Chapter 2 Australia’s Human Rights Dialogues
2.1
In September 2005, the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade (the Committee) tabled its report for the inquiry into Australia’s
Human Rights Dialogue Process. Chapter 1 of the report provides a
background on Australia’s bilateral human rights dialogues. The report
highlights the previous Australian Government’s rationale for conducting the
dialogues:
The Australian Government firmly believes that non-confrontational,
cooperative dialogue is the most effective way to address the human rights
situations in other countries.[1]
2.2
The previous report also noted the goal of Australia’s human rights
diplomacy at that time:
...the most important goal of Australia’s human rights
diplomacy is to make practical improvements to the human rights situations in
other countries. The Government pursues this goal through a combination of
constructive dialogue, technical assistance and the building of institutions
which underpin good governance.[2]
2.3
The Committee notes that it did not receive enough evidence to undertake
an assessment of whether there are measurable outcomes as a result of the human
rights dialogue process, how effective it has been to date, and whether the
process represents value for money.
Overview of the Australia – China Dialogue
2.4
In 1997, the Australian Government initiated a high-level bilateral
dialogue on human rights with China.[3] There have been thirteen
rounds of formal dialogue since its inception, with the most recent round taking
place in China in December 2010.[4] The human rights
dialogues are held alternately in either Canberra or Beijing.[5]
2.5
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) was of the view that
the human rights dialogue with China had evolved ‘from an officials-only
meeting to become a wide-ranging dialogue between delegations comprising
parliamentarians, officials and non-government practitioners.’[6]
2.6
DFAT highlighted that the composition of the Australian delegation to
each human rights dialogue has varied over time ‘due to a range of factors,
including the timing, the length of notice given and the location of the
dialogue.’[7]
2.7
In its Submission, DFAT stated that the human rights dialogue consists
of four elements:
n formal talks between
official delegations;
n representations on
individual cases of concern;
n a separate program
for the visiting delegation which allows direct interaction with non-government
human rights practitioners; and
n a Human Rights
Technical Cooperation (HRTC) program through which Australia works with
partners to support specific human rights-related projects.[8]
2.8
DFAT also stated that the primary components of the human rights
dialogue were the formal talks between official delegations and representations
on individual cases of concern.[9]
2.9
Topics that Australia raised at the 13th human rights
dialogue included:
n freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, association, procession
and demonstration;
n the use of the death penalty;
n the petition system and forced labour;
n legal reform and the rights
of lawyers;
n the rights of women;
n the rights of persons
with disabilities;
n the rights of
children;
n the rights of ethnic
minorities, including in Tibet and Xinjiang;
n freedom of religion;
and
n civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights.[10]
2.10
Australia has also raised the issues of organ donation programs and the
harvesting of organs from prisoners within China.[11]
2.11
A list of the topics discussed at the first eight human rights dialogues
with China is provided in Appendix D of the Committee’s previous report into Australia’s
Human Rights Dialogue Process.[12]
Issues raised about Australia’s human rights
2.12
As a dialogue partner, China has an equal opportunity to raise matters
relating to human rights concerns in Australia. Topics that China raised at the
13th human rights dialogue included:
n changes to
shared-parenting laws (2006 amendment to the Commonwealth Family Law Act 1975);
n male-female wage gap;
n attacks on
international students;
n visas for
international students; and
n rights of Indigenous
Australians.[13]
2.13
The Attorney General’s Department also highlighted that the kinds of
issues raised by China often relate to Australia’s domestic human rights
position, Indigenous matters and immigration.[14]
Overview of the Australia – Vietnam Dialogue
2.14
The Australia-Vietnam human rights dialogue was first held in Hanoi in
2002.[15] There have been nine
rounds of formal dialogue, with the most recent taking place in Vietnam in April
2012. The human rights dialogues are held alternately in either Australia or
Vietnam.[16]
2.15
DFAT added that while the dialogue with Vietnam is conducted at the
level of First Assistant Secretary/Director-General[17]
‘participation in the HRD [human rights dialogues] has broadened since 2002 to
include a range of government agencies on both the Australian and Vietnamese
sides, as well as Members of Parliament.’[18] In particular,
‘Vietnam’s representation at the human rights dialogue has become more senior
and has been drawn from a wider range of government agencies.’[19]
2.16
DFAT’s submission noted that the Australia-Vietnam human rights dialogue
also consists of formal talks, representations on individual cases of concern,
direct interaction with non-government human rights practitioners for the
visiting delegation, and a HRTC program.[20]
2.17
DFAT also stated that the primary components of the human rights
