Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

TWO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON TUNA 3rd Report
CONTENTS

CHAPTER 2

The Agreements

2.1       Both the Subsidiary Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan Concerning the Long-line Tuna Fishing 1996 and the Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission deal with the conservation and management of tuna species which occur within Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

2.2       Subsidiary agreements detailing procedures for the operations of Japanese fishing vessels are required under Article II s2 of the Agreement on Fisheries between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan 1979 (the Head Agreement). This Agreement deals with the proportion of the total allowable catch of fish stocks available to Japanese fishing vessels operating in the Australian Fishing Zone.

2.3       Subsidiary agreements have been negotiated annually since 1979 and are now implemented under the Fisheries Management Act 1991. Japanese long-line tuna fishing vessels are licensed subject to conditions set out in subsections 34(4) and (5) and the subsidiary agreements which outline the terms and conditions which apply to fishing operations in the Australian EEZ.

2.4       Under this Agreement Japan fishes about ten per cent of its global quota of 6 065 tonnes of SBT in the Australian EEZ. The Japanese have been progressively excluded from areas as the domestic fleet expands. The fishing limits are confined by effort and by catch restrictions in some areas of the EEZ.¹ The Japanese have accepted this and have assisted the Australian industry.² At the end of August 1996 there had been 10 Japanese boats operating off Tasmania, 29 off the east coast and provision for 15 off the west coast. ³

2.5       Vessels operating under the bilateral subsidiary agreements are restricted in the quantity of SBT taken but have no such restrictions on other tuna species.⁴ The Committee was told that apart from SBT, the tuna stocks fished commercially are regarded as being at sustainable levels.⁵

2.6       The Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia also believes that the subsidiary agreements do not impact on the tuna and billfish stock within the AFZ or outside of it.⁶ The issue is one of resource sharing rather than pressure on the stock except for SBT. It was put to the Committee that irrespective of the arrangements for the tuna and billfish within the EEZ, these fish can be caught outside the EEZ.⁷

2.7       TRAFFIC Oceania described this Agreement as:

an excellent example of how the management of fisheries should be constructed to ensure the compliance with the sustainable management of our marine resources. It represents a concerted effort to ensure that biological information is collected so as to allow for biological assessment which will ensure the production from a fishery does not exceed sustainable levels. 8

Benefits to Australia

2.8       The Australian SBT industry and the yellowfin and bigeye tuna fisheries have been recipients of benefits from the subsidiary agreements.⁹ ATBOA believes that the benefits to the Australian fishing industry have provided a stability which has enabled them to invest more. ¹⁰ For example, the techniques learnt from the Japanese fishermen have also been used in the crayfish industry and abalone farming.¹¹

2.9       The benefits of the Agreement to Australia include:

a high access fee by international standards; no damage to Australian fisheries as Japan uses its own quota of SBT and highly migratory species such as yellowfin or bigeye which would otherwise be caught on the high seas; ensuring that SBT stocks are not further reduced; monitoring of species stocks that would otherwise not be possible, or would be difficult and expensive; access to the Japanese fleet to influence their seabird avoidance practices and the use of seabird catch mitigation measures; economic benefits from servicing the Japanese fishing fleet; providing the Australian Government with some leverage in other negotiations such as CCSBT; access to Japanese data on fish locations; access to Japanese data on shared stocks outside the AFZ; the collection of biological samples; direct funding for research on tuna and billfish; and meeting Australia's United Nations Convention on the Law Of Sea obligations.12

2.10       The CSIRO stressed that the Japanese data provides the independently verified information on which the management of the Australian component of the catch is determined.¹³ It was argued that if the Japanese did not continue to fish in the AFZ, the data currently available could in time be supplied by the Australian industry.¹⁴

2.11       The Committee was told that the disadvantages to Australia of not concluding the Agreement with Japan were substantial in relation to the potential environmental and financial losses including the possible loss of:

the access fee; the fishery's relationship with Japan per se; the regular forum of communication with Japan; the benefits from port access arrangements; accurate and timely information on technological developments in the Japanese fishery; Australia's influence over Japanese fishing operations in relation to bycatch and the maintenance of fish stocks; funds for management and research which would need to be sourced from the Australian industry, or would not be available; and the valuable information on the fishery which assists in the stock

2.12       The disadvantages assessment.¹⁵ of the subsidiary agreements include:

the bycatch of seabirds and other bycatch species caught by long-line fishing vessels in our region; and the impact of waste plastics and fishing refuse on marine mammals, seabirds, fish and a range of marine invertebrates within the AFZ.16

Tuna species other than Southern Bluefin Tuna

2.13       The Western Australian Government expressed its concern at the potential for the Japanese vessels to target species other than the southern bluefin tuna.¹⁷ The total tuna and billfish catch by bilateral vessels in the AFZ is about 6 000 to 7 500 tonnes annually.¹⁸

2.14       The Western Australian Government pointed out that:

fishing effort can shift in an uncontrolled manner (in the absence of output controls) and in an opportunistic fashion from Southern Bluefin Tuna to other prime pelagic species, with serious implications for the abundance and sustainability of these species.19

2.15       The value of the total catch by the Japanese fleet is taken into account during the negotiation of the annual subsidiary agreements.

Note:	Years are AFZ years (previous October to November of labelled Table includes data for licensed and joint venture
Source:	System - Japanese longline tuna logs Australian Fisheries Authority, Australian Fishing Zone Information

Figure 3 Number of fish caught by the Japanese vessels within the AFZ by AFZ year(Bureau of Resource Sciences 25 October 1996)

Access fee

2.16       Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) use several methods to calculate an expected access fee.²⁰ A negotiating range is then determined at an interdepartmental meeting which takes into account the number of fishing days, the expected catches and the exclusion zones.²¹ The bycatch for 14 species of fish is included based on the quantity caught, the areas they are caught in and the value of the product.²²

2.17       The access fee for 1996 was $3.45 million of which $275 000 was for west coast access, $2 175 000 for east coast access and $1 000 000 for Tasmanian access.²³ Australia determines how much of the access fee is allocated to each region.

