CHAPTER 3

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

TWO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON TUNA 3rd Report
CONTENTS

CHAPTER 3

Fishing Industry

3.1       Australia's tuna and billfish industries have a gross value of production of around $110 million.1 Japan is the dominant market for sashimi southern bluefin tuna which the Committee was told is insatiable.2 Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea and China are major competitors in Australia's key yellowfin/bigeye markets.3

3.2       In 1992 a major part of the Australian tuna industry was in receivership or under bank control but now operates as high value added industry.4 Australia has a quota of 5 206 tonnes of SBT but only operate within the EEZ.

3.3       The Committee was told that:

the Australian long-line fishery is weather limited, smaller boats fishing for fresh fish. It is physically a different fishery to the Japanese fishery which is large scale, freezer, long-line vessels.5

3.4       ATBOA told the Committee that Australia has tried to develop a long-line fishing industry but seven or eight ventures have gone bankrupt and the one remaining has had one profitable year in three.6 There is one large vessel operating from Western Australia.7 It was pointed out that:

3.5       The Australian long-line boats, with the exception of one operating out of Fremantle, stay out three to four days and airfreight fresh chilled fish to Japan.9

3.6       ATBOA believes that it will be a long time before Australians will invest in frozen tuna vessels.10 Further, from the point of view of Australian workplace and industrial occupational health and safety requirements, Australia may need to revise the nature of operations carried out on frozen tuna long-line vessels.11

3.7       DPIE consults annually with the Australian fishing industry through the management advisory committees (MAC), to determine if further restrictions need to be placed on Japanese access where the Australian industry has developed its operations.12 These additional restrictions can apply to areas of operations and impose catch limitations on the Japanese fleet.13 The information obtained from industry groups can then be coupled with the expertise of fishery managers to contribute to the decisions made in relation to Australia's negotiating position.

3.8       The quantity of SBT taken by the Japanese is substantial if Joint Venture vessels are included in the equation (Figure 5). However, the Committee was told that the presence of the Japanese in the EEZ has not been an impediment to the Australian fishing industry moving into large-scale freezer long-line vessels.14

3.9       There are areas of the EEZ that are unexploited by small, weather limited boats of the Australian fishing fleet.15 The albacore in the Tasman Sea were given as an example of unexploited resources.16 The Western Australian Government believes there are five fish stocks that are not exploited to a high level such as yellowfin and fat-tailed tuna.17

Figure 5 Number of Southern Blue Fin Tuna caught by Japanese vessels within the AFZ by AFZ year (Bureau of Resource Sciences 25 October 1996)

Figure 5 Number of Southern Bluefin Tuna caught by the Japanese vessels within the AFZ by AFZ year (Bureau of Resource Sciences 25 October 1996)

3.10       The presence of the Japanese fleet in the EEZ has been of considerable benefit to the Australian tuna industry. There has been co-operative research and development funding for tuna fisheries' stock assessments and industry projects such as the tuna farms at Port Lincoln.18 The comment was made that the Australian fishermen use Japanese fishing reports to locate fish and when the Japanese vessels left Australian waters last October, the catch rates of the Australian fleet dropped.19

3.11       The Japanese have been progressively excluded from areas where there is competition, gear conflict or the Australian fleet has developed the capacity to operate in the area.20 The CSIRO found that Australian and Japanese fleets utilise the same stocks of southern bluefin and yellowfin tuna.

3.12       There is interaction between Japanese and domestic fishing operations in the EEZ, and there is little doubt that this has some impact on domestic operations. Tagging studies on SBT, for example, show a rapid interchange of fish between the domestic and Japanese fishing operations off eastern Tasmania, as a result of fish movement, even though the fishing operations are separated spatially by many miles.21

Technological benefits

3.13       The Committee was told that the ability of the Japanese to locate fish is the most significant technological difference between the Japanese and the Australians.22 This is largely attributable to the experience of the Japanese fishing masters.23

3.14       In relation to fishing in Australia's northern zones, the Committee was told that the Japanese have not changed their technology in 20 years, apart from improving the material the gear is made of.24 The methods being used by the Australian fleet in northern waters are said to be more efficient, have better catch rates, are cheaper to operate and need less people.25

3.15       In southern waters, however, the Japanese will continue to have the major effort and the major impact because the fish are not catchable by Australian fishermen.26

