Chapter 5 The Pacific
CER
5.1
The Closer Economic Relations agreement between Australia and New
Zealand (CER) has been described by the Chair of the WTO Trade Policy Review
Body as:
...one of the world’s most comprehensive trading
arrangements.[1]
5.2
The Ministerial Communiqué at the end of the CER Ministerial meeting in
2004 noted that:
The CER, which commenced in 1983, is undoubtedly the world’s
best example of a comprehensive free trade agreement and a model for both
countries in their negotiation f newer free trade agreements.[2]
5.3
In his evidence to the Sub-Committee, the NZ Deputy High Commissioner
commented that the comprehensive coverage of CER is gradually being reflected
in other agreements negotiated by Australia and NZ:
The other point I would make is that there has been something
of a negative metaphor around so-called low quality, spaghetti bowl creating
agreements. If you look at the most recent free trade agreements that both
Australia and New Zealand have concluded, that suggests to you that those
agreements are comprehensive, they are what trade negotiators call ‘very
clean’, and they are providing the basis for engagement around some of the
broader free trade zones that we are all interested in our region.[3]
5.4
In March 2009 the Australian and NZ Prime Ministers reiterated the
importance of continuing to strengthen and deepen the relationship – with the
long-term aim of a single economic market. They agreed to pursue a variety of
measures, including: accelerate the harmonisation and alignment of regulations;
finalise an Investment Protocol; complete a new Tax Treaty; review the CER
Rules of Origin; further reduce border barriers for both goods and travellers;
strengthen cooperation in achieving open markets and trade; and expand joint
trade promotion activities. The Prime Ministers called for substantial progress
on these and several other issues and requested a progress report after the
July 2010 CER Ministerial meeting.[4]
5.5
The New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner, in giving evidence to the
Sub-Committee, commented that for NZ CER is the most important free trade
agreement and Australia is the largest trading partner. He added that Australia
takes about 25 per cent of New Zealand’s products, with a value of $10 billion
and growing fast.[5]
5.6
He noted that there had been substantial growth in services trade
between Australia and NZ, an increase of 67 per cent in recent years, to reach
about $6 billion. He said also that the forthcoming CER investment protocol
will help to further stabilise and facilitate investment flows.[6]
5.7
The Deputy High Commissioner said that most Australian companies in the
export field actually got their start by exporting to NZ:
In fact, more Australian companies export to New Zealand than
to any other market and the figures are quite striking. In 2007-08 nearly
18,000 Australian companies exported to New Zealand. That compares with less
than 10,000 that exported to your next most important market, which is the
United States.
If you drill further into the data what is very interesting
about these figures is that the high-end manufacturing niche industries, where
the highest value added is returned to the exporters, are the companies that
are trading into New Zealand. The IT companies and the high-value, high
niche-end manufacturing industries are doing best in New Zealand. They are the
ones who are experiencing the greatest growth.
So, in terms of CER, this has very much been a two-way
exercise for both of us in developing our own export capacity, in ...
leveraging out.[7]
5.8
He noted that there was still much to be done under CER, even though
tariffs and service barriers have been dealt with:
There is of course our shared agenda for the Single Economic
Market. That often tends to be forgotten because it is not as headline grabbing
as some of the other stuff that we do. It includes things like the ability for
both countries to offer securities, to simplify cross-border insolvency
proceedings, to make trans-Tasman company registration easier and to better
align our competition law between us.
As I said, none of those are headline grabbing issues, but
they are exactly the kinds of things that reduce the friction to our companies
doing business with one another. I think it is a critical part of our process.
I like to think of them as the quiet achievers. They do not make a big fuss,
but they are the ones who will deliver the big gains to our companies over
time. That is a very important part of the agenda.[8]
5.9
The 2010 CER Ministerial Forum confirmed the importance of pushing ahead
with closer integration of the two economies:
The trans-Tasman relationship is the closest and most
comprehensive there is for both countries. Work to develop the relationship
further was given added energy by the agenda set by the two Prime Ministers in
their March and August 2009 meetings. This agenda reflects the resolve of both
governments to take the relationship to a new level, including deeper economic
integration.
