Joint Standing Committee on Treaties
CHAPTER 4
Australian Ports
Port Access
4.1 Under Article IV of the 1996 Subsidiary
Agreement, Australia undertakes to permit licensed vessels to enter certain
ports. Fishing and port access are considered important levers in international
fisheries management and Australia can use those elements to influence
the way fisheries are managed.1 DPIE told the
Committee that:
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The current policy of linking port and fishing access together
provides a mechanism to allow port access by as many vessels as
Japan has traditionally sought (up to 250 under the current agreement)
while capturing for Australia a reasonable share of the benefit
that accrues to Japanese vessels from port and fishing access.2
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4.2 Under the current arrangements, bilateral
subsidiary agreements allowing Japanese vessels, port and fishing access
cannot be finalised until the international SBT quota is set by the Commission
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. This provides a mechanism
for maintaining leverage over fisheries management outcomes important
to Australia.3
4.3 Japan has argued strongly for a separation
of port access and the fishing access agreements.4
The Japanese would like to sever the linkage because the administrative
burden is significant and the nexus with the southern bluefin tuna Commission.5
Some Japanese join the subsidiary agreements to utilise the port access
for fuel, recreation and with no intention of fishing in the AFZ.6
Others seek the high quality fish in the AFZ.7
Japan charges a lower fee to its vessels wishing to utilise the port facilities
and a higher fee to those wishing to fish in the AFZ as well.8
4.4 The benefits to the Japanese in having
access to Australian ports include the facilities and services available,
the commercial convenience of not having to travel to other more distant
ports and there is single access fee.9 ABARE
has estimated the value of access to Fremantle alone as $6.75 million
to the Japanese industry.10
4.5 The Commonwealth Government believes
that there is adequate scope within the current subsidiary agreement to
provide port access to any Japanese long-line vessels seeking it.11
It was pointed out that the agreement provides access to a negotiable
number of vessels with no administrative charges other than those applied
by the ports.12 Despite requests, Japan has
not provided information on the reasons for seeking separate port and
fishing access.13
4.6 It was argued that:
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Port access to Australia is not critical for Japan. They can use
Bali, Singapore, NZ and Fiji. They can also service their vessels
at sea through tankers etc., contracted by Japan Tuna Federation.
Our view is that the current Australian strategy of using the bilaterals
as a lever to get a CCSBT Agreement each year will eventually be
counterproductive.14
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4.7 ATBOA believes that the continuation
of this link may lead to a net economic loss for Australia and is not
beneficial to Australia's relationship with Japan.15
4.8 The point was made that Japan has
28 fishing agreements and, of these, the agreement with Australia is the
only one that links port access and fishing rights.16
New Zealand has a policy of separate port access and a number of Japanese
vessels used New Zealand ports during the boycott.17
There was a general call for the separation of port access and the indirect
link with the establishment of quotas.
Legal implications of separate port access
4.9 The question arose during the Inquiry
as to whether Australia could grant port access to an unlicensed foreign
fishing vessel of one country but refuse to grant access to the unlicensed
fishing vessel of another country. The Attorney-General's Department believes
that as a matter of international law, Australia has the right to deny
fishing vessels access to its port except vessels in distress.18
Further, Australia can place conditions on port access which could include
membership of and compliance with the Convention on the Conservation
of Southern Bluefin Tuna.19
4.10 The United Nations Convention
on the Law Of the Sea has provisions which prevent Australia from
discriminating between vessels from different countries in certain circumstances
but these do not include access to ports.
4.11 There are also constraints on port
access in the Fisheries Management Act 1991 which requires vessels
to have a license, or for Australia to have an agreement with their country
allowing port access.20 Section 94 of the
Act allows for the granting of port permits to unlicensed foreign fishing
vessels for a specific purpose such as:
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if it was appropriate to do so for the purpose of monitoring movement
of foreign fishing boats.21
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4.12 UNCLOS requires Australia to give
other countries access to unexploited marine resources. It was also noted
that:
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The obligation to allow other states access to the surplus is framed
there, in terms of taking into account all relevant factors. Two
of those relevant factors are the significance of the living resources
of the area to the economy of the coastal state - namely, Australia
- and its other national interests. If we decide that it is not
in our national interest to let other countries into our zone, then
we do not let them. There is no way that we can be forced to.22
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4.13 Further, DFAT pointed out that the
dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS include:
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article 297 says that the worst that can actually happen to us
if we would be forced, not into arbitration, merely into conciliation.