The weather conditions in those areas, the distance from ports, makes it almost impossible for a western style of operation to succeed in those waters. The conditions are just too bad at the time that the fish are there, for most of the time.27

Joint Venture

3.16       There was a substantial Joint Venture with Japanese vessels catching the Australian quota for the Australian industry.28 It is estimated that the Joint Venture in 1993 contributed $5.8 million to the Australian economy.29 The Joint Venture vessels were allowed restricted quotas for SBT and limits on the bigeye and yellowfin tunas taken.30

3.17       The Australian input was the provision of quota. The benefit for Australia was the technology transfer from the Japanese and the injection of capital which enabled the Australian industry to recover and build its value adding capacity.31

3.18       The other aims of the Joint Venture included taking the pressure off the SBT stock in the high seas, reducing the catch of small SBT, reducing the volume of fresh SBT on the Japanese market and assisting the Australian industry recovery.32

3.19       The Committee was told that the reason for the cessation of Joint Venture was commercial.33 It was suggested that it:

was used in this situation as a lever by the Japanese industry over the Australian industry to create difficulties and therefore engender support for an increase in quota.34

3.20       ATBOA told the Committee that:

The Joint Venture is temporarily suspended for technical reasons i.e. until we can find a solution to the problem of being able to measure tonnage in a hold without unloading, and compare catch records. We expect it to resume in later 1997.35

3.21       Since the cessation of the Joint Venture, Australian fishing vessels now catch about 4500 tonnes.36 The ATBOA believe that the Joint Venture may resume at the end of 1997.

Exclusion Zones

3.22       During the Inquiry there were a number of requests for the exclusion of the Japanese vessels from specific areas. ATBOA believes that:

the Japanese accept the theory that there will be Australianisation of the fishery over time, whether it be through commercial exploitation by Australians, or by expansion of the charter of recreational fisheries.37

(a) Commercial Fishing Industry

     (i) Queensland

3.23       In the Western and Central Pacific Ocean there does not appear to be evidence of serious stock depletion for yellowfin or skipjack tunas although the effects on stock recruitment are uncertain.38 Concern was also expressed about the lack of knowledge in relation to bigeye stocks but albacore stock showed considerable improvements.39

3.24       It was suggested that limitations on Japanese long-line activity in the north east region would be beneficial to local industries. However, if the Japanese ceased to utilise the fishery north of 34 degrees, the Australian fishing industry would take five to six years to fully exploit this resource which would be worth about $25 million.40

     (ii) Western Australia

3.25       The Japanese fleet on the west coast is primarily targeting yellowfin tuna.41 The Japanese fleet operated 14 long-line vessels over a two month period off Port Hedland in an area not frequented by SBT.42 The substantial tonnages of yellowfin tuna taken in the north west are from areas of high water temperature and subsequently have relatively low market value.43

3.26       The Committee is concerned that attempts to exclude the Japanese fleet from areas in Western Australia may deter the use of port facilities at Fremantle. The SBT adjacent to the Western Australian coast are mostly juveniles so there are economic benefits in fishing for larger fish off Tasmania and South Australia. It would therefore be more convenient to undertake bunkering activities in Hobart. SBT are not a major resource on the Western Australian coastline with 265 kilograms being caught by the Japanese fleet in 1993 and 98 kilograms in 1994.44 Those vessels targeting species other than southern bluefin may continue to operate off Western Australia.45

3.27       In Western Australia, fishermen in the scallop and rock lobster fisheries are looking at economies of scale by having larger boats which also suit tuna fishing activities.46 The scaling down of Japanese activities in the area may also assist this industry's adjustment process.

     (iii) Tasmania

3.28       The Committee was told that there is wide ranging support in Tasmania for an extension to an exclusion zone of 50 nautical miles.47 It was pointed out that the better fish come in to feed off the continental shelf and fat fish are worth the most money.48 Good sashimi fish are caught below 500 fathoms and this line is about 12 nautical miles off Tasmania. To the south, however, the continental shelf extends to 30 nautical miles so sashimi fish are not present in any quantity within the 12 nautical mile zone.49

3.29       The Committee was told that the Tasmanian fishermen who have entered the long-line fishing industry have done very well and that there was a 'lot more potential' for local fishermen.50 Mr Green pointed out that he caught 20 fish averaging 100 kilograms with one weighing 200 kilograms about 50 nautical miles from the coast thereby demonstrating the value of this to the local fisherman.51

