This chapter examines the history, arguments in favour of, and options for, a shift to four-year terms for the Federal House of Representatives. There have been a number of detailed publications on the history of the issue of four year terms. Four-Year Terms for the House of Representatives? (September 2003) by Scott Bennett of the Parliamentary Library provides a comprehensive overview, and is regularly referred to throughout this chapter.

Introduction

The Constitution provides that terms for the House of Representatives continue for a maximum of three years from the first meeting of the House subsequent to an election. The House may also be dissolved sooner than the three-year term by the Governor General. ¹ This means that a Federal Election for the House of Representatives may be called at any time in the three-year period following the first sitting of the House.

There have been almost continuous calls over recent years for reconsideration of the appropriateness of this three-year maximum term for the efficient governance of the country. Specifically, the question has been often asked whether the term of the House of Representatives could be extended to four years.

Recent calls for this extension of the parliamentary term have attracted widespread and cross-party support. ²

Any change to the term of the House will, most likely, necessitate amendment to the existing terms for the Senate. This raises a number of complex issues, which are outlined later in this chapter.

Finally, this issue is further complicated by the need to amend the Constitution in order to change the duration of the House of Representatives. There are also other electoral issues that would be affected by the introduction of a longer term. These matters are also discussed throughout the chapter.

History

The issue of parliamentary terms has been on the national agenda since the first Constitutional Convention in 1891. Since that time, the question of the appropriateness of the three-year House of Representatives term has been asked in various public forums no less than 12 times. ³

The Constitutional conventions

The colonies initially had five-year parliamentary terms, which they inherited from the British parliamentary system. By the 1890s, however, the colonies had moved to three-year terms, with only Western Australia having a four-year term.

Not surprisingly, therefore, the various draft constitution bills throughout the 1890s showed a clear preference for three-year terms.

The Western Australia Premier and Legislative Assembly also argued strongly in favour of the four-year term throughout the Federation Conference, citing a belief that the three-year system was too short. ⁴

The four–year term proposal, however, was defeated during debate in the Australasian Federal Convention in April 1897, and the three-year House of Representatives term became enshrined in the Constitution in 1900. ⁵ This decision was arguably influenced by a desire to harmonise the House terms with the already settled six-year term of the Senate, rather than by any serious objection to four-year terms in principle.

This decision ensured consistency with the three-year terms of the states at the time.

The original aim of consistency has now been lost. All of the States and Territories (with the exception of Queensland which has a unicameral Parliament) have now moved to four-year terms.

The original consistency argument therefore now demands a shift to four-year federal terms to align with the states. ⁶

Further reviews of parliamentary terms

There have been numerous calls to increase the House of Representatives term since 1900 in a wide range of forums.

In more recent times, Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters has given its unanimous support to the idea of four-year terms in the House of Representatives via its investigations into the 1996, 1998 and 2001 Federal Elections. ⁹

Further, both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have been open to review of the length of parliamentary terms. Prime Minister Howard stated that he thought it “a good idea to have a longer period of time to deal with medium and long term issues”. ¹⁰

Past attempts to change parliamentary terms

In 1983, the four-year term option was again recommended at an Adelaide session of the Australian Constitutional Convention. ¹¹ The Commonwealth Parliament passed the necessary legislation (Constitution Alteration [Simultaneous Elections] Act 1983) to bring this change to a referendum in February 1984. ¹²

While there was widespread community support for this change, a difference of opinion between the Hawke Government and the Senate of the day led to the referendum being delayed indefinitely. ¹³

The proposal to increase the House of Representatives term from three years to four years has, therefore, only been presented to the electorate on one occasion in 1988, where it was defeated with the lowest ‘YES’ vote in any referenda since 1900. ¹⁴

While there appeared to be significant and widespread community support for an increased House term, the 1988 proposal was combined with other more contentious proposals (including the reduction of Senate terms to four years) without the option for voters to choose ‘YES’ for only one element of the package.¹⁵

It is therefore arguable that the “NO” vote in this referendum did not reflect the true feelings of the electorate, and so does not preclude future support for the extension of the House of Representatives term.

Length of parliaments since Federation

The primary factor which determines the length of the House of Representatives term is the Governor General’s discretion to call elections any time in that three-year period, arguably when it is politically judicious to do so.