dialogue with Vietnam were the formal dialogue and a program of additional
meetings and site visits.[21]
2.18
Topics that Australia raised at the 8th human rights dialogue
with Vietnam included:
n respective national approaches
to human rights;
n individual cases of
concern;
n freedoms of speech,
assembly, the press, association and demonstration;
n the use of the death
penalty;
n legal and judicial
reform;
n prison conditions;
n freedom of religion;
n civil, political,
economic and cultural rights;
n ethnic minority
rights;
n women’s rights;
n the rights of persons
with disabilities;
n international human
rights mechanisms (e.g. the UN Human Rights Council, human rights treaties);
and
n Vietnam’s
implementation of recommendations from its Human Rights Council Universal
Periodic Review appearance.[22]
2.19
A list of the topics discussed at the first three human rights dialogues
with Vietnam is provided in Appendix D of the previous Committee report into Australia’s
Human Rights Dialogue Process.[23]
Issues raised about Australia’s human rights
2.20
DFAT noted that, at the 8th human rights dialogue, Vietnam
had a general exchange on human rights, questioned why Australia had not
enshrined a bill of rights, and raised concerns about an assault on a Vietnamese
student.[24]
Overview of the Australia – Laos Dialogue
2.21
Australia has held three human rights dialogues with Laos, with the
first held in October 2006 and the third held in April 2012. DFAT noted that,
due to funding issues for the Lao delegation, the human rights dialogues have
been held in Laos.[25]
2.22
The second human rights dialogue with Laos, held in April 2009, was conducted
at the First Assistant Secretary/Director-General level. Other Australian
participants have included officials from the Attorney-General’s Department and
the Australian Human Rights Commission. The Lao delegation also included representatives
from the Ministry of Justice, Supreme Court, Prosecutor’s Office, Ministry of
Public Security and the Lao Women’s Union.[26]
2.23
The dialogues also provide an opportunity for the delegates to visit a
range of relevant human rights projects in Laos. At the second dialogue, the
delegation visited the National Rehabilitation Centre and the Cooperative
Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) visitor centre, the Lao Bar
Association, the Training Centre for Women with Disabilities and an open trial
at the Vientiane Capital People’s Court for Civil Proceedings.[27]
2.24
Topics discussed at the second human rights dialogue included the promotion
and protection of women’s rights, access to justice, protection of minority
rights, and the role of civil society in the protection of human rights.[28]
2.25
The Australian Government does not operate a technical cooperation
program under the framework of the formal human rights dialogue process with
Laos. However, Australia does fund a range of projects aimed at the promotion
of human rights in Laos under the Human Rights Grants Scheme.[29]
2.26
In the last five years, Australia has funded two non-government
organisations through the Human Rights Grants Scheme:
n Lao Disabled People’s
Association (2008-09, $149,969);[30] and
n Participatory
Development Training Centre (2011-12, $90,000).[31]
Overview of the Australia – Iran Dialogue
2.27
The Committee’s previous report into Australia’s Human Rights
Dialogue Process noted that the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for
Trade, the Hon. Tim Fischer, first discussed the possibility of a dialogue with
Iran in 1999.[32]
2.28
Australia and Iran have held one bilateral human rights dialogue which
was in held in Tehran in December 2002. The Australian delegation included
representatives from DFAT, the Attorney-General’s Department, AusAID and the
then Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (now the Australian Human
Rights Commission).[33]
2.29
Topics discussed at that dialogue included:
n Role of the
judiciary;
n International human
rights instruments;
n National human rights
institutions;
n Role of civil
society;
n Position of
minorities;
n Treatment of the Baha’i;
n Freedom of the press;
n The Shirazi Jews; and
n Dissidents.[34]
2.30
Following the first round of the dialogue, Australia funded a visit to the
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission by a delegation from the Islamic
Human Rights Commission of Iran.[35]
2.31
Australia only held one formal human rights dialogue with Iran. In their
evidence to the Committee, DFAT noted that the Australian Government attempted
to schedule a second round but was unsuccessful:
We did in the couple of years after that, make attempts to
try to schedule a second round, but the Iranian side was reluctant. They cited
a number of reasons: they cited scheduling problems, they said they were
preoccupied with the UN consideration of Iran, they cited our attitude. So they
were not interested. Then there was a period from about 2007 where Iran itself
sought to re-establish the dialogue. The judgment we made was that Iran was not
genuinely willing to engage in substantive discussions on human rights.[36]
2.32
Australia has provided funding for a range of projects aimed at the
promotion of human rights in Iran under the then Human Rights Small Grant
Scheme. Between 1998 and 2001, Australia provided $48,266 in funding for
projects that provide legal advocacy and support services to women and children
in Iran.[37]
Community perceptions of Australia’s human rights dialogues
2.33
A significant number of organisations expressed strong concerns about
the bilateral human rights dialogues.
