Chapter 2 - AU-US Space Launches

  1. AU-US Space Launches
    1. This chapter outlines the key issues identified during the Committee’s inquiry into the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America on Technology Safeguards Associated with United States Participation in Space Launches from Australia (TSA or the Agreement). While recognising that the TSA raises some concerns, the Committee believes that overall it has the potential to provide significant benefits to Australia and endorses binding action to give effect to it.

Benefits to Australia

2.2The Australian Space Agency (the Agency) explained that the United States (US) requires the TSA to ensure that US space technology is protected in Australia.[1] This agreement will enable US companies, government organisations and universities to conduct commercial spaceflight activities in Australia.[2]

2.3The Agreement ‘strikes the right balance between protecting sensitive US technology and unlocking benefits for Australia.[3] It does not impede the development of an Australia launch capability.’[4] The TSA creates potential for Australia and the US to collaborate on new space-related commercial opportunities.[5] The TSA also unlocks a new market for Australia in the form of the US, which holds the largest share of the global spaceflight market with respect to the number and mass of rockets and satellites launched.[6]

2.4The Agency explained that most Australian satellites are launched by US companies outside Australia and therefore the TSA ‘presents an opportunity to capture some of that market and, in turn, grow a spaceflight industry in Australia through US and international demand and foreign direct investment.’[7] The Agency believes that there will be a growth in the returns market in the medium future, the expansion of on-orbit manufacturing and increased science exploration.[8]

2.5Other stakeholders also argued that the TSA will benefit Australia’s space sector capacity. Canberra Airport said, ‘The Agreement will significantly promote the development and delivery of launch capabilities and services within Australia by leveraging increased demands for access to space by other nations including the United States.’[9] On the unique benefits of launching spacecraft from Australia, Southern Launch said the TSA ‘is a clear signal that the Australian space industry is world-class and on par with the industry leaders. This combined with Australia’s unique geography means that together we can deliver space capabilities not found anywhere else on Earth’.[10]

Economic considerations

2.6The Australian space industry was worth AUD 4.5 billion in 2021.[11] There are estimates of the global space sector growing to the trillion-dollar mark by 2040 of which approximately five per cent is the direct launch market.[12] The Agency also noted that in 2023, international space consultancy firm Euroconsult forecasted that over the decade to 2032 Australian spaceport operators could supply between 45 and 95 of space launches with a value of $460 million to $1.15 billion. This forecast assumed access to the US market through the TSA.[13]

2.7The benefits of the TSA to the Australian economy were noted by submitters. Capricorn Space Agency (CAPSA) said, ‘The TSA will assist Australia in generating a successful circular economy around the new space age and ensure that much of the research and development (R&D) capital is spent in our nation.’[14]

2.8Similarly, submitters highlighted how the TSA will benefit local businesses. Canberra Airport said, ‘The opportunities that can be gleaned from the Agreement by Australian owned and operated business involved in both the upstream and downstream industries of the Australian space eco-system are promising.’[15]

2.9Jeff Bleich Centre for Democracy and Disruptive Technology (JBC) said facilitating ‘these technologies to come to Australia will allow Australian businesses, such as launch services providers, to approach new customers and to open new opportunities and these opportunities would not have existed without the TSA’.[16] Space Industry Association of Australia (SIAA) said, ‘unlocking the US market for [space] activities to be conducted from within Australia's territories will see a benefit not only directly to companies that can provide the facilities to conduct those spaceflight activities but also through their supply chains’.[17]

2.10The Agency said that as the majority of Australian payloads are currently sent to the US to be launched, costs are reduced for Australian companies by not sending the payload to the US and it creates an opportunity to enable more STEM activities in Australia.[18] The Agency explained that launch activities bring ‘an entire value chain with it.’[19] In addition to launching there are assembly, integration and test activities which require a skilled workforce.[20] This skilled workforce will grow and spill into other industries.[21] The Agency said, ‘In establishing a company or an operation in Australia, US companies will be drawing on local Australian companies as their suppliers.’[22]

2.11Gilmour Space took a more concerned stance, saying that, ‘The TSA makes it possible for US rockets to launch from Australia. However, it does not follow that they will, or that it will be in sufficient scope or cadence to be economically sustainable.’[23] Gilmour Space believes that ‘There would be limited benefits from high-tech jobs and supply chains in Australia’.[24]

