Chapter 1Introduction
Referral of the inquiry
1.1The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives and read a first time on 29 November 2023.
1.2On 7 December 2023, the Senate referred the provisions of the Treasury Laws Amendment (Reserve Bank Reforms) Bill 2023 (the bill) to the Senate Economics Legislation Committee (the committee) for inquiry and report by 21 March 2024.
1.3On 28 February 2024, the Senate granted an extension of time to report. This extension was to 22 March 2024.
Purpose of the bill
1.4The purpose of the bill is to amend sections of the Reserve Bank Act 1959 (the RB Act) and the Banking Act 1959 (the Banking Act) in order to implement changes to the Reserve Bank of Australia (the RBA) following the recommendations of the Independent Review of the Reserve Bank of Australia (the RBA Review) commissioned by the Australian Government.
1.5The proposed changes contained in the bill implement four recommendations of the RBA Review (recommendations 1, 5, 8 and 12). Other recommendations coming out of the RBA Review will be implemented administratively by the Government and the RBA.
1.6In the second reading speech of the bill, the Hon Dr Jim Chalmers MP, Treasurer said:
These reforms are the biggest undertaken at the Reserve Bank in over three decades. They follow months and months of consultation, including with the RBA, the opposition and with other stakeholders, internal and external, and much welcome public debate since the release of the Reserve Bank review in April 2023. The review itself was the product of extensive consultation that included current and former RBA board members and staff, international experts, academics and others. This bill is our opportunity to reform and renew the monetary policy and governance framework of the RBA to ensure it works in the interests of the Australian people and in the interests of their economy.
Background
The Reserve Bank of Australia
1.7The RBA is Australia’s central bank. It was established in 1959 through the passage of the RB Act to carry out central banking functions, with commercial banking functions in Australia at that time carried out by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia.
1.8The RBA is ‘tasked with promoting the economic welfare of the people of Australia through the use of its monetary and financial policies and operations.’ In a practical sense, the RBA issues Australia’s currency, provides banking services to the Australian Government, works to maintain a strong financial system, and conducts monetary policy.
1.9Currently, responsibility for the decisions of the RBA is divided between two boards:
The Reserve Bank Board (the RB Board) which is responsible for setting monetary and banking policy of the RBA and all other policy except for payments system policy. The RB Board is required to exercise its functions to best contribute to:
the stability of Australian currency;
the maintenance of full employment in Australia; and
the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.
The Payment Systems Board (the PS Board) which is responsible for payment systems policy, and is required to direct this policy ‘to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia.’
The RBA Review
1.10On 20 July 2022, the Treasurer announced the RBA Review, which ‘was designed to ensure that Australia’s monetary policy arrangements and the operations of the Reserve Bank continued to support strong macroeconomic outcomes for Australia in a complex and continuously evolving landscape.’
1.11This was the first independent review of the RBA undertaken since the 1990s, when flexible inflation targeting was introduced.
1.12The completed RBA review, titled ‘An RBA fit for the future’ was provided to the Government on 31 March 2023 and was published with the Government’s initial response on 20April2023.
1.13While the findings of the review were largely positive, finding that the RBA was performing its functions well and was positively regarded by the wider community, the review identified areas to strengthen both the RBA itself and Australia’s monetary policy framework going into the future. Accordingly, the RBA review made 51 recommendations which could be organised into five themes:
a clearer monetary policy framework;
stronger monetary policy decision making and accountability;
an open and dynamic RBA;
more robust corporate governance; and
RBA leaders drive institutional and cultural change.
1.14In its Government Response to the RBA Review, the government accepted these recommendations in principal. As stated above, this bill will make changes to the RBA Act and the Banking Act into order to implement four of these recommendations.
1.15These recommendations are:
Recommendation 1: affirm the RBA’s independence and clarify its statutory monetary policy objectives;
Recommendation 5: legislate the RBA’s financial stability role;
Recommendation 8: constitute an expert Monetary Policy Board with diverse perspectives and knowledge;
Recommendation 12: update RBA oversight and accountability by establishing a Governance Board.
Provisions of the bill
1.16The bill has one schedule which amends the RB Act and the Banking Act. This schedule is divided into nine parts. As this schedule and its parts deal with implementing overlapping recommendations from the RBA Review, they will be dealt with thematically, rather than by part.
1.17Broadly speaking, the bill makes the following changes:
(a)Affirms the RBA’s independence by:
(i)removing the power of the government to override its decisions relating to monetary policy; and
(ii)removing the RBA’s power to determine the lending policy of private banks.
