This chapter considers the nature of the voting systems used for Federal House of Representatives and Senate elections. Specifically, it discusses the arguments surrounding the complexity of preferential voting systems and the impact of such systems on voting behaviour and electoral outcomes.

Introduction

The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (CEA) governs the requirements for voting in Federal Elections.

House of Representatives voting

In accordance with subsection 240(1) of the CEA, a valid vote for the House of Representatives is cast by:

1. writing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom the person votes as his or her first preference; and
2. writing the numbers 2, 3, 4 (and so on, as the case requires) in the squares opposite the names of all the remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of the person’s preference for them.

The numbers placed in the boxes on the ballot form must be consecutive, and must not repeat any number.¹ Further, no more than one square may be left blank, and only where this reflects the voter’s last preference.²

If a voter does not follow the requirements in section 240, the ballot paper will be informal, and the vote will not count, except in very specific circumstances.³

Senate voting

The processes used for voting for the Senate are different because of the different electorate structure. Rather than a number of candidates vying for one House of Representatives seat, a number of candidates compete for a number of vacancies (currently six for each State at a half-Senate election, or twelve in the case of a double dissolution election, and two for each Territory). Parties or groups of candidatescan request to be grouped on the Senate ballot paper⁴, where preferences automatically flow to the candidates in a group, in the order in which they are printed on the ballot paper.

Subsection 239(1) of the CEA states that a person may vote in a Senate election by:

1. writing the number 1 in the square opposite the name of the candidate for whom the person votes as his or her first preference; and
2. writing the numbers 2, 3, 4 (and so on, as the case requires) in the squares opposite the names of all the remaining candidates so as to indicate the order of the person’s preference for them.

Other provisions of the CEA, however, allow a valid vote to be cast above the line on the Senate ballot paper:

A vote may be marked on a ballot paper by writing the number 1 in a square (if any) printed on the ballot paper under subsection 211(5) or 211A(6).⁵

Where a voter has marked a tick or cross in a square printed on a ballot paper under subsection 211(5) or 211A (6), the voter shall be regarded as having written the number 1 in the square.⁶

Voters may vote for a political party or group by putting the number “1” in one box only above the line on the Senate ballot paper. Each box above the line represents a group of candidates. By casting a vote this way, voters indicate that they adopt the Group Voting Ticket that the party or group has lodged with the AEC, so all the preferences will be distributed according to the Group Voting Ticket.

The registration of groups for above-the-line voting requires each party to lodge with the AEC at least one Group Voting Ticket, which outlines the flow of preferences upon their party receiving a single vote above the line. Parties and groups may lodge more than one Group Voting Ticket, indicating different preference allocations.

Where an individual, in error, votes accurately both above and below the line on the Senate ballot paper, the below the line vote takes precedence and will be counted. If the below-the-line vote is informal, then the vote will be counted as formal above the line.

The preferential voting system

As outlined above, elections for both the Federal House of Representatives and the Senate are held under compulsory preferential voting systems. Compulsory preferential voting is sometimes referred to as “full preferential voting”.

Preferences on the House of Representatives ballot paper and in below-the-line voting for the Senate operate to ensure that the candidate who is successfully elected is the one who received the highest combined number of votes, both primary votes and those flowing from preferences. The difference between a preferential voting system and “first past the post” voting is that the flow of preferences ensures that a candidate cannot be elected without securing at least 50% of the total formal votes for an electorate. It is for this reason that it is argued the preferential voting system most accurately represents the will of the electorate.⁷

In the Senate, the flow of preferences for above-the-line voting works differently. Under the STV approach, parties are required to lodge at least one (but up to three) Group Voting Tickets with the AEC before an election. These Group Tickets state how preferences will flow for each party in the event that a voter votes “1” only above the line. Votes cast for a single party above the line flow to the candidates as they appear below the line on the ballot paper.

