28 June 2024
PDF Version [576KB]
Dr Adam Broinowski
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security
The US hosted 2 major consecutive summits in Washington on
10 and 11 April 2024 – a Japan-US bilateral summit, followed by a trilateral
Philippines-Japan-US summit. During his 4-day official visit to the US, Japanese
Prime Minister Kishida also attended a state dinner at the White House on
10 April and addressed a joint session of Congress on 11 April.
As part of a diverse range of initiatives, the leaders
emphasised their commitment to upholding the US-led international order, with a
view to balancing China’s influence through economic diversification and deepened
regional integration and in
the Indo-Pacific region.
The trilateral summit introduced the US-Japan-Philippines
security partnership as part of a growing ‘latticework’ of minilateral regional
formations. In particular, in accordance with Australia’s 2024 National
Defence Strategy
and update to the Integrated Investment Program, the summit
announcements as outlined below are of direct relevance to Australia’s regional
participation in the Japan-US-Australia
air-defence network, defence industrial base integration, research innovation,
and supply chains.[1]
In the joint statement, ‘Global
Partners for the Future’,
President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida unveiled over 70 deliverables,
involving defence and security cooperation, space projects, technology
innovation, economic security, climate action, diplomacy and development, and
strengthened people-to-people exchanges.
The details will be discussed in the next Japan-US 2+2
Foreign and Defence ministerial meeting.
Defence and security
The most significant announcements in the Biden-Kishida
summit were the:
- ‘historic’
upgrade of the Japan mutual security alliance to a ‘global partnership’
- proposed integration of the defence industrial bases of the 2
countries.
US-Japan security alliance
Prime Minister Kishida confirmed that Japan would assume greater
responsibility for regional security, based on Japan’s 2022 National
Security Strategy.
President
Biden confirmed upgrades to command and control (C2) and US Forces Japan
structures, for
seamlessly coordinated response operations by the 2 militaries in the
Indo-Pacific region.[2]
The 2 leaders further stated their intentions to engage more
in regional maritime security, particularly with partners in ASEAN.
Defence industrial base integration
To accelerate manufacturing and sustainment of US military
equipment, the 2 leaders pledged to:
Following the 8 April announcement
by AUKUS countries, Prime
Minister Kishida confirmed that Japan would consider contributions to AUKUS
Pillar II ‘advanced
capability projects’ (cyber, artificial intelligence, quantum, undersea,
and hypersonic missile capabilities).[5]
Japan will also indirectly support the pact with increased weapons
exports.[6]
China and North Korea
Both leaders pledged:
- close coordination to oppose China’s changes to the status quo by
force or coercion in the western Pacific
- engagement with China in dialogue and candid communication, and
cooperation on common challenges
- their opposition to the PRC
accelerating build-up of its nuclear arsenal without transparency or
meaningful dialogue.[7]
- close coordination on North Korean missile and nuclear (including
space) development.
- And:
-
urged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with UN
Security Council resolutions, including ballistic missile development,
testing and transfers
- called for immediate resolution to the abductions
legacy issue
-
urged North Korean compliance with human rights conventions.
President Biden confirmed continuing personal communication
with President Xi Jinping (alongside military-to-military
contacts) and that the Japan-US alliance was ‘purely defensive in nature’.
The 2 leaders confirmed that their respective positions on Taiwan remain
unchanged – to maintain cross-Strait peace and stability.
The 2 leaders offered to negotiate ‘without preconditions’ with
North Korea, while Prime Minister Kishida followed
up on his earlier
proposals to conduct a
Tokyo-Pyongyang summit.[8]
Russia and Ukraine
The leaders reiterated their support for Ukraine’s
sovereignty within its internationally recognised borders and stated that
Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons is unacceptable and that any such use
would be unjustifiable.
Nuclear issues
Both leaders reiterated their support for nuclear
disarmament through measures such as the Hiroshima Action Plan
and the G7
Leaders’ Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, and for reductions in
global nuclear arsenals, including through the Japan-led Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty Friends initiative.
President Biden announced the Fukushima
Daiichi Decommissioning Partnership for cooperation in research and fuel
debris retrieval, and in public-private investment in enriched uranium production.
Space
Following the 2021
Japan-US Space Command MoU, and a March
2024 Japanese Government announcement of a 10-year space fund (US$6.7
billion), the 2 leaders committed to further collaboration on space activities,
including:
United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
The 2 leaders declared support for reform of the UNSC and
Japan’s permanent
membership.