(b)Makes changes to the objectives of the RBA, establishing that the RBA has an overarching objective to promote economic prosperity and the welfare of Australians, as well as making changes to the RBA’s objectives relating to monetary policy. These amendments also confirm that the RBA has a responsibility for contributing to financial stability in Australia.
(c)Introduces a three-board system to head the RBA:
(i)The responsibilities of the RB Board are split into a Monetary Policy Board and a Governance Board.
(ii)The Payments System Board remains largely unchanged.
Affirming the RBA’s independence
1.18Section 11 of the current RB Act provides a mechanism for the government of the day to overrule the decisions of the RB Board and the PS Board in situations where the government and the boards of the RBA could not reach agreement. This section allowed the decisions of the boards of the RBA to be overruled by an order of the Governor-General, acting on advice from the Federal Executive Council. This power has never been used by an Australian Government.
1.19The RBA Review recommended that this power be removed from the RB Act, noting that the continued existence of this section risks the independence of monetary policy in Australia. The RBA Review went on to state that in countries where governments had intervened in monetary policy decisions, this had resulted in poorer macroeconomic outcomes and higher inflation.
1.20The amendments contained in the bill will repeal the parts of section 11 which allow the government to override the decisions of the RB Board in relation to monetary policy, while still requiring that both the Monetary Policy Board (a new board largely replacing the RB Board, see below for further discussion of this change) and the PS Board keep the government informed of their decisions.
Responsibility for the lending power of banks
1.21The amendments contained in the bill will also remove the RBA’s power to determine the lending policies of private banks. This power, contained in section36 of the Banking Act, was granted to the RBA when it had responsibility for supervision of the banking sector. This responsibility was transferred to the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) in 1998.
1.22This implements recommendation 1.3 of the RBA Review, which noted that the RBA has not used this power since it was transferred to APRA and that it was inappropriate to keep such a power when responsibility for the banking sector sits with APRA.
Objectives of the RBA
1.23The bill makes changes to the objectives of the RBA by making amendments to various sections of the RB Act. This implements recommendations 1.2 and 5 of the RB Review. These changes alter the bank’s objectives specifically relating to monetary policy while also inserting an overarching objective for the RBA.
1.24The EM provided the following rationale for these proposed amendments:
The intent of these amendments is not to change what is the current understood objective of the RBA, nor to change the understood aims of its monetary policy, financial system sustainability policy or other policies. Rather, separating the overarching objective of the RBA from other objectives (such as the dual mandate of monetary policy) better defines the responsibilities of the RBA as an institution and the specific aims of its policies.
1.25The bill introduces a section to the RB Act: section 8AA Overarching objective of the Bank. This objective ‘is to promote the economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia both now and into the future.’ This overarching objective has been reproduced from the previous monetary policy objective in the RB Act (discussed further below).
1.26Currently, section 10 of the RB Act states the objective of the RBA in relation to monetary policy as ‘to ensure that the monetary and banking policy of the Bank is directed to the greatest advantage of the people of Australia.’ It goes on to state that the powers of the RBA are to be exercised to best contribute to:
(a)The stability of the currency of Australia;
(b)The maintenance of full employment in Australia; and
(c)The economic prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia.
1.27Amendments contained in the bill clarify the existing dual mandate of price stability and full employment. The newly created Monetary Policy Board (discussed below) ‘must exercise its function to determine the monetary policy of the RBA in a way that best contributes to price stability and full employment in Australia.’
1.28The change of language from ‘stability of currency’ to ‘price stability’ reflects recommendation 1.3 of the RB Review and more modern interpretations of the meaning of ‘stability of currency.’
1.29These amendments solidify the RBA’s responsibility for contributing to the stability of the Australian financial system, implementing recommendation 5 of the RB Review.
New Boards of the RBA
1.30As mentioned above, the RBA is currently made up of two boards: the RB Board which determines monetary and all other policies of the RBA, and a PS Board, which determines payment system policy.
1.31As per the recommendation of the RBA Review, the RB Board will be replaced with the following two boards:
the Monetary Policy Board, which will determine the monetary policy of the RBA and its policy regarding financial system stability (other than payments systems policy); and
the Governance Board, which will oversee the governance of the RBA, as well as determining policies that are not covered by the two other boards of the RBA (the Monetary Policy Board and the PS Board).
