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Chapter 2
The law enforcement oversight environment
External law enforcement oversight
2.1
Modern police accountability has seen a shift away from police control
of disciplinary processes and an increase in external or civilian control
through the processes of review and, increasingly, investigation. Professor Tim
Prenzler explained that the impetus for this trend was the perception that
police could not be wholly trusted to investigate themselves:
Civilian review was initially developed as a counter to the charge
that police internal investigations were compromised by the natural tendency to
close ranks and cover-up misconduct.[1]
2.2
Recognition of the high corruption-risk nature of policing also drives
the view that some form of external oversight is critical to minimising police
corruption and providing effective accountability:
Given the propensity for corruption in the high-risk occupation
of policing, there is little argument by non-police about the need for
effective accountability mechanisms and oversight of the operations of police.[2]
2.3
Whilst there is considerable support for some form of external oversight,
the most effective model and the relationship between the oversight agency and the
bodies it oversees continue to be debated and explored. Some oversight bodies
are predominantly 'reactive': they monitor and review the way in which
complaints are managed by police. Other oversight agencies are, in different
ways, proactive. For example, they may have the power to conduct own-motion
investigations into police misconduct and/or have a dedicated prevention and
education function.[3]
2.4
Mr Don McKenzie noted that a distinction is emerging between anti‑corruption
agencies and complaint management agencies. He explained that complaint
management bodies tend to be concerned with process and anti-corruption
agencies tend to be outcomes-oriented:
Complaint management agencies are generally process focused.
They are about ensuring that each individual has meaningful recourse to the
misapplication of authority. Management systems in the subject agency may
improve on account of an effective complaints management process, but this is a
secondary issue to ensuring that a worthwhile complaint process is in place and
operating effectively.
Anti-corruption agencies are more outcomes focused. They are
about impacting on the standards of integrity of designated agencies. Their
actions may be based on complaints made to them, but these are a resource for
them, not their raison d’être. They are not required to deal with all complaint
matters/information sources equally. Rather, they steer their resources to
where they can maximise their impact on integrity standards.[4]
2.5
Ombudsmen agencies play a key role in complaint management: their
primary purpose is to investigate and address complaints reported by individual
citizens who believe they have been treated unfairly, unreasonably or
improperly by a government department or agency.[5]
Law enforcement and public sector integrity agencies increasingly focus on
serious misconduct and corruption. Through their investigations they endeavour
to expose the truth in order to curb and prevent corruption. Through risk
analysis, research and education they aim to raise standards of integrity.[6]
External police oversight in
Australia
2.6
In Australia, every police force has been subject to some form of
external oversight since 1986. The nature of this oversight, however, varies
significantly. In some states law enforcement bodies are subject to external,
independent review by anti-corruption agencies, while in other states the
oversight of police conduct falls solely within the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman.[7]
2.7
Law enforcement agencies in all states and territories are subject to
the scrutiny of their respective Auditor-General and in most jurisdictions their
administrative decisions are open to review by their respective Ombudsmen. In
the Northern Territory and Tasmania this is the extent of the external police
integrity arrangements.[8]
2.8
In South Australia a Police Complaints Authority was established under
the Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 1985. The SA
Police Complaints Authority was created to monitor internal police
investigations of complaints. With a few exceptions, the Authority does not
conduct primary investigations of police complaints.[9] Investigations into public sector
and police corruption in SA are predominantly carried out by the
Anti-Corruption Branch of the South Australia Police (SAPOL).[10]
2.9
The AFP is responsible for policing in the ACT. The AFP provides this
service through its community policing arm, ACT Policing.[11]
ACT Policing officers are, therefore, subject to the oversight of the
Commonwealth Ombudsman and ACLEI.
2.10
The remaining four states - New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria and Western
Australia - have external law enforcement integrity agencies in place.
2.11
The four state bodies and ACLEI operate according to an inquisitorial
investigative system. Unlike a prosecutorial system in which the objective is
to establish whether or not a person(s) is guilty with respect to criminal
charges, an inquisitorial approach seeks to establish what happened; to expose
the truth. Within this system the integrity agencies each have the power to
compel witnesses to answer questions.
