the assistance of victims, and wanted Australia's suspension of the operational use of APLs to be permanent. [79]

3.108     The Network recognised the gains made in the amended Protocol: tighter restrictions and better standards of detection. There were, however, 'gross loopholes' which made it unsatisfactory:

While the verification mechanism was seen as weak, the Protocol did call for consultations and an annual review process. [80]

3.109     Commenting on Australia's position, Sister Pak Poy noted the development from a position stressing the legitimacy, efficiency and military usefulness of APLs to one of strong support for a total and global ban, albeit with a condition. This made the nation's position a compromise and revealed an ambivalence: the reservation of the right to use APLs seemed to the Network to be based on the premise that these are legitimate weapons. This could lead to accusations of hypocrisy, and the Network wanted to see Government rhetoric matched by actions such as the renunciation of the use of these weapons and a reduction in the stockpile not needed for training. [81]

3.110     Sister Pak Poy referred to 'a strong body of military opinion' which held that these weapons were not as strategically and tactically useful as claimed, a point also made by the ARC, the MAPW and Dr Maley. She said the NGO community applauded the Canadian initiative, believing that it promised to hasten a total ban. She also expressed some concern at the prospect of placing landmines on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament because of its slow processes and the restriction of discussions to member parties. [82]

3.111     Sister Pak Poy expressed the view that Australia has the potential and capacity to be a catalyst for progress on this issue in its region, and looked for the policy commitment to further the cause of a total regional ban to be honoured. She sought a reduction in Australia's stockpile, active participation in the initiative proposed by Canada and continued support for mine clearance and assistance to victims of landmines. [83]

3.112     Major General A Clunies-Ross (RL) of the Returned and Services League (RSL) mentioned that it was one of the few organisations in the country whose members had had personal experience of APLs. It was therefore more aware than most of the horrific nature of the injuries they caused. It also appreciated the difficulties involved in the formulation of a document with world wide, practical application. It supported the Protocol, noting it was the only international agreement which defined limitations on the use of APLs.

3.113     The RSL condemned the careless and indiscriminate use of APLs and, were it at all practical, would support a total ban on their use. It supported the suspension of the operational use of APLs, taking into account the requirement to protect the ADF, and also the right to review that policy. It believed there was a possibility APLs would need to be used in the future and therefore stocks must be maintained for training and initial use. Australia also needed to remain abreast of technological developments in the field. [84]

3.114     The amended Protocol was seen as a necessary, interim measure pending more substantial developments. The RSL believed there was loose wording in some articles which created significant weaknesses, and it shared the view of some NGOs, referred to above, that this document was only a step in the right direction. The major flaw, according to the RSL, was deferral of compliance for nine years which it believed rendered the amended Protocol largely ineffective for a substantial period. [85]

3.115     Major General Clunies-Ross stated that APLs provided an additional capability for military personnel which was only feasible in defensive situations. Alternative means of protection could be available but would depend on the range of other, available resources. There were situations in which commanders would not lay APLs because, once laid, mine fields become problems to secure properly. [86]

3.116     Dr William Maley also believed that the amended Protocol was a step forward towards the ultimate goal of getting rid of these weapons altogether, but saw a number of problems in the international management of landmines which still needed to be addressed. He thought that anathematisation as an utterly uncivilised weapon of war would ultimately be the path by which APLs would disappear. He suggested that a combination of unilateral steps by countries around the world would put so much pressure on those continuing to produce these weapons that it would not be in their political interests to continue. He saw scope for moral suasion to be applied to some countries importing APLs, although he recognised that there were some which would simply not be susceptible to such pressures. [87]

3.117     One of the problems of which he was aware was the danger of secondary markets. Only about one third of States have adhered to the IWC, and the amended Protocol did not place any moral pressure on those who might move away from it and begin producing dumb mines for use in Third World conflicts. Dr Maley pointed to a situation which could arise where wealthy countries used smart mines, and there was also an expanded market in dumb mines for both producers and consumers who could not afford smart mines. [88]