1.32The split of the RB Board into these two new boards partially or fully implements recommendations five, eight and twelve of the RBA Review.
Monetary Policy Board
1.33The new Monetary Policy Board will have the following functions:
To determine the monetary policy of the RBA in a way that will best contribute to price stability and the maintenance of full employment in Australia;
To determine the policies of the RBA for its contribution to the stability of the Australian financial system;
To promote the proper, efficient and effective policies of the Board;
Any other functions conferred on the Board by the RB Act; and
To do anything conductive or incidental to the performance of the above functions.
1.34Under item 17 of the bill, the Monetary Policy Board would be required to have regard to the Governance Board’s duties as the RBA’s accountable authority under the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (the PGPA Act), however a failure to do so would not give rise to a legal action or other proceedings for damages, nor would it invalidate the Monetary Policy Board’s performance of its functions.
1.35The above sections of the bill are included in order provide legal certainty to the functions of the Monetary Policy Board, considering the market-sensitivity of these functions and the wide-ranging consequences to the economy they can affect. Application of the PGPA Act regarding the Monetary Policy Board is discussed further below.
Membership
1.36The Monetary Policy Board will comprise of the Governor (who will act as Chair), Deputy Governor (Deputy Chair), the Secretary of the Treasury, and six other external members. Members of the Monetary Policy Board must ‘act in an independent and impartial manner when exercising their powers and performing their functions and duties. They cannot be directed by anyone including the Government.’
1.37The bill strengthens existing arrangements under the RB Act that the Secretary of the Treasury is to act independently in their role in the Monetary Policy Board and cannot be directed by the Treasurer. Previously, the Secretary of the Treasury’s independence on the RB Board had been a matter of convention. This implements part of recommendation 8 of the RB Review.
1.38External board members of the newly established Board would be appointed by the Treasurer by written instrument and would act on a part-time basis. The members of the Board would be:
appointed for a specified term which could not exceed five years;
able to be reappointed for up to two years beyond the original five year term for a total of seven years of maximum service on the Board;
renumerated as per the Renumeration Tribunal determination; and
able to resign through providing a written resignation to the Treasurer, effective from the date of receipt.
1.39The Treasurer is required to terminate an external member of the Monetary Policy Board where that member:
becomes bankrupt, applies to take the benefit of any law for the relief of bankrupt or insolvent debtors, compounds with the member’s creditors, or makes an assessment of their remuneration for the benefit of their creditors;
does not attend two consecutive meetings, or three meetings in a period of 12 months;
becomes a staff member of the Reserve Bank, is engaged or appointed under the Public Service Act 1999, or becomes a director, officer or employee of an authorised deposit-taking institution.
1.40An external member of the Board may also be terminated by the Treasurer due to a lack of mental or physical capacity, misbehaviour, or a contravention of general duties of officials under section 30 of the PGPA Act.
1.41All Monetary Policy Board members would be required to act in an independent and impartial manner when exercising their powers. All members would also be required to make an oath or affirmation of allegiance, as well as a declaration of secrecy, prior to commencing their roles.
Meetings
1.42The bill requires that the Monetary Policy Board ‘must hold such meetings as the Board determines are necessary for the efficient performance of its functions.’
1.43The RBA Review recommended that the Monetary Policy Board meet eight times a year. This was accepted by the RBA and will be adopted administratively.
1.44The bill states that the Chair of the Monetary Policy Board may convene a meeting at any time and that meetings of the Monetary Policy Board must be presided over by the Chair. If the Chair is not present then the Deputy Chair presides. If both the Chair and Deputy Chair are not present at a meeting then other members of the Board may appoint an acting Chair who will preside.
1.45Within the bill there are also provisions for the Secretary of the Treasury to nominate, via written instrument, a Senior Executive Service (SES) or acting SES employee of the Treasury to attend all or a singular meeting of the Monetary Policy Board on their behalf.
1.46The quorum of a Monetary Policy Board meeting is five members. Voting is by majority with the presiding member having a deliberative and, in the case of a tie, a casting vote. There are also provisions for making decisions out of session.
Application of the PGPA Act
1.47External members of the Monetary Policy Board are not ‘officials’ for the purposes of the PGPA Act. Despite this, the general duties of officials outlined in the PGPA Act (see sections 25 to 29) will apply to Monetary Policy Board members, maintaining arrangements of the currently existing RB Board.