2.34
The Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) held
concerns that the dialogue was at risk of ‘becoming ritualistic and an end in
and of itself.’[38] That opinion was also
reiterated by the Australian Baha’i Community.[39]
2.35
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) was of the view that
bilateral human rights engagement could ‘be seen to legitimise or make
respectable a particular government.’[40]
2.36
The Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) questioned whether the
bilateral dialogue process is effective in achieving cooperation between
countries on human rights issues and its impact on respect for human rights.[41]
2.37
More specifically, the Australia Tibet Council (the Council) voiced its ‘concern
over the Australian government’s reliance on the annual human rights dialogue
as the centrepiece of its efforts to improve China’s human rights performance.’[42]
In particular, the Council was of the view that it ‘has not seen a tangible
outcome from the dialogue process on the human rights situation in Tibet.’[43]
2.38
The NSW Falun Dafa Association (FDA) held a similar view to the Council on
the effectiveness of the dialogues stating that:
...the past Australia-China
Human Rights Dialogues have had no identifiable effect in helping to safeguard
the human rights of Falun Dafa practitioners in China over the past twelve
years.[44]
2.39
The FDA added that:
Australia should avoid engagement and dialogue on human
rights in China that is unconditional, because this often confers legitimacy
without requiring action or confirming outcomes.[45]
2.40
The Federation for a Democratic China also agreed with the view that the
dialogue between Australia and China had no positive human rights outcomes.[46]
2.41
The Vietnam Committee on Human Rights (VCHR) questioned the dialogues’
ability to bring about significant human rights change in Vietnam stating:
...after almost a decade of implementation, the lack of human
rights progress in Vietnam raises serious questions about the relevance and
impact of the dialogue process.[47]
2.42
The Unified Vietnamese Buddhist Congregation of Australia and New
Zealand (UVBC) also questioned the human rights situation in Vietnam, stating:
...it has seemed that in the past rounds of dialogue,
compared with what has happened in the streets and villages in Vietnam, it has
all not had any or much improvement in terms of Vietnam as a country having to
practise international standards of human rights as have been signed into
several key international covenants.[48]
2.43
The Vietnamese Community in Australia (VCA) viewed Australia’s human
rights dialogue with Vietnam as a ‘token exercise’.[49]
2.44
Ms Quynh Dao, who appeared before the Committee in a private capacity,
held the view that there ‘does not seem to be any clear indication that the
dialogue process has proved effective in furthering the cause of human rights
in Vietnam.’[50]
2.45
The Committee to Protect Vietnamese Workers (CPVW) expressed the view
that the dialogues provided a material benefit to the Vietnamese Government to
travel to Australia.[51]
2.46
However, in addition to expressing their concerns, most of the
organisations and individuals that provided evidence for this inquiry supported
the view that the human rights dialogues should continue.
2.47
Civil Liberties Australia (CLA) supported the ‘human rights dialogue as
a means for advancing human rights internationally.’[52]
2.48
The ACTU believed that ‘properly structured, human rights dialogues can
provide an important avenue through which to facilitate cooperation between
countries on human rights issues and to have a meaningful and practical impact
on respect for human rights.’[53]
2.49
The ICJ ‘supports in principle Australia’s human rights dialogues with
China and Vietnam and is pleased to see how the dialogues have been maintained
over the years.’[54]
2.50
ACFID also supported the dialogues believing that it was necessary to:
...have an incremental and quiet conversation about some of
the most difficult human rights issues and we see it as a tool among a suite of
tools.[55]
2.51
The Australian Baha’i Community, broadly ‘supports the human rights
dialogue process as a tool to be used alongside others in promoting the
protection of human rights around the world.’[56]
2.52
The Baha’i Community added that it was ‘important to view the dialogues
as part of a suite of tools available to the government.’[57]
The VCHR also agreed that the human rights dialogue was an accepted tool.[58]
2.53
The Council and the FDA stated that they supported the continuation of
the human rights dialogues as a part of a multifaceted approach.[59]
2.54
The Australian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) stated that it
did not want to abandon the human rights dialogues and advocated for a multifaceted
approach ‘to pursue human rights in China and Vietnam through bilateral,
regional, multilateral fora.’[60]
2.55
The Commission also noted that ‘Australian officials are not hesitant in
robustly raising issues of concern to Australia about human rights in those
countries.’[61]
2.56
The VCA believed that the human rights dialogues could ‘play a very
important role in improving the situation of human rights in Vietnam.’[62]
2.57
Mr Luke Donnellan MP, a member of the Victorian Parliament, held the
view that Australia should ‘keep pushing it at human rights dialogues, like we
do with China and the like.’[63]
Committee comment
2.58
Many submissions were critical of the progress achieved so far, but
overall the consensus seems to be that it is constructive to be talking to
other countries about Australia’s perspective on human rights, providing that
measures are put in place to enhance the effectiveness of the dialogues, that
NGOs are actively engaged in the dialogue process, that parliamentarians
participate, and that the human rights dialogues are considered as one
mechanism which is to be utilised as part of a suite of other mechanisms.
2.59
The Committee believes that Australia’s bilateral human rights dialogue
process is worthwhile and agrees with the wider community view that the
dialogues should continue as part of a multifaceted human rights approach.
2.60
A key component of human rights advocacy is government to government
dialogue aimed at genuinely cooperative efforts to improve human rights. Continuing
the human rights dialogues also increases Australia’s opportunities to engage
these countries on human rights issues.
2.61
The Committee is fully supportive of continuing the human rights
dialogue process.