The Liberal Party and the Nation als are of the view that the current Group Voting Ticket arrangements in the Senate work well, and that voters can be adequately informed about the lodgement of preference flows, or they can choose to vote below the line to redirect their preferences elsewhere.⁸ The Liber al Party of Austr alia commented that its position was that:

lodged tickets for Senate elections work well. We seek no change to that… simplicity with regard to the Senate ticket is important. The current system has been in place for a number of elections, and we believe it has worked well. We see insufficient evidence at the moment to give us concern to argue for a change.⁹

Concerns about the preferential voting system

Over recent times, a number of concerns have been expressed about the operation of compulsory preferential voting systems. Key issues raised with the Committee in this context were:

• informal voting;
• false preferencing;
• dictated Senate preferencing;
• preference harvesting; and
• disadvantaged independents.

Informal voting

Some witnesses suggestedthat the current compulsory preferential voting system in both the House of Representatives and below the line in the Senate is related to a high incidence of informal votes.¹⁰

There has been a trend to increased informal voting in the House of Representatives over the past 20 years (see Table 1.5 in Chapter 1).¹¹ The level of informal voting in the Senate appears to have declined because of the increased prevalence of the above-the-line vote, which does not require the direction of preferences.

This section largely discusses House of Representatives voting, but these issues also have currency for below-the-line votes in the Senate.

The compulsory preferential voting system is considered a factor in informal voting because its application is inconsistent between the House of Representatives and the Senate, and also with some voting arrangements at State, Territory and local government levels.¹² The different arrangements are outlined in Table 9.1 below. The outcome is that not all voters know how to record their vote when they come to a Federal Election.

the ticket voting system applying in the Senate is what is causing people to vote just No. 1 in the lower house, because they are using the same voting system.¹⁵

Table 9.1 Voting systems for Australian parliaments

Source Australian and state electoral office websites¹⁶

There is also evidence of a higher incidence of voting “1” only on House of Representatives ballot papers in New South Wales and Queensland when compared with other states. ¹⁷ As outlined in Table 9.1 above, New South Wales and Queensland employ optional preferential voting systems for their state elections, where voters may vote only “1” if they choose to do so.

Thus, in Queensland and New South Wales, voters are required to use different voting systems for each Parliamentary chamber which they elect: compulsory preferential voting for the House of Representatives and below-the-line Senate voting; voting by placing a single digit “1” for above-the-line Senate voting; optional preferential voting for the State Legislative Assembly and (in New South Wales), a limited compulsory preferential voting for the Legislative Council. This is a recipe for confusion.

Given the disparity amongst voting systems, it is not surprising to see a relatively high level of informal voting in these states with systems that are different from those in Federal Elections. According to Mr Max Mathers, a Liberal Party booth worker with over 50 years' experience:

where you have different systems involved, they become used to one system and perhaps endeavour to apply that system subconsciously to the one which they are currently voting in, which may happen to be the wrong system and often in this case contributes to an informal vote.¹⁸

This high informal vote appears to occur in spite of attempts to clearly explain how to vote via material in the polling places and campaigns to educate voters in these states.¹⁹

This concerned the Committee as it suggests that confusion arising from the differences in voting systems may prevent some people from exercising the democratic right to vote, and have that vote counted.²⁰ The will of the electorate can be distorted by such unintentional informal voting, particularly in close elections.²¹

This, however, would be difficult to achieve as the New South Wales optional preferential system in the lower house is constitutionally entrenched and would require a referendum to make any change.²⁴ Further, as Professor Hughes²⁵ advised, it would be more likely that other states will try optional preferential voting before those states could be convinced to change their system.²⁶

False preferencing

Another often stated criticism of the compulsory preferenti al voting system is that it requires voters to vote for candidates even when they prefer not to record a vote against certain candidates.²⁷ This can be because they have not heard of a candidate, or they do not wish their vote to flow to certain candidates. Mr C Bayliss stated:

a significant cause of voting dissatisfaction, as any polling booth official can attest is the Commonwealth voting requirement of total ballot paper numbering, rather than optional preferential. Voters with strong, ideological feelings, object to having to preference parties, whose policies they dislike, in some cases intensely. This attitude is often expressed to polling booth officers.²⁸

Dictated Senate preferencing

the only way an elector can overcome a preference deal they disapprove of is to vote below the line. But parties offer no assistance in doing this, as how to vote cards for all parties only recommend an above the line vote.³⁰

Furthermore, one would expect that electors who do take a careful interest in preference allocation would be likely to be those who go to the trouble to vote below-the-line. The Group Voting Ticket system for above-the-line Senate voting lacks transparency, and results in electors ceding their preference allocation decisions to the political parties themselves.