Capacity building

2.12Increasing the number of launches from Australia will develop expertise about how to undertake the launch and returns, which will build Australia’s space industry due to the work that is undertaken as part of the space launch, including the assembly, integration, testing and other associated services. However, the Agency clarified that there will be no transfer of knowledge.[25]

2.13The Committee heard that the TSA would provide capacity building for the developing Australian space sector. Canberra Airport said, ‘Partnering with mature spacefaring nations such the United States offers a unique and important opportunity to enhance Australia's position in the global space eco-system.’[26]

2.14The Agency said the Agreement would attract a ‘skilled and highly talented workforce.’[27] Further, it would attract talent from overseas and create opportunities for Australians who are studying space technologies at the university level.[28] It would also increase the opportunities for Australians to work in the space sector.[29]

2.15On the preferencing of the US businesses, the JBC said that ‘some participants in the Australian space industry have raised concerns that the TSA will negatively impact on the development of an Australian launch capacity by preferencing US businesses. We disagree with this position.’[30]

2.16The Agency noted that the TSA is not a technology transfer and is ‘not designed to transfer information about US-protected technology to Australian companies.’[31] That technology would still be controlled under US export restrictions.[32]

AU-US bilateral relationship

2.17The Agency noted that the TSA benefits Australia’s longstanding partnership with the US on space:

The TSA will deepen that relationship and increase its value... by further cementing Australia's reputation as a trusted strategic partner and global ally and by reassuring the US that Australia is a safe and reliable place from which to access space.[33]

2.18Strengthening the bilateral relationship between Australia and the US was also noted by submitters. Piston Labs said, ‘The TSA underscores a significant leap in the bilateral ties between Australia and the United States, offering a platform for enhanced technological exchange and cooperation in space ventures.’[34] CAPSA said, ‘this TSA is a real first stepping stone to an amazing opportunity for each nation to generate a whole new unique element to a booming industry and to the next frontier for us as an adventure seeking species.’[35]

2.19The Agency explained that the Agreement does not incentivise the US over other countries.[36] The Committee heard that Australia is an open market for launch activities providing an international company meets Australia’s regulatory conditions for launch.

2.20Submitters highlighted the influence of the US in the international space industry and the benefit of going into partnership. The JBC said, ‘It's our view that the TSA can serve a narrow but important purpose of opening up Australia to, arguably, the largest commercial space market in the world, being the US.’[37] Similarly, Equatorial Launch Australia (ELA) said, ‘the US absolutely dominates the market in the payload area, and that's both from a commercial perspective and from defence and government, or an institutional launch’.[38]

2.21The unequal relationship between the US and Australia in space activities was noted by submitters. Gilmour Space expressed concern and said, ‘The TSA will worsen what is already an unequal playing field for Australian launch vehicle companies, who will now have to compete with established and well-funded US competitors on our home ground.’[39] Piston Labs said, ‘An over-reliance on U.S. technology could make the Australian space sector vulnerable to external factors.’[40]

2.22The Committee heard that the Agreement is a requirement for the US to consider taking part in activities in Australia. The Agency acknowledged that the Agreement does not cover trade and there are no trade incentives, so it does not incentivise the US other than allowing them access to Australia. The Agency clarified that the Agreement ‘sets out the conditions [the US] need to be able to come here. But those aren't trade conditions; those are security protection conditions.’[41]

2.23Submitters noted that the TSA would encourage the US to launch their payload from Australia. Southern Launch said the TSA would, ‘attract US satellite manufacturers to look to Australia as an option to launch their payload.’[42] Southern Launch explained that, ‘This could be using US launch vehicles or an Australian launch vehicle with either option benefitting all Australian launch service providers.’[43]

2.24JBC said that, ‘The TSA will enable US-based entities to consider Australia as a viable location to launch their vehicles or spacecraft.’[44] International Aerospace Law and Policy Group (IALPG) said, ‘Without a TSA there are huge barriers that prevent an engagement with potential customers or collaborators from the United States, and that makes up an enormous part of the global markets for those activities.’[45]

2.25IALPG went on to argue that the TSA alleviates that barrier, ‘because it facilitates ways that the technology is managed relating to space launches.’[46] The SIAA said ‘without the TSA, it's tantamount to impossible to conduct spaceflight of US technology in Australia. At least with a TSA, whatever constraints are placed on those activities, they do become possible.’[47]