3.30       The Japanese vessels often fish a lot further south and east but do come in on occasions.52 The proximity of the fish to the Tasmanian coast depends on the presence of bait inshore, the climatic conditions and the amount of fresh water and factors such as El Nino.53 There is a seasonal component and in some seasons the fish will be further offshore.54

3.31       The Tasmanian Government supports the view that a 50 nautical mile exclusion zone would be beneficial to the local fishing industry although concerned that this may impact adversely on the number of Japanese fishing vessels visiting the port.55 The general opinion of the witnesses appearing before the Committee in Hobart was that there would be no significant negative economic impact.56

3.32       The Premier pointed out that a small extension at this stage would only inconvenience the Japanese fleet marginally but may address the issue of gear conflict.57 It was suggested, however, that an incremental increase to 50 nautical miles was not appropriate because fishing must be done outside the 500 fathom line.58

3.33       One Tasmanian fisherman told the Committee that tuna fishing is only a fledgling industry without the capacity to push the Japanese out to 50 nautical miles.59 ATBOA also argued that:

3.34       The 12 nautical mile zone has persisted because the Tasmanian fishing industry could not previously utilise this resource.61 It was pointed out to the Committee that most of the 30 tonnes of quotas for SBT owned by Tasmanians is currently leased to the fish farming projects in Port Lincoln.62

3.35       The view was given that the requested extension to 50 nautical miles would only assist those fishing for SBT.63 Some small Tasmanian operators have applied unsuccessfully for funding assistance from the Tasmanian Government and the Tasmanian Development Authority because they were unable to purchase the required SBT quotas.64

3.36       It is also anticipated that quotas will apply to Tasmanian cray fishermen in the next year and they will be looking to another fishery.65 In Tasmania these boats are suitable for SBT fishing if they can lease tuna quota which would result in increased local effort.66 It was suggested that the gearing up time would be two years if there was the incentive of the 50 nautical mile buffer zone.67 It was argued, however, that excluding the Japanese from the zone would assist in the development of the Australian fleet to utilise this area.68

3.37       Some gear conflict between Australian and Japanese vessels off the coast of Tasmania occurred as a result of the different types of gear used.69 The Australian gear is much lighter than the Japanese gear.70 There has been a precedent in the separation of Japanese and Australian operations in the east coast yellowfin tunas to avoid gear conflict.71

3.38       The Committee was told that there would be an advantage to have a system which enabled the recognition of other gear in the water.72 Problems can arise because there is no communication between the Japanese and the Australian boats.73 There is not usually someone on board Japanese vessels who can speak English.74

3.39       AFMA will follow up any reports of gear conflict immediately because they do not want the Japanese fleet creating difficulties for the domestic vessels.75 Notwithstanding this concern, the Committee believes that if the subsidiary agreements do not extend the exclusion zone to 50 nautical miles then there must be an attempt by Australian negotiators to develop a set of procedures which would prevent the gear conflict that is occurring in Tasmanian waters.

3.40       This would protect gear on both the Japanese fleet, which has had problems resulting from the interactions with Australian trawlers, and the Australian long-line vessels whose lines are lighter than those used by the Japanese. Radio beacons are used by Australian fishermen to locate their own lines. The Committee was told that the radio beacons currently used could only be used if the Australian boats can communicate with the Japanese boats.76

3.41       The Committee believes that the problems with gear conflict may increase if the Joint Venture project recommences at the end of 1997 as this could significantly increase in the number of Japanese vessels operating in the area.

Recommendation 7

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government undertakes discussions with the Government of Japan to resolve the communication difficulties between the two fleets.

3.42       Joint Venture vessels are of more concern to Tasmanian fishermen than the bilateral vessels.77 There are 10 vessels operating in Tasmanian waters under the Subsidiary Agreement for 45 - 60 days catching 400 tonnes of SBT.78 The Committee was cautioned, however, that there would be limited benefit in extending the exclusion zone to 50 nautical miles if this only applied to boats using the bilateral arrangements if joint venturers were permitted to work in the 12 to 50 nautical mile zone.79 The Committee is concerned that given the small number of Japanese boats operating in the area and for a limited time, that without adequate restrictions, an increase in the size of the exclusion zone would be of more benefit to the Joint Venture vessels than the local fishermen.