The issues highlighted above suggest that people are ceding their preferences to the politic al parties without a true understanding of the impact of their vote on preferences,³⁴ resulting in a Senate voting system that does not necessarily reflect voter intentions. ³⁵ Mr A Green stated:

I think at the moment … the way the ticket voting system works means that there are serious questions about whether Senate elections are now reflecting the will of the electorate or a series of deals done in the background without the voters’ knowledge.³⁶

There is, however, a view that the STV system for voting above the line does not prevent voters from choosing their preferences. If a voter chooses to vote above the line, it is assumed that they are happy for their preferences to flow according to the voting ticket. If a voter is unhappy with the preference flow chosen by the party, they have the freedom to preference all candidates below the line.³⁷

Further, Professor Hughes advises that the current system for Senate elections is simple enough for most voters to understand, even if it does require voters to pass on their preference choice to their chosen political party.³⁸

Preference harvesting

As outlined above, when a voter votes only “1” above the line for the Senate, their preferences are determined according to the Group Voting Ticket of the parties.

The Group Voting Ticket system is susceptible to manipulation via a practice known as preference harvesting. Broadly speaking, this is a form of strategic behaviourwhere parties manoeuvre to keep preferences away from other parties, often the major parties, through arrangements with minor or micro parties. These deals often taken place between parties with little ideological affinity, with micro parties arranging preference deals with a number of more prominent parties in order to “harvest” their preferences as they are eliminated in the count.

for example, if a political party wants to change the flag – as a hypothetical illustration – they run a stooge party on ‘save the flag’ and get people who would vote against them to vote for them and then their ticket can be used to direct preferences to their own party. It is really fooling the voters into garnering votes. The voters, if they knew what was happening, would not vote for them.⁴¹

As well, it was alleged parties may engage in the practice of “assisting” the creation of minor parties, in order to harvest preferences from them.⁴² Even if this has not actually happened, there is the opportunity for it to occur under the present system.

There is, therefore, a general lack of understanding of how preference deals work in the Senate election. Mrs Susanna Flower stated:

a lot of people will just follow the card: they think, ‘Okay, that sounds good to me.’ A lot of people follow that without realising.⁴³

Complementing this view, Mr Peter Andrew stated:

it is all but impossible for even informed electors to juggle the complexities involved in working through the preferences of the minor parties and independent candidates.⁴⁴

Many voters may believe that following a voting ticket will ultimately assist a party from the same side of the political spectrum, or with similar policies, as their primary vote. This may not be the case because preference deals are based on electoral self-interest, where a party will receive certain preferences because it will assist a certain party to be elected, or cause another not to be elected.⁴⁵

‘above the line’ ticket voting for the Australian Senate is not living up to the justifications for its introduction in 1984. It was meant to be an efficient and easy way for voters to register their votes, but increasingly today leads to distortion of those very preferences.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the Group Voting Ticket system encourages manipulation of preference flows which may lead to outcomes which do not reflect the electors' intentions. In other words, it encourages parties to make deals, for strategic reasons, which results in their voters being committed to preference distributions of which they are unaware and would not knowingly endorse. The decision of the Family First Party in some states to favour a preference distribution to other minor parties which advocated policies radically at variance with Family First's declared core values, may be an example of this type of strategic behaviour, and its consequences.

Disadvantaged independents

The problems associated with above-the-line voting are compounded by the significant proportion of voters who choose to vote “1” only above the line, which has an effect on the election success of independent candidates.⁴⁹ The size of the Senate ballot paper arising from the number of Senate candidates arguably encourages voters to vote “1” above the line, as it is not easy to consecutively number every square below the line without making a mistake.⁵⁰ Such mistakes make a vote informal.⁵¹

There is also evidence that voters do not like completing preferences for every candidate below the line, which further disadvantages ungrouped independents. Mr A Green stated:

no logic or reason is attached to such an exclusion, it is simply a provision of the act that all preferences must be correct for any preference to count.⁵³

Possible options for change

This section deals with suggestions that have been made aimed at:

• reducing the informal vote; and
• improving voter engagement in the election system by allowing them to express their true voting preferences.