2.18       ATBOA believes that Australian negotiators have been able to benefit from Japan's strategic view of access to the zone.²⁴ ATBOA believes that the access fee is a 'good business deal' for Australia as it provides most of the research funds and there are direct benefits to the Australian fishing communities.

2.19       The access fee funds a substantial amount of research on tuna stocks in Australian waters. In 1995-96, $680 000 was provided as research into tuna and billfish stocks and related species.²⁷ These funds contribute to research projects such as the East and West Coast yellowfin/bigeye fisheries, seabirds and SBT research.²⁸ ATBOA considers that the Australian tuna industry would not be able to fund the equivalent level of research currently provided by the access fee.²⁹

2.20       Although it is a negotiated fee, the minimum amount must cover the costs of management and the enforcement of management programs on the Japanese vessels.³⁰ Mr Lister believes that the proportion of the $3.45 million to catch 400 tonne quota adjacent to Tasmania minus the cost of licensing, managing, monitoring and observers was not substantial.³¹

2.21       Mr Rowley also argued that there is only about $1 million remaining after the cost of supervision and monitoring and other costs are subtracted.³² Further, Mr Rowley suggested that:

On the basis of the effort which is put into those fisheries by the Japanese, we can determine the measure of their interest or their payment. So for every hook that they put into each individual fishery, there is a cost to them. I have calculated on this basis that the western fishery contributes $134 000 to the bottom line. The south-east fishery, which again is southern bluefin in Tasmania, contributes $507 000. ... The north-east fishery contributes $315 000. When we look at selling our resource for that kind of money, it becomes a nonsense. The cost for a Japanese long-liner to operate in the Australia fishing zone works out to close to $120 a day. We in Australia claim to have the highest return on the use of our resource by foreign fishing vessels; actually, I think we have the lowest ... accepting those access fees those island nations incur no cost.33

2.22       Fortuna Fishing Pty Ltd suggested that the Australian value of the Japanese catch in 1995 was $94 511 800 while the access fee, less costs, gave a total benefit to Australia of $1.3 million, representing 1.375 per cent of the possible value of the catch.³⁴

2.23       The Queensland Government believes that the proportion of the access fee gained to enable the Japanese fleet to access tropical tunas is inadequate as such a small proportion of it relates to access to the Coral Sea.³⁵ There are significant numbers of yellowfin, bigeye and albacore tuna caught by the Japanese fleet within the EEZ (Figure 4). Mr Rowley claimed that if the Japanese fleet was excluded from north of 34 degrees south and to the south of Lord Howe Island this resource would be worth $25 million to the domestic industry.³⁶

Note:	Years are AFZ years (previous October to November of labelled Table includes data for licensed and joint venture vessels
Source:	System - Japanese longline tuna logs Australian Fisheries Authority, Australian Fishing Zone Information

Figure 4. Number of each tuna species caught by Japanese vessels in the AFZ by AFZ year (Bureau of Resource Sciences 25 October 1996)

2.24       The Queensland Government believes that there has been a significant reduction in the attractiveness of the Queensland game fishery as a result of that access. It considers that the net benefits from Japanese access to the Coral Sea are large and negative.³⁸

2.25       The West Australian recreational fishermen point out that the Japanese bilateral fleet pays $275 000 annually to fish in Western Australian waters while the recreational fishery in that State is estimated to be worth $400 million annually. ³⁹ The proportion of the $275 000 used for observers and management costs is $170 000. ⁴⁰

2.26       The access fee paid to Australia is the highest access fee Japan pays anywhere in the world therefore increasing the fee would be very difficult. ⁴¹ Australia collects 9.5 per cent of the value of the product while in New Zealand it is 5 to 6 per cent; the Americas 5 to 7 per cent; South Pacific nations 4.5 to 5 per cent while Papua New Guinea sought 10 per cent and the Japanese were not prepared to pay this amount. ⁴²

2.27       The Committee is also mindful that the Japanese vessels could catch the fish in areas adjacent to the AFZ with little additional effort. The value of access to the Australian EEZ is limited to the difference between these two fishing approaches. The Committee appreciates the difficulties faced by the negotiators and that the access fee is only one part of the benefits to Australia from these agreements. The Committee believes that the Commonwealth Government should continue to negotiate vigorously in relation to attaining the highest possible access fee.

Negotiation process

2.28       The Department of Primary Industries and Energy has portfolio responsibility for fisheries management and leads the bilateral negotiations for Australia. The AFMA provides technical advice and expertise in the negotiations and is responsible for administering the terms and conditions of the agreements.

2.29       The management advisory committees on western, eastern and southern tuna fisheries provide advice on issues which may affect the negotiations such as access conditions. These committees comprise members from state and federal governments, the fishing industry, recreational and charter boat sectors, conservation sector and scientists.

2.30       The subsidiary agreements have enabled Australia to have some influence over the Japanese fishing fleet in terms of improved fishing techniques particularly in respect to environmental technologies such as seabird bycatch mitigation measures.

2.31       The Committee notes with some concern that officers from the Department of Environment, Sport and Territories did not participate in the negotiations on the Subsidiary Agreement 1996 due to resource constraints. ⁴³The Committee appreciates that notwithstanding the absence of the DEST from the negotiations, environmental issues were addressed in relation to the introduction of the mandatory satellite vessel monitoring systems, real time catch and position reporting, the use of fisheries observers and mandatory measures to reduce the incidental take of seabirds and measures to reduce the incidental take of sharks. ⁴⁴

2.32       The Committee believes that the environmental implications are highly significant because of the unacceptable level of bycatch and the threat to seabirds. The Committee urges the Minister for the Environment to review this situation for future negotiations.

Bilateral arrangements

2.33       Under the existing arrangements it is a simple matter for Bilateral vessels to change to Joint Venture arrangements within the same season thus allowing them to circumvent limitations imposed by the Australian authorities. The Committee was given the example where Joint Venture vessels were restricted to the area south of 34 degrees south on the Western Australian coast in response to concern about high catch levels in the yellowfin pre-breeding aggregation. ⁴⁵ The vessels then changed to the bilateral arrangements which enabled them to again access this fishery. ⁴⁶

2.34       As a matter of urgency the Committee believes that these arrangements need to be reviewed to ensure that this mechanism for circumventing restrictions is addressed before the joint ventures begin operating in 1997.