3.43       Further, there is already a significant presence of domestic vessels from other states. Last year there were about 14 interstate boats from Port Lincoln, Eden and others, as well as the local boats operating off Tasmania.80 It was suggested that at the peak of the season there may be more than 20 Australian boats floating long-lines.81

3.44       The difficulty is that most of the fish occur within the 50 nautical miles zone off Tasmania.82 There was a strong reaction from the Japanese negotiators when it was suggested that there be an extension of the exclusion zone to 15 or 20 nautical miles.83 The Japanese negotiators have suggested that an exclusion zone to 50 nautical miles would be unacceptable.84

3.45       The Committee appreciates that a balance must be struck between being seen to exclude foreign vessels from particular areas before the domestic industry can fully utilise those resources and allowing the fish stock to increase in those areas to provide an incentive for the domestic industry to invest the capital to expand into those areas.

3.46       On balance the Committee believes that the best outcome is for the Commonwealth Government to establish a 50 nautical mile exclusion zone as a matter of national consistency.

Recommendation 8

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government create, as a matter of national consistency, an exclusion zone for the Bilateral and Joint Venture Japanese long-line fishing vessels around Tasmania of 50 nautical miles.

(b) Recreational and game fishing

3.47       There are significant numbers of marlin caught by bilateral vessels including some very large fish. This is detrimental to the recreational fishing sector because the attraction to the game fishing industry is maximum numbers of large fish.85 Under the subsidiary agreements, the Japanese long-line vessels caught between 1991 and 1994 off the eastern coast, an annual average reported catch of 378 black marlin, 502 blue marlin, 3118 striped marlin and 7635 broadbill swordfish although it is estimated that another 30 per cent were released.86 The total marlin catch for the decade preceding this was substantially higher (Figure 6).

Figure 6 Number of marlin caught by Japanese vessels within the AFZ by AFZ year

Figure 6 Number of marlin caught by Japanese vessels within the AFZ by AFZ year

(Bureau of Resource Sciences, 25 October 1996)

3.48       Striped marlin fetch high prices on the sashimi market in Japan.87 The percentage of striped marlin landed alive is 40 per cent but the retention is almost 100 per cent.88 Joint vessels are not excluded from targeting striped marlin.89 The point was made that striped marlin are difficult to distinguish from other marlin particularly in the water.90 The Committee was told that:

this difficulty in identification has triggered an increasing take of blue and black marlin despite the "Gentlemen's agreement" by commercial and Japanese to return to the sea the blue and black marlin.91

3.49       The CSIRO Division of Fisheries point out that broadbill swordfish have a life history which makes them very vulnerable to overfishing.92 There are a substantial number of swordfish caught by Japanese long-line vessels each year (Figure 7). Swordfish are prized in the United States as steaks.93 The percentage of broadbill swordfish landed alive is 32 per cent with a retention rate of almost 100 per cent.94 Broadbill swordfish are slow maturing and its balance has been disturbed in most fisheries.95

3.50       Mr Rowley expressed his concern that broadbill swordfish are nominated as a target species in the agreement and this is a potential growth area for the domestic industry on the east coast.96 He also points out that broadbill swordfish have been subjected to overfishing in most other fisheries.97

3.51       The Committee does not believe that in relation to bycatch the conditions placed on the Joint Venture vessels should be less than those required under the bilateral agreements.

Figure 7 Number of sailfish/swordfish caught by Japanese vessels in the AFZ by AFZ year (Bureau of Resource Sciences 25 October 1996)

Figure 7 Number of sailfish/swordfish caught by Japanese vessels in the AFZ by AFZ year (Bureau of Resource Sciences 25 October 1996)

     (i) East Coast fishery

3.52       The Queensland recreational and game fishing industry has significant economic value.98 The Committee was told that the game fishing industry off Queensland and New South Wales is worth $200 million.99 The access fee has in part been used for major recreational and charter operation studies on the east and west coasts.100 In particular the CSIRO is looking at the marlin off Cairns and the interaction between commercial fisher and charter boats.101

3.53       Off Queensland the long-line vessels target yellowfin whereas black marlin are caught incidentally.102 In the Coral Sea there are 13 small domestic long-line vessels and 55 large Japanese long-line vessels which have a potential impact on the number of marlin available for recreational fishing.103