The study “Four-Year Terms for the House of Representatives?” contains a comprehensive analysis of the length of House of Representatives terms of 38 completed parliaments between 1901 and 2003. It shows that, as a result of the operation of the Prime Minister’s discretion, parliaments have ranged from under one year to over three years, with an average length of 30.7 months, or 2.5 years per parliament. ¹⁶

Whilst that research may indicate that parliamentary terms have been shortening over the long term, the experience of elections in the 1990s reve al s an average parliament length of 34.5 months, ¹⁷ so there is no discernible trend in the time between elections.

Comparison with other systems

A comparison between Federal parliamentary terms reveals some disparity with jurisdictions throughout Australia and other bicameral systems throughout the world. Generally speaking, three-year terms are not the norm, with some jurisdictions adopting either four-year or five-year terms.

There is also some difference arising from whether the term is a “maximum term” (where an election must be called before the expiration of this term) or a “fixed term” (where the election is fixed on a certain date for the future).

The following sections outline current practice in both Australian States and Territories and overseas.

Australian States and Territories

There has been a recent trend towards four-year terms in State lower houses, with only Queensland and the Commonwealth House of Representatives retaining three-year terms. Responding to recent calls to extend the Queensland parliamentary term to four years, the Queensland Premier, the Hon. Mr Peter Beattie MP, stated that he would prefer that any change to the state's system occur in conjunction with amendments at the Federal level. ¹⁸

As illustrated in Table 7.1, below, not all Australian jurisdictions employ fixed parliamentary terms.

Table 7.1 Parliamentary terms: Australian lower house terms

Source: Adapted from Bennett S., " Four-Year Terms for the House of Representatives?", September 2003, and Sawer M and Kelly N, ‘Parliamentary Terms’, Democratic Audit of Australia , February 2005, ²⁰

Overseas jurisdictions

A significant majority of democratic jurisdictions throughout the world employ either four-year or five-year terms for the lower houses of their parliaments, with just over half having a parliamentary term of five years.

Table 7.2 summarises term durations for countries which, like Australia , employ a bicameral system for their national government. The United Kingdom ’s parliamentary system, the model for the Australian Federal electoral system, employs a maximum term of five years.

Table 7.2 Parliamentary terms: International lower house terms (bicameral systems only)

Source Inter-Parliamentary Union ²¹

Constitutional requirements for parliamentary terms

Senator Andrew Murray pointed out that the introduction of a fixed three-year term for the House of Representatives may be possible via legislative change, rather than requiring a referendum. ²²

Section 7 of the Constitution provides that Senators will be chosen for a term of six years, with the places of senators becoming vacant at the expiration of six years from the beginning of the term of service. The terms of half of the senators expire every three years, so an election for the vacancies must occur within a year prior to the places becoming vacant. ²³

Table 7.3 Parliamentary terms: Australian upper house terms

Note that sections 43 and 54 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (CEA) require that an election of Senators and members of the House of Representatives for each Territory must be held at the same time as each general election. Senators from the Territories, therefore, serve only a three-year term.

Any attempt to change the Senate term, therefore, would also require constitutional amendment via a referendum.

Finally, the Constitution also provides mechanisms where the Senate twice rejects or fails to pass a bill passed by the House of Representatives within a three-month period. If this occurs, the Governor General may dissolve the Senate and the House of Representatives simultaneously, but not within six months before the next general election is due. ²⁴

If a bill is rejected or remains unpassed after such a dissolution, the Governor General may convene a joint sitting of the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. If an absolute majority of members of both Houses affirm the bill, it is then taken to be duly passed by both Houses of Parliament. ²⁵

As discussed below, a number of commentators have suggested amendment to the double dissolution provisions in the Constitution. Such a change would also require a referendum to become effective.

Arguments in favour of a four-year parliamentary term

In the earliest discussions about the length of the term of the House of Representatives, the three-year term was felt to be inadequate considering the large area of the country and some electorates and the large number of important issues confronting the young Parliament.

These concerns have largely evaporated with the passage of time, but one significant argument against the three-year term remains: the three-year period is seen as providing insufficient time between electoral contests. ²⁶

Advantages of longer terms

The Committee reviewed a range of opinions supporting a move to a longer term for the House of Representatives:

• improved policy-making;
• increased business confidence;
• reduced cost of elections;
• improved debate; and
• voter dislike of frequent elections.