Recommendation 1 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government, in consultation with the relevant States, ensures that restrictions placed on either bilateral vessels or Joint Venture vessels cannot be circumvented by interchange between such arrangements.

2.35       The Committee was also told that there are no controls in place to restrict foreign ownership of West Australian long-line licenses. It was suggested therefore that it would be possible to create a de facto foreign fleet if beneficial ownership changes to foreign companies. ⁴⁷ Given the fragility of the subsidiary agreements, the Committee believes that as a matter of urgency the Commonwealth Government and the State governments review this situation to ensure that ownership by foreign companies or joint venture proposals can not be used to circumvent appropriate restrictions on catch levels.

Recommendation 2 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government reviews the existing arrangements for potential foreign ownership of fishing licences within the Exclusive Economic Zone or Joint Venture arrangements which may jeopardise the potential to manage fish stocks in the Exclusive Economic Zone.

Duration of the Agreement

2.36       The development of these agreements can be extremely resource intensive from a bureaucratic perspective. ⁴⁸ DPIE acknowledges that one of the advantages of a longer term agreement would relate to the 'expense and difficulties of pursuing the negotiations and the treaty process itself'. ⁴⁹

2.37       The Committee believes that longer term agreements may also provide a better framework for a more strategic approach. DEST made the point that it:

... has pressed for the clarification of long term objectives and strategies to guide Australia's negotiations at the CCSBT. The Portfolio is concerned that current negotiating strategies are developed annually and are often in response to initiatives from other Convention parties. A long term understanding of the negotiations and the history of the Commission is currently required to participate fully in the development of the Australian Government negotiating position. 50

2.38       From a legal point of view changing the duration of the subsidiary agreements would not require changes to the 1979 Head Agreement with Japan, any other international agreement or the existing legislation. ⁵¹ The Attorney-General's Department pointed out that Article III of the Head Agreement:

provides for Australia to determine the total allowable catch for individual stocks within the Australian Fishing Zone annually and to consider the allocation to fishing vessels of Japan of parts of the surpluses of such stocks not taken by Australian vessels. However, I do not believe that this implication would prevent the negotiation of a subsidiary agreement for a period longer than 1 year, particularly given that a global quota is now set for southern bluefin tuna by the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna under the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna ... If Australia and Japan entered into a subsidiary agreement for a period of greater than 1 year, this in itself would be evidence of the fact that both countries believe that the longer period is permitted in the Head Agreement. ... while the Convention allows for the setting of a global quota on an annual basis, it does not require that it be done on that basis. Article 8.3 of the Convention, which provides for the setting of a 'total allowable catch and its allocation among the parties' does not state expressly that this will be done by the Commission on an annual basis. Furthermore, that Article allows the Commission to decide, on the basis of recommendations from the Scientific Committee, to adopt 'other appropriate measures' and thus avoid the setting of a quota altogether. 52

2.39       Under section 34(5)(d) of the Fisheries Management Act 1991 foreign fishing vessel licences may only be granted for a period of 12 months so these licences would need to be renewed annually. ⁵³

2.40       If there is a change to multi-year quotas the Southern Bluefin Tuna Fisheries Management Plan 1995 adopted under the Fisheries Management Act 1991 may need to be changed as it is based on the annual setting of quotas.⁵⁴Under paragraph 7(d), however, it does not apply to:

... fishing in the Australian fishing zone in accordance with an agreement between the Commonwealth and the government of a foreign country. 55

2.41       The disadvantages of longer agreements relate to the international management of the SBT fishery and other contentious issues. Practical considerations include the calculation of the access fee, the introduction of environmental measures and the detail of the access arrangements to accommodate the expansion of the domestic industry.

     (a) Stability and strategic planning

2.42       The possibility of two to three year agreements has already been considered by the Commission on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna as this would enable better planning for industry and governments. ⁵⁶ There would be additional benefit in the development of a five year agreement as this would enable some strategic planning, provided Australia and Japan were clear about where they wanted to be in five years. ⁵⁷

2.43       Greater stability in the process may be beneficial as it would assist in business planning. ⁵⁸ ATBOA pointed out that the Japanese work on an 18 month minimum business plan and that the $9 million boats cost $14 000 per day to operate. This is a substantial investment on the basis that these vessels currently operate for part of the year on an annual agreement. ⁵⁹ It was suggested that the Japanese would prefer a three year agreement but two years would be an improvement. ⁶⁰

2.44       It was pointed out that:

Logistically, for these vessels, it is extremely difficult for them to be operating on a year to year basis. Some of these vessels are at sea for 11 months of the year. They need to plan for stores and bait which we find is being shipped from Chile, Argentina, Indonesia, Japan and all around the world to various ports for them to resupply. With only a year's advance warning as to where they can go - I admit that would be a terrible to try to come to terms with. 61

     (b) Efficient resource management

2.45       The Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia believes that:

While the Australian negotiators see significant advantage in annual agreements, the amount of time that is put into those discussions, the small changes that occur in reality from year to year and the fact that there is a fixed formula for the access fee, really make multi-year agreements more sensible. 62

2.46       The view was also given that:

no doubt a significant number of AFMA jobs depend on bilateral access. Although there are some very conscientious and diligent people in AFMA, I certainly have received the distinct impression in the last two years that the whole of AFMA organisation starts to twitch if the Japanese are not about to sign a cheque. 63

2.47       ATBOA believes that the money spent on annual discussions which they estimate to be $1 million could more usefully go into research. ⁶⁴ DPIE point out that this estimate must include the cost of every participant with full interpretation costs while the additional costs of the bilateral negotiations are not extreme. ⁶⁵

2.48       The Committee considers that the possibility of resource savings could be investigated as part of a review of the current processes and the possibility of longer term agreements. However, it is noted that the Commission is required to meet annually irrespective of whether quotas are determined at those meetings. ⁶⁶ This may inhibit the capacity to have substantial cost savings.