CER Ministers welcomed the progress achieved over the past
year in strengthening the economic and trade relationship, taking Australia and
New Zealand further along the path towards a single economic market. ...
The importance of the economic relationship is reflected in
trade and investment levels. Two-way trade between Australia and New Zealand
was A$20.6 billion (NZ$25 billion) in 2009, including goods and services, only
slightly lower than the previous year despite the economic downturn. The
countries are close investment partners, with total accumulated investment
between them standing at over A$90 billion (NZ$ 110 billion).
The stronger economic links parallel increasing
people-to-people contact. Visits in each direction exceeded one million in
2009, and there are around half a million New Zealand citizens in Australia and
about 65,000 Australians in New Zealand.
Reflecting the deepening integration of the two economies, Mr
Groser[9] will join the Ministerial
Council on International Trade, which brings together the Australian
Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments for consultations on issues
concerning trade and international competitiveness. Mr Groser will attend his
first MCIT meeting in Sydney on 30 June.
New Zealand’s participation in the MCIT will provide
increased opportunities for close and effective consultation on important areas
of mutual trade interest.[10]
Trans-Pacific Partnership
5.10
The idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) had its beginning in the
so-called P4 group (Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement). It was
formed between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore in 2005 and joined by Brunei in
2006.[11]
5.11
Australia, Peru and Vietnam all indicated their interest in joining the
group and negotiating an agreement – to be called the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement. The decision by the US Government to also take part in the
negotiations has given the group the critical mass it needed to progress the
discussions.[12]
5.12
The NZ Deputy High Commissioner noted the potential of the agreement and
said that it had always been planned as a benchmark for an expanding regional
trade architecture:
And we are, of course, rather pleased with that agreement
because it has its origins in the Pacific Four Partnership that we struck with
Singapore, Chile and Brunei in 2005.
We had always had it in mind back then that this would be a
pathfinder agreement, that the P4 agreement would form the basis for an
evolving regional architecture in the region, and we are really pleased that
Australia has applied to join that agreement, along with the United States,
Peru and Vietnam.
It is a very exciting development for a whole range of
reasons...[13]
5.13
The first round of negotiations began in Melbourne on 15 March 2010.
Australia’s Trade Minister, Hon Simon Crean MP, called the discussions “a major
milestone”. He said that:
The Trans-Pacific Partnership represents a pathway toward
achieving APEC’s long-term goal of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. …The
TPP will be an ambitious, 21st century agreement that will
strengthen economic integration in the region
The Australian Government will be seeking a high standard,
comprehensive agreement that complements the WTO Doha Round.[14]
5.14
The Minister commented that:
The participation of the US is an important signal of the
Obama Administration’s commitment to the region, and an encouraging sign of a
broader US engagement on trade policy issues.
He said that the:
…negotiators will explore new approaches to the obstacles
facing businesses in the region, particularly in emerging sectors and growing
areas in international trade, including services,
e-commerce and green technology.[15]
5.15
In evidence given to the Sub-Committee DFAT set out the purpose of the
agreement and its long-term aims:
The aim of this agreement is to put in place a comprehensive
high-quality agreement that we hope will form a building block for greater
regional economic liberalisation and integration. It is one possible pathway
towards a free trade area of the Asia Pacific but by no means the only one. It
is an agreement by a group of countries who are interested in taking a
high-quality approach to these agreements and exploring ways in which we can be
responsive to business needs in the 21st century.[16]
5.16
Some commentators in the US are more sceptical of the possibilities. An
article by the Cato Institute’s Sallie James commented:
Four of the seven TPP partners, for example, already have a
free trade agreement with the United States. The other three are relatively
small markets —and are already attracting criticism from domestic lobby groups
concerned about competition from imports.[17]
5.17
The author went on to say:
Free trade in dairy products from New Zealand, for example,
could bring significant benefits to U.S. consumers paying through the nose for
dairy products. Alas, though, the dairy farmers and their sponsors in Congress
have already stepped up the fight to protect their turf. Similarly, the textile
lobby has warned that textile and apparel from Vietnam would not be welcome.[18]
5.18
Australian commentators were more hopeful; for example, Kristen
Bondietti at ITS Global commented:
The decision of the Obama Administration to participate
indicates a clear intention to engage on trade in the Asia-Pacific region. It
will give new weight to the negotiations and provide impetus for progress by
2011, when the US will host APEC.