The provision goes on to say that in no case shall the conciliation
commission substitute its discretion for that of the coastal state
in such matters ... if we do not want to let others into our zone,
we cannot be forced to.23
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4.14 The other issue is whether, as a
matter of policy, Australia would wish to discriminate between flag States
in allowing port access by unlicensed foreign fishing vessels.24
The Committee does not consider this to be an insurmountable problem if
the condition of entry is the membership of the Flag State to the Convention
for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna.
4.15 The Committee believes that Australia
is now in the position where it needs to actively seek business for its
ports and can no longer rely purely on the proximity to the southern fishing
grounds.
4.16 The Western Australian Government
pointed out that the port of Fremantle provides attractions other than
the fishing operations.25 When the SBT reach
Western Australia they dive and disappear into deeper water.26
This is when vessels visit the port of Fremantle.27
Vessels visiting Fremantle have usually been at sea for three months and
require re-provisioning, repairs, rest and recreation for the crew and
crew change overs.28 The value of these visits
to Fremantle was estimated to be $21 million including fuel.29
4.17 If Japanese vessels ceased coming
to Fremantle then a number of businesses would reduce their staff.30
The supplies provided to tuna vessels on average were about $25 000 while
that supplied to cargo vessels was in the order of $2 000.31
4.18 Concern was raised in relation to
the sales tax levied if the ship does not visit another port between two
stops in Australia. The comment was made that this involved a considerable
expense and ensures that vessels are more inclined to go to Indonesia.32
It was also pointed out that Japanese vessels employ an increasing number
of Indonesian crew which creates an additional attraction for vessels
to use Indonesian ports rather than to visit our ports.33
4.19 Japanese long-line vessels use four
main ports in the southern oceans New Zealand, Hobart, Fremantle and South
Africa. 34 Cape Town is aggressively seeking
business from long-line vessels and has constructed a multi-million dollar
facility to store fish at minus 60 degrees as a transhipping facility.35
The Japanese fleet uses Cape Town as an operations base and injects millions
of dollars into the local community.36
4.20 The recent boycott of Australian
ports is a clear indication that the Japanese will make alternative arrangement
if agreements with the Australian authorities break down.37
During the boycott of Australian ports Indonesia constructed the necessary
facilities thereby weakening Australia's leverage through port access.
The Japanese also used a supply tanker to refuel on the high seas during
the boycott.38
4.21 It was suggested to the Committee
that the boycott was called by the fisheries association and not the vessel
owners and that the reason they have returned to the negotiating table
is pressure from the boat owners.39 The additional
cost of going to Bali is $100 000 and the cost of the tanker was
$50 000 to $100 000.40 The cost
staying in port during the season is about $10 000 per day.41
4.22 The Marine Board of Hobart also believes
that port access should be separated from fishing rights as this would
enable local businesses to plan for the longer term.42
The estimated value of visits to Hobart was $15 million annually.43
They also suggest that this would enable the Port of Hobart and Tasmania
to compete freely in the international market place.44
The point was raised that it may not be in the best interest of Australia
because not all other countries with long-line capacity are as economically
well off as Japan.45
4.23 The Fremantle Port Authority sees
the quota issue as having a negative impact on the number of vessels visiting
Fremantle.46 The Maritime Agencies of Tasmania
believes that the separation of the two would have potential economic
benefits for Australia.47 It was suggested
that this is purely a commercial decision as it would take an extra 12
days to go to ports in Indonesia. 48
4.24 Businesses in Fremantle and Hobart
emphasised that the Japanese spend substantial amounts of money in Australia,
they are good payers and there would be significant employment reductions
if the Japanese vessels ceased to call into these ports. These companies
provided services including ship repair, food services, providores, health
and medical services. The estimated value of Japanese long-line vessel
visits to Australian ports was estimated to be $46-50 million.49
4.25 However, DPIE believes that the net
benefits for Australia are significantly less than the total expenditure
when costs are taken into account.50
4.26 One of the difficulties in separating
port access and the subsidiary agreements is the increased capacity of
those vessels using the nearest port to spend the additional time fishing
inside and adjacent to the EEZ. The Western Australian Government raised
the point that to deal with the separation of port access and fishing
outside the EEZ there may be a need to introduce controls over the take
of species other than those already under quota.51
4.27 Port access is not given to unlicensed
fishing vessels.52 The concern was expressed
that if Australia were to move to a policy where unlicensed vessels were
permitted to use our ports then under the law of the sea Australia could
be required to allow access to vessels from other countries.53