     (c) Link with quota allocations determined by the Commission

2.49       An important consideration is the nexus between the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and the bilateral subsidiary agreements. ⁶⁷Australia has proposed multi-year quota setting by the CCSBT over recent years. ⁶⁸The Committee was told that Japan is opposed to longer term quota setting as annual agreements consider the latest data in determining the total allowable catch. ⁶⁹

2.50       The Committee can see some value in multi-year quotas but believes that this issue could also be addressed by having a clause in the agreements enabling annual global quota set by the Commission to be allocated to the parties on a proportional system. Currently the Commonwealth Government does not allow the Japanese to fish in the EEZ until a quota has been agreed. The Committee supports this view but believes that a longer agreement could accommodate this requirement.

2.51       Conservation groups support an annual agreement if it is tied to the assessment and quota allocations. ⁷⁰ The point was made that:

If a disease or something went through the fish, that fishery may have to be closed down or partially closed down for six months, 12 months or two years until the stocks recovered. If you have a three year agreement there, then you are locked into something with a foreign country. 71

2.52       Last year there was a significant delay in determining the annual quota for SBT. The bilateral agreements provide leverage for Australia in terms of the operations of the Commission and the Committee does not believe that this should be jeopardised. It is envisaged that longer agreements would only operate subject to the continuation of the work of the Commission.

(d) Environmental measures

2.53       The Committee believes that matters relating to bycatch could be addressed by requiring mandatory environmental measures that apply to the Australian long-line fishing fleet also apply to foreign vessels fishing in the EEZ. TRAFFIC Oceania point out that this agreement goes beyond Australian policy in fisheries management. ⁷² There may be considerable benefit in having these measures apply to the Australian domestic long-line fleet given its potential to expand in the foreseeable future.

2.54       There was some concern that the environmental issues listed under the Records of Discussion were not included under the agreement. Mr Evans believes that the Records of Discussion reveal that both Governments are non-committal about improving their environmental performance. ⁷³

2.55       He was also critical that the agreements merely encourage fishermen to modify their practices and is critical of Australia's current marine policy capabilities. ⁷⁴ The Australian Marine Science Association also believes that there is scope for improved scientific benefits from the agreements. ⁷⁵

2.56       Other evidence indicated that a co-operative approach was more likely to achieve improved environmental practices than making it compulsory measures. A co-operative approach would have a greater chance of encouraging the use of environmental improvements on the high seas. The Tasmanian Parks and Wildlife Service has been working with the relevant Australian organisations and with Japan Tuna, the Japanese Government and fishing companies of other nationalities in a program which focuses on co-operative:

assessment of the impact on seabird populations; changes to methodologies to address the bycatch issues; and incorporation of practical solutions into fishing agreements. 76

2.57       For example, the booklet Catch Fish Not Birds explains the commercial gains of bird avoidance measures and was distributed in a range of languages. ⁷⁷

2.58       The possibility of changing the period of the subsidiary agreements may come down to the perceived significance of the changes made in recent years. AFMA pointed out that in each of the last five years, there have been changes in response to industry or ecological concerns in terms of seabirds and catch levels. ⁷⁸ATBOA pointed out, however, that the quota has remained the same for eight years and the changes were to exclusion zones, mitigation measures for sea birds and small changes to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) regulations. ⁷⁹

2.59       It was argued that evidence of Australia's influence on long-line fishing practices of Japanese vessels include:

Recent significant demonstration of foreign vessel compliance with MARPOL (International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) regulations is partly the result of Australia having the opportunity to influence practices at sea. These new work practices, learned within the AFZ are being used on the high seas too. 80

(e) Urgency provisions for tabling in Parliament

2.60       Treaties are to be tabled in Parliament at least 15 sitting days before the Government takes binding action to enable the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties to examine those that are of particular interest. The Government indicated that special procedures will apply when treaty action is required urgently as was the case with the Subsidiary Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan Concerning Long-line Tuna Fishing 1996. The Government has undertaken to use such procedures sparingly and only where necessary to safeguard Australia's national interests, be they commercial, strategic or foreign policy interests.

2.61       The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) supported the urgent finalisation of the Subsidiary Agreement because:

its negotiation was at an advanced stage when the reformed treaty-making process was introduced; the line Department (DPIE) was able to provide assurances that its provisions were in the national interest; and it had the nature of a time-specific arrangement. The southern bluefin tuna (SBT), the species affected, is highly migratory; by the time the Subsidiary Agreement was concluded, in early May 1996, the fish were already in the Australian fishing zone and the previous fishing seasons had already begun by that time of year. Japan is aware of the new procedure for the tabling of treaties and the Government's reluctance to invoke the urgency provisions. For 1997 and subsequent seasons, Subsidiary Agreements should be concluded and tabled early in the calender year. 81

2.62       The Committee is concerned that annual agreements enable a repeat of the situation where the signing of the agreement was delayed to the last possible moment in the hope of gaining further concessions. This delay resulted in the urgency provisions being implemented. The late tabling in Parliament did not allow the procedures in place to scrutinise such agreements to operate in the normal manner.

2.63       The view was given that two year subsidiary agreements would require careful wording to avoid similar delays in signing at the end of two years. ⁸²The Committee believes that a deadline would need to be set after which there would be no further negotiations to avoid the re-occurrence of this problem. The Committee believes that a longer term agreement may avoid what is potentially an annual occurrence.

2.64       The Committee has taken on board the concerns raised in relation to a possible extension of the subsidiary agreement to cover more than one year. There is a need to retain the flexibility which enables changes to be made as the domestic fishing industry expands and would like to extend the boundaries of their operations. ⁸³ There can also be quite marked changes in what is considered acceptable in particular areas of the fishery on a year to year basis. ⁸⁴ Another advantage of annual agreements is the capacity to implement at short notice additional bycatch mitigation measures. ⁸⁵

2.65       The Committee also appreciates that it is essential to base the total allowable catch levels on the latest available catch data. However, this means that there is annual pressure on increasing the quotas. Potentially, a lower level quota set for three years may result in a lower average.