It should encourage over time, broader membership from important
economies in the region, including China, Korea, Japan, Malaysia and other
ASEAN countries.
The TPP has been touted as a possible platform for an FTA
involving all APEC members. It will build on the Trans Pacific Strategic
Economic Partnership Agreement (P4) among Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and
Brunei to include Australia and Peru, as well as the US and possibly Vietnam.
The P4 … is generally regarded as a comprehensive and high quality free trade
agreement. Indeed, one of the objectives in negotiating it was to create an FTA
that could be seen as a model within the Asia-Pacific region and could
potentially attract new members.[19]
5.19
The Sub-Committee considers that this agreement has the potential to
close some of the gaps in Pacific relationships and, in time, to integrate
closely with the aims and activities of APEC.
PACER Plus
5.20
For the last two years the Australian and New Zealand Governments have
been consulting with Pacific Island leaders about a proposed new trade and
economic integration agreement for the Pacific region.
5.21
Australia and NZ have offered tariff concessions and marketing
assistance to the nations of the Pacific Islands Forum for many years; under
SPARTECA.[20] The intention is,
however, that the proposed agreement will go much further, by seeking to
address issues that are of particular importance to the island nations but are
not covered by SPARTECA.
5.22
In announcing the decision to commence negotiations, the then Minister
for Trade, the Hon Simon Crean, said that the aim of the agreement would be to
promote economic sustainability in the region. He noted that eighteen months of
consultations had been undertaken to ensure that the matters of concern to the
islands were dealt with.[21]
5.23
The Minister gave several examples of major difficulties faced by the
Forum Islands in trading with the Australian and NZ markets. He noted that:
n compliance with
strict quarantine requirements is an issue for several nations;
n development of a
consistent set of rules of origin would be of benefit to the entire region;
n improvement of
aviation links would be of great assistance to tourism;
n liberalisation of the
telecommunications industry is a priority area, particularly for business;
n region-wide labour
mobility has been a very high priority for some years now; and
n the development of
technical skills is essential if the island nations are to gain full benefit
from the large infrastructure projects now being established in the region.[22]
5.24
During the inquiry, the Sub-Committee heard evidence from the Pacific
Islands Trade Commissioner, who represents the Pacific Islands in Sydney and
seeks to encourage trade and investment links with Australia:
The Pacific Islands Trade and Investment Commission, or
PITIC, as it is commonly referred to, is one of four trade offices of the Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat. The forum is based in Fiji and is the region’s
premier political and economic policy organisation, representing the 14 Pacific
Island nations as well as Australia and New Zealand.
PITIC Sydney is tasked with the promotion of trade and
investment between Australia and the Pacific. We encourage trade from the
Pacific to Australia and promote investment from Australia back to the Pacific.
... PITIC is the leading agency that focuses on delivering export and
investment facilitation services across key industry sectors, which include
agriculture, fisheries, general goods and limited services.
We work in tourism promotion, and this year we have also
begun to do a bit of export facilitation in the creative arts, which is
important to the region. We also work in the complex area of investment
promotion and facilitation.[23]
Capacity Building
5.25
In a Ministerial Statement to the Parliament, the Minister said that,
rather than being a commercial agreement, the main emphasis of the new agreement
will be on capacity building in the Pacific:
Quite frankly, from the point of view of trade, Australia is
not primarily pursuing the PACER Plus agreement from the perspective of
commercial benefit. Australia’s primary objective with PACER Plus is a more
sustainable and prosperous Pacific – an aspiration that I am sure we all share.