DPIE pointed out that Australia:
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would be under considerable pressure to provide those same privileges
to fleets from other countries who are fishing in an unregulated
and increasingly unconstrained - in some cases - way on the very
resource on which we have a $100 million industry dependent.54
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4.28 The Committee also notes that under
the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna Australia
is legally obliged not to facilitate the operations of countries that
are not party to the Convention. Further, under the 1923 Maritime
Ports Convention countries have the right to control access to
their ports except for a vessel in distress but under UNCLOS, vessels
from foreign countries should not be treated in a discriminatory way.56
4.29 The point was made that if the fishery
collapses because of uncontrolled fishing in the region then there will
be no future fishing fleet to use our ports.57
The example was given of the collapse of the cod stock on the Grand Banks
off Canada. Canada had an open access policy and trawlers overfished the
area outside the Canadian zone.58 Open access
which would allow fishermen from a number of countries may lead to the
expansion of fishing activity adjacent to the AFZ and potentially undermine
the viability of Australian fisheries.
4.30 DPIE emphasised that in relation
to an open access arrangement:
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While this could in the short term provide for more stable expenditure
patterns in Australian ports, such benefits need to be weighted
against broader impacts on the sustainability of fishery resources
on which our industry (and foreign fleets) depend and the viability
of valuable Australia industry sectors which exploit those resources
such as the domestic SBT fishery.59
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4.31 The Japanese activity in the EEZ
will decline as the Australian domestic industry expands. The Committee
believes that the separation of port and fishing access will be inevitable
if Australia is going to maintain the economic benefits that these visits
provide. The Committee believes that the continuation of the current arrangements
may discourage Japanese vessels from visiting our ports.
4.32 Further, with the establishment of
the IOTC there is now an alternative mechanism for the Japanese to seek
the management of SBT stocks. The point was made that Australia would
need to maintain the ability to withhold fishing and port access sanctions
in the absence of international management measures being agreed within
the CCSBT. 60
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Recommendation 13
The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends the separation
of port access from the subsidiary agreement but making port access
subject to the continuation of Japan's membership of the Convention
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and participation
in the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.
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4.33 In addition there would need to be
a number of requirements that would relate to fishing in the EEZ and vessels
entering our ports to maintain the integrity of our management arrangements.
These would include having satellite-based vessel monitoring and the right
to inspect.61
Port infrastructure
4.34 It was suggested to the Committee
that a number of steps could be taken to improve the quality of service
to encourage Japanese vessels to use Australian ports. These ranged from
small matters such as not berthing the vessels in areas which require
access through three padlocked gates to get to the local business centre.62
The time taken to unload containers in Fremantle makes it not cost effective
and would need to be improved.
4.35 It was suggested that the establishment
of ship repair facilities could provide significant economic benefits.64
Facilities have already been established in Cape Town, Canary Islands
and Peru.65 A number of vessels requesting
port access fish on the high seas, although some would also be those currently
fishing in the EEZ.66 The Maritime Agencies
of Tasmania believes that there is potential for a ship repair industry
and transhipment of catch where ships would remain in Hobart while the
crews flew home.67
Australian port communities
4.36 Japanese vessels provide a major
source of economic activity in Fremantle, Hobart and to a lesser extent
in Sydney and Brisbane.68 There are a number
of businesses in Hobart and Fremantle which have a substantial proportion
of their business dependent on Japanese vessels.69
4.37 Witnesses to this inquiry from businesses
all agreed that the Japanese are excellent payers. Ship Agencies Australia
Pty Ltd has in the past managed ships from other countries and very few
Australian companies benefited from their visits while the point was made
that the Japanese appear to have very few restrictions on their spending.70
4.38 Ships are now usually in port for
12 to 24 hours whereas previously they would be in port for three or four
days.71 Further, modern vessels need a lot
less maintenance than older ones.72 This would
indicate that the extent of the services provided previously on a per
vessel basis may be significantly reduced over time. Further, in Tasmania
and foreign ports a major fishing industry association has acquired social
clubs and restaurants where their vessels frequent73
which may impact on the benefits to the local businesses.