1.48From the EM:
The general duties of officials are applied to the Monetary Policy Board members to ensure that members are held to a single set of high standards that apply to all officials across the Commonwealth…The general duties assist Board members who may have other roles to be clearer about their responsibilities and obligations as a Monetary Policy Board member.
1.49The amendments contained in the bill would also transfer across prior arrangements for disclosure of material interests from RB Board members to members of the Monetary Policy Board.
Governance Board
1.50As stated above, the RB Review recommended the establishment of a new Governance Board of the RBA to ‘update and strengthen the RBA’s corporate governance and to provide guidance and oversight for RBA management in the running of the organisation.’
1.51In accordance with this recommendation, the bill would establish a Governance Board for the RBA. The functions of this Board are:
To oversee and determine policies for the organisational affairs and management of the RBA (including the RBA’s balance sheet management to the extent that this function does not limit the Monetary Policy Board’s actions);
To determine the policies of the RBA for its functions in relation to issuing and cancelling Australian notes, and delivering banking services to the Commonwealth as the Commonwealth’s banker and financial agent.
To determine policies of the RBA in relation to any matters not covered by the Payments System Board and the Monetary Policy Board;
Any other functions conferred on this Board by the RB Act or any other Act; and
Anything incidental or conductive to the performance of these above functions.
1.52The Governance Board will become the accountable authority of the RBA (moving this position from the Governor), meaning it will take carriage of the responsibility of complying with relevant duties under the PGPA Act, including performance assessment and reporting obligations. The Governance Board will also be responsible for informing the Treasurer of its decisions and the RBA’s activities.
1.53The following sections of the PGPA Act will not apply in relation to the RBA:
Section 36: budget estimates;
Section 54: banking by corporate Commonwealth entities;
Section 55: banking of relevant money by Ministers and officials; and
Section 59: investment by corporate Commonwealth entities.
1.54The Governance Board will also have other miscellaneous duties, such as directing custody of the RBA’s seal and approving its use, determining the terms and conditions of the Governor and Deputy Governor’s employment that are not otherwise provided for in the RB Act, and management of the RBA’s capital.
Membership
1.55The proposed Governance Board of the RBA would be made up of the Governor, the Deputy Governor, six external members, and the staff member of the Reserve Bank Service who is primarily responsible for assisting the Governor in the management of the RBA. This staff member is referred to in legislation as the ‘senior RBS [Reserve Bank Service] member.’
1.56According to the EM, the ‘senior RBS member’ referred to in legislation is intended to be a newly created role within the RBA: the Chief Operating Officer. The use of the term ‘senior RBS member’ in the bill is to allow flexibility in the creation of this position, which is not intended to be a statutory office holder position within the RBA.
1.57The RBA Review recommended the creation of a Chief Operating Officer role within the structure of the organisation who would have the same level as the Deputy Governor and would have various corporate and enabling functions within the organisation. This role would also allow the Governor and Deputy Governor more time to focus on policy issues.
1.58The inclusion of the Deputy Governor of the RBA in the Governance Board is intended to allow them to take part in strategic planning, enable them to remain informed of Governance Board decisions, and will allow for all the RBA’s senior executives to contribute to decisions relating to RBA operations.
1.59As with the Monetary Policy Board, members of the Governance Board will be required to act in an independent and impartial manner and must take an oath or affirmation of allegiance, as well as a declaration of secrecy prior to commencing their role.
1.60The Chair and Deputy Chair of the Governance Board are to be appointed by the Treasurer and can be any of the nine members of the Board. Of the Chair and Deputy Chair, one of these two roles must be an external member of the Board. The Deputy Chair is able to act as Chair in situations where the Chair is absent or this role is vacant.
1.61Rules relating to the appointment and term of external board members mirror those for the Monetary Policy Board, in that appointments are on a part time basis, can be for up to five years for an initial term, and can be renewed for two years beyond the initial term, making the maximum term of an external Governance Board member seven years.
1.62The rules relating to renumeration, leave, resignation and termination of external members of the Governance Boars also mirror the same rules relating to the Monetary Policy Board (see above).
Meetings
1.63The bill requires that the Governance Board be convened at least four times a year, and that the Board should ‘hold such meetings as the Board determines are necessary for the effective performance of its functions.’
1.64It is also a requirement that the Governor, Deputy Governor and the Chief Operating Officer not take part, or be present, in meetings where the terms and conditions of the Governor and Deputy Governor’s offices are being deliberated. This does not extend to the Governor or Deputy Governor being present or taking part in deliberations relating to the Chief Operating Officer’s terms and conditions of their office.