2.12
These five agencies also have a similar range of other coercive powers.
A summary of these powers is provided at Appendix 3.
2.13
However, while sharing some fundamental features, these agencies vary in
terms of function and breadth of jurisdiction. Three principal functions have
been identified: a misconduct function; a prevention and education function;
and an organised crime function.[12]
Of these, various terms are used to describe the mix of functions that may be
given to any one agency:
- The existence of the misconduct function and the organised crime
function in one agency is referred to as the merged model;
- The bifurcated model describes the approach of having
separate agencies responsible for each of the misconduct and organised crime
functions;
- An agency which oversees police activities solely – such as the
NSW Police Integrity Commission – is referred to as the specialist model;
and
- An agency whose jurisdiction extends to all public sector
officials is referred to as the generalist model.[13]
Misconduct function
2.14
A further division is found in the misconduct function, with serious
misconduct the responsibility of the external integrity agency and misconduct
of a lesser nature dealt with by the respective state ombudsmen and/or
internally by the organisation being oversighted.
2.15
The PIC outlined the advantages of dividing minor and serious complaints
between the Ombudsman and the integrity agency:
- The integrity agency can focus its specialist powers and
resources on the most serious forms of corruption – 'its role is undiluted by
legislated obligations to manage a complaint handling process'; and
- The separation of the two functions into two agencies means that
the two functions do not have to compete internally for resources.[14]
2.16
The states in which this division occurs are NSW, WA, and Qld.
Similarly, at a Commonwealth level, ACLEI deals with corruption matters, while
the AFP, the ACC and the Commonwealth Ombudsman manage misconduct that does not
raise a corruption issue.
2.17
A potential disadvantage of dividing serious and minor complaints is the
possibility for duplication to occur.[15]
The PIC indicated that this can be avoided through the clear categorisation of
complaints and ongoing communication between the relevant agencies.
2.18
A further, related potential disadvantage is for confusion to exist
between the agencies responsible for complaint management if the division
between agency roles and the categories of misconduct are not sufficiently
clear. The Commonwealth Ombudsman, Professor John McMillan, raised this matter
with respect to the relatively broad definition of corruption within the LEIC
Act. He argued that such a broad definition could lead to uncertainty between
the agencies that have obligations under the Act. [16]
2.19
ACLEI noted that the somewhat non-prescriptive definition of corruption was
included in the LEIC Act so that ACLEI's jurisdiction pertains both in
circumstances beyond criminal conduct and in circumstances that may involve unprecedented
forms of corrupt behaviour.[17]
In order to preserve the existing definition but clarify jurisdictional
boundaries, the Commonwealth Ombudsman, ACLEI, the AFP and the ACC have been
working jointly to clarify and refine administrative arrangements about
classification, notification and referral of corruption issues between
agencies.[18]
2.20
In Victoria, by contrast, the Office of Police Integrity (OPI) is
responsible for assessing all police complaints. Some complaints are
investigated by the OPI. However, the majority of complaints are referred back
to Victoria Police for investigation, with the OPI playing an oversight and
review role.[19]
2.21
In support of this approach, Associate Professor Colleen Lewis argued
that the external integrity agency should be a central receiving point for all
complaints and should be responsible for assessing and classifying all
complaints. Further, she argued that the integrity body should monitor and
supervise the processing of complaints that are returned to the police body for
investigation. Professor Lewis explained that the external integrity agency
should be the 'gatekeeper' of all complaints because citizens lack confidence
in the police to investigate complaints objectively and fairly.[20]
The committee notes also that complaints from members of the public can be a
source of information that may indicate the existence of corrupt conduct.
2.22
The complaint handling process is given further consideration in chapter
4.
Serious and organised crime
function
2.23
Two state integrity agencies – in Queensland and Western Australia -
have a serious and organised crime function as well as a misconduct function.
