23 May 2024
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Dr Vu Lam
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section
Executive
summary
- The
Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index maps countries’ diplomatic networks,
offering insights into their engagement levels and potential influence.
- The
2024 index highlights China and the US’s global dominance. Australia’s ranking
remains largely unchanged on this index, with a primary focus on the
Indo-Pacific and a limited global presence that may not fully reflect its
economic power.
- Index
authors suggest a larger network could boost Australia’s diplomatic
effectiveness.
- However,
physical presence is one factor among many in diplomatic success. The nature
and effectiveness of initiatives, including both traditional and
non-traditional tools like digital diplomacy, play important roles.
- Evaluating
diplomacy requires a holistic, long-term approach. Focusing solely on any
single index has limitations.
- Seeking
global impact or regional influence is a strategic choice. Even with a middle
way, Australia, like many global and regional powers, chooses to focus on aspects
of the Indo-Pacific where it can exert the most significant influence, given
its resources and strategic interests.
- While
Australia’s diplomatic network leaves room for expansion, its strong soft power
and nation brand rankings highlight other areas of strength.
- There
are acknowledged challenges within Australia’s diplomatic apparatus, including
underfunding, understaffing and a lack of clear strategic direction in some
areas. The limited diplomatic network may be a symptom of these issues, or it
could be an intentional choice reflecting a focus on maximising influence
within the Indo-Pacific region.
- In
short, the index provides valuable data on diplomatic networks. However, it is
most useful when considered alongside other metrics that together provide a
comprehensive understanding of Australia’s diplomatic standing.
Introduction
The Global Diplomacy Index, a project by
the Lowy Institute, is a tool developed to map and compare the diplomatic
networks of countries worldwide. The index aims to quantify the diplomatic
reach of nations by cataloguing their embassies, consulates, multilateral
missions and other diplomatic posts around the world.
Launched in 2016 and now in its fifth edition, the index
provides data on how countries may prioritise their foreign policy objectives
through the establishment and maintenance of diplomatic missions. As of 2024,
the interactive tool assesses the diplomatic presence of 66 countries or territories,
specifically those in Asia, members of the Group of 20 (G20) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The index’s wide
coverage of traditional diplomatic networks allows for a broad overview of
where nations deploy their diplomatic resources. This provides insights into
the geographical focus of diplomatic efforts, comparisons between countries and
the evolution of networks over time. However, it is important to remember that
the index prioritises physical diplomatic presence, potentially overlooking
other influential factors in diplomacy.
Researchers, policymakers and the public can use the Global
Diplomacy Index to understand the distribution and density of diplomatic
missions globally, contributing to their analyses of trade, bilateral relations
and broader geopolitical strategies.
What the index is about
By the Lowy Institute’s own account,
the index is created with data gathered through desk research examining the
websites of foreign ministries of the included countries and territories,
alongside direct communications with these ministries, embassies and
consulates. For the 2024 iteration, such data was collected from July to
November 2023.
For inclusion in the index, diplomatic missions such as
embassies, high commissions, consulates-general and consulates must have a
resident head or chief of mission with formal accreditation in the host
country. This means the mission’s leader is directly employed by their home
country’s foreign ministry and stationed abroad specifically to perform their
duties. The index also counts permanent missions or delegations to key
multilateral organisations (such as the UN, EU, NATO and the OECD) and
representative offices in territories where formal diplomatic relations might
not exist, provided they meet similar criteria of having a dedicated resident head
of mission.
Key findings
The 2024 Global Diplomacy Index reveals a dynamic
physical landscape in international relations. The ongoing rivalry between
China and the US for diplomatic dominance is evident, with each superpower
focusing on distinct regions for influence. While China has a stronger foothold
in Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, the US maintains a solid presence in
Europe, the Americas and South Asia. By sheer numbers, China is edging ahead of
the US with 274 diplomatic posts, compared to the US’s 271 posts. Russia’s
diplomatic reach has notably diminished due to the war in Ukraine,
demonstrating the potential consequences of aggression on the international
stage.
Furthermore, the index highlights the rising ambitions of
middle powers such as Türkiye and India, both rapidly expanding their
diplomatic networks, with Türkiye primarily focusing on Europe and India on
Africa.