2.26ELA said, ‘We have seen, particularly since the signing of the TSA in October last year, a massive uptick in interest from US companies either coming to launch with us or engaging us to do services for them.’[48] ELA explained that interest from the US was not however a guarantee, noting that the Agreement ‘has certainly removed a mental block from US companies about coming here.’[49]

Regional engagement

2.27The Agency noted that the TSA benefits Australia’s strategic role in the Asia-Pacific region.[50] The Agency explained that there had been interest from regional neighbours including South Korea.[51] They also noted that Japan is a launching state and most of Australia’s south-east Asian regional partners operate satellites, their own sovereign satellites and would be looking to decrease the cost of access to space and put their satellites into space via the most convenient and least expensive option available.[52] The Agency said, ‘We would identify that the region as a whole would provide a market to Australian spaceport operators.’[53] The TSA would increase Australia’s capacity to conduct space launches therefore non-US based companies including some in the Asia Pacific region would be attracted to working within/in Australia.

Improvements to technology and internet capabilities

2.28The Agreement enables Space X, which currently launch satellites out of the US, and Amazon/Kuiper who will also do so, to launch from Australia.[54] The Agency said that this will not directly impact on the cost or availability of satellite internet but could have an indirect effect.[55] By offering more options to those operators, they might reduce the costs.[56] The Agency acknowledged that this is however speculation and there are no direct flow-on effects.[57]

Other TSAs and equivalent agreements

2.29The Committee heard that there are currently five TSAs that are in effect including one with New Zealand (NZ) which was finalised in 2016.[58]

2.30The Committee inquired into why the US TSA with NZ, was concluded in advance of the equivalent agreement with Australia which began negotiations in 2021. The Agency said that Australia ‘very consciously did not accept the first negotiating position put to us… We wanted to make sure that we retained sovereign decision-making rights around launch in Australia and that the deal would be as beneficial as possible to Australian launch companies’.[59]

2.31The Agency said that at the time of the signing of the NZ agreement, the company Rocket Lab, which was a NZ company at the time (now US) required a TSA in place to launch from NZ.[60] Further, the ASA did not commence operations until 2018 which was after the NZ TSA.[61]

2.32The Committee observed that there are differences between the two treaties, including that in the Australian agreement there is a requirement for politically binding arrangements while the NZ has legally binding arrangements. Legally binding agreements must be adhered to as a matter of international law, while politically binding arrangements do not have that same requirement. In addition, in relation to the relevance of the missile technology control regime, in the NZ agreement, NZ is forbidden from having a launch capacity of this kind, while Australia does not have this requirement.

2.33The Agency explained that these differences are the result of the NZ agreement being fast tracked for the purposes of Rocket Lab and the longer negotiation process for Australia.[62] The Agency said, ‘Those two differences provide Australian rocket companies and launch operators the greatest extent of agency possible. It is the reason that we believe that this is a very good deal for Australia.’[63]

2.34Regarding the NZ TSA agreement, the IALPG said, ‘There have been some protests in New Zealand about, for example, military launches, and there has been some concern in New Zealand about the transparency of the approvals process’.[64] IALPG said, ‘I think it's important that Australia is transparent about the approvals process and that it insists on sufficient information to meet Australia's domestic requirements.’[65]

2.35The Australian Government has engaged with non-binding political commitments with other governments that are seeking to launch from Australia that do not have the same legal standing as the TSA.[66] The Agency confirmed that there is a non-treaty level agreement with Germany that is not as comprehensive.[67]

2.36SIAA said that the ASA ‘should move quickly to establish MoUs with relevant governments to unlock further commercial opportunity for Australia.’[68] The Australian Centre for Space Governance (ACSG) said that there was a ‘need for further consideration of various side agreements’.[69] JBC said, ‘The Australian Government should consider proactively entering into the required politically binding agreements to ensure this requirement does not become a barrier to US businesses entering Australia.’[70]

Other issues and concerns

Segregated areas

2.37The Agreement provides for the US to operate in a discreet fashion where it can create segregated areas in which the US could operate. Access to these zones is substantially restricted due to the sensitivity of the technology and other related matters.