2.24
The arguments for having a merged model are summarised as follows:
- The royal-commission-type powers vested in external oversight
agencies and not normally granted to police can be harnessed in serious and
organised crime investigations;
- 'there is a demonstrated link between organised crime and corrupt
police officers' therefore dealing with organised crime and corruption under
the one roof facilitates information exchange on overlapping matters; and
- Cost-savings can be achieved through the co-location of these two
functions.[21]
2.25
Arguments against a merged model are:
- The police service is the 'principal law enforcement agency' and
there is no clear evidence that it has dealt inadequately with organised crime;
- It may lead to a 'loss of focus' within the agency;
- The capacity for the 'infiltration of corruption' into the agency
is increased;
- The potential for the duplication of effort in intelligence
gathering; and
- A loss of confidence by the public in the independence of the
agency.[22]
2.26
NSW has a separate agency responsible for serious and organised crime:
the NSW Crime Commission. Victoria does not have a separate crime commission.
Rather, it has a Chief Examiner who, under the Major Crime (Investigative
Powers) Act 2004, has the role of using coercive information-gathering
powers in relation to organised crime in Victoria.[23]
Prevention and education function
2.27
A prevention and education function focuses
attention on research, corruption risk-reviews, community awareness raising and
education of agency staff about integrity matters. The prevention and
education function is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.
An overview of state integrity arrangements
2.28
This section provides a general overview of the four state integrity
bodies: the Police Integrity Commission (PIC) in NSW, the Crime and Misconduct
Commission (CMC) in Queensland, the Office of Police Integrity (OPI) in Victoria
and the Corruption and Crime Commission (CCC) in Western Australia. It further
outlines the broader integrity framework in which these agencies sit.
New South Wales[24]
2.29
NSW has a bifurcated, specialist police integrity model. Serious and
organised crime is the responsibility of the NSW Crime Commission while police
misconduct is the responsibility of the PIC. The PIC is responsible for the
oversight of police only, with a separate body – the Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) – responsible for corruption in the broader public
sector.
2.30
The PIC and the Office of the NSW Ombudsman play complementary roles in
overseeing police integrity. The Ombudsman is a complaints administration body
and focuses on complaints concerning 'administrative efficiency and decision
making within NSW Police and other NSW public sector agencies'. Complaints are
dealt with in an open manner with ongoing communication with the complainant.
The PIC is a 'specialist investigative agency with special powers and resources
to assist, detect, investigate and prevent police corruption'. Investigations
tend to be covert with minimal contact with the complainant, and focus on
serious complaints.
Police Integrity Commission
2.31
The PIC was established in 1996 by the NSW Parliament on the
recommendation of the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service. It is
completely independent of the NSW Police Force.
2.32
The Police Integrity Commission Act 1996 sets out the principal
functions of the PIC. These functions are:
- preventing, detecting or investigating serious police misconduct;
and,
- managing or overseeing other agencies in the detection and
investigation of serious police misconduct and other police misconduct.
2.33
PIC is also empowered to manage those matters not completed by the Royal
Commission. Other functions of PIC described in the Act relate to: police
activities and education programs (s.14) and the collection of evidence and
information (s.15).
2.34
On 5 June 2008, the NSW Police Minister David Campbell announced that
the NSW Crime Commission would be brought under the oversight of PIC.
Parliamentary oversight committee
2.35
The Committee on the Office of the Ombudsman and Police Integrity
Commission is a joint statutory committee. It was established in 1990 by
amendment to the Ombudsman Act 1974 to monitor and review the functions
of the Ombudsman's Office. The Committee's jurisdiction was extended under the Police
Integrity Commission Act 1996 to include oversight of the PIC and the
Inspector to the PIC.
Police Integrity Inspector
2.36
The Police Integrity Commission Inspector oversees the legality and
propriety of the operations and activities of the PIC and any complaint of
misconduct on the part of its officers.
Queensland
The Crime and Misconduct Commission
2.37
The CMC was established on 1 January 2002 when the Criminal Justice
Commission (CJC) and the Queensland Crime Commission (QCC) merged to form the
new organisation.
2.38
The CJC had been established by the Criminal Justice Act 1989
following a recommendation from the Fitzgerald Inquiry into police corruption that
a permanent anti-corruption commission be established.
2.39
In addition to investigating police and public sector misconduct, the
(former) CJC worked with the police to investigate organised and major crime.