Simultaneously, Taiwan’s struggle to maintain formal
diplomatic recognition amidst pressure from China underscores the complexities
of geopolitics and the challenges faced by smaller nations. Geopolitical
competition also drives diplomatic activity in the Pacific Islands, which has
witnessed the fastest growth rate of diplomatic missions since 2017.
In particular, the 2024 Global Diplomacy Index presents a
discrepancy in Australia’s diplomatic posture. Despite its status as a
high-income middle power and a significant regional player, Australia’s
diplomatic network remains relatively small. Australia’s position as the 14th
largest global economy seems to contrast with its 26th place on the index.
Within the G20 group, Australia possesses the second-smallest diplomatic
network. Furthermore, the nation’s diplomatic focus remains heavily
concentrated within Asia and the Pacific Islands, leaving it seemingly
underrepresented in Africa, South America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and
Central Asia.
In a follow-up article, the index authors reiterate their concerns about Australia’s capacity to
respond effectively to emerging challenges and exert influence
outside its immediate region.
What the index is not about
Despite the valuable insights it offers, the index cannot
serve as the sole measure of a country’s diplomatic effectiveness – the same
can be said about any index of this kind. While providing a relatively
comprehensive overview of diplomatic networks, its specific limitations warrant
careful interpretation.
By design, the index only focuses on traditional embassies
and consulates, thereby excluding other forms of diplomatic representation
(such as honorary consulates or trade offices with consular functions).
Additionally, the index does not consider factors like embassy staffing levels
or the success of diplomatic initiatives – both of which are important to
assessing effectiveness. Note that boosting staffing was reportedly one of the key
recommendations in the most recent capability
review of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), for which the
late foreign policy expert Allan Gyngell was one of the consultants. The review
has not been released publicly.
The Lowy Institute acknowledges these
limitations, stressing the index’s focus on quantitative measurement. It also
suggests that users consult complementary tools, such as Lowy’s Asia Power
Index, in order to gain a broader understanding of diplomatic effectiveness.
The effectiveness of diplomatic missions extends beyond
their mere presence. It depends on the quality of diplomatic interactions, the
depth of relationships and the impact of diplomatic initiatives. In today’s
interconnected world, diplomacy reaches far beyond the establishment of
embassies and consulates. Non-traditional forms of diplomacy, such as digital
diplomacy, public diplomacy, sports diplomacy and cultural exchanges, play
important roles in shaping international relations and gaining international
reputation. Furthermore, the rise of non-state actors, enabled by online
platforms, can both support and challenge a nation’s diplomatic objectives.
Academic literature frequently highlights the limitations of
attempting to measure diplomatic effectiveness through quantitative means
alone. Prominent international relations scholars Andrew Cooper (University of
Waterloo), Jorge Heine (Wilfrid Laurier University) and Ramesh Thakur (Australian
National University) argue that the impact
of diplomacy can be subtle and long-term, making it difficult to capture in
a single index. They hold that the success of diplomatic initiatives often
depends on context-specific factors, including cultural nuances and historical
relationships, which are challenging to standardise and quantify across
different countries and regions.
Moreover, leading diplomacy scholars Bryan Hocking
(Loughborough University) and Jan Melissen (University of Antwerp) discuss the
evolving nature of diplomatic practices, emphasising that traditional metrics
may not
fully capture the effectiveness of new forms of diplomacy, such as digital
diplomacy. This further complicates the evaluation of a country’s diplomatic
footprint and influence, as digital engagements can amplify a country’s global
presence and impact in ways that traditional physical presences, such as
embassies, cannot.
The Lowy Institute Global Diplomacy Index, with its focus on
traditional diplomatic networks, is not designed to reflect the influence of
countries effectively applying these alternative diplomatic tools, nor does it account
for context-specific factors. For example, the diplomacy index ranks Singapore
52nd overall and 18th in Asia. However, in the Lowy’s own 2023 Asia Power
Index, it ranks 8th
out of 26, suggesting a strong capacity for influence despite its limited
size and resources. Another example is Sweden, which ranks 37th in the diplomacy
index, yet ranks 12th out of 193 in the 2024
Global Soft Power Index by Brand Finance. For context, the Global Soft
Power Index takes into account metrics that assess a country’s ability to
influence international actors, covering aspects such as economic stability,
global brand appeal, governance and contributions to global issues like climate
change.