Middle East
The US and Japanese leaders:
- condemned the attacks by Hamas and others in Israel on October 7,
and reaffirmed Israel’s right to defend itself within international law
- expressed concern for the humanitarian situation in the Gaza
Strip, and demanded the release of all hostages held by Hamas, which they
emphasised would bring an immediate and prolonged ceasefire and enable humanitarian
assistance
- underscored the need to prevent regional escalation
- reaffirmed their commitment to an independent Palestinian state
with Israel’s security guaranteed as part of a two-state solution.
Innovation, investment, economic security
and climate action
To resist economic coercion and dependency, and increase domestic battery and semiconductor production, the 2 leaders announced initiatives
to operationalise data free flow, boost supply chain resilience, and access
critical minerals.[10]
Mutual investment in digital innovation
Under the US-Japan Competitiveness and
Resilience (CoRe) Partnership, and through the US-Japan
Economic Policy Consultative Committee, initiatives announced include 5G
networks, advanced ICT, AI and cloud infrastructure, training and research,
digitisation,
and battery production.[11]
Other initiatives include:
Infrastructure and investment
partnerships
Joint regional infrastructure and
development
Initiatives to strengthen the international financial and
critical architecture include subsea cables and digital
communications infrastructure in the North Pacific
region (US-Japan); and loans from New World Bank, International Development
Association and Asian Development Fund.
Semiconductor and critical minerals
supply chains
Pre-existing partnerships and frameworks include:
Climate crisis, energy supply and
emissions reductions
Under the US Inflation Reduction Act and Japan’s Green
Transformation Promotion Strategy for energy transition, the 2 leaders
announced several climate change initiatives, including:
Biden-Kishida-Marcos summit – key
topics
In the first trilateral summit between Japan, the
Philippines and the United States, in a Joint
Vision Statement the leaders agreed to increase cross-government and
cross-sector cooperation.
Defence and security
The leaders affirmed their positions on security concerning
Taiwan, North Korea, Russia/Ukraine, nuclear issues, ASEAN and the Pacific
Islands.
They focused on maritime security cooperation to oppose economic
coercion in the South China Sea (SCS) and prioritising Philippine defence
modernisation.
Maritime security
Since 2022, Manila has lodged a series of protests against
what it perceives as China’s ‘intrusion’ into Philippine maritime territory
and China’s use of ‘grey zone’ actions in the area.
In January 2023, President Marcos visited Beijing to discuss
China-Philippines territorial
disputes in the SCS. China
and ASEAN also agreed
on new guidelines on 13 July 2023 for a binding SCS Code of Conduct (COC).[15]
Since mid-2023, Philippine foreign policy abruptly
shifted to a ‘traditional
alliance’ format. This includes expanded
US-Philippines military cooperation, annual military
exercises, maritime
patrols, and US-Japan-Philippines trilateral joint
manoeuvres.[16]
Under the 2024 Marine
Cooperative Activity, Australia joined trilateral maritime
patrols in the West Philippines Sea. This coincided with a
joint air and sea combat patrol by the Southern Theater Command of the People’s
Liberation Army in the SCS.
Beijing
warned Manila of putative territorial
violations in the SCS and against the bilateral Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (non-binding).
On 15 June 2024, the Philippines Foreign Ministry filed
a submission with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf for
claims in the West Palawan Region, which China’s Foreign Ministry reportedly
stated would not be considered by the UN Commission as it is disputed
territory.
Also on 15 June, China issued
new rules under its Coast Guard Law,
in which its coast guard could detain foreign crews if they illegally enter
China’s territorial waters and could fire upon foreign ships if necessary.
The summit leaders announced a trilateral maritime dialogue
to enhance coordination and collective responses, including capacity-building,
and training for Southeast Asian partners.[17]
This is assisted by:
Figure 1 Potential site locations and range of AFP BrahMos missiles
Source: Parliamentary Library
Modernisation of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines
Since the National
Defense Strategy 2018–2022, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has
undergone military
modernisation. This involves:
Gender equality and the rights of
women and girls
The leaders announced their support for the Philippines
hosting the International Conference on Women, Peace, and Security in October
2024, which will review UN
Security Council Resolution 1325.
Economic cooperation, investment
and resilience
The trilateral summit announced several trade and investment
initiatives in semiconductors, digital
economy, cybersecurity,
clean energy and critical minerals.
This follows a US
Presidential Trade and Investment Mission to the Philippines led by US
Commerce Secretary
Gina Raimondo in March 2024 which involved
a ‘historic’ investment package (US$1 billion) covering solar energy, electric
vehicles (EV), and digitisation in the Philippines.[21]
Further initiatives come under the IPEF
for Prosperity and are funded through US private sector investments (US$1
billion) and Japan’s public-private
investment (JPY 600 billion).