Recommendation 1 |
| |
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government
continue to support the human rights dialogue process. |
2.62
In light of the above, the Committee has formed the view that the
Australian Government should take steps to re-establish its bilateral human
rights dialogue with Iran.
2.63
Based on the evidence received for this inquiry, the last time Australia
considered re-establishing a human rights dialogue with Iran was in 2007.[64]
It is an opportune time for Australia to increase its engagement with Iran.
2.64
The Committee notes that the Australian Government takes a multifaceted
approach by engaging Iran on human rights issues through the Australian embassy
in Tehran, the Human Rights Council and the Third Committee of the General
Assembly.[65]
2.65
Re-establishing the human rights dialogue with Iran will enhance this
multifaceted human rights approach.
Recommendation 2 |
| |
The Committee recommends that the Australian Government
consider re-establishing its bilateral human rights dialogue with Iran. |
Roles and obligations of participating agencies
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
2.66
DFAT’s submission states that it is the lead agency responsible for the
bilateral human rights dialogue process which includes managing the
organisational aspects of the dialogue meetings, such as:
n arranging timing and
agendas with dialogue partners;
n settling on site
visits and field trips when dialogues are held in partner countries and
arranging field trips for visiting delegations when Australia hosts;
n organising and
coordinating the Australian delegations;
n preparing briefings
for delegations;
n liaising and
consulting with AusAID, the Attorney General’s Department, the Australian Human
Rights Commission, and other agencies as required; and
n handling other
administrative arrangements during dialogue meetings as necessary.[66]
2.67
The submission also states that DFAT is responsible for:
n liaising with
Parliament and providing briefings on request;
n liaising and
consulting with non-government organisations (NGOs), and providing debriefs on
the dialogues as requested and through the annual Government-NGO human rights
forum;
n compiling lists of
individual cases of concern, making representations and following up on these
representations; and
n reporting to the
Foreign Minister on outcomes of dialogues.[67]
2.68
In addition, DFAT highlighted that it routinely consults with the
following Commonwealth Departments and statutory authorities to prepare for
each dialogue:
n Attorney-General’s
Department;
n Australian Human
Rights Commission;
n Australian Agency for
International Development (AusAID);
n Department of
Immigration & Citizenship (DIAC);
n Department of Families,
Housing, Community Services & Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA); and
n Department of
Education, Employment & Workplace Relations (DEEWR).[68]
Attorney General’s Department
2.69
DFAT’s submission also highlighted that the Attorney General’s
Department (AG’s) provides advice through its participation in Australian
delegations and in written briefings.[69] DFAT stated:
The role of the
Attorney-General’s Department in the human rights dialogue process is to
provide advice to dialogue participants on Australia’s system of law and
justice, particularly regarding domestic human rights institutions, policies
and legislation.[70]
2.70
DFAT also noted that AG’s has provided advice on the following topics
that are relevant to its portfolio:
n Australia’s Human
Rights Framework;
n domestic
implementation of international human rights treaties;
n civil and political
freedoms;
n freedom of religion;
n national human rights
institutions;
n judicial
administration and reform;
n criminal justice;
n counter-terrorism and
security legislation;
n native title; and
n Indigenous
incarceration and deaths in custody.
2.71
In addition, AG’s provides briefings on key issues for the human rights
dialogues, liaises with DFAT about the timing and venue of the dialogues,
provides input into the dialogue agenda and provides broad support to the
Commission.[71]
AusAID
2.72
AusAID, an Executive Agency within the Foreign Affairs and Trade
portfolio, is responsible for managing Australia’s overseas aid program.[72]
2.73
DFAT’s submission noted that AusAID managed the Human Rights Technical
Cooperation programs in China and Vietnam, which ‘are valued at approximately
A$3.7 million per annum (with around A$2.5 million allocated to China and A$1.2
million to Vietnam).’[73]
Australian Human Rights Commission
2.74
The Commission website states that it is an independent statutory
organisation that reports to the federal Parliament through the
Attorney-General. The Commission works with other national human rights
institutions to address major human rights issues in the region.[74]
2.75
Its website adds: the Commission also undertakes bilateral international
activities as part of the Australian Government’s development program run by
AusAID. The most substantial of these is the Human Rights Technical Cooperation
Program, which is part of the annual Dialogue on Human Rights.[75]
2.76
DFAT mentioned that, in addition to being part of the Australian delegation
to the dialogues, during formal meetings the Commission:
...comments on the human rights situation in Australia and
also reports on progress in the HRTC programs with China and Vietnam (as
requested).[76]
2.77
It its submission, the Commission elaborated on its role in the Dialogue
processes with China and Vietnam, noting that it participates in three ways:
n the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and Trade invites the President of the Commission, or a
representative nominated by the President, to attend the dialogue sessions as a
member of the Australian delegation;
n the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade invites the Commission to prepare briefing material
on particular agenda items for inclusion in the delegation brief; and
n the Australian Agency
for International Development invites the Commission to design and implement
programs of human rights technical cooperation in order to support the Dialogues
and to implement that program.[77]
2.78
To date, the Commission has attended all of Australia’s human rights