The diplomacy index’s emphasis on middle powers like Türkiye
and India expanding their diplomatic networks provides a valuable data point. However,
this does not allow for an assessment of how effectively these countries can
translate this growth into tangible diplomatic influence and soft power. The
2024 Global Soft Power Index illustrates this challenge, where both countries’
rankings have declined.
Similarly, India’s position in the Asia Power Index
has also slipped since 2018, despite its network expansion.
The state of play at the Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Australia’s ranking on the Global Diplomacy Index corresponds
with several long-standing issues that observers of international relations
have raised about the Australian diplomatic apparatus.
One of the most significant of these criticisms is a history
of underinvestment in diplomacy, relative to the country’s economic power. Experts
have long expressed concern about the substantial implications underinvestment
has for Australia’s ability to shape
international affairs and protect
its interests globally.
Concerns over underfunding
and understaffing in DFAT and Australia’s diplomatic corps have persisted
for over a decade. Since 2009, the Lowy Institute’s consistent identification
of a ‘diplomatic
deficit‘ underscores the mismatch between Australia’s global presence and
its economic standing. Graeme Dobell (Australian Strategic Policy Institute) argues
that this underfunding has resulted in a halving
of spending on diplomacy as a proportion of the Commonwealth budget over 3
decades, stressing a combination of determinants, including political
decisions, the evolution of Australia’s national security system and broader
systemic changes such as globalisation and the digital era. Building on the
2023–24 Budget, which allocated an additional A$457 million for DFAT operations
over the forward estimates and a total of A$4.77 billion for official
development assistance (ODA), the 2024-25 Budget includes an additional A$254 million
to enhance the foreign service and A$4.91
billion for ODA. This represents a nominal year-on-year increase of 4% to
foreign aid, but the change is minimal
in real terms after adjusting for inflation. It remains to be seen whether
this will be seen as sufficiently addressing the longstanding budget deficit.
Given that Australia, like most other OECD donor countries, utilises
foreign aid to advance both strategic and development objectives, critics
have targeted the strategic direction and capability of Australia’s foreign aid
and development efforts. Development experts broadly agree that DFAT needs to rebuild
its development capabilities to ensure a more strategic, adaptable,
transparent and well-resourced approach. The Development Policy Centre’s
analysis of Australia’s new international development policy (2023) emphasises
that the policy reflects a struggle to balance
competing priorities. Australia attempts to reconcile governmental
aspirations for aid, civil society’s values, DFAT’s geopolitical considerations
and the increasing influence of China. Balancing these factors, along with
commitments to climate finance and gender equality, while operating within
tight budget constraints, results in a policy that can appear overextended and
raises questions about its feasibility and effectiveness.
On an operational and organisational level, DFAT
has faced criticism for its limited internal capacity to formulate policy
solutions and its lack of integration with other government agencies. In a 2022
discussion series by the Lowy Institute, analysts proposed a few
recommendations. Emphasising the need for a diverse workforce, one key
suggestion was for DFAT to increase its linguistic and cultural capabilities by
incorporating staff from varied backgrounds, highlighting particularly the
importance of Mandarin and Cantonese speakers. To address concerns of
insularity, analysts suggested promoting greater collaboration with other
government agencies and opening overseas postings to external candidates,
thereby infusing DFAT with fresh insights and broadening its perspective.
Furthermore, analysts advocated for structural reforms, such
as the creation of a cross-agency taskforce for trade and economic
diversification, alongside ensuring strategic positions are continually filled
to support robust policy development. Encouraging a culture of innovation and adopting
modern talent management strategies are seen as essential to attracting and
retaining top talent, in response to the challenges of a competitive labour
market. It is unclear, however, whether DFAT has considered any of these
recommendations.
Australia navigating the index
Australia’s relatively limited diplomatic network may be a
symptom of issues with the whole diplomatic apparatus, or it could represent an
intentional choice, which is typical
of a quintessential middle power like Australia.