Improved policy-making

Mr Tony Smith MP expressed a common argument throughout the debate in favour of longer parliamentary terms:

Government would gain a greater capacity to implement policies with a focus on the longer-term issues facing the nation over the shorter-term electoral considerations. ²⁷

It is thought that a government spends the first twelve months of their term settling in and only starts taking significant policy steps in the second year, before attention focuses on the election campaign in the third year. ²⁸

It is for this reason that governments in short-term systems are accused of focusing on making politically expedient decisions during their term, rather than pursuing policy that is in the national interest. A four-year term would potentially allow governments the extra time required to make the difficult policy decisions, without politics being the primary driver.

In the United States , the term of the government (namely the President), accords with international norms. The President is elected for a four-year fixed term with a pre-set election date.

There is, however, a contrary view that the shorter the parliamentary term, the greater the motivation for prompt legislative change. Further, there is nothing to say that the extension of the term by one year will ensure the same government is in power when one of their reforms is implemented. The shift to a longer term, according to this view, should not demonstrably improve the policy making activities of any given government. ³⁰

On a related point, Jim Snow (former Member of the House of Representatives) believes that the brevity of the three-year period means that members cannot effectively represent their electorate. ³¹ The majority of this time may be taken up with local campaigning, rather than agitating for solutions to long term problems in their local electorate.

Increased business confidence

The private sector has long complained that the short Federal election cycle has a negative impact on long term business planning, and therefore the national economy. ³² The evidence commonly used to support this claim is that retail sales tend to drop in the period leading up to an election as people become more cautious about their spending.

Some claim, however, that this criticism from industry may be motivated by a disinclination to lobby the political party in power. ³⁵

Reduced cost of elections

Perhaps the most tangible benefit identified about the introduction of a longer parliamentary term is the reduction of costs associated with holding less frequent elections. Mr Michael Wilson stated: ³⁶

The longer the period between elections, the greater the saving for the taxpayers forced to foot the election bill. ³⁷

The cost of the 2004 Federal Election was approximately $117 million (Table 1.10). Averaged over the current expected three-year term this equates to $39 million. Were the term of the House of Representatives to be extended to four years, the per annum cost would drop to approximately $29 million, effectively drop by up to 25 per cent.

Note, however, that for this benefit to be realised, the election cycle for the Senate must also fit into an expanded cycle (for example, by having four-or eight-year terms). This issue is discussed in further detail below.

Improved debate

The Australian Constitutional Convention in 1982 raised one, perhaps more tenuous, benefit of a longer period between elections: ³⁸ greater time between elections could allow a greater chance for a genuinely cross-party discussion of policy issues without the spectre of the election hanging over discussions. This, arguably, would raise the standard of political debate in this country.

Voter dislike of frequent elections

A small number of commentators believe that Australians show a marked dislike for frequent elections, perhaps linked to distaste for the highly adversarial nature of Australian party politics. ³⁹

There is a view in the general community that once a government has been elected, it should focus on the business of governing the country, rather than being concerned by an impending election. This might be alleviated by fewer elections under four-year terms, where the government could focus on making mid and long-term policy decisions rather than simply focusing on what may be politically expedient.

Nevertheless, a number of arguments against changing the existing three-year term were put to the Committee. ⁴⁰ The most commonly cited reason was that any attempt to extend the life of a Parliament offends the principles of democracy.

The historian Geoffrey Blainey argued that lengthening the parliamentary term would reduce the right of the Australian electorate to dismiss an incompetent or underperforming government at the earliest possible opportunity. ⁴¹

The Committee’s view

As Table 7.2 showed, more countries with bicameral systems have five-year parliamentary terms than any other length of term. As a result, some have suggested that the Commonwealth consider extending the federal parliamentary term to five years. The introduction of a five-year term could have significant ramifications for the operation of the Senate, which is discussed in further detail below.

Independent of the implications for the Senate, there were, however, pragmatic reasons for pursuing a four-year term.

Advantages of a four-year term

When examining the option of a four year period two factors assume importance:

• electoral consistency across jurisdiction; and
• voter acceptance.