3.118     Sub-paragraphs 2 (a) and (b) of Article 5 contain provisions for using dumb mines in some circumstances, but serious problems can arise when a regular armed force using dumb mines in marked fields is overrun by an irregular force. The local civilians then returned to the area of the conflict, where their houses are, and tended to take the marking fences for other purposes. This caused a major problem in humanitarian mine clearance: the entanglement of locals in minefields full of non-self destructing mines. [89]

3.119     Dr Maley did not believe much could be done about the nine year deferral of compliance with the detectability provision in the Technical Annex, as this was the shortest period some States were prepared to accept. He thought it was appropriate to continue to put pressure on States to adopt a shorter timetable. He did not believe that problems in the text, such as that with dumb mines, would be best dealt with, and advantageous for Australia, by ratifying the amended Protocol with reservations. [90]

3.120     While Dr Maley thought that there was a prospect for a total ban in 20 to 25 years, he also believed there was a case for keeping part of Australia's stockpile for training purposes. He said that this country had an excellent record of contributing to humanitarian mine clearance operations in countries with significant mine problems. First-rate work was done in Cambodia and Afghanistan and, referring to the 1993 withdrawal of ADF personnel from UNMCTT in the latter country, Dr Maley stated that this was 'an extremely ill-considered decision'. He expressed the view that it was important that this skill be maintained within the ADF, so that its personnel received field experience in clearance operations, and could also give to other nations the benefits of that expertise. [91]

3.121     He was uneasy about retaining the stockpile specifically to deal with 'a substantial deterioration in our strategic circumstances', referred to in the joint Ministerial statement. Because of Australia's geographical position and natural defences, he was not able to draw up a credible scenario in which mines would be useful. Dr Maley believed that it was in our interests to relinquish the use of these weapons and press for a total ban, and he would rather see Australia take a moral lead than retain these weapons for extremely unlikely strategic circumstances. [92]

The Committee's views

3.122     While the Australian Parliament has been concerned about the long term consequences of the use of APLs for some years, revised treaty-making processes have made it possible for Government departments, NGOs, other organisations and individuals to place their views before this Committee.

3.123     In our consideration of this issue, we have been conscious of the high standing of the ADF, both in its professional usage of landmines in the past and its more recent humanitarian work in clearing these weapons in various parts of the world and looking after the victims.[93]

3.124     APLs should be totally and globally banned because of their effects on innocent people long after the end of conflict. Evidence presented to this inquiry showed that fields which are not properly mapped, marked and fenced aggravate this situation. Changed international attitudes which led to the signing of the amended Protocol can only be welcomed. It is also clear that many Australian organisations and individuals see the document as deeply flawed. In the course of this inquiry, the information provided by all witnesses was very useful. NGO witnesses, in particular, were able to bring some of the deficiencies of the document to our attention in an objective manner, backed by detailed knowledge of the IWC and its Protocols.

3.125     DFAT and other witnesses used phrases such as 'a step along the way' to describe the amended Protocol II. We believe that it does make some worthwhile changes to the previous document: it remains the only international instrument which puts any controls on the use of APLs, and this version includes tighter restrictions and better detectability standards. Among other weaknesses, it also includes a deferral period for compliance with these detectability provisions. While this was the minimum period some nations would accept, this Protocol should be seen as only a step in the process leading to a total, world wide ban on the use of APLs.[94]

3.126     Dr Maley raised the possibility of Australia expressing a reservation about the operation of Article 5, but noted that this could be disadvantageous to the Protocol. While not making a recommendation on the matter, we believe the use of dumb mines in the circumstances cited by Dr Maley warrants some further investigation and consideration could be given to a reservation to this Article. If this is not appropriate, a statement on the subject could be made by Australia at the time of ratification.[95]

3.127     It is clear that the Australian position has changed greatly and we support continued involvement in such initiatives as that taken by Canada. The issue of a total ban should continue to be raised at all appropriate international forums, particularly at the annual conferences of States' Parties to the IWC and placed on the agenda for the review conference in 2001.