2.40
In 1997 this crime function was taken over by the newly formed
Queensland Crime Commission (QCC), under the Crime Commission Act 1997.
The QCC was also given the task of investigating paedophilia.
2.41
In 2001 the Queensland Government decided to amalgamate these two
commissions and form a single independent law enforcement body to fight crime
and public sector misconduct — the CMC. The legislation under which the new
body was created was the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001.
2.42
The functions of the CMC are to combat major crime in Queensland,
including organised crime and paedophilia, and official misconduct in the Queensland
public sector. The CMC also has a witness protection function.
Parliamentary oversight committee
2.43
The Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee (PCMC) was established
under the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001.
2.44
The committee has an ongoing role in monitoring and reviewing the CMC
and also conducts specific inquiries in respect of matters pertaining to the CMC.
This includes assessing and reviewing complaints about the CMC and in this
sense, it diverges from the Parliamentary Committees in NSW and WA and the role
of this committee – the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian
Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity.
2.45
It is through the committee that the CMC is accountable to the
Parliament and to the people of Queensland.
Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct
Commissioner
2.46
The Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Commissioner provides assistance
to the PCMC in its role of monitoring and reviewing the CMC. The Parliamentary
Commissioner may investigate complaints against the CMC or its officers on the
direction of the PCMC, and conducts audits and reviews of the CMC’s activities.
The Parliamentary Commissioner does not have an 'own-motion' power.
2.47
The CMC explained that the Parliamentary Commissioner regularly:
- acts on referrals from the PCMC to review the CMC’s management of
complaint matters
- audits the CMC’s compliance with legislation governing covert
instruments and the use of surveillance devices and assumed identities
- inspects registers that the CMC is required to maintain
- audits the CMC’s intelligence holdings[25]
2.48
The Parliamentary Commissioner may make recommendations about possible
improvements to processes or procedure. The Parliamentary Commissioner reports
to the PCMC.[26]
Victoria
Office of Police Integrity
2.49
The OPI was established in November 2004 under the Police Regulation
Act 1958. The Police Integrity Act 2008 was assented to on 1 July 2008 and re-established the Office of Police Integrity. The introduction of the
OPI's own Act, enabled adjustments to be made to the OPI's objects and powers,
as recommended by the Special Investigations Monitor in November 2007.[27]
The OPI is an independent organisation; it is not part of the Victoria Police.
2.50
OPI's role is to ensure that police corruption and serious misconduct is
detected, investigated and prevented, and to ensure that members of the force
have regard to the human rights set out in the Charter of Human Rights and
Responsibilities Act 2006.[28]
2.51
OPI receives and assesses all complaints about police conduct in Victoria.
Some complaints are referred to Victoria Police to investigate. OPI oversees
and reviews Victoria Police investigations. Other complaints are investigated
by OPI.
2.52
The Director, Police Integrity, has the ability to conduct an 'own
motion' investigation into any matter relevant to achieving the objectives of
the office, including but not limited to:
- An investigation into the conduct
of a member of the Victoria Police
- An investigation into police
corruption or serious misconduct generally
- An investigation into any of the
policies, practices or procedures of the Victoria Police or of a member of the
Victoria Police, or of the failure of those policies, practices or procedures.[29]
2.53
The OPI's jurisdiction does not include civilian members of the Victoria
Police, who remain under the oversight of the Victorian Ombudsman.[30]
2.54
Under the Police Regulations Act, the OPI has been given coercive
powers including the power to compel witnesses to answer questions.[31]
OPI's powers include the ability to:
- Summons any person to give
evidence on oath and/or to produce documents or things (summonses can be issued
by the OPI only in pursuing an own motion or complaints investigation)
- Conduct hearings
- Inspect, copy, and/or seize
documents and other items at the premises of public authorities including Victoria Police
premises, without a warrant
- Obtain search warrants to enter,
search, inspect, copy and/or seize documents or things relevant to an
investigation
- Obtain warrants to use
surveillance devices
- Seek certain orders under the Confiscation
Act 1997
- Employ a range of contemporary
investigation procedures – (OPI is able to receive telephone interception material.