These options may also avoid some of the other difficulties in the current systems outlined above. Note that the options outlined below are not mutually exclusive, so consideration of a combination of these options may have merit.

Option 1: Consistent voting systems throughout Australia

Some are of the view that the Commonwealth and the States should work together to establish a common voting system nationwide, matching the compulsory preferential voting system for the House of Representatives and other lower houses throughout Australia.⁵⁴ Others suggest introducing optional preferential voting at both the State and Federal levels to achieve this desired consistency.⁵⁵

Option 2: Relaxing formality requirements in the Act

The incidence of informal voting could potentially be reduced through some relaxation of the overly strict formality requirements in the CEA governing House of Representatives. This would allow votes where the voter has made a genuine mistake to be included in the count, where currently such votes are classed as informal.⁵⁷

Similar changes could be made to the CEA to allow for ballots marked with a non-numerical indication (such as a tick or a cross, for example) also to be counted as formal.⁵⁸

Option 3: A savings provision

Another mechanism which could reduce the rate of informal voting is a savings provision (such as that currently employed in South Australia), which allows votes clearly cast in error to be included in the count.⁵⁹

This approach requires candidates to lodge at least one ticket of preferences (akin to the one lodged in the Senate) which allows certain informal votes to be “saved” and included in the count.⁶⁰ In South Australia, how-to-vote cards are posted in each polling booth, so voters are aware of how they can direct their preferences when voting for one party. Mr A Green stated:

basically, if someone has just voted No. 1 then the vote for that ballot paper will be saved and will default to the registered ticket of the party. A party cannot recommend that people just vote No. 1; it is not a way of encouraging people to just vote No. 1 and capture the preferences.⁶¹

The use of this system in the South Australian election increased the formal vote by four per cent compared with voting without the savings provision operating. This contributes to South Australia being the only Australian state where the lower house informal vote is lower than the upper house.⁶²

The benefit of this approach is that it provides a mechanism for turning an informal vote into a formal vote where the voter’s intention is clear. This system does not allow votes to be counted where their preferences cannot be counted, so the problems of an optional preferential system becoming a de facto “first past the post system” are not encountered.⁶³

The operation of this system is not widely advertised, which means that it is unlikely that voters will vote informally knowing that their vote will still count.⁶⁴ It is also not permitted to publish a how-to-vote card, which advocates voting only “1”, so people are not encouraged to vote informally (even though this may be very difficult to police).

This system, however, does raise some concerns. A savings provision effectively constructs a voter’s preferences, when if a voter knew about the operation of the system in “filling in” the empty preference boxes (which it appears they do not, as it is not widely advertised), they may have directed their preferences elsewhere.

Option 4: Optional preferential voting

Voting for the Federal House of Representatives and below the line on the Senate ballot requires voters to number every box if the vote is to be counted as formal. One commonly suggested solution to the problems associated with this voting system is to allow for optional preferential voting.⁶⁵

Optional preferential voting, as the name suggests, allows voters to only indicate those preferences they wish to give, rather than having to allocate a preference to every candidate in their electorate. Preferences are exhausted with the last preference expressed, so the onus would be on the voter to ensure they expressed all desired preferences. ⁶⁶

Disadvantages of optional preferential voting

One commonly cited disadvantage of an optional preferential voting system is that it has the potential to become a de facto “first past the post” system.⁶⁷ A “first past the post” system is where the candidate who receives the highest proportion of the primary vote is elected, even if this proportion is less than 50%. This is because candidates are entirely at the mercy of the voter and their decision whether or not to include preferences, so preferences can be quickly exhausted where a large number of voters choose to vote “1” only.

This is particularly problematic where a large number of candidates are contesting a seat. In such a circumstance, it would be possible for a candidate to be elected with only a very small proportion of the vote, which could leave the majority of the population unrepresented.⁶⁸

A potential feature of campaigns run under optional preferential systems is the encouragement of voting only “1”, when the option exists to express further preferences. This effectively encourages a result based on “first past the post”, as the number of preferences that can flow to other candidates is reduced when more people just vote “1”.⁶⁹ Whilst this is not illegal per se, it is seen by some as being undesirable.

The most significant issue in instances of a vote “1” only campaign is the higher level of informal voting which may result in subsequent federal elections. This may be because voters have become used to using the optional preferential system and do not realise that voting in a Federal Election uses a different system.