dialogues with Vietnam and every human rights dialogue with China since 1999.[78]
The Commission noted that:
The President of the Commission has personally attended most
of the Dialogue sessions, and on those occasions where the President has not
been available, a senior representative of the Commission has attended on
his/her behalf.[79]
2.79
The Commission stated that its role in the human rights dialogues was limited:
The Commission is not involved in setting the agenda or in
deciding on the strategy to be followed. While it feels free to make
recommendations – and has done so on an informal basis – it recognises that it
is up to the Executive agencies responsible for the Dialogues to set the agenda
and the strategy.[80]
2.80
While acknowledging its limited role in the dialogues, the Commission
highlighted its role as an independent statutory authority involved in the
dialogues, stating:
... the Executive Government has placed no conditions on the
involvement of the Commission. The Commission’s representatives at the
Dialogues have always felt free to make their views known and to participate
fully in the Dialogues. On occasion this has resulted in the Commission taking and
presenting to the Dialogue partners a view on Australian policy and practice or
on the desirability of changes in the Dialogue partner’s policy and practice
that differs from the views of the Executive Government. The Executive
Departments have not voiced criticism of the Commission for taking a different
position and, in fact, the delegation leaders seem to have found this approach
valuable in demonstrating to the Dialogue partners that pluralism is respected
in Australia.[81]
2.81
The Commission also put forward a preference to move towards a more
holistic partnership with AusAID as a way of providing:
...a more effective and cohesive service to AusAID in that we
would be able to respond more quickly and effectively to, for example, new and
ad hoc areas that might come up in AusAID’s areas of interest where we might be
able to provide support and capacity building, and the resources in terms of
expertise, knowledge and staff and so on that we provide to AusAID’s programs
could be moved around and shifted more quickly in response to particular areas
of emphasis that AusAID might want at any given point in time.[82]
Community perceptions of the roles of participating agencies
2.82
ACFID held the view that AG’s had a limited role and had not been ‘a key
player in these dialogues.’[83]
2.83
ACFID was also of the view that DFAT, AusAID, the Commission and NGOs
could take a more coordinated approach to their liaison and consultation role both
before and after the dialogues are held.[84]
2.84
In addition, ACFID proposed an expansion to the roles and obligations of
Australian Government agencies to include:
n Close communication
with the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID);
n Liaison with other
States engaged in human rights dialogues;
n Identification and
completion of specific follow-up activities after each dialogue session; and
n Public disclosure of
issues raised pertaining to Australia’s human rights record.[85]
2.85
The Baha’i Community called for a clearly defined set of roles and
obligations for the agencies that participate in the human rights dialogues,
adding that:
...they should be defined in a
way that clearly charges the parties with working to bring about real progress
in the observation of international human rights standards in their respective
countries. Moreover the participating agencies should also have clearly defined
responsibilities to evaluate the progress of dialogue in achieving such changes.[86]
2.86
The FDA recommended that the ‘role and obligations of participating
agencies should be modified to improve the transparency and accountability of
the dialogue process’.[87]
2.87
The CPVW recommended the roles and obligations of participating agencies
include aims.[88]
Additional roles for dialogue participants
2.88
Several groups that provided evidence to the inquiry also made suggestions
about additional roles for agencies involved in the human rights dialogue
process.
2.89
The Prisoners of Conscience Fund (PCF), the CPVW, and the VCA all
suggested that Australian officials visit political prisoners and their
families.[89]
2.90
Sydney PEN also suggested that Australian officials meet and talk to individuals
whom Australia has expressed concern about. Additionally, Sydney PEN suggested
conducting inspections of relevant facilities.[90]
2.91
DFAT noted that, while Australia does not have a specific policy to visit
political prisoners, it has undertaken visits in the past which were conducted
with the agreement of the relevant authority.[91]
Dialogue agendas
2.92
As noted above, DFAT arranges the agendas for the human rights dialogues
with dialogue partners. Both AG’s and the Commission prepare briefing material
on particular agenda items.
2.93
The Commission also has informal discussions and meetings with AusAID
and DFAT where it has an opportunity to comment informally on particular areas
that would be worthwhile as topics to be included in the dialogue agenda. The
Commission noted that many of their comments have been reflected in the
dialogue agendas.[92]
2.94
DFAT pointed out that ‘Ministerial correspondence on human rights
situations in dialogue countries also informs the agenda, list of cases of
concern and briefing.’[93]
2.95
In addition, DFAT also draws on submissions from NGOs and as well as ‘publications
of relevant human rights NGOs, for example Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch.’[94]
2.96
The agenda for the Australia-Vietnam human rights dialogue, in
particular, is developed in consultation between both countries with:
...the country hosting the Dialogue to propose an agenda (the
visiting delegation has an opportunity to suggest amendments to the proposed
agenda).[95]
2.97
DFAT also held the view that the agenda for Australia’s human rights
dialogues with China had evolved, noting that:
...in the last dialogue we were able for the first time to
talk about Tibet, Falun Gong, Shi Jiang, in a way that in the past China was
very reluctant to do.[96]
Agenda focus
2.98
The Committee considered whether the agenda for the human rights
dialogues should focus on individual cases or broader thematic human rights
concerns.