2.38Australian law still applies to these special areas and Australian office holders can still perform their duties in these areas.[71] Further, it is not unusual for a rocket operator to create sequestered areas within a spaceport where only they can operate.[72] The Agency said the segregated areas are for security and safety reasons.[73] The Licencing system allows other Australian participants (commercial operators) to access those areas.[74]

2.39ELA requested ‘further information on the authorisation process, including timeline, for Australians requiring access to segregated or controlled areas.’[75] In response to concerns about sovereignty and the Agreement, ELA said, ‘Rather than deleting or diminishing any sovereign capability, we believe the TSA will enable a true sovereign capability and a sustained ‘access to space’ sector to flourish.’[76]

2.40The Agency said, ‘US technology will be tightly controlled, but … that is what gives the US reassurance that they can come here to do launch. The value of this agreement to the US is that they feel reassured that their most protected technology can come to Australia where it will be safe.’[77]

2.41ACSG said that there as a ‘sensitivity around the fact that most of our launch providers will be operating from traditional lands, where we have the strong interest of our Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities’.[78] ACSG said there might be the ‘misbelief that the TSA would create regions of being able to lock out Australians, particularly the traditional land owners.’[79] ACSG said that in the implementation phase it would be important to address these concerns.[80]

2.42Despite this, ACSG noted that ‘the underlying rationale for the establishment of these US-personnel only areas are reasonable and the exceptions to allow for Australian authorities to have access when carrying out statutory functions is appropriate.’[81] The IALPG said on the topic of First Nations people that ‘the Committee should seek to address how matters such as Controlled Areas and Segregated Areas will impact traditional custodians of Australian territory’.[82]

2.43Questions on notice to the Agency sought detail about how segregated areas would operate and examples of exigent circumstances in relation to access for Australians in segregated areas. The Agency clarified that the Agreement does not restrict authorities of the Australian Government, and its States and Territories, from carrying out their statutory powers, duties, and functions under Australian Law. The Agency added that under the agreement, the Government of the United States must ensure that Australian authorities retain facilitated access to segregated areas to conduct official duties.

2.44The Agreement, and the side agreement, also considers the entry of Australian authorities in exigent circumstances where no pre-existing authorisation can occur, for example during an emergency response. The Agency clarifies that exigent circumstances are undefined in the Agreement to allow for flexibility in their implementation. It is expected to be limited to emergency responders such as police, fire, and ambulance services.

Implementation

2.45The Agency said that the aim of the Agreement is to be principles based rather than outlining the specifics of a particular activity.[83] The Agreement does not outline what is required in each application from the US side.[84] This will be on a case-by-case basis depending on the type of activity and the sensitivity.[85] What is required on site for a particular launch application will be dependent on the State Department.[86]

2.46The role of the Agency through the regulatory process is to ensure that what is agreed between the US applicant or licensee and the State Department is done in Australia and that will be regulated through Australian domestic law.[87]

2.47The Agency has established a dedicated Technology Safeguards personnel situated within the Office of the Space Regulator with the role of overseeing implementation.[88] The Agency said that this team would ‘engage with the sector to clarify issues, seek feedback on the implementation approach and publish guidance material.’[89]

2.48Submitters raised issues concerning implementation of the agreement. SIAA said, ‘we urge the Australian Space Agency to increase the transparency to industry of its progress in implementing the TSA.’[90] With respect to legislative implementation, the JBC said that they note the Government has expressed that there is no need for the introduction or amendment to any laws to implement the TSA.[91] JBC further said, ‘We have some concerns about this position, at this time, as it suggests an intention to really rely on broad and discretionary powers across at least six federal laws.’[92]

2.49IALPG said, ‘I think there is some need for further implementing arrangements. There may be some need for standard conditions on licences that are issued by the Australian space agency.’[93] The Group further said that there should be consultation on these matters.[94] SIAA said that ‘We believe the Australian Government implementation should focus on: … Ensuring that the Australian government, companies and individuals are not unnecessarily or unintentionally prevented for participating in the US spaceflight activities we hope the TSA will unlock.’[95]

2.50IALPG said, ‘the framework(s) of the TSA should not add to the administrative burden faced either by Australian space actors or United States space actors considering to carry out or engage in launches or returns from Australia concerning United States launch vehicles.’[96]

Interactions with Government

2.51The Agreement notes the establishment of entities that oversee different aspects of the operation of the TSA and the transfer of information. The Committee inquired into whether anything would constrain the delivery of commercially viable timeframes and whether the Agency would encourage other Commonwealth departments to prevent roadblocks. The Agency said they had conducted a comprehensive consultation across Commonwealth departments.[97] The Agency also has a standing interdepartmental committee with relevant agencies that are consulted on key issues.[98]