3.54       The Billfish Assessment Group Report for the Eastern TUNAMAC considered that the assessments of the status of the billfish stocks are compromised by the absence of comprehensive catch and effort data.104 The lack of information from the recreational sector inhibits the capacity to evaluate potential fishery interaction problems.105 The available data suggests that there has been no decline in the local abundance within the eastern AFZ with the possible exception of black marlin although the status of regional billfish stocks is less certain. 106

3.55       The Billfish Assessment Group found that:

Direct evidence of an interaction between the recreational and commercial fleets fishing within the eastern AFZ exists through the recapture of tagged billfish, though previous spatial closures imposed on the Japanese fleet off north-eastern Queensland do not appear to have been accompanied by increases in strike rates within the recreational sectors in this region. Whether or not recent increases in domestic long-line activity have resulted in decreased recruitment in recent years remains unknown.107

3.56       Only 5 per cent of the total black marlin catch for the western Pacific is caught in the EEZ.108 The CSIRO believes that the total elimination of the black marlin catch in the EEZ would have little effect on the global black marlin stock.109

3.57       The Queensland Government believes there is a developing perception among international game fishermen that the North Queensland fishery is no longer productive.110 It is the perceived localised stock depletion due to the presence of the Japanese in the EEZ that is of major concern to the Queensland Government.111

3.58       The catch rates for black marlin off the eastern coast since 1980 has declined by 20 per cent.112 Technological advances in recreational fishing have placed greater pressures on fish stock in strong biomass fisheries but in Australian waters there has been an alarming trend to lower CPUE.113

3.59       Managing the stocks to ensure they are sustainable ignores the importance of size composition to the game fishing industry.114 Under the Commonwealth Fisheries Management Act 1991, the objectives are conservation and optimum utilisation and that:

providing the conservation objective is satisfied, the optimum utilisation objective is limited to maximising the economic returns of the commercial fishing sector.

3.60       In Queensland under the Offshore Constitutional Settlement arrangements, the East Coast Tuna and Billfish Fishery comes under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth.115 The Queensland Government pointed out that:

as a result of a legal opinion on the interpretation of the objectives of Commonwealth fisheries legislation, AFMA considers that it has no power to manage tuna and marlin resources in a way which takes into account the needs of the recreational and game fishing industry, regardless of the economic benefits that the industry generates.

... the Commonwealth does not consider game fishing to be an industry and thus does not accord it appropriate importance when determining management arrangements for the fishery and in particular access arrangements under the Australia/Japan Tuna Long-line Agreement.

The result of this situation is that, under the current arrangements and philosophies, economic benefits to Australia, and particularly to North Queensland, from this valuable fishery are unlikely to ever reach their full potential.116

Recommendation 9

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government undertake a review of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 to determine if amendments are necessary to facilitate the management of all Australian fisheries to enable the recreational and game fishing industry to be treated as a commercial activity with particular reference to achieving optimum utilisation of the resource.

Recommendation 10

The Joint Standing Committee on treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government undertakes a full assessment of the relative values of the recreational, game and long-line fisheries and their compatibility as a basis for determining the most appropriate management arrangements for the fishery and the degree of access to be allocated to each sector.

     (ii) West Coast fishery

3.61       The Western Australian Government believes that sports fishing is the most appropriate, valuable and sustainable use of these resources.117 The West Australian Government believes that the greatest multiplier benefit for their domestic economy is through billfish, sharks and yellowfin tuna.118 Based on the 1992 figures the recreational fishing industry was worth $400 million and the commercial fisheries between $900 million and $1.2 billion to Western Australia when the multiplier effects were taken into account.119

3.62       The Western Australian Government believes that the charter boat fishing industry may require a higher density fish stocks than commercial operators and accordingly would like to see additional exclusion zones around Dampier archipelago, Broome and Ningaloo Marine Park. These areas are peak development areas for charter fishing in Western Australia but other areas such as Rottnest, Abrolhos Islands, Kalbarri and Carnarvon are also developing sport fisheries.121 The Western Australian Government's preferred position is for the phasing out of the Japanese long-line vessels to enable the development of the domestic fisheries.122