2.66       DPIE pointed out that if the Japanese were given access to the Australian EEZ a number of years ahead, this could open the possibility of Japan having access to the EEZ even if it did not continue to be party to the international regime. ⁸⁶Australia would not wish to have countries which are not bound by the international regime to have access to the EEZ in the interests of sustainability and responsible control of the fishery. ⁸⁷

2.67       Notwithstanding these concerns the Committee believes that there are substantial benefits in having a longer agreement which would enable the Japanese and Australian industries to make longer term plans. The agreement could include the appropriate wording that would:

enable the parties to have a defined proportion of the total allowable catch determined annually by the Commission; require that all vessels operating in the EEZ to implement mandatory requirements placed on the Australian fishing fleet in relation to bycatch and other environmental concerns; allow the access fee to be calculated annually; ensure there are acceptable management arrangements in place for the global SBT fishery; and put in place a mechanism which enabled the agreement to be changed if there were marked changes in fish stocks or Japan ceased to belong to an appropriate body for the management of the fish stocks being utilised within the EEZ.

2.68       The DFAT told the Committee that an annual agreement was preferable, ⁸⁸ however:

Some other countries have a process where the head treaty is examined as a treaty but things happen to update it. They are very different in form but very similar in effect across different types of treaties. With some treaties an updating is effectively done by the conference of parties, which looks at definitions or levels of contamination. 89 Recommendation 3 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the subsidiary agreement on long-line tuna fishing with Japan be for a timeframe of at least two years.

Monitoring and compliance

2.69       AFMA is responsible for the surveillance, compliance and enforcement of the terms and conditions of the subsidiary agreement. This is conducted through a satellite based vessel monitoring system, random at sea inspections, pre- and post-fishing inspections. The surveillance of licensed foreign vessels is conducted by state government fisheries staff, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Defence Force who are authorised under the Fisheries Management Act 1991.

2.70       It was argued that the current monitoring and enforcement measures are adequate:

Observer coverage at a level statistically validated by scientists, daily catch and effort logbooks and aerial surveillance combine to make the Japanese tuna long-line vessels significantly enforced. In the past five years we have also had several successful prosecutions with significant penalties for breaching rules and regulations handed down by the courts. 90

2.71       The pre- and post-fishing inspections and the comparisons of the radio reports with the vessels which do have observers on board provide further checks and balances. ⁹¹ The observer coverage achieved in the 1995/96 fishing season was 15 per cent for the Tasmanian region and 10 per cent for the east and west coasts. ⁹²

2.72       Most of the seven prosecutions since 1990 have been for discrepancies in the reported weights of the catch and one for zone violation. ⁹³ The penalties can be severe in terms of forfeiture of catch, gear and possibly the vessels which have all been applied which is a more significant penalty and deterrent than the fines. ⁹⁴The Committee was given the example of a fine of $4000 for 3.8 tonnes of mixed tuna species with a forfeiture of the $38 000 bond. ⁹⁵

2.73       In 1990 Sato and Kakura were ordered by the court to forfeit the vessel and the catch with a value of $4.5 million for misreporting over an extended period involving over 25 tonnes of SBT. ⁹⁶There is also a $3.5 million outstanding debt on the Kotobuki vessels resulting from a conviction requiring the forfeiture of vessels and catch. ⁹⁷ Under the Forum Fisheries Agency, Australia has had these vessels removed from the register and they are excluded from fishing in Australian waters and the wider Pacific tuna region. ⁹⁸

2.74       There were, however, some concerns expressed about the reliability of the previous logbook and reporting system. Anecdotal evidence exists of the transfer of fish at sea. ⁹⁹ The Committee was also told that the catch information held by the Japanese Government was in conflict with that presented to the Australian officials. ¹⁰⁰ Incidents in which the catch profile while the observer was on board differed from those that did not have observers on board resulted in some prosecutions in 1990. ¹⁰¹

2.75       Before the introduction of the vessel monitoring system (VMS), the Japanese vessels were required to give their position by daily radio reports. ¹⁰² The VMS links the Global Positioning System (GPS) information to the satellite transponder and reports via satellite communications the position daily. ¹⁰³ This system may improve the speed with which information relevant to the global tuna fishery can be relayed and the data is less able to be tampered with. ¹⁰⁴

2.76       Current technology does not allow the use of scales on conveyor belts at sea when these boats are moving in very rugged conditions. Hence mechanical movement-compensated scales specifically designed for fishing vessels are still used. ¹⁰⁵ It was suggested that weighing fish on the high seas with a 60 knot wind was difficult and that the Japanese would like to have in place a set tolerance level and a dispute resolution mechanism. ¹⁰⁶

2.77       ATBOA believes that it is 'very risky' for the Japanese fishing inside the EEZ because of the risk of arbitrary detention with either large fines or costly holdings in port. ¹⁰⁷ It was argued also that the method for checking the fish in the hold is so inaccurate that it is difficult to estimate the exact quantity of fish and that it exposes the Japanese fleets to huge risk. ¹⁰⁸The cost of detention is about $10 000 per day. ¹⁰⁹One vessel was held in Fremantle for 10 days while the quantities in the hold were measured. ¹¹⁰ The Tasmanian Police allow the vessels to return to Japan to have the loads checked by the Japanese authorities. ¹¹¹

(a) Observer program

2.78       Observer coverage is very high for particular areas such as the SBT fishery off Tasmania, the marlin spawning grounds on the north-east coast and the sailfish fishery on the west coast. ¹¹³ The coverage for the Tasmanian area is determined statistically, giving a 95 per cent confidence level. It is a random stratified pattern although observers may be shifted to cover vessels with irregular catch rates. ¹¹⁴In Tasmania the aim is 15 per cent cover of fishing days. ¹¹⁵

2.79       Further, the Committee appreciates that it is much cheaper to use an observer program on the Japanese fleet to acquire the scientific data than to conduct the experiments needed to obtain this information. The observer program used for monitoring and surveillance also provides a cost effective way of checking scientific veracity. ¹¹⁶

2.80       There has never been a formal risk assessment in relation to the required level of the observer program. ¹¹⁷ A number of north American fishing treaties require an observer on board all the time. It was suggested that following the United States example is unrealistic but increasing the number of observers and having a greater random compliance component may be beneficial. ¹¹⁸ An independent cost benefit analysis concluded that the Australian observer program was beneficial and the percentage cover was about right. ¹¹⁹

(b) Pre- and post-fishing inspections

2.81       When Japanese vessels enter Australian ports to be issued with a fishing licence, the holds are inspected and the reporting arrangements are explained. ¹²⁰ AFMA allocates considerable resources to pre- and post-fishing inspections to reinforce Australia's compliance requirements and to raise awareness about environmental issues. ¹²¹