The index authors advocate for a broader global
expansion of Australia’s diplomatic network, citing ongoing and future
global crises outside Australia’s current reach.
This is part of the discussion that underlines a broader
issue within Australia’s foreign service – balancing the strategic focus on
immediate regional interests with the need to engage more broadly on the global
stage. The case of Türkiye illustrates this point. As noted in the index, Türkiye’s
recent network expansion has focused on the Middle East and Africa, reflecting
its strategic interests in those areas.
Widening or deepening Australia’s
diplomatic footprint
The debate over whether Australia, as a middle power, should
prioritise the width (that is, a broad, global diplomatic presence) over the
depth (specialised expertise and deep engagement in specific areas) of its
diplomatic network must be grounded in the context of limited resources and
evolving global challenges. Any choice would entail inherent trade-offs and
strategic implications.
On the one hand, emphasising the width of Australia’s
diplomatic network by maintaining a broad, global presence could bolster its
ability to influence a wide range of international issues, engage with diverse
actors and respond to emerging global crises. A wider diplomatic footprint would
support Australia’s commitment to multilateralism and a rules-based
international order, allowing it to participate actively across various
regional and global platforms. However, spreading resources too thinly may
dilute Australia’s impact, resulting in a breadth of engagement that lacks the
depth necessary to effect substantive change in any single area. According to a
2012 inquiry by the
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, the funding
of an expanded diplomatic footprint would require careful consideration to
address several key challenges, including reallocating resources, the potential
for closing existing posts to open new ones and alternative funding mechanisms,
including user-pays systems. Increased funding alone may not sufficiently
address the need for deeper engagement in Australia’s diplomatic efforts. While
advocating for an increased diplomatic footprint, former
ambassador James Wise noted, ‘a footprint can become broader but still
remain very shallow’.
On the other hand, based on other middle powers’
experiences, focusing on the depth of its diplomatic network could enable
Australia to exploit
its strengths in niche areas where it can make a significant impact, such
as climate change, international trade, peacekeeping and regional security in
the Asia-Pacific. Specialised expertise could enhance Australia’s reputation as
a mediator
or coalition-builder in these domains, fostering deeper, more meaningful
engagements in international forums and negotiations. However, this approach
may risk narrowing Australia’s global influence and its ability to respond to a
broader range of international issues. Prioritising depth over width could
potentially limit Australia’s flexibility in foreign policy and diminish its
visibility in regions or on issues outside its areas of concentrated expertise,
which is in line with the index authors’ concerns.
A middle way with a clear focus
Yet, given budget constraints, there are cost-effective
tools to both deepen and widen diplomatic presence beyond the physical
footprint. ‘Track
2 diplomacy‘ and ‘track
1.5 diplomacy’ are valuable examples. While track 1.5 involves dialogue
between government and non-government representatives, track 2 diplomacy is
non-official engagement between individuals or groups from various sectors,
such as academics, non-governmental organisations (NGO), former government
officials and civil society representatives. They can help build trust and
address sensitive bilateral issues outside official diplomatic channels. Such
an approach complements formal diplomacy and can quickly
fill gaps in the foreign policy framework, building genuine friendships
that can overcome difficult issues.
Public diplomacy, a facet of foreign policy aimed at
engaging and influencing foreign publics, has been an indispensable component
of Australia’s
international engagement efforts. With a view to deepening people-to-people
links and supporting economic objectives, Australia has embraced public
diplomacy through cultural initiatives, educational programs, sports exchanges
and science collaboration. The New Colombo Plan (NCP), for example, plays a
significant role in Australia’s public
diplomacy strategy by supporting Australian undergraduates to study and
work in the Indo-Pacific region. Through scholarships and a mobility program,
the NCP fosters cultural literacy and professional skills among participants,
making it an effective tool for building future leaders with a comprehensive
understanding of the Indo-Pacific. It also serves as a mechanism for promoting
a positive image of Australia internationally, by fostering genuine
dialogue and mutual understanding.