2.99
The ICJ agreed with the view that the focus should be on individual
cases rather than offering more broadly based criticism, stating:
It is a marginal issue, but I think, yes, it is. It at least
shows the Chinese we are willing to engage as a friend simply expressing
concerns rather than as a perpetual critic on the outside.[97]
2.100
ACFID stated that the focus should be balanced between individual cases
and the broader thematic or systemic approach.[98]
2.101
ACFID added that:
...we should really be looking for structural systemic human
rights reforms, and often the dialogues in our experience have been very
individual case lead. I am not sure if that is the best use of those dialogues.
You could do it through the post, so why do you have to do it in a bilateral
dialogue? But they often seem to be very symbolic and they add to the
ritualism. They bring up several issues with Indigenous Australia and the
mandatory detention of asylum seekers, and then we bring up a range of
individual cases and there is an impasse. So it leads to that very ritualistic
type of dialogue. We would be interested in seeing a slightly wider discussion
of human rights.[99]
2.102
DFAT stated that the dialogues focus on both individual cases as well as
broader human rights issues.[100]
Suggested additional themes for the agenda
2.103
A number of organisations that provided evidence to the inquiry suggested
topics to include in the dialogue agenda.
2.104
A common theme suggested by the organisations was for the Australian
delegation to make additional representations on individual cases of concern.[101]
2.105
Other topics to include on the dialogues’ agenda focused on the areas of:
n social and political
rights;[102]
n illegal organ
harvesting of political prisoners;[103]
n Vietnam’s penal code;[104]
n Indigenous languages
of ethnic minorities;[105]
n labour rights and
trade unions;[106]
n ethnic minority
rights for specific communities such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, Montagnards, Hmongs,
Khmer Krom;[107] and
n re-education through
labour.[108]
Human Rights Technical Cooperation Programs
2.106
The Commission’s submission provided a background on the HRTC program
noting:
Both of the human rights technical cooperation programs
operate under the framework of the Australian Government’s formal human rights
dialogue process with China and Vietnam. The programs are funded by the
Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) and implemented by the
Commission under a Record of Understanding between the Commission and AusAID.[109]
2.107
The Commission also highlighted that the next cycle of each program is
approved at the regular Dialogue sessions, but:
...where this is not practical
due to delays in the scheduling sessions, approval has been given
out-of-session though an exchange of letters between the Dialogue partners.[110]
2.108
The Commission commented that the choice of topics that Australia works
on with the HRTC programs partner agencies is based on a decision about:
...areas that are priorities for their work on human rights
where Australia has some useful expertise to offer and where they link in with
major reform programs in those countries that will give them some momentum.[111]
2.109
DFAT’s submission added:
The program provides a mechanism for funding practical
activities to promote human rights in line with the objectives of the human
rights dialogues. The HRTC programs support small-scale activities that are
intended to have a tangible impact on a targeted group of people. The programs
also generate links between Australian and Chinese or Vietnamese human rights
institutions.[112]
2.110
The Commission considered that the HRTC programs were good programs and
reasonably well managed but acknowledged that improvements could be made:
Whilst I consider the China and Vietnam technical cooperation
programs to be good programs and reasonably well managed, there is a lot of
scope for improving and strengthening them to have a stronger focus on outcomes
and better monitoring and evaluation to measure to those outcomes. That is what
we are working very closely on with AusAID at the moment.[113]
2.111
The Commission also believed that a strength of the HRTC programs is
that they are ‘low key’:
I think one of the strengths
of the human rights technical cooperation programs is that they are fairly
low-key programs, and, as a result of that, we find that the Chinese and
Vietnamese participants feel comfortable, knowing that they can open up and
have fairly candid discussions about issues.[114]
2.112
The Commission stated that the HRTC programs could be a valuable
mechanism for extending the participation of Australian and partner countries
agencies.[115]
2.113
The HRTC programs are valued at approximately A$3.7 million per annum.[116]
2.114
Table 1 and Table 2 of DFAT’s submission contains further information on
the activities funded under the HRTC programs from 2006-2011.[117]
2.115
The Commission, in its submission, also provided a list of some key
outcomes from the activities of the China and Vietnam HRTC Programs.[118]
Human Rights Technical Cooperation Program with China
2.116
The HRTC program with China, which commenced in 1998, was first agreed at
the inaugural Australia-China human rights dialogue ‘as an avenue for providing
practical capacity building for key Chinese agencies in areas relevant to human
rights protection.’[119]
2.117
HRTC activities in China focus on three priority theme areas: legal
reform; women’s and children’s rights; and ethnic minority rights.[120]
2.118