4.39 The annual expenditure in Hobart
was estimated to be $8-12 million annually and $50 - 70 million in Australia.74
This expenditure has an estimated multiplier effect of about five which
means the economic benefit to Australia could be $350 million exclusive
of the access fee and the Joint Venture arrangements.75
4.40 In Fremantle, the services utilised
include pilotage and mooring, fresh water, and a berth hire charge which
is about $2 000 per vessel which is $370 000 in total including
research and training vessels.76 Revenue for
the port of Fremantle is in excess of $20 million.77
In Western Australia the multiplier effect is thought to be roughly two
to one.78 Other estimates were $46 million
for Australia of which 50 per cent was for Western Australia.79
4.41 The 1993 ABARE survey estimated the
net economic benefit of port access to be 10 to 30 per cent of gross expenditure
giving a direct benefit of $3 to $10 million annually.80
DPIE believes that a multiplier effect of 2 to 2.5 applies to the net
benefits only and not the total expenditure. 81
It was also pointed out that the estimates of aggregate in port expenditure
provided to the Committee in some submissions does not appear to discriminate
between bilateral vessels and Joint Venture vessels.82
4.42 Australia probably benefits more
from their use of the ports than the Japanese do even though they save
money on not having to go to Bali to bunker or to have a mother ship in
the fishing grounds.83 Another benefit is
that the resources used to provide services for the Japanese vessels such
as bunkering oil and providoring can be used by others.84
4.43 Dr Martin believes that if Japanese
vessels ceased using Australian ports, this would have an adverse impact
on the health of the fishing boat crews and compromise the existing 24
hour priority/emergency medical services currently available to all merchant
shipping.85
4.44 The Australian Maritime Officers
Union (AMOU) supports the continuation of the Agreement because it represents
about 30 per cent of the total pilotage movements through the port of
Hobart and the loss of this business would impact on employment levels
throughout southern Tasmania.86
4.45 The rural community in Tasmania grow
vegetables such as Chinese cabbage for Japanese vessels and there is a
significant effect on the State rural sector.87
A number of local companies tailor their services for the particular needs
of the Japanese and Indonesian crews.88 Some
businesses have used the Japanese business as a base and have also been
able to offer these services to the Australian industry.89
4.46 A number of Japanese vessels will
be in port for two or three weeks then will come back two or three months
later.90 When there are 10 to 15 long-line
fishing vessels in Hobart there are also a number of visitors from Japan
associated with these vessels. 91 In addition,
the crews from Japanese long-lining vessels spend a considerable amount
of money on recreational activities such as at the casino.92
4.47 There is some potential to increase
Australian business with the Japanese. The Committee was given the example
of the possible sale of 2 000 tonnes of mackerel as bait for the
Japanese. It was suggested that there was a huge market for bait if a
suitable product could be developed.93 Purdon
and Featherstone have orders for 300 tonnes for long-line bait for the
1996 season.94
4.48 Mr Goadby emphasised that the bait
stocks 95 must be evaluated in terms of the
sustainability of the stocks. The point was made that one of the factors
determining whether the SBT came near the Tasmania shore was the presence
of bait. If the potential bait industry in Tasmania harvests the bait
from waters which may have been the feeding grounds for the SBT then the
fish may not come close to land.
