Chapter 3
Combating crime in the Southern Ocean
3.1
While the committee received no evidence indicating threats from
terrorism, people smuggling or other transnational crime in the Southern Ocean,
the vast and scarcely monitored waters to Australia's south remain open to
threats which would be hard to detect and even harder to respond to.
Australia's large proximate border and maritime sovereign jurisdiction creates
a unique need to monitor activities and protect our interests there.
3.2
Meanwhile there are crimes taking place about which Australia is well
aware. The scourge of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in
southern waters was a prominent theme in the submissions made, as was the need
for Australia to maintain a deterrent and monitoring presence in response to
future lethal whaling.
Illegal fishing
3.3
The Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters offer a unique and lucrative
source of fish for both legal and illegal operators. Australian fisheries lie in
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) around Macquarie Island and around the
territory of Heard Island and McDonald Islands (HIMI), which generate some $50-$80
million annually from Patagonian toothfish and mackerel icefish, presently harvested
by two licensed Australian companies.[1]
The Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) advised that one
Australian company had also applied to CCAMLR for permission to fish for
Antarctic toothfish in the Ross Sea area of the Antarctic high seas, commencing
in December 2014.[2]
3.4
The Southern Ocean also supports an enormous population of Antarctic
krill, which is not presently fished by Australian companies but is an area of
existing and increasing interest among others who fish for krill on the high
seas. In their submission Dr Sam Bateman and Dr Anthony Bergin described the
Antarctic krill fishery as 'the largest underexploited fishery in the world'
and one that was most likely to become the major focus of increased illegal
exploitation in the Southern Ocean.[3]
3.5
In their submissions, the Department of Agriculture and AFMA noted that
portions of the Southern Ocean off the coast of South Australia and around
Macquarie Island and HIMI also formed part of Australia's southern bluefin tuna
fishery, one of Australia's most valuable fisheries, with exports valued at
over $150 million in 2011-12. Parts of the Southern Ocean were in addition
encompassed within the high seas fisheries managed by a number of other regional
fisheries management organisations.[4]
3.6
The issues raised during the inquiry were, however, generally focused on
the Australian Macquarie Island and HIMI fisheries, and Antarctic waters under
the CCAMLR area of competence.
3.7
The fisheries regime in Antarctic waters is unique, being governed under
the CAMLR Convention. Unlike other regional fisheries arrangements, the CAMLR
Convention is first and foremost a conservation agreement, but it is one which
also operates as a fisheries management treaty, providing for 'rational use' of
Antarctic marine living resources under an ecosystem-based approach to the
protection of all marine life in the Southern Ocean. Australia's priorities
within CCAMLR therefore marry environmental objectives, such as the establishment
and maintenance of marine protected areas, with continued sustainable access
for Australian fishers to the resources of the HIMI fishery, and action to
prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.[5]
The Department of the Environment explained that 'Australia is a fishing
country with a strong conservation agenda, and is focused on maintaining an appropriate
balance with regard to CCAMLR's objectives'.[6]
3.8
Mr Martin Exel from Austral Fisheries, one of the Australian companies
operating in the southern toothfish and mackerel fisheries, provided a positive
assessment of the state of legal fishing in Australia's southern maritime
jurisdiction: 'We are very confident that stocks are healthy and things are
going right'.[7]
This was confirmed by AFMA, who verified that the fisheries were well-managed
and not overfished.[8]
Australia's Macquarie Island and HIMI fisheries are independently certified as
sustainable and well-managed by the international Marine Stewardship Council.[9]
3.9
Submissions and evidence welcomed Australia's efforts to eradicate
illegal fishing in Australian waters, notably in the HIMI EEZ. AFMA advised
that between 1997 and 2005, Australia apprehended nine large industrial foreign
fishing vessels in the Southern Ocean.[10]
Australia also played a leading role during this period in the development by
CCAMLR of a comprehensive suite of measures against IUU fishing in its area of
responsibility.[11]
Since 2005 no IUU fishing had been detected in the Macquarie Island or HIMI EEZs.[12]
Speaking on behalf of the fishing industry, Mr Exel affirmed this outcome and commended
Australia's 'exceptional' efforts to combat IUU fishing.[13]
3.10
At the same time both Australian fishing companies emphasised to the
committee the importance of continued vigilance against IUU fishing, to protect
the previous investment made in that regard.[14]
The industry noted its own efforts to collectively respond to the threat of IUU
fishing, originally through the ISOFISH grouping and more recently through
establishment of the Coalition of Legal Toothfish Operators (COLTO), which
worked with CCAMLR and relevant governments toward eliminating IUU fishing and
ensuring the continued sustainability of the legal industry.[15]
3.11
The government agreed that continued IUU fishing activity on the high
seas remained a concern.[16]
Ms Gillian Slocum from the Australian Antarctic Division (AAD) confirmed that the
Australian government was aware of the 'continuing, persistent problem' of IUU
vessels operating in adjacent waters.[17]
CCAMLR maintains a list of IUU vessels which currently numbers 18, at least
eight of which have been recently observed operating in the CCAMLR area close
to the HIMI EEZ.[18]
Other witnesses concurred with the assessment that IUU fishing remained a
significant concern on the southern high seas, and was potentially increasing.