Mr A Green, however, argues that encouragement to voters not to direct their preferences to other candidates is just as valid as deliberate preference deals between political parties, which engineer election results that may not necessarily reflect the will of the electorate.⁷² Mr M Mathers stated:

I feel that [the strategy of encouraging people to only vote ‘1’ in state elections] has been a method of confusion, and it may well have been designed in that respect. But specifically it is because the system is different from that of other situations that you find that people have become confused. In particular, if you look at people, say, from Victoria, where they follow the firm preferential system right through, who then come to Queensland, where they do not have that system, they do certainly become confused and do not understand the reason for the differences. That is why, in my opinion, we had quite an increase in informal votes in the last federal election.⁷³

There are also concerns that encouraging people to vote “1” through a publication without placing any other preferences may constitute a misleading electoral publication under section 329 of the CEA.⁷⁴ Professor Hughes is of the view that whilst such a publication may be undesirable, it should be left to the discretion of the AEC to decide whether it encourages a single vote is misleading.⁷⁵

Objections about optional preferential voting becoming a de facto “first past the post” system can be addressed through the partial preferential variant of optional preferential voting. Under this arrangement, the voter is required to number a minimum number of preferences (say, three, for example), but can then choose whether they wish to complete the remainder of the ballot paper.⁷⁶ Mr Brian McRae stated:

if voters were only required to fill in a certain number of boxes to qualify for a formal vote, then this would encourage those informal voters to at least have some input, while at the same time give them the option of not giving a preference to someone they are totally opposed to. The question is; how many boxes to fill in, and I would suggest (3).⁷⁷

Other identified disadvantages associated with optional preferential voting include that major parties can no longer assume that preferences from parties on the same side of the political spectrum will automatically flow to them.⁷⁸ Mr Antony Green is of the opinion that it is unusual for a party on the left or right fringes to not direct their preferences to another party on the same side of the political spectrum; this can be thwarted under an optional preferential system if the major parties do not actively seek preference deals with other parties on the same side as them. Effectively, the optional preferential system gives parties the choice of not directing their preference anywhere.

Mr Michael Danby MP, however, had a contrary view:

it would be, in fact, to enhance the power of people further out to the right and further out to the left, which is one of the principal reasons that I do not favour optional preferential voting.⁷⁹

Optional preferential voting systems also tends to favour the candidate with the highest primary vote,⁸⁰ and there are suggestions that independent candidates have difficulty polling first via primary votes, with the majority of independents being elected via the flow of preferences.⁸¹

Benefits of optional preferential voting

The major benefit of optional preferential voting is the potential for reduction of error‑induced informal voting. It is easier to vote correctly if a voter is not required to record preferences for all candidates.⁸³ Under this system, the high incidence of informal votes for the Federal House of Representatives in New South Wales and Queensland would be reduced. This is because votes where only the first preference is expressed would be counted as formal.⁸⁴

This system would also allow Langer Style votes to be counted as formal.⁸⁵ This voting approach is where ballot papers requiring compulsory preferences are numbered non-consecutively, for example, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3. At present, such votes are informal, but under optional preferential voting, preferences accurately numbered could be distributed to the point of the error, thus increasing the formal vote.⁸⁶

This simplification in preferential voting should increase participation in the electoral system by allowing people to express their true intentions,⁸⁷ which could, in turn, encourage the election of more representative governments.

In response to claims that the optional preferential system creates a “first past the post” election result, supporters of this system argue that whilst this voting system can result in a candidate without majority support being elected, the same is possible under a compulsory preferential system, where parties manoeuvre their preferences to construct a majority.⁹⁰ This is because the party that is ranked third in an electorate is in a position to arrange a preference deal resulting in the candidate with the lower primary vote being elected. Mr Green stated:

the bronze medallist is determining who is winning gold and silver in every case.⁹¹

Further, Professor Hughes has undertaken analysis of election results from Queensland and New South Wales to measure the impact of optional preferential voting on election outcomes. His study reveals that in only one instance would there have been a different result under a compulsory preferential system.⁹² Anecdotal evidence also suggests that people who vote for minority parties in the New South Wales optional preferential system tend to number all their preferences anyway. This generally does not cause a “first past the post” result.⁹³