3.128     We were advised that Australia enacts legislation only when it falls short of the needs imposed by international obligations, and that there is no call for additional domestic legislation to implement this Protocol. We do not accept the argument that it is realistic, or even possible, to legislate domestically to seek to impose a moral argument or position on other countries about any international instrument.[96]

3.129     As ACFOA and the ARC observed, a number of nations in Australia's region have not signed the amended Protocol and opportunities should be taken during bilateral discussions to further this important cause. Australia should participate in any regional conferences and give consideration to organising one if the opportunity arose.[97]

3.130     The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that:

3.131     Australia could still be seen to be in a difficult situation internationally on APLs. While government policy changed significantly in 1996, the caveat in the joint Ministerial Statement in April 1996 was significant. It allows for the retention of the APL stockpile in case our strategic situation deteriorates substantially, and does not do credit to our overall position on these weapons. This can be set against expressions of regret, in October 1996, that a total ban was not achieved and that the amended Protocol did not include stronger restrictions and prohibitions. These statements also seem to sit uncomfortably with the good work the ADF has done in such places as Cambodia and Afghanistan, removing mines and training locals in this dangerous work.[98]

3.132     While they have had a traditional, defensive role, Major General Clunies-Ross made it clear that APLs were not the answer to all tactical problems. Furthermore, in the absence of a direct threat to the continent, and in view of the comments made by Dr Maley about the strategic circumstances in which mines would be employed, there seems to be some potential for accusations of a national double standard.[99]

3.133     It would be easy to say that Australia should destroy its stockpile and have nothing further to do with APLs. The ADF must however retain the capacity to use landmines because, once lost, this capacity can not be regained quickly. It must also retain a capacity to deal with landmines for humanitarian reasons, so as to be able to participate in demining operations overseas, and because a global ban will not be effective for some time. For the next few years at least, and depending on progress towards such a ban, we believe that only a small training stockpile needs to be retained and replenished as required.[100]

3.134     It was argued that Australia's current position on retaining the stockpile damaged its international standing on APLs, and that its position could be seen as hypocritical. If these weapons were renounced and most of the stockpile destroyed, we believe Australia's credibility would be enhanced and its views at the December 1997 Ottawa Conference immeasurably strengthened, and so possibly would the move towards a total global ban on APLs.[101]

3.135     We have also however considered the evidence given by an ADF witness on the size of the APL stockpile required to maintain different levels of capability within the ADF. This evidence was that only 'modest' stocks would be required to retain capabilities in the use of APLs. We believe that Australia could retain a small number of APLs, to ensure it had the necessary capabilities within the ADF, and still work towards a total global ban.[102]

3.136     We therefore believe that Australia should destroy its APLs, except for the training stock referred to above. Australia should formulate a proposal for an international timetable which will lead to the destruction of the APLs of all nations. It will take time and effort to get international agreement to the implementation of such a timetable, but it would be appropriate for Australia to propose that this work begin at the December 1997 meeting in Canada.

3.137     The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that:

3.138     Australia has already contributed to a range of demining, mine awareness and rehabilitation programs in five countries. ACFOA, the MAPW and Dr Maley suggested that the Department of Defence should contribute more resources to humanitarian mine clearance in countries which have problems with mine clearance. This would represent a change from the current situation where most funding for this activity comes through AusAID.[103]

3.139     There is no reason why Australia should not participate in such operations overseas, nor does it seem to matter who pays for this work. If it is being undertaken by the ADF, it could well be argued that, for both simplicity and function, Defence rather than AusAID should also control funding for these projects as it does the personnel, their conditions of service, logistics, etc.

3.140     The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that:

3.141     Manufacturers have improved APL technology and, although these weapons are being cleared, the existing de-mining technology can not deal quickly with all those APLs still potentially lethal in many countries. Funds have been committed to programs, but the time being taken means many innocent people will continue to be killed and maimed for many years. Australian designers and engineers have developed equipment which will, it appears, speed up the de-mining process while retaining safety and efficiency and allow previously undetectable mines to be found. Government assistance was requested to develop the equipment for use in the field.[104]

3.142     The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that:

3.143     We believe more use should be made of the skills of the ADF in humanitarian mine clearing operations, that it is important for Australia to make contributions to de-mining technology and that work should begin on an international timetable for the destruction of all APLs. It should not be forgotten however that, as Ms Hoyt of the ICRC and Dr Maley pointed out, the goal must be the total global ban on APLs as soon as practicable.[105]

3.144     The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that:

W L Taylor MP
Chairman

Footnotes

[1] Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 5, 6.