To not address these aspects of capacity building could
easily result in not only underperformance or stagnation but failed states.
This objective is born out of all of the evidence that demonstrates that
prosperity can be secured by countries engaging effectively with trade.[24]
5.26
The New Zealand Deputy High Commissioner offered similar comments to the
Sub-Committee:
We should not forget the fact that Pacific island countries
already have duty-free and quota-free access to New Zealand and Australia. This
agreement is no longer about a traditional free trade agreement; it is no
longer about a knockdown, drag-you-down fight around tariff removal, because we
are tariff-free to them.
What it is actually about—and your Prime Minister and your
Minister for Trade have talked in some detail about what this might comprise—is
putting economic sustainability at the core of this negotiation. It is about us
thinking very hard and creatively about the trade and development nexus that we
need to confront with the Pacific. If you like, this is about a hand up, not a
handout in the agreement.[25]
5.27
He added that some examples of ways in which Australia and New Zealand
might assist the Pacific economies, not only in trade with our two countries
but also in creating new opportunities within their own economies:
What ministers have been talking about that I think is of the
greatest interest is the capacity building process, in other words development
assistance. It is not going to be just development assistance in its
traditional form. This is going to be development assistance that is designed
to build capacity to take advantage of the trade agreement.
To give you a couple of practical examples, in the case of
New Zealand some time ago we established a particular section in the Ministry
of Agriculture that would process requests from Pacific island countries on
quarantine questions as a priority. That was one way to try to assist them and
to help them directly. You could see a process whereby you would have a New
Zealand quarantine or MAF official working directly with the Pacific island
counterparts on tropical fruit access to the New Zealand market, to try to help
them establish the kind of mechanisms they need. Remember that these are going
to be very small, not even medium sized, enterprises that are going to do this.
The other interesting question is going to be building
capacity around servicing the local economy as well. You could see, for example,
scope for local tropical fruit producers to increase the quality of production
domestically to provide for the hotel services trade. I think you will be as
surprised as I was to learn that many hotels in the region simply do not have a
secure supply of products, so they rely on getting products from outside of the
direct region. You can see that there is a little niche capacity there to build
up.
Around tourism services, for example, we could look to
provide targeted specific assistance to help them maximise the benefit of tour
groups that come through. I could see a way in which our two countries, our
trade promotion agencies, are thinking about how they might work together to
bring, for example for the Rugby World Cup, when you have visitors coming to New
Zealand as to how is the Australian trade promotion authority looking to talk
to us about how they might bring them over to Australia as well. We have had a
long-running tradition of trying to get people that come to visit Australia to
nip across the ditch to come and see us in New Zealand. We could envisage a way
of extending that by adding one or other of the Pacific islands on to that
process as well.
I think there is a real, keen interest on the part of Pacific
island countries to look at what that capacity building is going to look like,
but that kind of dialogue cannot be just a one-way conversation. It has got to
be one where they also are clear about the kind of things that they need and
where they would most benefit, but we would be very clear that this kind of
capacity building is designed to help them leverage the benefits of economic
integration and this kind of free trade agreement.[26]
5.28
The Pacific Islands Trade Commissioner commented in his evidence to the
Sub-Committee that the proposals for PACER Plus go well beyond what is offered
under SPARTECA:
SPARTECA is clearly just a free trade agreement between the
Pacific Islands and Australia to import tax-free goods. The exporters we work
with take advantage of SPARTECA. PACER Plus is more of a creative regional
cooperation agreement which will encompass a lot of other factors rather than
looking solely at the trade elements. If you read between the lines, it will
incorporate the labour issue. It will incorporate the delivery of aid. It will
touch on capacity building as well, and a whole lot of other issues that need
to meet WTO guidelines will come together. It is a regional agreement but it
obviously has a free trade agreement style to it.