It is also able to conduct covert surveillance and is a registered authority
under the Assumed Identities Act. Like Victoria Police and
other law enforcement agencies, the OPI must have sufficient reasons for deploying these
powers and a warrant must be obtained from the appropriate external issuing
authority).[32]
2.55
OPI cannot take direct action against Victoria Police. The agency can
only make recommendations to the Chief Commissioner of Police and the Victorian
Parliament. In making these recommendations, OPI cannot compel Victoria Police
to act upon or implement its recommendations. It can however report to the
Victorian Parliament on the degree of cooperation exhibited by Victoria Police.[33]
2.56
The committee notes that the OPI, through education research and working
with Victoria Police, seeks to develop and implement corruption resistance
strategies to reduce the risk of corruption and serious misconduct. This task
is undertaken by OPI's Corruption Prevention and Education Unit, which works
with Victoria Police and other agencies to develop solutions for building
police integrity.[34]
2.57
In order to undertake its role the committee notes that OPI is both well
staffed and resourced. In 2007-08, OPI's funding was $21.3m and the office had
a staff of 113 permanent staff and 14 casual/contract staff.
The Office of the Special
Investigations Monitor
2.58
The Office of the Special Investigations Monitor is a statutory agency
and was created by section 4 of the Major Crime (Special Investigations
Monitor) Act 2004, which commenced operation on 16 November 2004.
2.59
The role of the Special Investigations Monitor includes monitoring
compliance with both the Police Regulation Act 1958 and the Major
Crime (Investigative Powers) Act 2004 by the Director, Police Integrity and
the Office of the Chief Examiner respectively.
Commissioner for Law Enforcement
Data Security
2.60
The Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data Security is established under
the Commissioner for Law Enforcement Data Security Act 2005.
2.61
The Commissioner’s principal role is to 'promote the use by Victoria Police
of appropriate and secure management practices for law enforcement data'.
2.62
'The Commissioner has the power to refer any
matter connected with the performance of his/her duties as the Commissioner to
the Director, Police Integrity, or the Privacy Commissioner. This may occur if
the Commissioner considers that the matter is relevant to the performance of
functions or duties undertaken by either of these offices.'[35]
Western Australia
Corruption and Crime Commission
2.63
The CCC was established on 1 January 2004 following a
recommendation from the Kennedy Royal Commission in WA. The CCC is based on the
Queensland anti-corruption model.
2.64
The CCC investigates allegations of misconduct by Western Australia
police officers and public officers, including officers employed in local
government.
2.65
The CCC has two main purposes:
- to combat and reduce the incidence of organised crime. While the
Commission does not investigate organised crime itself, it can grant the
Commissioner of Police exceptional powers not normally available to police to
investigate organised crime. The use of these powers is authorised and
monitored by the Corruption and Crime Commission Commissioner; and
- to reduce the incidence of misconduct in the public service.
Parliamentary oversight committee
& Parliamentary Inspector
2.66
The Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 provides for a range
of accountability mechanisms to scrutinise the CCC's use of its special
investigative powers. This includes a Joint Standing Committee on the
Corruption and Crime Commission, whose role is to:
- monitor and report to Parliament on the exercise of the functions
of the Commission and the Parliamentary Inspector of the Commission; and
- promote integrity within the public sector.
2.67
The role of the Parliamentary Inspector is to ensure that the CCC exercises
its powers and conducts operations in accordance with the law. The Inspector is
responsible under Part 13 of the Act to assist the Committee in the performance
of its functions.
ACLEI: a broad comparison
2.68
ACLEI has been established as a specialist agency within a bifurcated
system. That is, it focuses solely on law enforcement integrity and the
function of serious and organised crime is undertaken by a separate agency –
the ACC. ACLEI's legislation (the LEIC Act), places greater emphasis on ACLEI's
role as an investigative body and gives less prominence to corruption
prevention. This is discussed in further detail in chapter 3.
2.69
At the Commonwealth level there is no dedicated public sector anti-corruption
body.[36]
Corruption matters of a criminal nature within the public sector are the
responsibility of the AFP. This committee – the Parliamentary Joint Committee
on the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity – provides external Parliamentary
oversight of ACLEI. There is no inspector at the Commonwealth level.