[2] Senate, Hansard, 20 November 1996, p 5627; House of Representatives, Hansard, 20 November 1996, p 7101.

[3] Exhibit No 52.

[4] Exhibit No 55.

[5] Exhibit No 48. See also Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 65-66.

[6] Article 2; see also Exhibit No 9, pp 13, 12; Transcripts: 2 December 1996, pp 60, 42; 3 December 1996, p 83. The Exhibit, prepared by the ICRC, is one of many which includes a great deal of technical information about APLs, including their varieties, tactical uses, consequences and clearance, which need not be set out here. In this Report, 'APL/s', 'mines' and 'landmines' will be used interchangeably. It should be noted that statistics used in discussing this subject vary from source to source. Where there is no reference, the NIA has been used.

[7] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, p 39; 3 December 1996, p 74.

[8] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 6; Exhibit No 9, p 13.

[9] Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 84. A documentary, Silent Sentinel, Coward's War, shown on Australia's SBS Television on 28 January 1997, included interviews with people injured by APLs, displays of different types of mines, and showed some being laid in Cambodia, as well as humanitarian clearance operations.

[10] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 4; Exhibit No 2, p i; Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 47.

[11] Exhibit No 9, p 3. See Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 62, for a comment on the time estimated to clear existing APLs.

[12] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, pp 4, 23; 2 December 1996, p 62.

[13] ibid, p 4; Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 62; Exhibit No 9, p 7.

[14] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, p 36; 3 December 1996, pp 84, 83, 75.

[15] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 34, 35-36.

[16] Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 82, 76, 82-83.

[17] ibid, p 83; 2 December 1996, pp 35, 47.

[18] Exhibit No 21; Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 4, 6. See also the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996, pp 5427-5430.

[19] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 4.

[20] House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996, pp 5428, 5429.

[21] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 105. See paragraph 3.4 above.

[22] Exhibit No 57, p 5; Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 106.

[23] Exhibit No 57, pp 5-6.

[24] See paragraphs 2.15 to 2.20 above.

[25] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 28.

[26] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, p 6; 2 December 1996, p 34; 6 December 1996, pp 90-91.

[27] ibid, p 91; Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 113.

[28] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, pp 43, 44, 53; 3 December 1996, pp 79-80, 85.

[29] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, pp 18-19; 3 February 1997, p 107.

[30] Transcript, 6 December 1996, pp 91-93.

[31] Transcripts: 30 October 1996, p 19; 6 December 1996, pp 92-93, 94.

[32] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 108.

[33] ibid; Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 28.

[34] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 110; Submissions, pp 24-25. $A0.510 million was also given for such things as global funds and for attendance at meetings by NGO representatives.

[35] Transcripts: 3 February 1997, pp 109-110; 30 October 1996, p 27; House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996, p 5429; Submissions, pp 24-25.

[36] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 109.

[37] Submissions, pp 16-18; Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 110.

[38] Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 22, 28-29; Submissions, p 3. See Exhibit No 35 for a report about the alleged use of APLs on Bougainville in 1996.

[39] House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996, p 5429; Exhibit No 57, p 5. See also Transcripts: 2 December 1996, pp 43, 53-54; 6 December 1996, p 94, for other mentions of this subject.

[40] Submissions, pp 22, 23; Transcript, 3 February 1997, pp 111-112.

[41] Submissions, p 23. Transcripts: 6 December 1996, p 94; 3 February 1997, pp 112, 114.

[42] ibid.

[43] Transcript, 3 February 1997, pp 114-115.

[44] ibid, p 114.

[45] Submissions, p 23; Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 115.

[46] Transcript, 30 October 1996, p 24.