The first trilateral
commerce and industry ministers meeting was held simultaneously with the
summit to diversify the semiconductor global supply chain. Its initiatives
include:
- training for Philippine engineers in AI and cybersecurity
- 5G networks and cybersecurity in the Philippines
-
investing in resilient supply chains for nickel deposits and EV
battery production.
The 3 leaders announced the Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment ‘Luzon
Economic Corridor’ for connectivity between Subic Bay, Clark, Manila, and
Batangas on Luzon Island. Facilitation is through:
Critical and emerging technologies
Projects include:
- Open Radio Access Network technology, field trials and an Open
RAN Academy in Manila[22]
-
Semiconductor workforce development in the US and Japan, supply
chain resilience, and US-Philippines coordination under the CHIPS and Science
Act’s International
Technology Security and Innovation Fund.
Climate partnership and clean-energy
supply chains
The 3 leaders committed to:
- accelerating clean-energy economies
- expanding clean-energy technologies and capacity (solar, wind,
and nuclear) through several
programs in the Philippines
- supporting critical minerals development (EV and storage
batteries)
- generating supply chain jobs while protecting rights and the
environment.
In April 2024, the Philippines was inaugurated as a member
of the Minerals
Security Partnership Forum.
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[1].
Washington and Tokyo will partner with London to set up a regular
maritime exercise in the Pacific, starting in 2025. For further discussion
of the new and emerging Indo-Pacific architecture, see, T. J. Pempel,
‘Alliances and the Future Asia-Pacific Order’, Global Asia 11, no. 1
(2016): 24–27; Thomas Wilkins, ‘The
“Minilateral Moment” and the Regional Security Architecture in the Indo-Pacific’,
NIDS Commentary no. 254 (16 February 2023): 1–9.
[2].
Although not confirmed, this may include an upgrade to a US
Indo-Pacific operational command in Japan.
[3].
In early March 2024 the US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro visited the
shipyards of HD Hyundai
Heavy Industries and Hanwha Ocean in South Korea
and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries in Japan.
[4].
Already, the US, Japan and Australia are working on their Defence Industrial Base Accelerator with
organisations including International Security Industry Council of Japan, Pacific Impact Zone, Pacific
International Center for High Technology Research
and the Advanced
Strategic Technology Accelerator.
[5].
New
Zealand, Canada, and South Korea have also
expressed interest in the AUKUS Pillar II project.
[6].
The National Security Council amended the Implementation
Guidelines on the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and
Technology.
[7].
Although under-reported, following the US Department of Defense report on
China’s nuclear arsenal, the US and China held nuclear arms control talks in November
2023 to establish a missile launch notification framework.
[8].
North Korea has repeatedly refused to negotiate with the US
or Japan if denuclearisation is a precondition. Kim Yo Jong also stated that the abduction issue has been resolved. Nonetheless, Kim also stated, ‘If Japan ...
makes a political decision to open a new path for improving ties based on
mutual respect and respectful behaviour, it is my view that the two countries
can open a new future’.
[9].
To date, 4
countries – US, China, Russia, and India – have developed anti-satellite
weapons. In 2019, the Trump administration launched
the US space command.
[10].
In March 2023, the US and Japan signed the US-Japan
Critical Minerals Agreement (not a free trade
agreement), regarding tax credits for electric vehicles (EV). Japan also
committed to subsidising Japanese companies up to
half the cost of projects involving critical minerals.
[11].
There was no mention of Washington’s membership of the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CP-TPP).
[12].
Japan’s National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology will
collaborate with the US National Institute of Standards and Technology.
[13].
These include the Silicon Valley ‘Japan Innovation Campus’, the Tokyo ‘Global
Startup Campus’, and the Global Innovation Through the Science and Technology
initiative.
[14].
This includes
incentives for EVs assembled in North
America and mutually recognised technology standards between the 2 countries.
[15].
There are concerns that the Philippines
may seek to derail the ongoing COC negotiations.
[16].
Under the Philippines-US Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA, 2014), in addition to renewed access
to Clark
Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, and following an
agreement to 5 bases designated in 2016, 4
new bases for US access were announced in 2023.
[17].
Including 12 Coast Guard vessels, and 5 additional vessels provided to the
Philippines by Japan.
[18].
Including in Balikatan
2025, and maritime training around Japan.
[19].
Japan has supplied surveillance boats to the Philippines
and Vietnam.
[20].
The BrahMos missiles were first
contracted in January 2022. Further AFP missile systems procurement is outlined in the May 2023 US-Philippines
Bilateral Defense Guidelines.
[21].
The Philippines is one of 7 countries (others
confirmed are Vietnam, Panama, Puerto Rico, Mexico) selected to partner
with the US.
[22].
Additional support includes the Global
South Future-Oriented Co-Creation Project and
trilateral Cyber and Digital Dialogue.