Other practical benefits of the adoption of optional preferential voting include removal of the need to decide preference distribution, a lesser need for electoral staff to educate voters on how to vote, easier scrutineering and counting of votes and it saves voter time.⁹⁴

Option 5: Above the line preferential voting in the Senate

people should be able to allocate their preferences above the line or below the line. It should be compulsory preferential but it can be above the line or below the line. You would recall how many … got lost numbering between one and 70 on the old Senate tickets in the early 1980s. If you gave people the option of voting above the line and numbering the boxes with their party preference I think that would be a reasonable compromise.⁹⁶

The Festival of Light stated:

above-the-line voting [is] a simple, achievable compromise that is a workable solution and it eliminates all the problems associated with ticket voting.⁹⁷

If preferential voting was introduced for above-the-line voting in the Senate, section 168 of the CEA would have to be amended to automatically allocate an above-the-line voting square upon a request to the AEC for grouping under this section.⁹⁸

Table 9.2, overleaf, outlines the possible combination of voting systems for the Senate. Discussion of the components of these options follows.

Disadvantages of preferential voting above the line

The introduction of compulsory preferential voting above the line has the potential for increased complexity and informality when compared with the existing STV system. The requirement to complete more voting boxes above the line would result in increased opportunity for mistakes, and would also require voters to express preferences for parties for whom they have no interest in voting (the optional preferential voting system does not encounter this problem).⁹⁹

The introduction of compulsory preferential above-the-line voting in the Senate could also act to disadvantage minor parties and independent candidates in a variety of ways.¹⁰⁰

On the other hand, some witnesses believe that the people who would exercise their preference choice would be more likely to vote below the line, so it is unlikely that minor parties will be dramatically disadvantaged by this option.¹⁰² It is notable that the principal minor party which addressed this issue in its submission to the Committee, the Australian Greens, supported compulsory preferential above-the-line voting.¹⁰³

The Festival of Light believes that any increased complexity in Senate voting arising from the introduction of this system would be minimal, as the Senate voting mechanism would simply reflect what voters are required to do when voting for the House of Representatives.¹⁰⁴ It is likely that the registered parties entitled to an above-the-line voting box on the Senate ballot will largely reflect the average number of individual candidates standing for the House. While a higher number of independent, ungrouped candidates do stand for the Senate, unless these individuals have the standing to be a registered party, they would not enter the equation of above-the-line voting.

The Electoral Reform Society advocates the abolition of above-the-line voting for the Senate, with optional preferential voting below the line being the only option for voters.¹⁰⁵ This option does not appear to have widespread support.

Benefits of preferential voting above the line

Above-the-line preferential voting would remove some of the existing confusion about how preference deals on group voting tickets affect the election outcome. Voters would be in a better position to know where their votes are going because they would have the capacity to control where their preferences flow without having to resort to completing the below-the-line section of the ballot paper.¹⁰⁶

Some commentators feel that if a voter chooses to vote above the line, then they should be required to provide a preference for every group.¹⁰⁷ Under this option, the power of the Group Voting Ticket would be removed and people would be forced to direct their preferences according to either their own desires or according to the party’s how-to-vote card.¹⁰⁸ This compulsory preferential approach would also avoid the problems associated with the high level of exhausted preferences under optional preferential voting in New South Wales.¹⁰⁹

More importantly, compulsory preferential voting above-the-line would significantly reduce the capacity of parties to manipulate or “game” the system by making strategic deals of which the electorate, for all practical purposes, is unaware, and of which their own voters may not approve. It would, in the Committee’s view, considerably advance the value of transparency, without causing undue complexity.