[47] Unless otherwise indicated, material in this section comes from ibid, pp 23-25.

[48] Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 109.

[49] Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, United Nations Peacekeeping and Australia, May 1991, pp 20, 64, 82.

[50] JCFADT, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, December 1992, Recommendation 14, pp 56-57.

[51] JSCFADT, The Implications of Australian Defence Exports, September 1994, p 84.

[52] JSCFADT, A Review of Australia's Efforts to Promote and Protect Human Rights, November 1994, pp 79-81 (Recommendation 22) 87-88, 89-94, 102-105 (Recommendation 27).

[53] JSCFADT, Australia's Participation in Peacekeeping, December 1994, 30-31; Appendix 5, pp 153-155.

[54] ibid, pp 41-43. See Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 79-80, 85-86, and paragraph 3.120 below.

[55] JSCFADT, 1994, op cit, pp 96, 128.

[56] Report of a Parliamentary Delegation to the Kingdom of Cambodia, January 1996, pp 11-12.

[57] ibid, p 12.

[58] Australia's Relations with Southern Africa, November 1996, pp 138-142 (Recommendations 38 and 39).

[59] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 33-34, 41, 44-45.

[60] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 33-34, 44, 41; see paragraph 3.47 above.

[61] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 34; Exhibit No 33, p 3; Transcript, 3 February 1997, p 112. See also Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 17, 38.

[62] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 38, 40, 56.

[63] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 35.

[64] Transcripts: ibid, pp 34-35, 48, 39; 3 December 1996, p 81. 'Smart' and 'dumb' mines were briefly described in paragraph 3.26 above.

[65] Transcripts: 2 December 1996, p 38; 3 February 1997, pp 104-105.

[66] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 38.

[67] ibid, p 37.

[68] ibid, p 41, referring to Exhibit No 19. See also Exhibit No 53, p 60.

[69] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 40-41.

[70] ibid, pp 35-36, 43, 44. See also Transcripts: 30 October 1996, p 5, for DFAT's use of the phrase; 2 December 1996, pp 35, 51, 63, 67, 70, and 3 December 1996, p 75, for other uses.

[71] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 43, 45; Submissions, p 1.

[72] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 36-37.

[73] ibid, p 47.

[74] ibid, p 59.

[75] ibid, pp 47-48.

[76] ibid, p 48.

[77] ibid.

[78] ibid, pp 53, 44; Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 85.

[79] Transcript, 2 December 1996, p 49.

[80] ibid, pp 49-50.

[81] ibid, pp 50-51.

[82] ibid, pp 41, 50-51, 55, 57, referring to Exhibit No 19; Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 78. See Transcript, 30 October 1996, pp 16-17, for DFAT comments on the Canadian initiative and the Conference on Disarmament mechanisms.

[83] Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 51-52.

[84] ibid, pp 64, 68.

[85] ibid, pp 65, 70.

[86] ibid, pp 70, 68.

[87] Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 85, 74, 75, 78. For the 'moral force' argument, see also Transcript, 2 December 1996, pp 41, 44-45, 60.

[88] Transcript, 3 December 1996, p 74.

[89] ibid, pp 74-75.

[90] ibid, pp 75-76, 77.

[91] ibid, pp 78, 79-80, 85-86. See paragraph 3.80 above.

[92] Transcript, 3 December 1996, pp 81-82. Exhibit No 21.

[93] See paragraphs 3.49 and 3.57 above.

[94] See Footnote 70 above for references to uses of the phrase 'a step along the way'.

[95] See paragraph 3.119 above.

[96] See paragraph 3.67 above.

[97] See paragraphs 3.89 and 3.95 above.

[98] Exhibit No 21; House of Representatives, Hansard, 15 October 1996, p 5428.

[99] See paragraphs 3.115 and 3.121 above respectively.

[100] See paragraph 3.54 above.

[102] See paragraph 3.53 above.

[103] See paragraph 3.106 above.

[104] See paragraphs 3.60 to 3.66 and 3.99 above.

[105] See paragraphs 3.92 and 3.116 above respectively.