However, a major challenge with employing non-traditional diplomacy
and similar initiatives is that it requires time and
sustained effort to mature. While it offers a flexible and dynamic way to
engage with other nations, its informal nature may not always align with formal
diplomatic goals and policy settings. Moreover, it takes time to build
deep and personal connections across cultural and language barriers and the
impact of these efforts may not be immediately visible. All of this reinforces
the view that it takes a longitudinal effort to realise the effect of
diplomacy.
Exploring a flexible middle way that harmonises the depth
and width of Australia’s diplomatic network presents a strategic opportunity to
navigate the complexities of global engagement as a middle power. By
identifying core areas where Australia possesses or can develop substantial
expertise and leadership potential – such as climate policy, regional security
and trade – while also maintaining a capable and responsive presence in a broad
set of international forums, Australia can craft a foreign policy that is both
focused and flexible.
In implementing a middle-way approach with constrained
resources, Australia’s diplomatic strategy would benefit from focusing on
strategic prioritisation, efficient resource allocation, innovative diplomacy, tapping
into partner networks and multilateralism and maintaining adaptive and
responsive diplomacy. Strategic prioritisation is fundamental to Australia’s diplomatic
approach. Even within the framework of a middle-way approach, establishing
clear priorities is crucial for effectively navigating international
engagements. For instance, Australia has identified climate change as a core
interest, leading to its active role in international climate negotiations and
initiatives like the Climate
and Clean Energy Window, which aims to bolster joint efforts with ASEAN
partners on climate change and clean energy. Similarly, Australia’s leadership
in advocating for a free and open Indo-Pacific denotes its prioritisation of
regional security, demonstrating how focusing on key areas can enhance its
global stance and influence.
There is a strong case for Australia to focus on the
Indo-Pacific region, which houses over half of the global population, nearly
two-thirds of the world's economic output and 7 of the largest militaries. Regional
and global powers are increasingly formulating comprehensive Indo-Pacific
strategies to address the multifaceted challenges and opportunities in this
region marked by dynamic geopolitical shifts and economic potential. These
strategies are not only a response to the evolving power dynamics, particularly
with China’s rise, but also a reflection of the strategic importance of the
Indo-Pacific in global trade, security and international relations.
The US has been active in shaping its Indo-Pacific
Strategy (IPS), focusing on fostering a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. Through
the IPS, the US has deepened
its partnerships and initiated new ones, notably with the Quad (Australia,
Japan, India and the US) and AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom and the US),
besides upgrading its engagement with ASEAN and Vietnam into Comprehensive
Strategic Partnerships (CSP) while enhancing its alliances with the Philippines
and Thailand.
South Korea has announced its own Indo-Pacific strategy, Strategy for
a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, highlighting a
decisive shift from its previous
stance of strategic ambiguity towards a more clear-cut foreign policy
direction. This approach emphasises the dual strategy of addressing both North
Korea and China, while also seeking to bolster South Korea’s role as a global
pivotal state. This involves expanding diplomatic and economic ties beyond
traditional partners, deepening strategic cooperation with key regions in the
Indo-Pacific such as Southeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania. Under this
strategy, South Korea will engage in a wider range of bilateral and
multilateral initiatives, contributing to the strengthening of the rules-based
international order.
Canada has also launched its Indo-Pacific Strategy with a
vision to act in
its national interest while defending its values. This strategy outlines a
commitment of almost C$2.3 billion over 5 years, focusing on trade, investment
and supply chain resilience as well as a sustainable and green future. Canada
is set to enhance its
engagement capabilities across the Indo-Pacific, focusing notably on
Australia, ASEAN members, China, India, Japan, Pacific Island nations, South
Korea and New Zealand.
Given its geographical location and strategic interests, the
Indo-Pacific is where Australia can potentially exert the most significant
influence and contribute to regional security, stability and prosperity. This
approach aligns with the principle of ‘playing to one’s strengths’ by focusing
on areas where Australia can make the most difference. In May 2023, a Lowy Institute
article penned by its own staff noted that Australia’s diplomatic success
requires more than just financial investment, suggesting that DFAT makes
strategic cuts to focus on the Indo-Pacific. This apparent contradiction
between the Lowy Global Diplomacy Index, which prioritises the global expansion
of Australia’s diplomatic network and the Lowy Institute’s own recommendation for
an Indo-Pacific focus, highlights the multifaceted nature of diplomacy and the
challenges of capturing its effectiveness through a single metric.