3.63       The Western Australian Government believes there is considerable economic benefit in developing a charter fishery which would not significantly impact on the resource.123 High strike rates are needed to attract international tourists. It was suggested that a domestically based recreational fishery could have a negative economic impact because fishing gear is imported even though money is being channelled through the region.124

3.64       The recreational fishing sector in Western Australia has a substantial offshore boating fleet and the quality of fishing is fundamental to the development of this industry.125 The Western Australian Government believes that Japanese long-liners take sufficient billfish to impact on the local stocks to a level where recreational fishing is seriously compromised. 126 Japanese long-line activity off the west coast has caught 26 565 marlin from 1984 to 1990.127

3.65       The game fishing sector is accessing the same stocks as long-line vessels. 128 It was pointed out that in 1988 and 1989, of the four marlin caught by recreational fishers, two had long-line hooks in their jaws.129 The point was made that the Japanese fleet was restricted to 20 vessels operating north of 34 degrees south on the west coast and 50 nautical miles to limit gear conflict with the increasing number of recreational fishers.130 The value of the game fishing industry would increase if there was a perception that there were recreational fisheries.131

3.66       Marlin are bycatch of the yellowfin tuna caught in the pre-breeding aggregation on the north west coast. It was suggested that a seasonal zone closure from 1 January to 31 March in this area between 22 and 16 degrees south would protect the pre-breeding aggregation of yellowfin tuna and eliminate the high marlin bycatch.132

3.67       The recreational fishermen in Western Australia have access to accurate individual club and organisational records going back to the early 1950 that the scientists do not have.133 There are over 400 000 recreational anglers in Western Australia.134 The Committee would like to see all of this information made available for collation and research analysis.

3.68       The Western Australian recreational fishers favour the Japanese presence because they provide the only State based historical data.135 Local fleets under private and commercial secrecy arrangements, do not have to reveal their activities and AFMA is three years behind in collecting tuna reports from Western Australian long-line vessels.136

3.69       Concern was expressed with the wording of the subsidiary agreements in relation to:

permit those vessels to take within the Zone all species of tuna and broadbill swordfish, together with all species of finfish including billfish and oceanic sharks which are incidentally caught.

3.70       Mr Stagles considered that the recreational fishing sector of Western Australia would prefer a nominated range of tuna species with a sustained level of harvesting and an exclusion for marlin.137 Recreational fishermen believe that incidental bycatch should be returned to the sea dead or alive and that methods should be investigated to minimise the bycatch of billfish.138

3.71       Although it is appreciated that part of the access fee relates to the billfish catch it was suggested that this would be far less than the potential economic benefits from the international game fishers who would be attracted to areas with high catch rates.139

3.72       The Queensland Government is concerned that:

Following its legal opinion on optimum utilisation, AFMA lifted a total ban on the retention of all billfish taken off the area off Cairns. The total ban was replaced with a seasonal ban on black marlin only during the September to January spawning season, for resource conservation reasons.

This means that the commercial fishers, both Australian and Japanese, may now retain all billfish they catch and use them for commercial purposes, except for black marlin during the spawning season.140

3.73       Under the Subsidiary Agreement the Japanese vessels may retain marlin which are dead at the time of retrieval which means that they can quite properly have marlin on board. It was suggested that this negates the effectiveness of the voluntary release arrangement with Japan unless an Australian observer is on board at all times.141

3.74       The Queensland Government believes that:

Most Australian boats observe a voluntary code of conduct requiring the release of all marlin regardless of whether they are dead or alive when the long-line is retrieved.142

3.75       The Committee was also told that the code of practice requires the release of blue or black marlin if they are alive but the 'compliance level on local long-line operators has been terrible'.143 It was argued that if all marlin are cut free then a percentage of them will survive.144 Research can be done by using sonic tags to monitor their movement but this is an expensive exercise.145

Recommendation 11

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government require all Japanese vessels fishing in the Exclusive Economic Zone to cut free all marlin (alive or dead) without removal from the ocean.

3.76       TRAFFIC Oceania point out that the subsidiary agreements go beyond Australian policy in fisheries management.146 With greater Australianisation, there will be greater reliance on the domestic fleet in relation to conservation issues. The Committee believes that the Government should also consider the same restrictions being placed on Australian vessels.

3.77       Further, given the potential of the Australian long-line fishing industry to develop the capacity to utilise the tuna resources in the EEZ, research should be done to find methods to eliminate the bycatch of marlin. These measures could then also be applied to Japanese fishing vessels working in the EEZ.