Electoral consistency across jurisdictions

As shown in Table 7.1 above, all Australian lower houses, apart from the Commonwealth House of Representatives and the Queensland Legislative Assembly, have a term of four years. Were the term of the House of Representatives to change to four years, it would be consistent with other election cycles throughout the country.

Voter acceptance

It has been argued that the shift from three-year to five-year terms may be too great for the electorate to accept, even if they would potentially provide greater stability and efficiency for government. ⁴² This view is also supported on the grounds that a five-year term could lead to a ten-year Senate term (on the presumption that the Senate term would be twice the length of the House term), which could be unpalatable to the electorate. ⁴³

The Committee’s view

The Committee concluded that a four-year term was appropriate as a compromise between the overly short three-year term and the dramatic change associated with a five-year term. This is particularly important in light of the fact that voters are comfortable with four-year terms in the States, so a change to four-year terms in the Federal sphere would not represent a significant change for voters.

A fixed term

Further, members of the business community are in favour of fixed term elections as they provide a more certain environment within which to make long term business decisions. ⁴⁵ The introduction of fixed terms would mean that business were not in ‘an electoral cycle of uncertainty every two or so years’. ⁴⁶

There are, however, a number of issues associated with fixed terms that arguably preclude its successful operation in the Australian Federal system.

Most importantly, fixed terms are often supported because it is argued that they minimise the opportunity for political manoeuvring.

A shift to a fully fixed term Federal Parliament in Australia would change the character of the Parliament.

It is also argued that fixed term elections could help reduce the cost of campaigning, because there would be a clearly defined period for campaigning. ⁴⁷ here are suggestions, however, that flexible election dates result in shorter and cheaper election campaigns. ⁴⁸ For example, the final year of the fixed Presidential term in the United States system appears to be characterised by significant formal campaigning for a long period of time. This is in contrast to the Australian experience, where formal election campaigning does not commence until the election is called, allowing only six weeks of intensive campaigning.

The Committee’s view

The Committee therefore decided to consider in detail only those options that it sees as feasible in the current climate and capable of achieving broad community support. ⁴⁹ In doing this, the Committee sought options which were simple to understand and would not require a major change to implement.

Potential House terms

The options the Committee believes likely to achieve widespread support are:

• House Option 1 : increase the maximum term for the House of Representatives to four years, retaining the existing power for the Prime Minister to call an election at any point before the expiration of that period; and
• House Option 2 : increase the maximum term for the House to four years, but introduce a fixed three-year period where an election could not be called until the third anniversary of the first sitting date of the House of Representatives had passed, except where there is a constitutional crisis. ⁵⁰ This hybrid option would retain flexibility for the Prime Minister to call an election at any time in the fourth year, consistent with Westminster conventions, while also introducing three years of certainty to the parliamentary term. ⁵¹

House Option 1

The advantage of an extension of the current three-year maximum term to four years is that the election process would be largely similar to existing processes. The public would know that discussions about the Federal Election would generally start at some point in the fourth year of the term, so even though more time would pass between elections, the lead up to the calling of an election would remain the same. The Prime Minister would be able to call on the electorate at any time within this four-year period, retaining a key element of the current system.

House Option 2

This model has the same benefits as outlined for House Option 1, but would, in fact, provide a higher level of certainty around when an election could take place. Again, the Prime Minister would retain the power to call an election before the expiration of the four-year period, but there would also be increased stability of government as an election would not be possible in the first three years of the term. This limits the uncertainties attached to an indefinite campaigning period to only the final of the four years. ⁵²

This option would provide more certainty than the current maximum term without the restrictiveness of the fixed term option.

Constitutional ramifications

The two options outlined above would require a referendum to amend section 28 of the Constitution to extend the maximum term of the House of Representatives to four years. It is worth noting that the complexity and history of the referendum process could prevent this reform coming to fruition. In addition to the Government securing the support of the opposition, ⁵³ a majority of states must vote ‘YES’ to any proposal to change the parliamentary term.