1.65Quorum of the Governance Board is seven members. There are provisions for a reduced quorum of the Governance Board in situations where members are excluded from taking part in or being present at meetings due to the matters being discussed. Voting at Governance Board meetings is by majority of members present, with the presiding member having the deliberative, and in cases of a tie, casting vote.
1.66As with the Monetary Policy Board, the bill contains provisions for deciding matters out of session, including the conditions under which this can occur, which members are entitled to vote in this situation, and the records which must be kept.
Application of the PGPA Act
1.67The bill establishes that all members of the Governance Board are taken to be ‘officials’ of the RBA under the PGPA Act as they are part of the accountable authority. As such they are the subject to the general duties which apply to officials under the PGPA Act.
1.68The relevant sections of the PGPA Act relating to disclosure of material personal interests applies to all members of the Governance Board as members of the accountable authority of the RBA.
Payments System Board
1.69Amendments in the bill affecting the PS Board are generally consequential in nature, made to ensure consistency between the new Reserve Bank boards, or are made to reflect updated legislative drafting practice.
1.70The EM states that there was no intention to change the remit or responsibilities of the PS Board through the bill. The functions of the PS Board was not within the terms of reference of the RB Review.
Relationship between the boards
1.71The bill has established a governance model that will act to prevent instances of conflict or overlap between the three Boards, reflecting concerns that were raised by the RB Review. There are three arms to this model, each of which is discussed below.
Freedom of action of the policy boards
1.72The bill establishes that the new three-board system will have a governance model that allows the Monetary Policy Board and the PS Board to have the necessary freedom to achieve their functions.
1.73Proposed section 10D of the bill, Functions of the Governance Board, prevents the Governance Board from doing anything that would intrude on the functions or powers of the Monetary Policy Board or the PS Board. The Governance Board is similarly limited in that it is not authorised to implement any of the policies that are the responsibility of the other boards, such as monetary policy, payments policy or financial system stability policy.
1.74This section reflects the significant effect which decisions made by the Monetary Policy Board and the PS Board can have on Australia’s financial markets and market infrastructure, as well as the broader Australian economy, and the need for these boards to be able to act in a decisive and timely fashion in times of crisis.
1.75The bill also clarifies that, despite the Governance Board’s responsibilities under the PGPA Act relating to the financial health of the RBA, it is not authorised to do anything that would limit the Monetary Policy Board’s ability to perform its functions or powers in a way that affects the RBA’s balance sheet.
Governance Board’s role as accountable authority
1.76As mentioned above, the bill establishes that the Governance Board will be the accountable authority of the RBA in respect of the PGPA Act.
1.77The bill’s governance model also establishes that all three boards are subject to the PGPA Act’s governance, accountability and performance framework, except in situations where this is inconsistent with the board in question’s legislated functions. It also establishes that, although the Governance Board has limits on its powers, the residual powers it derives from the PGPA Act remain intact.
1.78The EM provides the following example of this power:
…the Governance Board may require the Monetary Policy Board or Payments System Board to provide information for the purposes of reporting against the corporate plan, the annual report or the annual performance statement. Preparing these documents is a core obligation for Commonwealth entities and they are designed to enhance the entity’s financial and strategic planning. The Governance Board’s ability to fulfil this role on behalf of the whole bank is an important accountability mechanism.
1.79The bill also does not prevent the Governance Board from issuing accountable authority instructions to staff of the RBA, as long as these instructions align with the Governance Board’s limitations.
Consultation between the boards
1.80The bill also establishes a mechanism for consultation between the boards. It requires that the Governance Board consult with the Monetary Policy Board and the PS Board before doing anything that would affect the relevant board’s performance of its functions or powers.
1.81In return, the bill also requires that the Monetary Policy Board and the PS Board have regard to the Governance Board as the accountable authority of the RBA when performing their functions and powers.
1.82In the case of disagreement between the three boards, the Governor has the power to resolve such disagreements.
Consultation
1.83As stated above, the bill implements recommendations from the RBA Review which was announced on 20 July 2022 and delivered its final report on 20April2023. The RB Review published an Issues Paper on 15September2022.
1.84The RBA Review was open to public submissions from September to November2022 and received 114 submissions, of which 78 were published. Along with submissions, the Review Secretariat conducted:
12 focus groups,
230 interviews, and
three surveys involving 1100 people.