Many of the countries do not have the expertise and experience
to negotiate their position. The Office of the Chief Trade Negotiator, which
hopefully will be in place by the end of the year, will have many challenges in
bringing the 14 forum island countries to an informed position.[27]
5.29
One of the important aspects of capacity building highlighted by the
Minister is the capacity of the islands to effectively negotiate their position
in discussions about the agreement. This will be addressed in two ways:
n by providing
appropriate technical capacity building and support to enable the Forum Islands
to fully participate in the negotiations; and
n Australia and NZ will
provide $500,000 a year each for three years to fund the Office of the Chief
Trade Adviser (OCTA).[28]
5.30
The OCTA will be based in Vanuatu and will “… provide independent
support and advice to Forum Island countries over the course of the
negotiations”. The Minister said that OCTA’s independence was guaranteed and
that it was also encouraged to seek additional funding from other sources.[29]
5.31
The South Pacific Trade Commissioner, however, indicated that a lack of
information on the anticipated benefits to the Islands is posing real problems:
I think that there is still a real lack of information out
there about what the potential benefits of this agreement would be, or of free
trade agreements in general. But, as I said previously, PACER Plus is being
positioned as a regional agreement encompassing many other things now. As
alluded to, I am not sure whether the public sector has had the opportunity to
fully inform the private sector in a lot of the Pacific Island countries as
well, and so more time is needed. It is very challenging.
In terms of trading, a lot of these countries do not have the
capacity to take advantage of the agreement, as they have not taken full advantage
of SPARTECA. I think that we have to look historically and look at what is
happening with the EPA negotiations and with the other negotiations. I think
that it all gets back to the capacity to take advantage of these agreements.[30]
5.32
When asked if some of the problems were based on the likely loss of
Customs revenue, he said:
That is right. I think that is where most of the fear is. It
is a real fear. A lot of these countries rely heavily on that revenue. As I
pointed out, I do not think the world is going to change and suddenly start
creating trade surpluses with Australia and other countries, so that imbalance
will always exist. But that comes at a later stage in the negotiations, when
the countries get down to the nitty-gritty and talk about the harmonised tariff
codes.[31]
Rules of Origin
5.33
The NZ Deputy High Commissioner also referred to a problem faced by the
Pacific Islands in taking advantage of the duty-free access offered to their
products:
There is one thing that I think we forget about that is very
important to Pacific island countries, and that is the rules of origin. Many
Pacific island countries have complained that it has all been fine to have duty
free and quota free access to the New Zealand and Australian markets, however ... their production processes and facilities are simply
unable to take advantage of this duty free access that they have to the New
Zealand market or to the Australian market because the rules of origin are so
out of date.
If you compare, for example, the rules of origin that we have
agreed with ASEAN countries, which includes some least developed
countries—Laos, which is not even in the WTO, Cambodia and Burma—those
countries have better rules of origin applying to them entering the Australian
and the New Zealand market than the Pacific island countries currently do. That
is obviously something that Pacific island countries could legitimately expect
us to fix for them.
We would need to make more facilitating rules of origin for
them. We would update the way in which SPARTECA handled rules of origin. In
effect, it has not. What we would look to do is make those more liberal and
that would allow Pacific island countries to actually get the benefit that we
have given them for such a long time that they have not been able to take
advantage of. Rules of Origin is a really important element of that
negotiation.[32]
5.34
The Sub-Committee sought further clarification on the question of Rules
of Origin and the Deputy High Commissioner added:
Essentially, a rule of origin would apply whereby you would
produce a certain amount of a product in a Pacific island country and you would
qualify for the duty free access.