3.12
In addition to the economic cost of IUU fishing, the Department of the Environment
and AFMA both expressed concern that IUU vessels in the Southern Ocean tended
to use demersal gillnets to catch Patagonian toothfish, a method particularly
destructive to other marine and bird life, and therefore prohibited by CCAMLR.[19]
The Department of the Environment noted that Australia's extended continental
shelf off its HIMI territory was an important toothfish habitat and an area in
which large-scale IUU fishing took place. The department assessed that
It is likely that fishing practices empoloyed by IUU fishers
are having an impact on benthic species on the Continental Shelf and possibly
long term impacts on Australia's interests including benthic habitats. It is in
Australia's interests to better exercise control over the extended continental
shelf.[20]
3.13
Australia's response to IUU fishing is a multifaceted one, encompassing
on-water surveillance and enforcement, regional and international cooperation,
diplomatic representations, in-country education and capacity building. AFMA asserted
that its Southern Ocean program had evolved over many years and each component
was integral to its success.[21]
Surveillance and patrolling
3.14
Much of the evidence placed great importance on surveillance and patrolling
within Australia's Macquarie Island and HIMI fisheries to continue to protect
them from IUU fishing.
3.15
Beyond Australia's EEZ, the committee was advised that Australia held certain
obligations and powers to act against IUU fishing on the high seas, within the
terms of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement[22]
and regional fisheries agreements such as the CAMLR Convention,[23]
although AFMA conceded that the conditions on these arrangements made high seas
interception more challenging.[24]
On the water
3.16
From 2006-10, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
(ACBPS) patrol vessel Ocean Protector conducted between three and five
patrols each year in the Southern Ocean. In the 2010-11 and 2011-12 financial
years, this was reduced to two patrols per year, due mainly to diversion of the
ship to duties in Australia's northern waters, principally the transport of
illegal maritime arrivals. The ship was also tasked to support other law
enforcement and humanitarian missions in Australian waters during those years.
The Ocean Protector last patrolled the Southern Ocean in February 2012,
and since then has undertaken all of its patrol days in Australia's northern
waters.[25]
3.17
Several submissions expressed grave concern that there had been no
maritime patrols conducted by Australia in the Southern Ocean in over two
years, and that Australia's only maritime vessel suited for Southern Ocean
operations now spent all its time elsewhere.
3.18
Mr Eldene O'Shea, a student at the University of Tasmania, was motivated
to make a submission expressing his concerns about what he saw as a weakening
Australian response to IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. Mr O'Shea believed it
was important for Australia, as one of the few CCAMLR members with territorial
waters within the Convention area, to maintain a strong physical presence to
prevent and deter IUU fishing. He noted that an independent study had assessed
Australian agencies as among the most important organisations in the world for
preventing IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. Mr O'Shea assessed that in light
of the absence of border protection assets in recent years, however, Australia
was 'effectively opening the Southern Ocean back up for exploitation by IUU
fishing vessels'.[26]
3.19
Indeed, Mr O'Shea questioned the validity of CCAMLR and ACBPS reporting
that there were no IUU vessels presently operating in Australia's HIMI fishery:
ACBPS reporting that no vessels were spotted during the
previous year does not mean that there are no vessels operating, what it does
show is that Australia is not finding them.[27]
3.20
Austral Fisheries expressed concern that dedicated funding previously
provided to AFMA for its patrol program had been directed elsewhere, with a
potential loss of $2 million per annum earmarked for patrolling against IUU
fishing in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic region.[28]
3.21
In its submissions, Australian government agencies acknowledged that
competing priorities had prevented on-water surveillance by Australian border
protection assets in recent years. However, they noted that maritime patrolling
of Australia's HIMI EEZ continued to take place during that time under the
terms of bilateral arrangements between Australia and France.