1.85In the lead up to the commencement of the RBA Review, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) did a round of consultation in order to inform the drafting of the RBA Review’s terms of reference. This involved discussions with international and domestic macroeconomists, think-tanks, financial institutions, as well as former members of central bank boards and monetary policy committees.
1.86Due to the comprehensive review and consultation process, Treasury did not undertake further consultation, such as an exposure draft consultation, once the RBA Review was handed down.
Consequential and transitional amendments
1.87The bill makes several minor and consequential amendments to the RB Act.
1.88Under subsection 25(2) of the existing RB Act, the Treasurer cannot terminate the Governor under section 30 of the PGPA Act. The bill moves this subsection to become proposed section 7F of the RB Act, being part of the sections which deal with the application of the PGPA Act. According to the EM, ‘this reflects a stringent approach to the Governor’s independence and there was no suggestion in the Review Report to change the status quo.’
1.89The bill also introduces several new defined terms relating to the new Boards of the RBA, such as defining ‘Chair’, ‘Deputy Chair’, and ‘external members’ for each of the new Boards as well as the existing PS Board.
1.90Other minor amendments contained in the bill include:
Removing the definition of ‘monetary and banking policy’ to implement the RBA Review’s recommendation that responsibility for the functions of monetary policy and banking policy be separated;
Relocating the definition of ‘Australian note’ so it applies across the RB Act and repealing the definition of ‘payment system’;
Removing redundant references to ‘Treasury’ and ‘Department of the Treasury’ as the term ‘Secretary’ is now one of the definitions at the beginning of the RB Act;
Amending the definition of ‘officer’ so that secrecy provisions apply to the new boards created by the bill;
Revising the note to section 7 of the RB Act to reflect that the bill introduces new provisions regarding the application of the PGPA Act; and
Removing gender specific language in a number of RB Act provisions as well as making minor amendments to improve readability.
Transitional provisions
1.91Items 85 to 90 of the bill contain transitional provisions that allow for the following:
Preserving the prior determinations of the Governor and Deputy Governor’s terms and conditions of employment, treating them as if they had been made by the new Governance Board;
Allowing the service of the current term of old RB Board members (excluding the Governor, Deputy Governor and Secretary of the Treasury) to count towards service in the new boards;
Clarifying that actions taken and policies determined by the previous RB Board will continue in force as though they had been determined by its successor boards; and
Conferring a rulemaking power to the Treasurer to deal with any unforeseen transitional matters which may arise through a legislative instrument which would be subject to disallowance.
Commencement
1.92The bill will commence on the later of:
The first day of the next calendar month after three months have elapsed from the day after the bill receives Royal Assent; or
1 July 2024.
Financial impact
1.93The proposed changes in the bill will be managed by the RBA through its internal budget. According to the EM, the changes proposed in the bill are unlikely to have a direct impact on the Budget due to the RBA not receiving an annual appropriation and not being expected to provide a dividend to Government for several years.
Legislative Scrutiny
1.94In Scrutiny Digest 1 of 2024, the Senate Standing Committee on the Scrutiny of Bills made no comment in relation to the bill.
1.95As at the time of writing, there has been no further legislative scrutiny of the bill.
Human rights implications
1.96The EM states that the Bill does not engage any applicable rights or freedoms and as such is ‘compatible with the human rights and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in section 3 of the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011.’
Regulatory impact
1.97The EM offered no discussion about a Regulatory Impact Statement of the amendments contained within the bill.
Conduct of the inquiry
1.98The committee advertised the inquiry on its website and wrote to relevant stakeholders and interested parties inviting written submission by 2February2024.
1.99The committee received 104 submissions as well as additional information and answers to questions on notice, which are listed at Appendix 1.
1.100The committee also received a significant amount of correspondence from interested members of the public whose contributions were very similar.
1.101The committee held a public hearing for the inquiry on Thursday, 22February2024. The names of witnesses who appeared at the hearing can be found at Appendix 2.
Acknowledgments
1.102The committee thanks all individuals and organisations who assisted with the inquiry, especially those who made written submissions and participated in the public hearing.
Notes on references
1.103In this report, references to the Committee Hansard are to the Proof Hansard and page numbers may very between Proof and Official Hansard transcripts.
Structure of report
1.104Chapter 1 provides an overview of the bill and the conduct of the inquiry.
1.105Chapter 2 provides views on the bill from stakeholders taken from submissions, evidence given at the public hearing on 22 February 2024 and additional material provided, as well as providing the committee’s view on the evidence and recommendations on the bill.