2.82       The pre- and post- fishing inspections are mandatory only for the Tasmanian region, while on the east and west coasts and the external territories it is random. ¹²² Exemptions may be granted for vessels fishing in remote areas such as Cocos Keeling Island and Christmas Island. ¹²³

2.83       These inspections monitor catches of SBT under the quota but catches of yellowfin and bigeye are not restricted in terms of quantities taken. ¹²⁴ Yellowfin tuna is the largest component of the Japanese catch by weight but SBT accounts for 30 per cent of the value. ¹²⁵

2.84       The Committee received a number of complaints about the way crews were treated or the length of time vessels were detained and the trivial nature of the offences involved. ¹²⁶ The Committee does not believe that it has at its disposal sufficient evidence to comment on this and these matters need to be dealt with in another forum.

(c) Certificate system

2.85       The Committee believes that a certificate program in which tuna accepted at the markets is tagged to identify its source may significantly improve the capacity to enforce compliance measures. The World Wildlife Fund promotes this approach and Unilever is working on this in Europe. ¹²⁷

2.86       While the Committee appreciates that there would be difficulties in introducing a certificate program, it does not believe that these difficulties are insurmountable. Monitoring of catches where each fish is tagged would make checking much easier.

2.87       The Committee was told that the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna introduced a certificate based regime which discriminates against tuna caught by non-parties to ICCAT. ¹²⁸ A number of countries have since joined the international management regime.

2.88       It was suggested that there may be some enthusiasm from the Japanese fisheries authorities for the implementation of trade-based measures. ¹²⁹ However, potential problems within the broader Japanese system and the international trading system would need to be resolved. ¹³⁰

2.89       The Committee was told that a certificate system would be difficult because:

tuna are reimported to Japan as a Japanese product via Taiwan and Hong Kong; the Japanese have wider trade relations with Taiwan and China which they would not wish to prejudice; there are growing sashimi markets in Taiwan and Korea which would need to be administered; the cost of tagging is considerable and would cost Australia $900 000 annually; the only point of control is Japan's customs; marketeers want supply and would not be interested in banning produce from non-party countries; and when the Japanese quota was decreased, the catches of other nations increased through reflagging or Japanese/Korean company interactions. 131

2.90       It was also brought to the Committee's attention that Australia is currently setting up monitoring arrangements with Indonesia and Taiwan. ¹³² An attempt to exclude Indonesia from the market may therefore be sensitive in this regard if these monitoring arrangements were placed in jeopardy.

2.91       The extent to which there is greater control would assist in the elimination or reduction of the market for those countries outside the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. This may allow those parties to the Convention an increase in quota.

2.92       The Committee believes that, although the cost to Australian industry would be of the order of $900 000 annually, there would be an increase in the price of Australian tuna which would result in a net benefit.

2.93       Notwithstanding these reservations, the Committee would like to see the matter raised with the Japanese, Korean and Indonesian governments. A possible forum would be the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.

Recommendation 4 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that the Commonwealth Government raises the issue of the introduction of a certificate system for southern bluefin tuna within the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission.

Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission

2.94       The Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) was concluded in 1993 and came into force on 27 March 1996. The National Interest Analysis for the Agreement was tabled in Parliament on 8 October 1996. Membership is available to Indian Ocean rim countries and countries that fish in the Indian Ocean. Australia proposes to deposit an Instrument of Acceptance by 2 December 1996.

2.95       The newly formed Commission is an additional international regime for the management of the highly migratory tuna species in light of its vulnerability to fishing on the high seas. ¹³³ Other such bodies are the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, the South Pacific Forum Fishery Agency, Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission and the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. ¹³⁴ The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission's role will cover major international tuna fisheries for yellowfin, skipjack, bigeye, albacore and southern bluefin tunas.

2.96       In addition to Australia's $100 million SBT fishery there is also a significant commercial, charter and recreational fishing industry based on the other tuna stocks and bycatch species. The Cocos and Christmas Islands are near the SBT spawning grounds and the potential increase in long-line activities in this region is one of the issues of concern to Australia. ¹³⁵

2.97       All of the submissions received strongly support Australia's membership of the IOTC. ¹³⁶ The benefits listed include:

the conservation of fish stocks within and adjacent to the Australia's EEZ; co-operation with other countries involved in the fishery; protection of valuable straddling and migratory stock on the high seas; joint research and development of stock; Australia's involvement could allow a watching brief by way of independent observers; providing Australia with the best position to request co-operation between the IOTC and the CCSBT; meeting Australia's international obligations such as the Agreement on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982; and providing information on fish stock and CPUE adjacent to the EEZ. 137

2.98       There will be a significant advantage in involving all of the countries that are impacting on the fishery as this will provide Australia with the opportunity to influence other countries on issues such as ecologically sustainable fishing practices. ¹³⁸ The Agreement does not set conservation standards so Australia needs to be in a position to influence such decisions. ¹³⁹

2.99       The spawning ground for the SBT are near Java and the SBT then either travel west to South Africa or east to Australia. Countries which do not currently belong to the CCSBT but have significant SBT catches may become members of the IOTC.

2.100       DPIE pointed out that Australia's membership is necessary to protect our interest in the SBT, to ensure that the IOTC respects the competence and prior existence of the CCSBT and to protect the management measures already in place under that Commission. ¹⁴⁰ It is likely that decisions will be made within the IOTC that will impact on the operations of the CCSBT even if the IOTC recognises the competency of the CCSBT. ¹⁴¹ Australia's membership of the IOTC will assist in ensuring consistency in management measures of the two organisations. ¹⁴²

2.101       This Agreement is consistent with Australia's international obligations concerning tuna management. ¹⁴³ Article 63 (2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 requires co-operative management of species within and adjacent to the EEZ.