Recommendation 12

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government undertakes a review of the existing tuna fishing technology to determine if modifications could be made to reduce the bycatch of non-target species.

3.78       Concerns were raised in relation to the limited contribution of the recreational fishing industry to research and good management and contribute to the well being of the industry.147 The point was made that recreational fishermen were linked to the charter boat owners which is a commercial industry and the biggest users of marlin.148

     (iii) Tasmania

3.79       The Tasmanian Game Fishing Association and Tuna Club of Tasmania support the increase of the exclusion zone to 50 nautical miles.149 Most recreational fishers in Tasmania do not go out 25 to 30 nautical miles from a safety point of view.150 However, it was suggested that the charter industry would have the potential to expand if the 50 nautical mile limit was introduced.

Mechanism for advice on potential exclusion zones

3.80       The Tuna Management Advisory Committees are relevant to the subsidiary agreements because DPIE uses these committees to gain advice on industry needs in terms of restrictions to be placed on the Japanese vessels or exclusion zones and catch limits in some areas.

3.81       The Committee was told that globally there is a trend towards the inclusion of all user groups in the management of fisheries.151 The recreational fishing sector which has 10 000 members of clubs throughout Australia is now represented on the western and eastern TUNAMAC, but on the southern TUNAMAC the recreational representative has permanent observer status only.152 The Game Fishing Association of Australia considers that this disadvantages them because they must contribute to the expense of having a representative present yet their input need not be accepted.153

3.82       Under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 the maximum number of members of the MACs is nine but AFMA has addressed the problem of having all interested parties by adding observers as corporate members.154 When a position has become available, AFMA has moved to incorporate other groups other than industry as members.155

3.83       AFMA considers that the composition of an independent chairman, an AFMA member and seven other members was appropriate to facilitate the necessary skills mix.156 A review in the context of possible legislative amendments in 1995 concluded that the status quo was most appropriate.157 Further, it was pointed out that on the Western TUNAMAC there were conservation and recreational members and only three industry members.158

3.84       The Committee is aware that some limitations have already been placed on Japanese fishing vessels in areas utilised by the recreational fishermen and that a number of studies are being conducted to determine the extent to which the long-line vessels are having an impact on the stocks of interest to sports fishermen. The Committee believes that it is appropriate to await the outcomes of this research.

Footnotes

[1] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Submission No. 33, p. S 175

[2] Young, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 78; Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 151; Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 230

[3] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 322

[4] Ibid, p. S 322

[5] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 15

[6] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 356

[7] Romaro, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 308

[8] Pike, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 356; Puglisi, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 356

[9] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 151

[10] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 328

[11] Martin, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 330

[12] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 6-7

[13] Ibid, p. 6

[14] Ibid, p. 15

[15] Caton, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 17

[16] Young, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 76

[17] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 256

[18]Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary Submission No. 33.1, p. S 408

[19] Pike, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 359

[20] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 18

[21] CSIRO Division of Fisheries, Submission No. 10, p. S 32

[22] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 414

[23] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 249

[24] Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 221

[25] Ibid, p. 221

[26] Ibid, p. 221, 226

[27] Ibid, p. 221

[28] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 20

[29] Marine Agencies of Tasmania, Submission No. 27, p. S 131

[30] Ward P (1996) Japanese Long-lining in Eastern Australian Waters 1962 -1990. Bureau of Resource Sciences, Canberra, p. 21

[31] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 323

[32] Ibid, p. S 336

[33] Caton, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 415

[34] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 415

[35] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 337

[36] Caton, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 17

[37] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 347

[38] Ninth Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish (1996) Status of Tuna Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Working Paper 3, 22-23 July 1996, Noumea, New Caledonia, pp. 13-14

[39] Ibid, p. 14

[40] Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 228

[41] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 294

[42] Ibid, p. 296

[43] West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 18

[44] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 293

[45] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 249

[46] Ibid, p. 245

[47] Horton, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 145; submission No. 32, p. S 162; Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 146

[48] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 150

[49] Ibid, p. 151, 157

[50] Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 142

[51] Green, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 155

[52] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 150

[53] van den Hoff, Transcript, 5 September 1996, pp. 115, 118

[54] Horton, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 158

[55] Tasmanian Government, Supplementary Submission No. 39.1, p. S 447

[56] Morgan, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p., 107; Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 124; Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 140