One option in the current political climate, therefore, would be to undertake any change in two distinct stages:

• hold the referendum to give effect to the constitutional change at the next Federal Election for the 42 P nd P Parliament (which is due by January 2008); but
• delay the introduction of the longer parliamentary term until the commencement of the 43 P rd P Parliament in 2010. ⁵⁵

Impact on the operation of Senate terms

The term for Senators is a fixed term of six years, and runs from 1 July to 30 June six years later. The Governor General, however, may dissolve the Senate in the circumstances outlined in section 57 of the Constitution.

Working on the presumption that either of the options for the House of Representatives term above is implemented, and that change to the Senate is necessary as a result to keep election timetables in step and to avoid unnecessary confusion amongst the electorate, there are a number of options for the length of the term of the Senate. ⁵⁶

Note that the term of Senators from the Territories is only three years long, as mentioned above. ⁵⁷ This means that any proposal to change the length of the Senate term should take into account the length of this distinct Senate term and whether any amendment to the CEA is required.

Potential Senate terms

As with the length and character of the term for the House of Representatives, a number of possible models have been suggested for application to the Senate. These range in length from four to eight years and can be either fixed or maximum terms. Some of these models are discussed below.

Some have argued that a six-year maximum term, regardless of the length of the House of Representatives term, would al low the Senate to stand al one and have a higher public profile: ⁵⁸ Madden stated:

[r]emoving the Senate electoral race from the partisan prime ministerial election process would help to focus more attention on individual Senate candidates rather than political parties. This would in turn help to increase the independence and prestige of the Senate and ultimately, its effectiveness. ⁵⁹

Others suggest a maximum four-year term, where the Senate and the House of Representatives would have identical terms, and all seats in the Senate would be vacated at the same time as the House. This model would have the advantage of allowing the composition of the Senate to more accurately reflect the views of the electorate. ⁶⁰

The six-year model would result in a higher number of elections, as simultaneity would be rare if the House had four-year terms. Further, the existing difficulty associated with a delay between an election and the commencement of the Senate term would be exacerbated—where the House of Representatives would be placed in the unenviable position of having to wait until an election subsequent to the first sitting of a new Parliament to start enacting their mandate. ⁶¹

Under a four-year model, if the current half-Senate election system were retained, the Australian public would be required to vote at a Federal Election every two years. ⁶² This would cause a dramatic increase in the number of elections held, when one of the benefits, however, of shifting to a four-year term for the House of Representatives is that there would be fewer elections, not more. TP PT In order to realise this benefit it is likely, therefore, that simultaneous elections would be held, meaning the end of the half-Senate election and its associated benefits.

If the House term is extended to a four-year maximum term via either option outlined above, there are, therefore, only two plausible options for amending the Senate term, regardless of whether there is a fixed component. Both of these options would require a referendum to amend the Constitution to take effect. These are:

• Senate Option 1 : increase the fixed term of the Senate to eight years, being from 1 July to 30 June eight years later;
• Senate Option 2 : increase the term for the Senate so it is the length of two House terms, with half-Senate elections simultaneous with House of Representatives elections. This option would remove the fixed-term component, so the precise length of this term would not be known until an election was called.

Senate Option 1

This option would increase the existing six-year maximum term to an eight-year fixed term. ⁶³ The benefit of this system is that it essentially maintains the existing arrangements with simply an extension of time, as the Senate has traditionally been a fixed-term body. This may make this option more palatable to commentators concerned about the powers of the Senate. ⁶⁴

Voter opposition may act as an obstacle to the introduction of eight-year terms for Senators: ⁶⁵ a move to extend the Senate term could be seen as self-serving by the general public. ⁶⁶ Further, an eight-year term can raise issues of the currency of the mandate issued by the electorate to the Senate. ⁶⁷ However, even greater criticism is likely to be raised at what would effectively be a double dissolution every four years.

Any discussion of the longer House of Representatives terms raises the important question of how such terms would be coordinated with Senate elections. Simultaneous elections are not a Constitutional requirement, but they are cost effective and administratively more efficient. Only six of the 40 House of Representatives elections have been held alone, and the last was over 30 years ago in 1972. The Australian experience has therefore been that the three-year House of Representatives/six-year Senate model makes it relatively easy to hold elections for both houses on the same day.

If the House of Representatives terms became four years with no alteration to the Senate terms it would be necessary, as a matter of practicality, to extend the duration of Senate terms to maintain the synchronicity of half-Senate and House of Representative elections.