Building on partnerships and engaging in multilateralism are
cornerstones of Australia’s diplomatic efforts. This collaborative approach
amplifies Australia’s influence beyond what it could achieve independently,
pooling resources for greater impact and underlining its commitment to a
rules-based international order. As an example, Australia actively takes part
in multilateral and regional trade initiatives like the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). To
promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, Australia also participates in various security
pacts and platforms, including the Quad, AUKUS as well as ASEAN-led mechanisms
such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence
Ministers’ Meeting Plus. Additionally, its comprehensive strategic partnerships
with countries like Singapore, Indonesia, India, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia, South
Korea and Vietnam underscore its regional engagement. This strategic direction
is in line with recent foreign policy pronouncements, including the Defence
strategic review and DFAT’s new international
development policy.
As for the index authors’ concern about global issues out of
Australia’s diplomatic reach, one may argue that strategically utilising
established mechanisms like dual accreditation, honorary consuls and
third-country embassies could effectively address these less frequent or
non-permanent issues. This approach uses existing resources and diplomatic
infrastructure like the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, potentially
mitigating the need for a large-scale and costly global network expansion. For
example, under the Canada-Australia
Consular Services Sharing Agreement, Australians can seek consular services
from Canadian offices in 15 locations.
In relation to international crises, Ingo Henneberg (University
of Freiburg) highlights the effectiveness
of International Contact Groups (ICG) in managing international conflicts
through ad hoc coordination, noting a trend towards enlargement and
regionalisation since 1977 with 27 ICGs formed. It highlights the ICGs’ role in
enhancing multi-actor coordination, as seen in the case of the ICG for the
Central African Republic. A study by Sreeja Nair and Akshat Garg (National
University of Singapore) on the role of international ad hoc groups during SARS
and COVID-19 found that these
groups enhanced crisis response in several Asian countries, including
Taiwan, Vietnam and Singapore, by facilitating information sharing and
communication with stakeholders. These insights may be useful for Australia in
crisis management beyond its diplomatic posts.
Innovation in diplomacy has become increasingly important
given resource constraints. Australia’s interest in global issues like climate
change, trade and international security does require a global presence, but
this does not necessarily mean having a physical diplomatic post in every
country. In the digital age, diplomacy can also be conducted through virtual
engagements, summits and international coalitions on specific issues. Besides
public diplomacy, digital diplomacy, illustrated by DFAT’s active use
of social media and digital platforms, helps extend and deepen Australia’s
reach and engagement globally.
An adaptive and responsive diplomatic approach is vital for navigating
the fluid global landscape. Australia’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic,
including its participation in global
vaccine access initiatives and regional
support mechanisms, demonstrated its ability to adapt to emergent crises
swiftly. Such agility ensures Australia remains a relevant and proactive
participant in addressing immediate and long-term international challenges.
In essence, a balanced approach not only reflects Australia’s
pragmatic recognition of its capacities and limitations as a middle power but
also its aspiration to contribute meaningfully to shaping the international
order. This nuanced, strategic balance could allow Australia to maximise its
impact, contributing significantly to its areas of strength while retaining the
flexibility to engage on a wide range of issues. This ensures it remains a
pivotal player on the global stage, adept at navigating between its regional
interests and global responsibilities.
Australia’s significant improvement in the 2024 Brand
Finance Global Soft Power Index, alongside its stable performance in the Nation Brands Index
over the last 2 years, points to its capacity to exert significant global and
regional influence beyond mere numerical strength. The rise in rankings,
particularly the notable jump in the 2024 Soft Power Index, reflects its
attempts to apply soft power through culture, values and foreign policy to enhance
its regional and global standing. However, it is essential to remember that these
indices measure perception, based on large-scale surveys and interviews. What
matters more is the tangible impact of Australia’s diplomatic initiatives in
addressing global challenges and advancing its interests on the world stage.