[57] Tasmanian Government, Supplementary Submission No. 39.1, p. S 448

[58] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 163

[59] Green, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 155

[60] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 332

[61] Green, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 159

[62] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 357

[63] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 165

[64] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 405

[65] Buchanen, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 168

[66] Lister, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 168

[67] Buchanen, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 169

[68] Horton, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 160

[69] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 132; Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 146; Lister, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 146

[70] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 133

[71] Young, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 89

[72] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 164

[73] Lister, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 162; Shelton, Submission No. 19, p. S 95

[74] Kruimink, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 177

[75] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 401-402

[76] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 164

[77] Green, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 144

[78] Green, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 144

[79] Green, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 147

[80] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 156

[81] Lister, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 162

[82] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 400

[83] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 401

[84] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 404

[85] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 250

[86] Billfish Assessment Group (1996) Synopsis on the Billfish Stocks and

[87] Billfish Assessment Group (1996) Synopsis on the Billfish Stocks and Fisheries within the Eastern AFZ, September 1996, p. 6

[88] Ibid, p. 5

[89] West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 19

[90] Goadby, Submission No. 7, p. S 24

[91] Ibid, p. S 24

[92] CSIRO Division of Fisheries, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 6, p. S 25

[93] Billfish Assessment Group (1996) Synopsis on the Billfish Stocks and Fisheries within the Eastern AFZ, September 1996, p. 6

[94] Ibid, p. 6

[95] Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 231

[96] Fortuna Fishing Pty Ltd, Submission No. 5, p. S 12

[97] Ibid, p. S 12

[98] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S249

[99] Stone, Transcript, 27 September, p. 367

[100] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 329

[101] Ibid, p. S 329

[102] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 249

[103] Ibid, p. S 249

[104] Billfish Assessment Group (1996) Synopsis on the Billfish Stocks and Fisheries within the Eastern AFZ, Billfish Assessment Group for Eastern TUNAMAC September 1996, p. 8

[105] Ibid, p. 7

[106] Ibid, p. 8

[107] Ibid, p. 8-9

[108] Australian Marine Sciences Association, Submission No. 37, p. S 222

[109] CSIRO Division of Fisheries, Submission No. 10, p. S 31

[110] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 250

[111] Ibid, p. S 250

[112] Billfish Assessment Group (1996) Synopsis on the Billfish Stocks and Fisheries within the Eastern AFZ, September 1996, p. 8

[113] The Game Fishing Association of Australia, Submission No. 30, p. S 157

[114] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 250

[115] Ibid, p. S249

[116] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S249

[117] Western Australian Government, Supplementary Submission No. 28.1, p. S 385

[118] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 239

[119] Ibid, p. 239

[120] Ibid, p. 238

[121] Ibid, p. 244- 245

[122] Western Australian Government, Supplementary Submission No. 28.1, p. S 386

[123] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 237-238

[124] Ibid, p. 246

[125] Western Australian Government, Supplementary Submission No. 28.1, p. S 384

[126] Ibid, p. S 385

[127] West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 17

[128] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 294-5

[129] West Australian Recreational & Sportsfishing Council et al, Submission No. 6.1, p. S 257

[130] Ibid, p. S 256

[131] Stone, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 368

[132] West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 20

[133] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 292

[134] Ibid, p. 295

[135] Ibid, p. 294

[136] Ibid, p. 304

[137] Ibid, p. 302

[138] RECFISH Australia, Submission No. 35, p. S 209; West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 20

[139] RECFISH Australia, Submission No. 35, p. S 209

[140] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 251

[141] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 252; West Australian Recreational & Sportsfishing Council et al, Submission No. 6 1, p. S 258

[142] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S251

[143] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 295

[144] Ibid, p. 300

[145] Ibid, p. 300

[146] Sant, Transcript, 9 September 1996, p. 183

[147] Puglisi, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 353

[148] Valcic, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 354

[149] van den Hoff, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 112

[150] Ibid, p. 115

[151] Stone, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 368

[152] Ibid, p. 369

[153] Ibid, p. 369

[154] Meere, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 411

[155] Ibid, p. 412

[156] Ibid, p. 412

[157] Ibid, p. 412

[158] Ibid, p. 413