At the moment you could have a situation where a product
comes from outside the region, say China or Japan, a certain amount of value is
added in the Pacific, but it is unable to qualify for the current rules of
origin for the duty free access, so it has to go under the WTO rate. For
example, in textile, clothing and footwear, in the case of New Zealand—and I
know you are in a very similar situation—you are talking about tariffs in
excess of 10 per cent. Even if they can add a little bit of value in the
Pacific they are not able to benefit from the lower duty.
The idea of the rules of origin would be to try to facilitate
that so that you get that kind of access. We can ask ourselves a question about
whether or not textile, clothing and footwear is really where the comparative
advantage of Pacific island countries lies or whether it is somewhere else.
Regardless of what we think, it is the rules of origin that determine whether a
product qualifies for that lower duty or whether it has to come in under the
WTO standard rate that applies for China, India and any other country that
comes through.[33]
Labour Mobility
5.35
Another problem that has worried the islands for many years is the
question of labour mobility:
[Another] area that I know is a sensitive one is, of course,
regional mobility, labour mobility. New Zealand has a longstanding set of
arrangements with a number of Pacific island countries. I know you have
something similar, perhaps of a slightly different type. It will be those kinds
of things that Pacific island countries will be looking to because of the value
of remittances, because of the way in which you can upskill your labour force,
how you bring them back and how that capacity building can help.
Those would be my three things that I would identify: the
rules of origin in a really practical way, the trade and development angle with
this building capacity question, and then of course regional mobility has to be
at the heart of this negotiation from the perspective of the Pacific island
countries.[34]
Submission on Women’s Issues
5.36
A submission by the International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA)
commented that an important aspect of the PACER Plus negotiations will be the
willingness of governments to:
...systematically integrate gender into trade analyses and
approaches to negotiation. Regional economic policy needs to be aligned with
regional and national gender equality commitments to contribute to equitable
development.[35]
5.37
Failure to do this, the IWDA said:
...may result in women being disproportionately excluded from
economic opportunities created by trade liberalisation. At the same time women
will carry an unequal burden of trade adjustment costs, exacerbating prevailing
gender inequalities.[36]
Special steps to promote women’s participation in
consultation processes are necessary given their marginalisation in the private
sector and poor representation at government levels.
Given the isolation and geographic dispersion of populations
in Pacific island countries and the marginalised position of women in society,
genuine consultation will require the creation of a safe space for women to be
able to speak out and adequate time for hosting meetings in rural areas and
then collating and analysing data. Negotiation time frames should be developed
with this in mind, and governments should be encouraged.[37]
5.38
In giving evidence to the Sub-Committee the Executive Director of the
Agency said that while her comments were particularly relevant to the proposed PACER
Plus Agreement the comments have a more general application:
What I say here, though, can be applied equally to the
development of FTAs with other developing countries. There is a real chance for
Australia to step up and create a best-practice model.[38]
5.39
The Executive Director commented that unless proper steps are taken to
ensure that women can participate in programs arising from trade agreements,
they may, in fact, finish worse off than before the agreement:
Trade relations can promote new business development and job
opportunities and can favourably impact on the price of goods due to increased
competition.
However, if women are not equally placed to access economic
opportunities or share in the benefits of these opportunities—so if they have
limited mobility, training and skills and if imported goods impact on women’s
limited livelihood opportunities without providing alternative options and if
it cuts into tariff revenues that affect health and social spending with
disproportionate impacts on women and children—not only will women bear the
burden of adjustment costs but also they could be further marginalised in
social, economic and political life with implications for their and their children’s
health, status and life experience and, consequently, for the development of
their country.[39]
5.40
The IWDA noted that the countries involved are signatories of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
This convention recognizes the rights of women to economic
equality and commits signatory governments to take steps to address
inequalities through social and economic policy. These nations have also made
commitments to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, which call for
gender equality and the empowerment of women: a goal widely regarded as a
necessary prerequisite to achieving the remaining seven goals.[40]
5.41
The Agency said that failure to address gender issues, particularly in
the Pacific, could undermine the advantages created by an agreement:
In the Pacific, gender inequality affects women’s engagement
in formal and informal economies. Significant wage gaps exist between women and
men. Work opportunities are often segmented by sex, and women face
discriminatory government policies and social norms when trying to access
business finance, licences and networks.