2.52The Agency further said that they meet various regulatory agencies and bodies across the Commonwealth, states and territories to inform these regulators about new types of activities.[99] While the Agency does not speak to them about specific cases, they discuss the process at a general level.[100] The Agency further explained that they work with departments to ensure that they communicate not on regulatory decisions but other issues that may impede a launch.[101]

2.53In terms of Government relations, ELA said, ‘The commercial nature of spaceports and space launch activities covered by the TSA will require rapid turnaround of departmental decision making and answers to queries.’[102] ELA therefore requested that ‘implementation of the TSA reside with one department or agency to minimise delays in seeking clarifications, answers to questions and authorisations as required.’[103]

Co-design process and communication

2.54The Agency confirmed that their intention is to establish working groups to ensure that what is taking place is in Australia’s national interests in terms of the whole life cycle capability for space.[104] They said that one pathway is that there will be a generic co-design activity within the relevant Australian sector.[105] The second pathway is a workshop activity with proponents.[106] They are trying to run both at the same time however currently the focus is on the second with particular applicants and Australian proponents.[107]

2.55Submitters raised the need for additional communications from Government. ACSG said that there was a ‘need for greater clarity, especially in communications from the Australian Space Agency, DFAT and PM&C to the general public, and to Australian space industry.’[108] ACSG further said ‘This will aid in alleviating concerns that have been aired regarding ceding sovereignty, the role Australian industry will play in any technology transfer activities that fall under the TSA, and assisting the Australian public to understand’.[109]

2.56Submitters noted that there were misunderstandings as to the purpose of the TSA. ACSG explained that ‘the Space Agency and the government need to be alert to the fact that the messaging, particularly to the public, needs to be clear about the somewhat limited nature of the effect of the TSA’.[110] ACSG further said ‘a lot of people misunderstood that the purpose of the TSA was really more like a free trade agreement for space between Australia and the US, that it would apply to all aspects of space activity, that it wasn't really just about launch.’[111] SIAA said ‘the TSA is not a technology sharing, collaboration or manufacturing partnership agreement. It's not a trade agreement. It was never pitched to us as such, so to see none of that encapsulated in there is not a surprise’.[112]

2.57The TSA has not designed a reporting structure, is bound by the department’s annual reporting processes and would report on their regulatory function.[113]

Potentially dangerous uses

2.58CAPSA noted the dual uses of space technology, which could have dangerous uses:‘Various space technologies have real potential to be used for purposes that can pose a threat to Australia and her allies around the world.’[114] However, CAPSA explained that the TSA provides ‘good safeguards to ensuring the security of shared space technologies and to allow a safe marketplace to launch and return enhanced space technologies into the future.’[115]

Interaction with other international agreements

2.59The Agency worked closely with Defence to ensure that ‘the TSA complements the AUKUS licence-free environment’.[116]

2.60The Agency clarified that, ‘Even with that licence-free environment, US restrictions on launch technology would apply.’[117] The Agency explained that the US maintains tight controls over 1 MTCR technology (launch technology) and there is no expectation that there will be a loosening of US export regulations for Category 1 MTCR technology.[118]

2.61Southern Launch said that the TSA would enable Australia to contribute to AUKUS through the delivery of advanced capabilities under Pillar II.[119]

2.62IALPG said that while AUKUS expanded in December 2023 to include the ‘Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability’, it still ‘does not comprehensively encompass space technologies. As such, space technologies generally are an incidental beneficiary of the synchronised efforts to remove restrictions on sharing of technology between AUKUS partners.’[120]

2.63Piston Labs said, ‘the alignment with the [MTCR] Guidelines echoes our commitment to non-proliferation and contributes to global security, positioning Australia as a responsible space-faring nation.’[121] SIAA requested explanation about the ‘interplay between what the TSA provides in terms of the transfer of technology from the US to Australia for MTCR Category 1 items and the emerging export control regulation-free environment.’[122]

2.64The Committee inquired into the MTCR Category 1 systems and whether there was a restriction on using the funds obtained from the space launch activities for their acquisition, development, production, testing and development. The Agency said that Australia does not levy fees on launch or return activities and so does not raise any funds that would be captured under that clause.[123]

2.65JBC noted that ‘The Australian Government should consider releasing further guidance’ on the use of funds in the TSA.[124]

2.66IALPG further said that ‘the proposed change to [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] and the implementation of the TSA deal with the same subject matter, being export-controlled goods and information, but under separate circumstances.’[125] IALPG said that that as there is a potential cross over by the jurisdiction of ITAR and AUKUS frameworks, the Commonwealth should make available to the public a guide which outlines the applicable frameworks to actors who are conducting launch and return activities in Australia.[126] They further said that the Government should define and consult with stakeholders on measures to reduce administrative burdens with respect to integrated technologies.[127]