2.102       The CSIRO believes that this type of agreement would be valuable for the conservation of species such as bigeye and broadbill swordfish which have a high commercial value and a life history that makes them very vulnerable to overfishing. ¹⁴⁴ CSIRO makes the point that there is currently no international management arrangement for these species and that the IOTC would be an appropriate forum. ¹⁴⁵

2.103       ATBOA pointed out that Indonesia, Taiwan, Korea and, in future, China are becoming major fishers of SBT, and are already the major competition in Australia's major yellowfin/bigeye markets. ¹⁴⁶ATBOA suggest that there is an inter-dependence which requires a global approach. ¹⁴⁷

2.104       The fish stocks that will be managed by the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission are significant to the Western Australian coastal fisheries. The Western Australian Government emphasised the importance of this Agreement to the economy of their State. ¹⁴⁸ The point was made that under the Offshore Constitutional Arrangements, the Commonwealth is responsible for the management of the tuna and tuna-like fishes and the State manages mackerel and marlin (billfish). All of these species are included under the IOTC Agreement. ¹⁴⁹ Therefore management measures in relation to mackerel and marlin would need to be implemented by the Western Australian Government under their Fish Resources Management Act 1994. ¹⁵⁰

2.105       The Western Australian Government would be interested in ensuring the inclusion of observers from key stakeholders. ¹⁵¹

Recommendation 5:

The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that: the Commonwealth Government: (a) notes Western Australia's particular interest in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission; and (b) facilitates their participation in the delegation to and any consultations relating to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission where possible (Paragraph 2.104).

2.106       If the management of the SBT stocks moves to the IOTC, the Commonwealth Government should also note Tasmania's interest in this Agreement.

2.107       ATBOA expressed the concern that the proposed program funding for Australia's IOTC participation will initially be provided from the Fisheries Resources and Research Fund (FRRF) while the membership funding would come from the Finance's International Organisations vote. ¹⁵² It was suggested that part of the cost would therefore come from industry but the industry does not believe that this is in the 'spirit ' of the normal FRRF programs. ATBOA's concern is that the FRRF role in key stock assessment programs in AFMA and CSIRO is maintained. ¹⁵³

2.108       Further, the ATBOA pointed out that industry will not pay for such organisations unless it has equivalent say. ¹⁵⁴ The example was given of the Forum Fisheries Agency which has been accepted as part of Australia's international obligations. ¹⁵⁵

2.109       The Committee believes that the ongoing funding of Australia's membership to the IOTC needs to be settled and shares the concern that the existing funding arrangements for this initiative must not jeopardise the key stock assessment programs currently being undertaken by AFMA and CSIRO.

2.110       The United Nations Agreement of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks envisages international observer programs. ¹⁵⁶Such a program could provide invaluable information for the assessment of stocks and bycatch problems such as seabirds.

2.111       Nations have the right to control their high seas international fishing operations and therefore an international observer program could only be implemented through co-operative arrangements. ¹⁵⁷ Incentives such as collaborative research and data collection programs or co-operative quota leasing arrangements may be used to encourage the implementation of an international observer program. ¹⁵⁸

2.112       The Committee believes that it is essential that Australia become a party to this Agreement to ensure that it will have a voice on the Commission. The IOTC will provide Australia with a wider forum to influence fishing practices and implement conservation measures.

2.113       The first meeting of the IOTC will discuss the allocation of costs for those participating in the Commission and the procedures for its operation. ¹⁵⁹ The Committee agrees that it is in Australia's best interest to attend the first meeting of the Commission in December 1996.

Recommendation 6 The Joint Standing Committee on Treaties recommends that Australia deposits an Instrument of Acceptance for the Agreement to Establish the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission on or before 2 December 1996.

Concluding comments

2.114       The Committee notes a number of concerns with both the Subsidiary Agreement 1996 and the IOTC Agreement. The Committee appreciates, however, that these provide a number of opportunities for international co-operation in research projects which will assist in the future management of the fish stocks in and adjacent to the EEZ and the issues raised in relation to bycatch and resource sharing.

2.115       It was also suggested that a cost benefit analysis be conducted into the subsidiary agreement. ¹⁶⁰ While the Committee appreciates that there are advantages in this approach there are also political considerations to be taken into account in entering into this agreement and many of the environmental benefits and disadvantages will not be able to be quantified.

2.116       The development of the domestic fishing industry in many areas will take a number of years to become a more viable operation. The Committee therefore supports Japan's continued use of fish resources provided that this does not place unsustainable pressure on stocks or hinder the development of local industry.

2.117       The Committee believes that Japan's continued access to the AFZ must be conditional on its continued active participation in the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and the continuation of the work of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.

2.118       The Committee notes that the subsidiary agreement does not limit the take of tuna species other than SBT. The Committee believes that a watching brief should be maintained on the catches of these species globally and particularly within Australia's EEZ. The CSIRO expressed its concern in relation to the vulnerability of the bigeye tuna as well as broadbill swordfish. The Committee is also aware of the spawning grounds for yellowfin and marlin occur within Australia's EEZ. This places considerable responsibility on Australia to ensure these fisheries are appropriately managed.

Footnotes

[1] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 10

[2] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 320

[3] Cassells, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 9

[4] West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 16

[5] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Submission No. 33, p. S 173

[6] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 333

[7] Ibid, p. S 333-334

[8] TRAFFIC Oceania, Submission No. 15, p. S 71

[9] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 346

[10] Puglisi, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 349

[11] Ibid, p. 351

[12] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 320, 328;

[13]Australian Marine Sciences Association, Submission No. 37, p. S 224 -225; Premier of

[2]Tasmania, Submission No. 39, p. S 231

[14] Stone, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 366

[15] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 13; Premier of Tasmania, Submission No.