2.70
The table below summarises the functions and scope of the four state
agencies and ACLEI.[37]
|
Misconduct - Police |
Misconduct – Public sector |
Prevention & education |
Major crime |
ACLEI |
Yes (corruption only)[38] |
No |
Yes[39] |
No |
PIC (NSW) |
Yes |
No (separate body – ICAC) |
Limited (mainly the responsibility
of ICAC) |
No |
CMC (Qld) |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
OPI (Vic.) |
Yes |
No |
Yes |
No |
CCC (WA) |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes[40] |
2.71
ACLEI is currently most analogous to the PIC in NSW.[41]
This is evident in the following ways:
- They are specialist integrity agencies;
- they sit within a bifurcated model, where serious and organised
crime is undertaken by a separate agency;
- they have a limited corruption prevention role and,
correspondingly, a greater focus on investigation; and
- they have oversight of their respective jurisdiction's serious
and organised crime body.[42]
Internal law enforcement integrity controls
2.72
This section provides a general overview of the four corresponding state
police services and their internal integrity arrangements.
New South Wales Police Force
2.73
The NSW Police Force currently operates under the Police Act 1990
and Police Regulations 2008. The Force has 19 319 employees, which is
made up of
15 324 sworn police officers and 3995 civilian staff.[43]
2.74
NSW Police Force personnel operate under The Code of Conduct &
Ethics and the Statement of Values. 'Those corruption matters of a
less serious nature are dealt with internally by the NSW Police Force and are
managed by the Professional Standards Command'.[44]
The Professional Standards Command (PSC) has responsibility for setting
standards for performance, conduct and integrity within NSW Police and reports
to the Deputy Commissioner Specialist Operations. The core business aims of the
PSC are:
- Promoting professional standards.
- Investigating serious criminal
allegations, corruption, and high-risk matters where police officers may be
involved.
- Identifying and responding to
high-risk behaviour in people, places and systems where misconduct is a factor.
- Promoting and supporting fair,
consistent and effective management of all staff.[45]
2.75
The functions undertaken by the PSC to achieve these aims are:
- Providing advisory, consultancy
and review services with respect to investigations, critical incidents,
complaint management and employee management.
- Applying investigation,
intelligence and integrity testing resources according to risk based
prioritisation.
- Developing and applying
intelligence to identify and support professional standards through analytical
support, audits, assessment of probity issues, and strategic research.
- Developing, or contributing to,
reference materials, standard operating procedures, policies and training that
support professional standards and the application of best practice.
- Acting as a primary point of
contact within NSW Police for agencies such as the Police Integrity Commission,
the NSW Ombudsman, the NSW Coroner, and the Independent Commission Against
Corruption.[46]
2.76
The PSC also maintains close liaison with the Police Integrity Commission
and the NSW Ombudsman to ensure that the issues of interest to those agencies
are considered within the NSW Police complaint management framework.[47]
Queensland Police Service
2.77
The Queensland Police Service (QPS) comprises eight regions dealing with
operational and community policing issues. Three commands deal with major
crime, specialist operational support and ethical standards, and a corporate
services group manages administration, finance, human resources and information
and communications technology functions.[48]
2.78
In 2007-08, the Service employed 13 948 personnel consisting of 9833
sworn police officers and 3711 unsworn staff members. All members of the QPS
have a statutory obligation under the Police Service Administration Act 1990
to report any misconduct or breaches of discipline as soon as practicable to
the Commissioner of Police and, in the case of misconduct or official
misconduct, to the Chairperson of the CMC.[49]
2.79
The standards and principles determining what constitutes ethical, lawful
and proper behaviour for the QPS are set out in a Code of Conduct, which
reflects the standards and principles in the Public Sector Ethics Act 1994.[50]
Responsibility for the efficient and proper administrative management of the
Police Service lies primarily with the Ethical Standards Command (ESC). The
Queensland Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Sport, the Hon. Judy Spence
MP, informed the committee that:
All matters of misconduct (which includes police misconduct and
official misconduct) must be overviewed by the ESC before any action is taken.