3.22
In 2005, a bilateral agreement entered into force between Australia and
France which established a framework for cooperation in the surveillance of
fishing vessels and in fisheries-related scientific research within the
adjoining waters of Australia's HIMI fishery and the French territories on the
Kerguelen Plateau.[29]
A subsequent agreement which took effect in 2011 enhanced these arrangements by
enabling enforcement personnel from each party to deploy on the other's vessel
patrols, and to undertake cooperative enforcement activities such as
apprehension, boarding and hot pursuit.[30]
3.23
AFMA indicated that since these agreements entered into force, AFMA and
ACBPS officers had been routinely deployed on French patrols, which took place
on average four times per year. This had enabled cooperative enforcement to be
undertaken including the apprehension of an IUU vessel from the Republic of
Korea fishing in France's EEZ in 2013.[31]
3.24
The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) described these
agreements as 'a very innovative and useful legal basis for engaging in
cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities'.[32]
Mr Roman Quadvlieg from ACBPS offered the view that 'the collaboration between
the French and us in terms of identification of potential fishing threats and
agreements and discussions around responses has been very good.'[33]
3.25
On the other hand, others were critical that Australia's maritime
patrolling now relied entirely on Australia's participation in vessel patrols
by France under the bilateral arrangement. This delegated the timing and
frequency of Australian patrolling of its waters to another nation's control,
and limited Australian maritime surveillance to the geographic area around the
adjacent HIMI and Kerguelen Plateau jurisdictions.[34]
Dr Bateman went so far as to describe Australia as 'freeloading' on the
French over the past two and a half years.[35]
3.26
DFAT advised, however, that France had not expressed any concerns to
Australia in that regard.[36]
The ACBPS was also at pains to dispel the concerns expressed:
it is a long-term relationship that we have with the French;
it is 10 years or more. Also, the relationship has multi elements. It is
satellite coverage. I guess its crown jewel is surface assets and
cross-secondments of our officers onto our respective vessels. There is other
work that we share in the intelligence space. There is other cooperative work
that we do in terms of our own aerial surveillance flights. Let me come back to
the issue that has been touched upon a couple of times around cooperative
patrols. Yes, we have not had a large vessel in the Southern Ocean since
January-February 2012. Prior to that, the French and us both had assets in the
Southern Ocean at various times and there were cross-secondments of officers on
those vessels. In the last couple of years, we have had officers embarked on
French vessels. We have not been able to conduct our own patrols to embark
French officers onto; however—and I need to emphasise this point—we have had
very intimate and regular discussions with the French over the last couple of
years in relation to this issue. They fully appreciate and are sympathetic to
the priorities that we have in terms of our north-western corridors and dealing
with our maritime people-smuggling threats. They have shown much grace and
tolerance in allowing us to focus our assets towards that particular threat.