The Commission noted that ‘each activity is designed and implemented
through a cooperative venture between the Australian Human Rights Commission
and a particular Chinese organisation.’[121]
2.119
The Commission added that ‘Australian agencies and professionals from
the government and community sectors contribute technical expertise to the
program.’[122]
2.120
Chinese partner agencies include:
n Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (the lead counterpart organisation);
n All-China Women’s
Federation;
n Beijing Legal Aid
Organisation;
n Ministry of Civil
Affairs;
n Ministry of Justice;
n Ministry of Public
Security;
n National Population
and Family Planning Commission;
n State Ethnic Affairs
Commission;
n Supreme People’s
Prosecution Service;
n Supreme People’s
Court; and
n United Nations
Association of China.[123]
2.121
Programs are delivered through a number of methods including: ‘seminars
and workshops in China, study visits to Australia by Chinese delegations, short
work placements in Australian organisations and a small number of scholarships.’[124]
2.122
HRTC projects focus on ‘domestic violence prevention, reproductive
health rights, criminal justice procedures, humane treatment of detainees in
correctional facilities, as well as alternatives to detention.’[125]
2.123
Approximately $400,000 was spent on HRTC activities with China in 1997‑98.[126]
The budget for the HRTC program with China has increased considerably since the
program’s inception. ‘AusAID funding for the 2010-2011 program cycle was A$2.5
million.’[127]
2.124
AusAID funding for Australia’s aid program in China is estimated at
A$22.5 million for 2011–12, and the estimate for total Official Development
Assistance (ODA) for 2011–12 is A$35.7 million.[128]
Human Rights Technical Cooperation Program with Vietnam
2.125
The HRTC program with Vietnam commenced in 2006 and, like the HRTC
program with China, each activity is designed and implemented through a
cooperative venture between the Commission and a particular Vietnamese
organisation.[129]
2.126
Vietnamese partner agencies include:
n Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (the lead counterpart organisation);
n Ministry of Justice;
n Ministry of Public
Security;
n Supreme People’s
Court;
n Supreme People’s
Prosecution Service;
n Vietnam Lawyers’
Association; and
n Vietnam Women’s
Union.[130]
2.127
HRTC projects with Vietnam focus on ‘skills for conducting community
education on legal rights and responsibilities, human rights training for
lawyers, raising awareness of women’s rights, access to the court system and
administration of criminal justice.’[131]
2.128
AusAID funding for the 2010-2011 program cycle was A$1.2 million.[132]
2.129
AusAID’s ODA for Vietnam is estimated at A$137.9 million for 2011–12, which
consists of the country bilateral program (A$102.4 million); regional and
global AusAID-managed initiatives (A$25.7 million); and other Australian
Government departments (A$9.7 million).[133]
Review of the Technical Cooperation Programs
2.130
DFAT noted that an independent review of the HRTC programs was
undertaken in 2010-11 by ‘an international human rights expert (Paul Dalton)
and monitoring and evaluation specialists (Rick Davies and Martine Van de
Velde).’[134]
2.131
DFAT added:
In the case of China, the
review found that the majority of activities implemented in the past four years
have been well-coordinated, with careful forward planning, participation from
well-qualified experts, and good communication between the Australian Human
Rights Commission (AHRC) and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[135]
2.132
Some of the key principal recommendations from the review of the China
HRTC program included:
n The potential exists
to improve the quality of information flow to the human rights dialogue
participants about the HRTC program;
n Greater emphasis
needs to be placed on results rather than on activity-based output reporting,
including the provision of systematic impact evaluations at appropriate stages
throughout the implementation process by cooperating agencies and the AHRC;
n A financial
management review of the HRTC program should be undertaken with a view to
increasing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the program;
n There should also be
greater clarity in the next phase of the program on the respective roles and responsibilities
of AusAID, DFAT and the AHRC in providing strategic direction, ensuring
accountability for achieving results against objectives and engaging with
cooperating agencies; and
n The review team
recommends that the program should change to a three-year cycle. A new program
design should be developed through consultations between DFAT and AusAID, with
the opportunity for all program stakeholders to provide inputs.[136]
2.133
With regard to the review of the Vietnam HRTC programs, DFAT stated:
The review found that the Vietnam-Australia Human Rights
Technical Cooperation Program was making progress on its key objectives, and
has had a positive effect on relations between Vietnam and Australia. Critical
to achieving this progress has been the Government of Vietnam’s confidence in
the two Australian partner agencies, AusAID and the AHRC. Recommendations from
the review, which addressed issues such as program design, monitoring and
evaluation, and financial management, are being considered for incorporation
into the next phase of the China and Vietnam Human Rights Technical Cooperation
Programs.[137]
2.134
At the time of writing this report, the review of the Vietnam HRTC
program was not publicly available.