With limited decision-making rights and limited mobility and
time due to responsibilities for household and caregiving work and subsistence
food production, women’s opportunities to engage in paid work are often limited
to flexible yet insecure informal sector work. Also, much of what is important
to poor people, and especially to poor women, is invisible to conventional
analysis and data collection.[41]
5.42
The IWDA said that “DFAT is in a unique
position to be able to drive an innovative process that links economic
development objectives to gender equality in the Pacific”. It concluded
by recommending some initial steps toward achieving gender equality:
n Support the gender
analysis of trade policy options at a national level through direct funding
provision to national governments, regional NGOs or bodies such as the Pacific
Islands Forum Secretariat.
n Support an inclusive
approach to the region’s future development that involves the input of diverse
voices in civil society, faith groups, unions and government. Given the
isolation and geographic dispersion of populations in Pacific Island countries,
and the marginalised position of women in society, genuine consultation will
require the creation of a safe space for women to be able to speak and adequate
time to host meetings in rural areas and then collate and analyse data.
n Work with AusAID to
support the strengthening of women’s machineries and each National Council for
Women (or other appropriate agencies) to engage in discussions with trade
departments on trade analysis.
n Integrate gender
analysis into all Aid for Trade activities including research initiatives,
fellowship programs and any future activities.
n Ensure that gender is
integrated into the negotiation agenda and processes.[42]
5.43
The Executive Director summarised her arguments by saying:
... in order ultimately to address ...gender inequality and
reduce or mitigate negative impacts of trade and maximise opportunities for
women to engage in economies, we need to look at women’s substantive role in
economies—both monetised and otherwise—and how trade will impact on their roles,
responsibilities and opportunities. This requires that we take a gendered
approach from the outset.
Integrating gender into trade policy development and
negotiation processes not only serves as an essential step in promoting
efficient and effective economic policy but also ensures policy coherence
between trade and aid objectives and provides the opportunity for the
Australian government to model best practice in the sector. The recommendations
identified have relevance across the Australian government’s entire trade
program.
Attention to gender in trade is a rights issue as well as an
efficiency issue. Policies which improve women’s access to and control over
economic and financial resources have direct implications for both women’s
economic empowerment and broader processes of development. Locating those
policies within a framework of rights ensures that women’s access to resources
is made part of their entitlements as citizens rather than left to the largesse
of the state, the discretion of male providers or the vagaries of the market.[43]
5.44
The Sub-Committee discussed the IWDA comments with a representative of
AusAID, who indicated that in quite a few of the areas mentioned, AusAID is
already incorporating the ideas outlined by the IWDA and giving due recognition
to gender issues. For example, AusAID has funded research on PACER Plus and its
potential effects on each Forum Island country.[44]
5.45
That said, however, Australia can only suggest that gender issues be
included:
The terms of reference for those studies are determined by
each country. ...clearly for reasons of confidentiality we do not dictate
directly what issues that research covers but we can certainly be suggesting
that gender issues could be included. We also do not see the final product
unless countries are keen to give that to us.[45]
5.46
AusAID continued by outlining some of the areas where gender issues are
being kept to the forefront:
There has been agreement among forum trade ministers that
there will be an annual consultation process with regional non-state actors,
which effectively means non-government organisations and the private sector.
There was one of those meetings in Honiara ...AusAID was represented also.
There is an intention to hold another such consultation at the next PACER Plus
negotiating meeting, which is tentatively set for November this year.