Compulsory preference voting above the line, and the subsequent abolition of Group Voting Tickets, would also remove the distortion of election results caused by preference harvesting. The Festival of Light stated:

corruption of the Senate election process by stooge parties and candidates could be eliminated by removing preference tickets and requiring voters to indicate their own preferences.¹¹⁰

This option is supported by the Greens, as evidenced by Senator Bob Brown’s proposed Bill to create compulsory preferential voting above the line.¹¹¹ This approach would avoid the exhaustion of preferences apparent in the New South Wales system which creates the impression of a “first past the post” system. This system could require the provision for voters to make up to a small number of mistakes in their preference ordering without invalidating their vote.¹¹²

we were concerned about the level of confusion in the last election that arose from the way in which preferential deals affected the outcome in ways that people who voted would probably never have anticipated. It is an issue that we think needs to be resolved to enable to electoral process to be more transparent, so we would encourage a move to something in the order of an above-the-line preferential voting system.¹¹⁴

Either the optional or compulsory preferential system would arguably improve the correlation between voter intentions and the final election of candidates when compared with current systems.¹¹⁵

Option 6: Ticket voting in the House of Representatives

Another possible option for reducing voting complexity in the House would be to introduce ticket voting, where people could simply vote “1” for their preferred party, and rely on the party preferences as outlined in their voting tickets, or choose to number candidates individually.¹¹⁶

This would mirror the system applied in the Senate, so would potentially reduce the level of informal voting caused by confusion about the two Federal voting systems. It would also be physically manageable as fewer candidates would be on each ballot paper.¹¹⁷

This system, however, will be difficult to implement as there are not generally groups of candidates running in the House.¹¹⁸ This means the ballot paper would have one column with the parties and the other with the candidates, and would not be entirely consistent with the Senate ballot paper.¹¹⁹

Further, Professor Hughes suggests that whilst there may be some merit in introducing ticket voting in the House, optional preferential voting would be a better option to attempt to reduce the informal vote.¹²⁰

Option 7: Limited number of possible preferences

Mr A Green feels that another mechanism that would alleviate the existing problems in the Senate voting system would be to retain the current single above-the-line vote, but impose a limit on the number of other parties that a single party can direct their preferences to.¹²¹ This would make it more difficult for parties to enter into complex strategic preference deals and would prevent preference harvesting. Mr A Green stated:

the standard method of voting in the Senate is that you vote for the candidates in the order you want to see elected. My argument against ticket voting as it applies at the moment under compulsory preferential voting is that parties do not have to behave that way. They can deal and gamble on the way preferences work, and that is what is distorting the system. The voters have got no say in this.¹²²

The best solution, according to Mr Green, would be to combine above-the-line preference voting, with limitations placed on the number of parties that can receive preferences on ticket votes. This option would mean that if a voter were to make a mistake in the numbering of their preferences above the line, the vote would still be counted as it could default back to the voting ticket for the intended preferences.¹²³

Option 8: Registration of political parties

Independent of any changes made to voting systems in the Federal House of Representatives and the Senate, potential limitations on the number of candidates standing for election is an important electoral issue. The increasing number of political parties standing for the Senate appears to be closely related to some problems identified with the ballot paper for the Senate.

This problem could be avoided through improved mechanisms to limit the number of candidates and parties in a single electorate. There could arguably, therefore, be some tightening of requirements for registration as a political party.¹²⁶

More stringent requirements on party registration would also have the benefit of excluding so-called “stooge” parties from adding to the complexity of the above-the-line vote for the Senate.

Professor Hughes, however, expresses the converse view based on an analysis of the informal vote in the New South Wales and Queensland in the 2004 Federal Election. He feels that possible methods for discouraging candidacy (such as limitations on registration as a political party) are unlikely to reduce informality as much as would optional preferential voting.¹²⁷

Option 9: Improved pre-election advertising

A number of submissions provided to the Inquiry suggested that the rate of informal voting could be reduced through more effective advertising about how to vote in federal elections. ¹²⁸ Specifically, attention could be drawn to the distinction between the different systems in the House and in the Senate. Further, a concerted campaign could be run in New South Wales and Queensland to highlight the differences between their State systems and the Federal system. Mr McRae stated:

the television advertisements shown before the previous election encouraging all voters to have their say is a good idea. This however needs to be continued on a semi permanent basis with an emphasis on how the system works, and the basic philosophy behind the preferential system of voting.¹²⁹

The Liberal Party of Australia stated:

the absolutely critical need for a public information campaign on the operation of preferential voting and about the importance of this campaign, particularly in those states where optional preferential voting is conducted for state elections and for local government elections.¹³⁰

The Committee’s view

Having regard to the foregoing consideration, and in particular the importance of the principle of transparency, the Government members and Senator Murray have concluded that compulsory above-the-line preferential voting should be introduced for Senate elections.