They are now heartened by the fact that Operation Sovereign Borders has reduced
that to almost zero trickle, and they are very much looking forward to the two
40 day patrols that we have planned upon which they will embark officers. It is
a very mature, very longstanding and very collaborative relationship with the
French.[37]
3.27
Austral Fisheries acknowledged that scientific assistance from Australia
to France had been 'significant', in return for increased dependence on French
patrol resources, while emphasising the importance of ensuring an appropriate
balance in the cooperative arrangement.[38]
3.28
In its submission, AFMA mentioned that in 2011 Australian officers
participated in a New Zealand patrol in the high seas area of the Ross Sea,
within the CCAMLR area of competence.[39]
Noting the importance of an on-sea presence, AFMA recommended that Australia
should consider putting in place more collaborative surveillance and
enforcement arrangements with like-minded states in the Southern Ocean, such as
New Zealand and South Africa.[40]
3.29
The ACBPS is in the process of acquiring eight new Cape class patrol
boats, which will replace and improve upon the Bay class fleet they are
replacing.[41]
While these vessels are not suited for operations in the Southern Ocean and
Antarctic waters, the ACBPS advised the committee that it was hoped they would
assist in freeing up the Ocean Shield to undertake patrolling duties in
the Southern Ocean. Mr Roman Quaedvlieg from ACBPS advised the committee that ACBPS
planned to conduct two 40-day patrols of the Southern Ocean on the Ocean
Shield this financial year, subject to other demands.[42]
3.30
During the inquiry some discussion was held about the possibility of deepening
cooperation with the commercial fishing sector for collaborative use of its
vessels to increase Australia's presence in the Southern Ocean for other
purposes, including surveillance and patrolling. While this was already taking
place and potentially able to be further explored for scientific research (see
chapter 4), the idea of utilising fishing vessels for security monitoring and
law enforcement was met with more caution. In fact, Australian fishing vessels
already carry official observers who monitor their voyages for IUU fishing.
While such monitoring and reporting roles were feasible:
...you would encounter some difficulties if it were to be law
enforcement as well. For a start, vessels can only undertake law enforcement at
sea if they are a warship or a vessel that is clearly marked as being on
government service. I think you could start running into some conflicts of
interest between the commercial side of things and the government side of
things if you were to go as far as to expect the vessel to undertake any law
enforcement other than, of course, a reporting role. A reporting role could be
important in itself.[43]
3.31
Possible cooperation with non-government organisations was also
canvassed. The Department of the Environment advised that environmental and
industry organisations including the World Wildlife Fund, the Antarctic and
Southern Ocean Coalition and COLTO had played a 'significant role' in
awareness-raising, information sharing and interdiction of IUU activities in
port or at sea. The department said that the government collaborated closely
with both non-government and industry organisations in that regard.[44]
3.32
Mr Jeff Hansen from Sea Shepherd Australia provided examples from
elsewhere in the world in which his organisation worked in cooperation with
local authorities, to the extent of providing vessels and volunteer crew to
local enforcement officers to allow them to act against illegal fishing.[45]
In the air
3.33
Above the water, the committee heard that other forms of surveillance
such as satellite monitoring and aerial patrols had been increasingly utilised
in recent years to detect illegal fishing and enable tracking and response. Mr Peter
Venslovas from AFMA advised that aerial surveillance had become very useful in
identifying IUU vessels in order to approach partners in port or market states
for further action. Mr Venslovas stated that since February 2012, 35 such
representations had been made to regional partners in South-East Asia, with
resulting action taken against six vessels.[46]
3.34
AFMA also highlighted the importance of satellite surveillance both
within the Southern Ocean and to trace IUU vessel movements in transit,[47]
and ACBPS advised of a contract between Australia and France on satellite
monitoring, under which Australia obtained access to 'almost live' data
covering nine million nautical square miles per year in the Southern Ocean.[48]
3.35
The committee noted that the planned acquisition by the Australian
Defence Force of a number of Triton unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) was another
example of an aerial asset that may be useful in monitoring illegal activity in
the southern waters. Air Vice-Marshal Gavin Davies, Deputy Chief of the Air
Force, confirmed that the Triton UAV would have the range and capacity to
operate in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica.[49]
3.36
DFAT explained to the committee that an expanded understanding of the
legal concept of 'hot pursuit' was being introduced, including in the
Australia-France agreements, which would enable pursuit of vessels for law
enforcement:
by so-called technical means, which could be pilotless aerial
vehicles or satellites. As technology is evolving and becoming cheaper it opens
up the possibility for commencement of surveillance and enforcement activities
at vastly lower cost than is currently the case without necessarily having
on-the-water presence in our EEZ around Heard Island and McDonald Island... We
see that as an important and useful development, which may into the future
render less significance to the extent to which a state may have an
on-the-water presence in a particular EEZ.[50]
3.37
The committee heard that there were nonetheless legal and practical
limits on the utility of non-vessel methods of surveillance and law enforcement
in the region. Mr Venslovas explained to the committee that with regard to IUU fishers
within Australia's EEZ:
In order to get the evidence necessary to undertake
prosecution, you first of all have to identify who that person is, and to do
that from an aircraft is very, very challenging, almost impossible, because you
cannot identify the person through a radio interrogation, for example. You
cannot be sure that they are who they say they are. So, essentially, you need
to physically apprehend the person on the boat to identify who they are and
also to be able to take action in court based on the proofs of evidence that we
have to utilise—to prove those or apply to prove those proofs of the offence.[51]
3.38
Mr Venslovas further noted that Australian law makes provision for
forfeiture of IUU vessels in certain circumstances, but this required physical
apprehension of the vessel and its crew and its escort to the Australian
mainland.[52]
The committee was also advised that in the most recent port interception of an
IUU vessel in Malaysia, the FV Thunder, the vessel operator was fined
but the illegally poached toothfish were never recovered.[53]
Market and Port State Measures
3.39
As noted above, submissions recognised that actions against port and
market states constituted an important element in the suite of responses to IUU
fishing in the region. In its submission, AFMA stated that:
Recognising IUU fishing is highly organised, mobile and
elusive, AFMA sees regional cooperation by port and market states as central to
combating the problem by disrupting IUU operations at port and blocking the
flow of IUU catch into national and international markets.[54]
3.40
AFMA advised the committee that surveillance had yielded 'clear
evidence' that IUU fishing vessels were primarily using ports in the South-East
Asian region to unload catch and resupply.[55]
In recent years, Australia had worked with South-East Asian countries to
develop and implement the Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible
Fishing Practices including Combating Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing in the Region (RPOA-IUU). The RPOA-IUU provided a framework under
which Australia could cooperate with participating states to take action
against IUU vessels tracked from the Southern Ocean fisheries to their ports
and markets.[56]
3.41
Mr Ian Thompson from the Department of Agriculture advised that:
Vessels that are identified going to and from Antarctica have
to go into a port somewhere, and using powers at port we have had some success
in recent years in having countries like Malaysia or others in South-East Asia
that have been traditional ports of unloading either deny port entry or
undertake vessel inspections, which is making the operations of illegal fishers
on the high seas a lot more difficult, and that clearly is a far more
cost-effective means of interdicting illegal fishers than sending boats out
looking for them in the Southern Ocean. You wait for them to come in closer to
your waters and take them there. That cooperative arrangement, which has been
developing over the last probably 10 years, has started to bear fruit in the
last 12 months.[57]
3.42
In its submission, AFMA referred to 35 sightings of IUU vessels by
Australian surveillance and enforcement operations, leading to six actions
under the RPOA-IUU to intercept vessels in South-East Asian ports for inspection
and/or denial of entry since early 2012.[58]
AFMA emphasised the value and importance of Australia's continued active
involvement in the RPOA-IUU and its ongoing work to strengthen compliance
activities. AFMA also raised the possibility of extending such arrangements to
other port and market states, noting that evidence had also indicated IUU
vessels unloading catch from the Southern Ocean in African ports.[59]
3.43
Several submissions noted that a critical element in strengthening international
cooperation to combat IUU fishing was the Agreement on Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Port
State Measures Agreement). The Port State Measures Agreement was adopted under
the auspices of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in
2009, and is presently awaiting the 25 ratifications necessary to enter into
force.[60]
3.44
Under the Agreement, states parties undertake to apply minimum
harmonised standards against IUU fishing vessels in their ports, including the
refusal of entry to ships identified as IUU vessels by regional organisations. The
Agreement also provides a platform for states parties to share information and
to cooperate in various ways to block the flow of illegally caught fish to
markets.