[16] Premier of Tasmania, Submission No. 39, p. S 231-232

[17] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 237

[18] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 72

[19] Western Australian Government, Supplementary Submission No. 28.1, p. S 383

[20] Battaglene, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 22

[21] Ibid, p. 22

[22] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 32

[23] Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Submission No. 25, p. S 112

[24] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 346

[25] Ibid, p. 347

[26] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 14

[27] Stevens, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 26

[28] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 325

[29] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 347

[30] Battaglene, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 22

[31] Lister, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 145

[32] Rowley, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 224

[33] Ibid, p. 224-225

[34] Fortuna Fishing Pty Ltd, Submission No. 5.1, p. S 359

[35] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S252

[36] Fortuna Fishing Pty Ltd, Submission No. 5, p. S 12

[37] Premier of Queensland, Submission No. 41, p. S 252

[38] Ibid, p. S 252

[39] West Australian Recreational & Sportsfishing Council et al, Submission No. 61, p. S 256

[40] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 293

[41] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 385

[42] Ibid, p. 388-389

[43] Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Submission No. 36, p. S 214

[44] Ibid, p. S 215

[45] West Australian Game Fishing Association, Submission No. 6, p. S 16-17

[46] Ibid, p. S 17

[47] Ibid, p. S 20

[48] Stevens, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 36

[49] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 382

[50] Department of Environment, Sport and Territories, Submission No. 36, p. S 215

[51] Campbell, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 381

[52] Attorney-General's Department, Submission No. 26.1, p. S 377

[53] Ibid, p. S 377

[54] Ibid, p. S 378

[55] Attorney-General's Department, Submission No. 26, p. S 126

[56] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 27

[57] Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 251

[58] Young, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 84; Millington, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 251; Maritime Agencies of Tasmania, Submission No. 27, p. S 138

[59] Pike, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 356

[60] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 356

[61] Morrison, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 141

[62] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 347

[63] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 294

[64] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 347

[65] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 383

[66] Campbell, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 383

[67] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 36

[68] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 382

[69] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 27

[70] Kennedy, Transcript, 9 September 1996, p. 202, Sant, Transcript, 9 September 1996, p. 202

[71] Chaffey, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 161

[72] Sant, Transcript, 9 September 1996, p. 183

[73] Evans, Submission No. 38, p. S 228

[74] Ibid, p. S 228

[75] Australian Marine Sciences Association, Submission No. 37, p. S 223

[76] Premier of Tasmania, Submission No. 39, p. S 232

[77] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 334

[78] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 35

[79] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 349

[80] Premier of Tasmania, Submission No. 39, p. S 233

[81] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Submission No. 31, p. S 160

[82] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 384

[83] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 35; Stevens, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 35 - 36;

[84] Harwood, Transcript, 10 Ocober 1996, p. 382

[85] Harwood, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 67

[86] Ibid, p. 67

[87] Ibid, p. 67

[88] Browning, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 51

[89] Lamb, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 47

[90] Stevens, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 26

[91] Rohan, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 387

[92] Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Submission No. 25, p. S 117

[93] Rohan, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 29

[94] Ibid, p. 29

[95] Ibid, p. 29

[96] Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Submission No. 25.1 p. S 368

[97] Rohan, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 410

[98] Ibid, p. 410

[99] Watson, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 283

[100] Stagles, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 292

[101] Rohan, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 387

[102] Rohan, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 31

[103] Ibid, p. 31

[104] Stevens, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 34; Rohan, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 34

[105] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 34

[106] Pratt, Transcript, 5 September 1996, p. 131

[107] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 327

[108] Ibid, p. S 330

[109] Ibid, p. S 331

[110] Tropical Traders, Submission No. 13, p. S 58

[111] Maritime Agencies of Tasmania, Submission No. 27, p. S 135

[112] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 385

[113] Ibid, p. 385

[114] Ibid, p. 389

[115] Rohan, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 386

[116] Evans, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 267

[117] Macartney, Transcript, 16 September 1996, p. 216

[118] Evans, Transcript, 26 September 1996, p. 267

[119] Rohan, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 386

[120] Rohan, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 29

[121] Stevens, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 42

[122] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 39

[123] Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Submission No. 25.1 p. S 370

[124] Exel, Transcript, 29 August 1996, p. 39-40

[125] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Submission No. 33, p. S 175

[126] Jeffriess, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 361

[127] Kennedy, Transcript, 9 September 1996, p. 189; Sant, Transcript, 9 September 1996, p. 189

[128] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 396

[129] Ibid, p. 396

[130] Ibid, p. 396

[131] Harwood, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 396; Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 397

[132] Exel, Transcript, 10 October 1996, p. 398

[133] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Submission No. 33, p. S 173

[134] Ibid, p. S 173

[135] Exel, Transcript, 10 Ocober 1996, p. 423

[136] Stone, Transcript, 27 September 1996, p. 367; Australian Fishing Tackle Manufacturers Association Inc, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 1, p. S 3; Tasmanian Game Fishing Association, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 2, p. S 8; Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 3, p. S 11; The Games Fishing Association of Australia Inc, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 4, p. S 17; Marine and Coastal Community Network - Western Region and Conservation Council of Western Australia, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 5, p. S 21; CSIRO, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 6, p. S 25; TRAFFIC Oceania, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 7, p. S 29; Tsamenyi and Woodhill, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 8, p. S 32; Western Australian Government, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 9, p. S 37

[137] The Game Fishing Association of Australia Inc, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 4, p. S 11-12; TRAFFIC Oceania, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 7, p. S 29; Tasmanian Game Fishing Association, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 2, p. S 8;

[138] Marine and Coastal Community Network - Western Region and Conservation Council of Western Australia, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 5, p. S 21

[139] Tsamenyi and Woodhill, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, Submission No. 8, p. S 33

[140] Harwood, Transcript, 10 Ocober 1996, p. 421

[141] Tsamenyi and Woodhill, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 8, p. S 33

[142] Ibid, p. S 34

[143] Ibid,, p. S 33

[144] CSIRO Division of Fisheries, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 6, p. S 25

[145] Ibid, p. S 25

[146] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia Inc, Submission No. 44, p. S 322

[147] Ibid, p. S 322

[148] Western Australian Government, Minister for Fisheries, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 9, p. S 37

[149] Ibid, p. S 38

[150] Ibid, p. S 38

[151] Ibid, p. S 37

[152] Tuna Boat Owners Association of Australia, Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Inquiry, Submission No. 3, p. S 12-13

[153] Ibid, p. S 13

[154] Ibid, p. S 13

[155] Ibid, p. S 9

[156] Department of Primary Industries and Energy, Supplementary Submission No. 33.1, p. S 413

[157] Ibid, p. S 412-413

[158] Ibid, p. S 413

[159] Harwood, Transcript, 10 Ocober 1996, p. 421

[160] Fortuna Fishing Pty Ltd, Submission No. 5, p. S 14