At the one in the Solomon Islands a number of non-government
organisations, including women's groups, were represented. So at that regional
level there is an opportunity for women's groups to be involved. At the
national level we are certainly very consistently supporting the intent of
governments to conduct national consultation. ...we are consistently
emphasising to countries that this is an important ongoing process and that
there need to be widespread consultations including all elements of
society—which would include, of course, women's interests as well.
We are also doing quite a lot of work on leadership programs.
The impacts of trade or PACER Plus in particular on outcomes for women really
depends to a large extent on the broader way in which women's and men's roles
are there in each Pacific country. That varies across countries, of
course. But we are working on a number of broader programs including on
leadership issues. I believe the statistics in terms of women's participation
in political leadership are quite stark. For instance ... Several countries
have no female representation at the political level at all. So a number of
leadership programs are under way that address those sorts of issues.
On the broader economic empowerment and private sector
development side, we are also involved both through having done detailed
studies and in partnership with the International Finance Corporation, which is
quite active in private sector development in the region. They have done
studies on our behalf of the constraints to women's involvement in economic
activity in the Pacific.[46]
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Recommendation 15
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The Sub-Committee expressed its satisfaction that AusAID has
given some emphasis to gender issues in negotiations with the Pacific Islands
Forum countries. It proposes that these issues should continue to be advanced
by DFAT and AusAID as a priority.
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5.47
AusAID’s representative appearing before the Sub-Committee was asked for
some comments on the issues raised by the IWDA. In general, the comments
indicated that AusAID agreed with the proposals and, in fact, was already
applying a number of them:
We note that that submission made a number of recommendations
focusing in particular on the potential gender implications of the PACER Plus
negotiations. For example they recommended provision of funding to national
governments, regional NGOs or the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat for
independent research studies.
They recommended wide consultation on trade issues,
particularly in relation to PACER Plus, strengthening national bodies such as
councils for women to engage in trade discussions; ensuring that gender is
taken into account in all trade related aid activities, including research and
fellowships; and integrating gender into the negotiation agenda and processes.
I guess in a nutshell AusAID's response to the IWDA
submission is that we agree on the importance of gender issues in relation to
trade issues specifically and economic empowerment issues more broadly and we
are already undertaking the types of activities that the IWDA recommends.
Certainly in terms of our approach to gender in development more broadly the Australian
government is committed to implementation of the Millennium Development Goals.
As you would be aware, of course, gender equality is central to achieving those
goals.
Trade policy is one of many factors that impact on the
ability of men and women to participate in and benefit from economic
opportunities, both in the formal and the informal sectors. Australia and other
donors are increasing understanding of these factors in the Pacific through a
number of programs. Key gender priorities for Australia's international
development assistance overall, including in the Pacific, are improved and
equitable health and education outcomes for women, men, girls and boys; women's
participation in decision making and women's political empowerment; improved
status of women; and reducing violence against women—which of course, along
with the fear of violence, can limit women's social, political and economic
participation in many communities.[47]
5.48
AusAID also gave some details of programs that incorporated issues of
involving women’s issues:
For example in relation to PACER Plus—in terms of gender
analysis of trade policy options, we have provided funding for research on
PACER Plus and the potential impacts of PACER Plus for each forum island
country. That would include social and gender issues if those forum island
countries were so to decide.
The terms of reference for those studies are determined by
each country. As noted in the submission, clearly for reasons of
confidentiality we do not dictate directly what issues that research covers—but
we can certainly be suggesting that gender issues could be included. We also do
not see the final product unless countries are keen to give that to us.
We are also providing funding to the Office of the Chief
Trade Adviser, which has been set up specifically to provide confidential and
independent advice to forum island countries. Again at the request of forum
island countries, that office could commission or undertake research into
issues associated with the PACER Plus negotiations, including possible gender
issues.
That is one specific area where the submission recommended
that research be carried out, and certainly there is a mechanism there to
undertake research. The submission also recommended consultations. There has been
agreement among forum trade ministers that there will be an annual consultation
process with regional non-state actors, which effectively means non-government organisations
and the private sector.[48]