3.45
Australia signed the agreement on 27 April 2010, but is yet to ratify
it. The agreement was examined by parliament's Joint Standing Committee on
Treaties in May 2014, and the committee recommended ratification of the
Agreement.[61]
3.46
In its submission and its evidence to the committee, EDO Tasmania called
for Australia to ratify the Port State Measures Agreement without further
delay. Ms Jess Feehely said ratification 'would be a significant statement by
the Australian government of its commitment to deter illegal fishing'.[62]
The Law Council of Australia likewise urged Australia to ratify the agreement,
stating that it would enhance Australia's international reputation as a
responsible fishing nation, as well as providing a basis for greater
cooperation with other states to reduce IUU fishing.[63]
AFMA also cited encouragement of other states to join the treaty as an
opportunity Australia should take to enhance the effectiveness of Australia's
activities against IUU fishing.[64]
3.47
Several submissions highlighted the work undertaken against IUU fishing
under the auspices of CCAMLR. The 20 Year Strategic Plan also did so, noting
the successes of the program and Australia's leading role in that regard. Dr
Press stated that:
Continued action by the Commission as a collective voice
against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing will need to continue to
avoid any resurgence as global market demand for fish increases. Australia's
continuing role as a champion in combating illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing will be critical for the Commission and the sustainable management of
marine living resources of the Antarctic.[65]
3.48
The committee was advised of broader diplomatic initiatives undertaken
to encourage action by other states against IUU fishing, notably in relation to
the flag states of vessels involved, and to support countries in the
implementation of international standards and processes through education and
capacity building. Action through INTERPOL to identify and respond to illegal
fisheries operations was another element in the suite of actions taking place.[66]
Committee View
3.49
The committee welcomes advice from ACBPS that with the acquisition of
new patrol vessels, it anticipates the re-commencement of patrolling in the
Southern Ocean, using the Ocean Shield. The committee strongly urges
that priority be given to patrolling the Southern Ocean to monitor, deter and
respond to transnational crime, particularly IUU fishing.
Recommendation 3
3.50
The committee recommends that Australia commits to re-commencing maritime
patrolling in the Southern Ocean, including a minimum of two 40-day patrols by
the Ocean Shield in the 2014-15 and 2015-16 financial years.
3.51
The committee recognises that resourcing for surveillance and patrol is
part of the overall question of the nature and management of Australia's
maritime assets in the Southern Ocean, which is addressed further in chapter 5.
3.52
Given the apparent constraints on Australia's ability to mobilise
vessels for adequate patrolling in the Southern Ocean, in response to both
illegal fishing and whaling, the committee believes that exploration of
enhanced partnerships for surveillance and patrol is well worthwhile.
Principally, the committee endorses the proposal for the pursuit of further
international arrangements for joint surveillance and enforcement building on
the success of the Australia-France model. New Zealand, South Africa and the
United States may represent priority countries for initial consideration in
that regard.
Recommendation 4
3.53
The committee recommends that Australia explores the possibility of
concluding new agreements with neighbouring and like-minded countries to
cooperate in patrol and deterrence in the Southern Ocean, based upon the
example of the arrangements presently in place with France.
3.54
The committee notes in that regard, however, that Australia must be
prepared to contribute its fair share to any bilateral arrangements, including
the extant agreements with France, by allocating appropriate resources to meet this
party's commitments to scientific, surveillance and operational collaboration.
3.55
In addition, while the committee recognises that there are limits on
feasible cooperation with commercial and non-government entities for law
enforcement purposes, the government should continue to identify and maximise
any opportunities that may arise for such mutual support.
3.56
The committee was encouraged by the evidence it received regarding the potential
of aerial technology to support Australia's security and law enforcement
objectives in the southern region. The committee believes that the quality and
affordability of technology in this field is likely to experience rapid
advancement in coming years. Air and satellite resources, including unmanned
aerial vehicles, may prove particularly well placed to support demands such as
those faced by Australia to surveil a vast area with limited resources.
Recommendation 5
3.57
The committee recommends that the government actively investigates the
potential for further use of non-vessel technologies, including consideration of
the potential application of new Defence assets, to support law enforcement and
border patrolling in the Southern Ocean.