Community perceptions of the Technical Cooperation Programs
2.135
The ICJ commented that the technical cooperation programs were ‘not at
all widely recognised by the Australian community.’[138]
2.136
The Commission agreed, noting that there is little media interest in the
HRTC programs.[139]
2.137
The Council viewed the technical cooperation programs as an ‘increasingly
large component of the bilateral dialogue processes.’ While noting the inherent
value of the HRTC programs with China, the Council was of the view that the
program had the following limitations:
n they fail to address structural
systemic problems in China, such as the non-independence of the judiciary;
n they are designed to
address only the formal legal processes, rather than the arbitrary and
extra-legal processes (such as re-education through labour) which affect millions
of people in China; and
n there is a failure to
consult independent NGOs in their design, implementation, monitoring and
evaluation.[140]
2.138
The PCF alleged that foreign aid, like the HRTC programs, is not used
correctly but rather that Vietnamese government officials are the direct beneficiaries
of the grants.[141]
2.139
The CPVW recommended that the HRTC programs should ‘do some things that
benefit the people directly.’[142] They added that the
HRTC program should be used to ‘help true NGOs, rather than the likes of the Vietnam
Women’s Union or the VGCL [Vietnam General Confederation of Labour] or the
Vietnam Lawyers Association.’[143] They recommended
providing funding to the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam in particular.[144]
2.140
Block 8406 stated that the HRTC program was not that effective and did
not target major human rights issues such as freedom of speech, freedom to
assemble and demonstrate.[145]
Committee comment
2.141
The Committee acknowledges the value of Australia’s HRTC programs which
work toward improvements in the promotion and protection of human rights
through the sharing of best practice.
2.142
The Committee is particularly pleased to see programs that are focussed
on addressing key human rights issues such as: justice, women’s and children’s
rights, legal aid and rights, and domestic violence.
2.143
The Committee appreciates the Commission’s acceptance that there is room
to improve and strengthen the programs to have a stronger focus on outcomes, better
monitoring and evaluation.
2.144
The Committee suggests that, in addition to discussing the choice of
topics that Australia works on with the HRTC programs’ partner agencies,
consideration be given to consulting other government agencies, NGOs, peak
human rights organisations, and other relevant groups.
2.145
The Committee supports the continued funding and operation of the HRTC
programs.
Other issues
2.146
Although not specifically within the purview of the inquiry, ACFID
expressed the view that adequate staffing at DFAT and AusAID had been a
‘chronic problem over the years.’[146]
2.147
ACFID called for more resourcing for human rights work within DFAT and
AusAID generally.[147] ACFID added that DFAT
needed more consistent expertise, stating:
The idea is that DFAT likes to have generalists, which is a
good policy, and obviously they post people. But some areas need specialist
expertise—chemical weapons, human rights, ASEAN—so there has to be a balance.
For things like these, which are about long-term bilateral relationships with a
particular subject expertise, you do need a little bit of consistency in
staffing and strategy. But, yes, in the UK, Canada and almost everywhere I have
been, the state department or the relevant foreign affairs department has a
much stronger human rights section—also domestically.[148]
2.148
ACFID also highlighted the need for human rights training, stating that:
…if there were a strong human rights training and flavour in
technical expertise across the department that would be a very good thing. But
some of the human rights dialogues do need some knowledge of conventions, and
you do need a little bit of expertise to be able to engage in human rights
discussions—particularly in this bilateral.[149]
2.149
ACFID noted that DFAT has graduate training in human rights but
commented that everyone in the department should understand that there can be human
rights dimensions to other bilateral issues.[150]
2.150
DFAT stated that it had a dedicated human rights and Indigenous issues
section, which is comprised of five officers and a director. DFAT added that
the section works closely with the geographic areas of DFAT and mentioned that
Australia’s posts were also actively engaged.[151]
2.151
DFAT contested ACFID’s view of its institutional knowledge noting that it
helps maintain continuity in the human rights and Indigenous area by rotating staff
in and out often.[152]
2.152
DFAT added that it offers an introductory course on human rights for its
graduate recruits which it is looking to expand, stating:
Every year a number of graduate recruits come into the
department and the human rights course is part of their dedicated training program.
This year is the first time it has been run by the University of Sydney. We are
looking to expand it next year to include officers of the department more
broadly.[153]
Committee comment
2.153
At a public hearing, DFAT advised the Committee that its geographic
areas and posts are very closely involved in the human rights dialogues.[154]
2.154
As noted above, DFAT also advised that it currently only provides human
rights training for its graduate recruits. The Committee notes that staff in
Commonwealth government departments’ are employed in a number of different
ways, not just through graduate recruitment programs.
2.155
The Committee agrees with ACFID’s view that it would be good for DFAT to
have a strong human rights training and flavour in technical expertise across the
department.
2.156
Therefore, it is the Committee’s view that all relevant staff dealing
with human rights issues should have an appropriate grounding in human rights
principles. Having staff obtain a solid knowledge base in human rights enhances
the Australia Government’s efforts to take a multifaceted approach through the
promotion and protection of human rights in international, bilateral, regional,
and local fora.
2.157
As such, the Committee sees merit in extending DFAT and AGs current human
rights training program to all relevant staff.
Recommendation 3 |
| |
The Committee recommends that the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade and the Attorney General’s Department ensure that all relevant
staff receive human rights education and training. The Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade should also ensure that human rights monitoring is an
integral part of the duty statement for its diplomatic staff. |