The ESC and the CMC audit and review how complaints, regardless of their
classification, are dealt with. Breaches of discipline are the responsibility
of Regions/Commands and Directorates, dealt with and finalised at the
local/regional level with only the outcome of those complaints recorded at ESC.[51]
2.80
The ESC is comprised of three branches: the Internal Investigations
Branch - responsible for the investigation of complaints against police; the Ethical
Practice Branch – responsible for corruption prevention, risk management and education
and training; and the Inspectorate and Evaluation Branch – responsible for the
inspection and audit of police establishments. The committee was informed that:
Each of the three branches is headed by a Superintendent who
reports to the Assistant Commissioner ESC, who in turn reports directly to the
Police Commissioner.[52]
2.81
The work of the ESC is supported by a strong partnership with the CMC
and professional practice managers in each region and command.
2.82
Of note, in 2007-08 the QPS produced a whole-of-Service Corruption
Prevention Plan, in accordance with the Police Service Administration Act
1990 and Whistle Blowers Protection Act 1994. The framework for this
plan is based on four pillars:
- the QPS corporate governance
framework for corruption prevention;
- a strategic framework to ensure
that the QPS remains a corruption resistant organisation;
- individual commitment: “Integrity
is everyone’s business”; and
- a quick reference guide to ethical
decision making, called the SELF Test.[53]
Victoria Police
2.83
Within Victoria Police's five regions, fifty-six Police Service Areas
have been established to deliver policing services. At the end of June 2008,
the organisation comprised 14 229 staff, including 11 444 sworn police officers
and recruits, 2634 public servants, and 139 protective service officers.[54]
The Police Regulation Act 1958 is the legislative instrument under which
Victoria Police operates.
2.84
The internal integrity of Victoria Police is managed and overseen by the
Ethical Standards Department (ESD). ESD's mission is to enhance and promote a
culture of high ethical standards throughout Victoria Police through effective
prevention, deterrence and investigation of unethical behaviour ensuring the
continued respect and confidence of the community.
2.85
The ESD is tasked with receiving and investigating complaints of
unethical behaviour and misconduct alleged to have been committed by Victoria Police
employees and proactively enhances the ethical health of Victoria Police
through education, training and forming strong community and government partnerships.
The Director, Office of Police Integrity, oversees the ESD.[55]
Western Australia Police
2.86
As at 30 June 2008, the Western Australia Police (WAPOL) had 5647 sworn
officers and 1879 unsworn staff members.[56]
2.87
Of note, in Western Australia, following the release of the Kennedy
Royal Commission Final Report, the Government provided funding for the WAPOL to
implement a range of strategies to build a corruption resistant culture.[57]
2.88
In accordance with this requirement, the WAPOL introduced an agency-wide
corporate Corruption Prevention Plan that:
- Actively promotes a culture of professionalism, integrity and
risk management.
- Strives to reduce the incidence of misconduct and corruption.
2.89
In 2004/05 implementation of corruption prevention plans were formalised
through integration into the WAPOL Corporate Strategic Business Plan.
2.90
WAPOL personnel operate under a Code of Conduct, which encourages
ethical awareness and personal commitment to appropriate behaviour. The Code
of Conduct also:
articulates the behaviours that the WA Police require of its
entire workforce and encourages ethical awareness learning and behaviour that
is vital for community trust and confidence in our agency.[58]
2.91
The Corruption Prevention and Investigation Portfolio within WAPOL is
responsible for maintaining the standards and the management of behaviour and
performance by ensuring efficient and effective accountable management and
disciplinary systems are in place.[59]
2.92
The Portfolio is comprised of four branches or units. The Internal
Affairs Unit – responsible for the investigation of matters associated with
serious misconduct, corruption and criminality; the Risk Assessment Unit –
primarily responsible for managing profiles of current police personnel or work
areas where an identified pattern of lack of integrity, dishonest behaviour, under-performance
or ethical issues are developing; the Ethical Standards Division – which
provides a corporate governance role with respect to professional standards of
the agency; and the Police Complaints Administration Centre – which records,
assesses, allocates and monitors complaints and formal investigation processes
that require internal investigation.[60]
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