Whaling
3.58
Evidence given to the committee on the issue of Southern Ocean whaling
repeatedly noted the long-held majority public opinion in Australia against
killing whales, and the importance of preservation and conservation of certain
whale species which had become endangered due to the proliferation of
commercial whaling in the early twentieth century. The committee was also
educated about the importance of whale populations to the overall functioning
of the Southern Ocean ecosystem, including the continued prosperity of
Antarctic fisheries.[67]
Monitoring and deterrence
3.59
The position of successive Australian governments against lethal whaling
in the Southern Ocean has been clear for many years. In 2008, the Federal Court
of Australia affirmed the legal validity of the ban on lethal whaling in the
Australian Antarctic whale sanctuary declared within Australia's Antarctic
territory.[68]
The 2014 International Court of Justice (ICJ) decision provided further legal
ballast to the efforts of this country and others to combat lethal whaling in
the broader Southern Ocean.
3.60
However, Australia does not exercise powers of enforcement over
non-Australian nationals within its Antarctic EEZ, under a long-established
understanding between Antarctic Treaty parties.[69]
Dr Greg French from DFAT explained Australia's continued commitment to this
approach:
while at times it may appear useful or it would seem
opportune to be able to enforce our laws in the Australian Antarctic Territory,
including maritime areas adjacent to it, against foreign nationals for
particular specific policy purposes, looked at in the broad in terms of the
abiding and deep strategic interests Australia has in maintaining the Antarctic
Treaty System and through that maintaining our sovereignty over the Australian
Antarctic Territory, we believe that it remains the wisest and most prudent
course to maintain the current setting of not enforcing our laws against
foreign nationals in that area. So it is a very important overlay in the
whaling context.[70]
3.61
Mr Jeff Hansen, Managing Director of Sea Shepherd Australia, expressed
concern that Australia's concrete activity to monitor and deter whaling within its
southern waters had decreased. There had been no vessel patrols in the Southern
Ocean during the 2013-14 whaling season, and Mr Hansen said Sea Shepherd's
observations suggested that surveillance flights were sporadic and ineffective:
Sending a Customs plane is pretty much like having a helicopter
go over a bank to watch the bank robbers pulling money out of a bank; you are
just watching a crime taking place...
So it was very disappointing when surveillance flights were
sent, because that was $300,000 spent. That could have been better spent to
fuel our fuel tanks, if they were not going to send a vessel.[71]
3.62
Mr Hansen advised the committee that in recent seasons Sea Shepherd
vessels had sighted at least one whale killing within Australia's Antarctic
EEZ, as well as incidents of Japanese whaling ships transiting Australia's
maritime jurisdiction.[72]
3.63
The government has expressed some apparent concern about the direct
anti-whaling activities of activist groups such as the Sea Shepherd. In
December 2013 the Australian government issued a joint statement with the
governments of the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United States condemning
'dangerous, reckless or unlawful behaviour' by all parties at sea during the
Southern Ocean whaling season, highlighting the risks incurred both to whaling
and protest vessels and their crews, and to rescuers sent to assist them. The
statement reaffirmed that the respective governments remained 'resolutely
opposed' to commercial whaling and would 'continue to engage on this matter'.[73]
3.64
Mr Hansen told the committee that:
our position is that if the government were to do a lot of
the work that Sea Shepherd is doing in the Southern Ocean we would be
happy not to send our vessels down there.[74]
Non-lethal research: making the
case
3.65
Submissions from both government agencies and non-government
organisations emphasised the importance of non-lethal whale research both for
its inherent value, and also for rebutting the case put forward by Japan and
others for lethal 'scientific' whaling. In this respect, the committee's
attention was drawn in particular to the valuable work of the Southern Ocean
Research Partnership (SORP). SORP is a collaborative effort between 11
countries, launched by Australia in 2008.