Therefore, a holistic assessment of Australia’s diplomacy requires looking
beyond rankings and considering how well its actions translate into meaningful
results.
The bigger picture
The issue of underfunding in foreign affairs, including ODA,
has been observed in several developed and developing countries, including the UK,
the US, France,
Germany
and India. In particular, many OECD donor members have faced
challenges in meeting the 0.7% ODA to GNI target, which was first agreed upon
in 1970. As of 2021, collective
GNI allocated to the least developed countries (LDCs) stood at only 0.09%,
below the commitment range of 0.15% to 0.20% set in 1981. In 2023, Australia’s
development aid budget was A$4.7 billion, which is 0.19% of GNI and 0.7% of
federal budget. This positioned Australia 28th among 32 Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) members in terms of ODA as a percentage of GNI.
As for the US, experts hold that it has faced ongoing
challenges in adequately funding its diplomatic and foreign affairs
initiatives. This situation is often perceived not as an anomaly
but as a persistent element of its foreign policy structure. The root
causes of this underfunding are multifaceted, encompassing not only a scarcity
of financial resources but also a discernible lack of political support for
diplomatic initiatives, coupled with a historical inclination
towards military
rather than diplomatic solutions. The Biden Administration’s request for a
modest 1% increase in the 2025 international affairs budget signals a cautious
approach amidst a tight budget environment, potentially affecting funding
for crucial sectors such as humanitarian and economic development. This raises
questions about whether this funding shortfall can guarantee the US ability to
pursue its international objectives through diplomatic means. In contrast,
after years of decline, China’s foreign affairs budget in 2024 increased by
6.6%, amounting to US$8.8 billion, after a year-on-year increase of more than 16%
in 2023.
South Korea provides another example. Its 2024 budget for the
foreign ministry has been set at 4.19 trillion won (US$3.21 billion), reflecting
a 25%
year-on-year increase. The budget includes a 39.2% increase in development
aid, doubling humanitarian aid for crises and the Ukraine conflict and a 28.5%
rise in aid for Africa. This increased funding aligns with South Korea’s
aspirations to become a global pivotal state, as detailed in its Strategy for a
Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo-Pacific. Accordingly, South Korea aims
to join the world’s top 10 aid donors in terms of ODA volume. Experts believe
that if South Korea continues its upward trajectory in ODA funding, it will surpass
Australia within 5 years in terms of ODA-GNI. Note that even though South
Korea is ranked higher than Australia on this diplomacy index, the number of
its diplomatic posts has seen only minimal increases since 2016, as have its
rankings. This once again suggests that there are other ways to exert diplomatic
influence beyond simply expanding one’s footprint.
Conclusion
Evaluating diplomatic effectiveness poses significant
challenges, largely due to the multifaceted and often intangible nature of
diplomacy itself. Indices like the Lowy Institute’s Global Diplomacy Index
offer valuable insights but inherently embody a certain level of subjectivity,
as they attempt to quantify aspects of diplomacy that are complex and nuanced.
This is because diplomatic influence and effectiveness extend beyond physical
presence or the number of diplomatic missions and encompass soft power elements,
the quality of diplomatic interactions and the strategic outcomes of diplomatic
engagements.
In light of these considerations, it is important to view indices
like the Global Diplomacy Index as providing one perspective among many, rather
than as definitive assessments of diplomatic effectiveness. They represent a
starting point for discussion, rather than a conclusive ranking and should be
complemented with qualitative analyses and contextual understanding to gain a
comprehensive view of a country’s diplomatic strategy and influence. This
approach acknowledges the inherent complexity and subjectivity in evaluating
diplomatic practices and encourages a more nuanced consideration of what
constitutes effective diplomacy in the contemporary international landscape.
Addressing Australia’s diplomatic challenges depends on
aligning strategic interests with resources, across both traditional and
non-traditional channels, especially when high-cost initiatives are not
feasible. Australia’s varied rankings across different indices highlight the
multifaceted nature of this assessment.
While increased funding would doubtless be welcomed and
enable an expanded diplomatic network, Australia may achieve greater impact by
prioritising staffing, skill development and targeted initiatives, guided by a
strong performance and delivery framework that includes public consultations.
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