4.49 It was also suggested that there
is enormous potential for the processing and export of bycatch which is
no longer kept under the current agreement.96
4.50 Although a large number of Australian
fishing vessels use the port of Hobart, piloting services are only needed
for vessels over 35 metres. The Committee was told that the economic benefits
to the local ports were not as great for Australian vessels because they
are smaller hence do not use pilots, pay less in port fees and do not
need as many provisions. 97
4.51 The Australian Maritime Officers
Union has not found the local fishery to be very labour intensive in the
port of Hobart. However, the Committee is mindful that Australian vessels
are dispersed amongst a larger number of ports. Should the domestic fishing
industry expand to utilise the fish currently being caught by the Japanese
such as those adjacent to the Tasmanian coast, there would be a significant
economic benefit to Tasmania. In Western Australia, the development of
a domestic industry may favour smaller ports such as Esperance and Albany
rather than the port of Fremantle.98
4.52 There were a number of arguments
presented which outlined the economic benefits of expanding the local
fishing industry rather than relying on the benefits from port visits
by Japanese vessels:
- Australian fishing vessels could provide employment for Australian
crews;
- wharfage and berthing fees for Japanese vessels are taken once or
twice a year compared to fees paid for the full year by locally based
vessels;
- Japanese vessels largely bring their own bait while most Tasmanian
boats purchase their bait locally;
- require local servicing with fuel and a wide range of general supplies;
and
- create additional jobs for Australians in freight forwarding, fish
processing, packaging etc.99
4.53 Because the Japanese do not land
their catch in Australia there are no ongoing benefits compared to that
which could be derived from Australian vessels.100
Transhipment
4.54 On one hand the Committee was told
that the Japanese had not expressed an interest in transhipping fish via
Australia, however, Tropical Traders believes that the Japanese are very
keen to tranship their catch from the tuna vessel to a reefer while in
port.101 The Japanese currently tranship
fish in the ports of Suva and Noumea.102
Cape Town now has a multi-million dollar transhipping facility which stores
fish at minus 60 degrees.103 The benefit
to the Japanese is that they can sell their catch to the reefer providing
an immediate cash flow.104
4.55 It was suggested that the fish could
be transferred to a larger vessel or transferred to a refrigerated container
and transported to Japan. The advantage of bringing the mother ship into
port would increase Australia's ability to monitor fish catches but transfers
at sea could not be controlled.105
4.56 No-one has been prepared to try transhipping
from Australian ports.106 Transhipment from
Fremantle would have a huge potential for the local industry.107
The Committee was told that transhipment would create more employment
in Fremantle and more frequent visits of vessels.108
4.57 Ship Agencies Australia Pty Ltd recently
shipped albacore to Japan for some Japanese vessels.109
This was acceptable for albacore which is a low-value product but would
not be acceptable for SBT or bigeye.110 Hobart
already has a cold store with a capacity of 3000 pallets of frozen cargo.111
4.58 The Marine Board of Hobart believes
that if transhipment was undertaken, long-line vessels would utilise docking
facilities which would benefit the local economy.112
Hobart has the requisite infrastructure to service these vessels.113
A further upgrade of Hobart's dry dock facilities would attract vessels
from other countries as Hobart has already established a research vessel
base.114
4.59 There may be a potential environmental
impact of transhipping because less fishing time will be lost if ships
can be serviced at the nearest convenient port. Although this will not
impact on the quantity of SBT caught within the EEZ, the Committee is
mindful that other tuna stocks do not have quota levels. Transhipment
could significantly increase the time available for fishing adjacent to
the EEZ which may have a negative impact on fish stocks.
4.60 There is no legal barrier to the
implementation of transhipment under the current arrangements except for
transhipment at sea which is not permitted for obvious compliance and
enforcement reasons.115 The major problem
is that facilities are required to ensure the product is maintained at
a super low temperature of minus 60 degrees.
4.61 A number of problems would arise
if the intention was to unload the product to the domestic market, including
displacing other products, lower prices for Australian fishermen and issues
under the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations. 116
Customs regulations may preclude the landing of catch without specific
ministerial approval.117
Footnotes
[1] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 423
[2] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1 ,
[3] Ibid, p. S 408
[4] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Submission
No. 33, p. S 175
[5] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 393
[6] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 313
[6] Ibid, p. 313
[8] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 392
[9] Ibid, p. 392
[10] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 408
[11] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Submission
No. 33, p. S 176
[12] Ibid, p. S 176
[13] Ibid, p. S 176
[14] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc,
Submission No. 44, p. S 326
[15] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 348
[16] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 122
[17] Maritime Agencies of Tasmania, Submission No.
27, p. S 134
[18] Attorney-General's Department, Submission No.