3.66
Dr Nick Gales, Chief Scientist in the AAD, described the evolution of
the initiative:
In essence, the International Whaling Commission would talk
about priorities but it was left in a relatively ad hoc way for members to come
back and provide research against those priorities. The notion of the
partnership that Australia took to the IWC was to get collective groups of
countries in regions together to go quite rigorously through the IWC's
processes to ask: what are the actual priorities and how can they be best
addressed? We went through that whole process and developed a range of
priorities.[75]
3.67
The Australian government invested approximately $14 million in SORP
over five years from 2008-2013, as part of a broader package of funding for
non-lethal whale research and related diplomacy totalling $32 million.[76]
3.68
SORP's research was described as crucial in demonstrating that
non-lethal methods were able to obtain all the research information which had
been previously cited by Japan and others to justify the 'scientific' slaughter
of whales. In doing so, SORP provided the key evidence which resulted in Australia's
success against Japan's lethal whaling program in the ICJ. Dr Gales told the
committee that:
We have certainly demonstrated in the development of the
techniques we have used that all of the questions the International Whaling
Commission has come up with, that it has said are important to be answered for
a whole range of issues, even driven by other countries who wish to utilise
whales in a different way than Australia or other countries, can be addressed
using nonlethal techniques. None of them are value added with the use of
lethally acquired data.[77]
3.69
Government funding for future whale research, including SORP, is
presently under review, with no confirmed funding beyond 2015. Funding of $6
million for a major blue whale research voyage planned for 2014 was placed on
hold following the 2013 election, and the government stated at that time that
future operations would be considered in light of the ICJ decision and the
outcomes of the 2014 IWC meeting.[78]
3.70
Ms Sharon Livermore from the International Fund for Animal Welfare
(IFAW) told the committee that:
SORP is delivering valuable, best practice, non-lethal
research, which demonstrates that whales do not need to be killed in the name
of science...
On the back of that success in the world court, it is
important that Australia continue to support that non-lethal research. Japan
have made their intentions clear to go back. There is funding and there are
resources from the Australian government to lead SORP non-lethal whale research
in Antarctica, and Japan needs an invitation to join SORP. It is not less of a
priority now that the ICJ decision has been made.[79]
3.71
IFAW and other witnesses noted the importance of engaging Japan in the
wake of the ICJ decision to positively influence its future decision making in
relation to whaling. While diplomatic sensitivities were acknowledged, others
noted that a time when diplomatic relations are very strong provides an
excellent opportunity for 'some friendly conversation among best friends'.[80]
3.72
One possibility mentioned in relation to encouraging Japan away from
lethal scientific research was inviting Japan to join SORP. The Department of the
Environment advised the committee that the matter had been raised with Japan (and
other countries) by Australian ministers in the past, and such an invitation
was most recently made by the Minister for the Environment, the Hon Greg Hunt
MP, to Japan's Commissioner at the IWC meeting on 15 September 2014.[81]
Committee view
3.73
The committee welcomes the constructive approach taken historically by
Australia to pursue its opposition to lethal whaling through diplomatic, legal
and scientific means. The ICJ decision was an important stepping stone toward
the abolition of so-called 'scientific' whaling, and the product of significant
effort and investment.
3.74
With a partial victory in place, and Japan's active interest in forging
its future whaling intentions, now is not the time for Australia to lose sight
of the issue or abandon its courage and commitment.
3.75
The committee recognises the legal and practical limits on Australia's
ability to prevent lethal whaling through direct intervention in the Southern
Ocean. Nonetheless, the physical presence of Australian assets in the Southern
Ocean provides a powerful symbol of deterrence as well as a facility for active
monitoring of whaling activities. It may also contribute to ensuring the safe
and measured behaviour of all other stakeholders who may be present.
3.76
As such, the committee encourages the judicious use of Australia's
maritime resources, including the Ocean Shield, to undertake monitoring
and deterrence as appropriate, should Japan re-commence its 'scientific'
whaling program in future seasons.
3.77
Meanwhile, Australia's scientific and diplomatic investment to date
should be further exploited, in appropriate ways, to influence Japan toward a
more acceptable position on this issue. Australia should continue to play a
leading role in internationally collaborative non-lethal whale research, and
should encourage Japan's positive engagement in that work.
Recommendation 6
3.78
The committee recommends that the government commits to continued
funding of the Southern Ocean Research Partnership for at least a further five
years beyond the completion of the current funding in 2015.
Recommendation 7
3.79
The committee recommends that Australia prioritises the active pursuit
of further diplomatic discussions with Japan about its future whale research
plans, including extending a formal invitation to Japan to join the Southern
Ocean Research Partnership.
Navigation: Previous Page | Contents | Next Page