In addition, Ms Robin Banks , Chief Executive Officer of the Public Interest Advocacy Centre stated:

to the extent that people are aware that government is created in the lower house—the House of Representatives—and that the Senate’s role is, while important, limited, what is more important is to create an effective mechanism to enable governments to govern for longer and keep us out of the electoral cycle for longer. It will not necessarily be seen as such a disastrous outcome to have people for eight years in the Senate. While…eight years will ring alarm bells for some people, a significant percentage of the population, through awareness that in effect government is the lower house, will be more concerned to give that stability to government than be concerned about the way the Senate operates. ⁶⁸

It is also questionable whether the major parties would support a situation where a Senator from a minor party would be able to hold a seat in the Senate for such a long time, even though they had only received a very small share of the vote: this situation arose after the 1999 New South Wales election. ⁶⁹ The electorate, too, might have similar qualms.

A further disadvantage of this option is that the current difficulties associated with a delay between the election and the commencement of the Senate term would continue. In the 2004 Federal Election, for example, new Senators were elected on 9 October 2004 , but had to wait until 1 July 2005 to take their seats to give the Government a majority in the Senate. This meant that the Government could not act to implement its legislative program for eight months after they received the electoral mandate to do so.

Senate Option 2

This option would extend the term of the Senate to equal the length of two terms of the House of Representatives. In practice, this would result in the Senate term being somewhere between six and eight years long. Elections would be simultaneous, meaning that a half‑Senate election would be held at the same time as every House of Representatives election. The Senate would, therefore, retain its current continuity through the life of two Parliaments.

If the first three-years of the House term were fixed, neither the Prime Minister nor the Senate could force an election in this period, unless the Parliament became completely unworkable. This option would also effectively retain the status quo for the Senate, as senators would serve at least a six-year term, and perhaps more. It would also reduce the number of elections held. ⁷⁰

One problem with this option is the uncertainty about the constitutional position of the Senate which would result. At present, with the exception of double dissolution elections, the Senate is a “continuous chamber”; that is, unlike the House of Representatives, it never dissolves. Under the current system there is no prorogation before a half-Senate election. Senators who retire or who are defeated at the half-Senate election continue to serve until the following 30 June, and the functions of the Senate (including its committee functions) ⁷¹ continue unaffected.

Arguably, the expiry of the retiring Senators’ terms at the same time as the expiry of the terms of the members of the House of Representatives would alter its constitutional character so that it would cease to be a continuous chamber. The counter-argument is that, by reason of the continuity of the non-expiring Senators, its character as a continuous chamber is unaffected.

The Committee does not have a clear view of the legal position, but is concerned about the potential problem which arises. One possible solution would be to deem the term of retiring Senators to continue until the swearing-in of the new members of the House of Representatives. If that course were adopted, the “old” Senate would have a continuous existence beyond the Election, but only for a brief period.

The Committee’s views

The Committee welcomed the existing cross-party contemplation of proposed alterations to the parliamentary term and considered that this was a sound basis for further public debate about the introduction of a four-year maximum term for the House of Representatives and extended term for the Senate.

Recent public debate highlights the initi al cross-party nature of support for these propos al s. The Prime Minister, the Hon. John Howard MP , has supported c al ls for a referendum to extend the House of Representatives term to four years. ⁷² The Leader of the Opposition, the Hon. Kim Beazley MP, stated that while he is still of the view that a fixed term would be better, he was prepared to consider supporting an extension of the House term to four years. The Leader of the Opposition stated:

I’m not going to stand up a sensible reform because it’s not perfect…if they are putting [flexible four year terms] forward between now and the next election, I wouldn’t rule out supporting it. ⁷³

Others in Federal Parliament have, however, expressed support for fixed term elections. ⁷⁴

The Committee is of the view that this is an opportune time to raise the issue of Federal parliamentary terms to allow sufficient time over the next two years for broad discussion to inform government consideration of this issue before the next scheduled election. This would also allow for sufficient time for the necessary referenda legislation to pass through Parliament before the next election.

The Committee believes that for any change to federal parliamentary terms to be implemented, there must be cooperation and a broad willingness to change from the major political parties. The Committee considers it is unreasonable for the Government to proceed with reforming parliamentary terms without clear support from the Opposition.