26.2, p. S 379
[19] Ibid, p. S 379
[20] Campbell, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 395
[21] Ibid, p. 395
[22] Serdy, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 71
[23] Ibid, p. 71
[24] Attorney-General's Department, Supplementary Submission
No. 26.2, p. S 380
[25] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p.
244
[26] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 260
[27] Ibid, p. 260
[28] Tropical Traders, Submission No. 13, p. S 51
[29] Ibid, p. S 53
[30] Neel, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 324-325;
[31] Paino, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 343
[32] Ibid, p. 338
[33] Martin, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 341
[34] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 260
[35] Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 226
[36] Fremantle Port Authority, Submission No. 12, p.
S 43
[37] Purdon & Featherstone, Submission No. 17, p. S
89
[38] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 129
[39] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 317
[40] Ibid, p. 318
[41] Neel, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 325
[42] Thompson, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 95
[43] Marine Board of Hobart, Submission No. 23, p.
S 106
[44] Thompson, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 95
[45] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 308
[46] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 258
[47] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 134
[48] Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 140
[49] Ship Agencies Australia Pty Ltd, Submission No.
11, p. S 39
[50] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 417
[51] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p.
239
[52] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 393
[53] Ibid, p. 393
[54] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 393
[55] Ibid, p. 393
[56] Campbell, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 394
[57] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 393
[58] Ibid, p. 399
[59] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 409
[60] Ibid, p. S 410
[61] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 394
[62] Phillips, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 338
[63] Martin, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 342
[64] Maritime Agencies of Tasmania, Submission No.
27, p. S 137
[65] Ibid, p. S 138
[66] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 15
[67] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 124
[68] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 407
[69] Woods and Cockerill, Submission No. 1, p. S 2;
Aqua Scuba Diving Services, Submission No. 2, p. S 4; Reads Electric Co,
Submission No. 4, p. S 9; Abernethy Owens and Associates, Submission No.
8, p. S 26; Franmarine Underwater Services Pty Ltd, Submission No. 16,
p. S 75; Key Engineering, Submission No. 24, p. S 108; Sabre Marine &
General Engineers, Submission No. 34, p. S 206; Neel, Transcript, 26 September
1996, p. 322; Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 137; Kruimink,
Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 175-176; MacMillan, Transcript, 5 September
1996, p. 176; MacMillan, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 176;
[70] Ship Agencies Australia Pty Ltd, Submission No.
11, p. S 40
[71] Martin, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 336
[72] Phillips, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 337,
339
[73] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 410
[74] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 122; Maritime
Agencies of Tasmania, Submission No. 27, p. S 132
[75] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 122-123
[76] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 259
[77] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 259
[78] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p.
246; Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 264
[79] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 310
[80] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 407
[81] Ibid, p. S 407-408
[82] Ibid, p. S 408
[83] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 312
[84] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary
Submission No. 33.1, p. S 407
[85] Westport Medical Centre, Submission No. 40, p.
S 237, 240
[86] Morgan, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 103:
Australian Maritime Officers Union, Submission No. 9, p. S 28-29
[87] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 130; Morrison,
Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 136
[88] Australian Maritime Officers Union, Submission
No. 9, p. S 28
[89] Ship Agencies Australia Pty Ltd, Submission No.
11, p. S 37
[90] Morgan, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 108
[91] Thompson, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 95
[92] Morgan, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p., 105
[93] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 318;
Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 139
[94] Purdon & Featherstone, Submission No. 17, p. S
90
[95] Goadby, Submission No. 7, p. S 24
[96] Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 142
[97] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 125
[98] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 261
[99] Lister, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 145
[100] Ibid, p. 145
[101] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 16;
Tropical Traders, Submission No. 13, p. S 54
[102] Thompson, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 94
[103] Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 226
[104] Tropical Traders, Submission No. 13, p. S 55
[105] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p.
264
[106] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 124
[107] Atkinson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p.
262
[108] Neel, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 323
[109] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 312
[110] Ibid, p. 312
[111] Thompson, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 97
[112] Ibid, p. 94
[113] Thompson, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 94
[114] Ibid, p. 100
[115] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 416
[116] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 417; Rohan,
Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 417
[117] Department of Primary Industries and Energy,
Supplementary Submission No. 33.1, p. S 412