2.67The Agency noted that according to the TSA the transfer of technical data that is necessary to complete the launch ‘is done in a very controlled manner … It wouldn’t be distributed beyond those who need access to that data and information.’[128] The Agency explained that the transfer of controlled information and its use is covered by export control licensing and permits.[129]

2.68The Agency clarified that the ‘US export control licences for technology transfer operate and apply outside of the TSA framework.’[130] IALPG said, ‘Although the United States is home to the world’s largest space launch industry, without a TSA, Australian space actors are effectively prevented from engaging with United States space actors.’[131] They said, ‘This is most evident in the form of the export control barriers deterring United States launch vehicle operators from coming to Australia to carry out their launch operations.’[132]

2.69The Agency said they had also been working closely with Defence on consultations regarding the amendments to the Defence Trade Controls Amendment Act 2024 and US export control reforms.[133] The Agency affirmed that the TSA operates separately to those export control processes.[134] The Agency said that export control licences and permits will still be required or not required with the TSA and that the Agreement does not cover or guide the export control process but is a separate framework.[135] The TSA outlines how technologies will be protected once they are in Australia.[136]

Conclusion

2.70Australia has been an active contributor to space activities, with Australia’s civil space and high-power rocket activities, as well as international engagement regulated and overseen by the Australian Space Agency which was established in 2018. Australia is committed to safe and secure operations in space and on Earth, aiming to transform and grow a globally respected Australian space sector that meets international obligations and norms.

2.71The Committee believes the development of the Australian space sector can be facilitated by ratification of the Agreement. Through collaboration on space activities with the US, a global heavyweight in this area, the Australian space sector would receive considerable benefit. The US currently has the largest and most advanced commercial space launch sector in the world with most Australian satellites currently exported from Australia to the US for launching by US companies.

2.72The aim of the Agreement is to provide a legal and technical framework to protect US launch vehicles, spacecraft, related equipment, and technical data. The Agreement would enable US companies, government organisations, and universities to undertake commercial space launch activities in Australia.

2.73This Agreement would strengthen Australia’s relationship with the US, a longstanding bilateral partner. The relationship between Australia and the US began in 1918 during World War I, with diplomatic relations established on 8 January 1940. The first Australian and US Ambassadors to the US and Australia respectively presented their credentials in 1946.

2.74The relationship between Australia and the US continues today with links between the two countries in the areas of defence and security, business, trade and investment, culture, sport, education, research, and tourism. The Australia-United States Alliance is expressed through the AUSFTA, signed in 2004, and the ANZUS Treaty, signed in 1951, another central pillar of relations between the two countries.

2.75Government and stakeholders were engaged in the JSCOT inquiry process for this Agreement. Entities from the Australian space industry, including those from industry, governance and lawmaking made submissions and appeared at the public hearing. The inquiry raised key issues in relation to the Agreement including the benefits of the Agreement for Australia including Australia’s relationships with the US, regional engagement, economic considerations including the value of the space industry, capacity building, other TSAs and equivalent agreements, the influence of the US in the international space sector, preferential treatment, the use of segregated areas, and improvements to technology and internet capabilities.

2.76Also raised during the inquiry were the issues of intellectual property rights, implementation, the co-design process, definitions, AUKUS, interactions with Government, and review and reporting. While not directly related to the treaty, the Committee heard evidence that regulatory barriers could hinder the development of Australia's space industry and encourages governments at all levels to facilitate the sector in a timely manner, while maintaining appropriate safeguards. The Committee believes that issues raised were adequately addressed through the inquiry process.

Recommendation 1

2.77The Committee supports the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America on the Technology Safeguards Associated with United States Participation in Space Launches from Australia and recommends that binding treaty action be taken.

Mr Josh Wilson MP

Chair

1 July 2024

Footnotes

[1]Mr Christopher Hewett, Australian Space Agency (ASA), Department of Industry, Sciences and Resources (DISR), Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[2]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[3]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[4]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[5]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[6]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[7]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[8]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 1.

[9]Canberra Airport, Submission 7, p. 4.

[10]Southern Launch, Submission 6, p. [2].

[11]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[12]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[13]ASA, Response to Questions on Notice, p. [2].

[14]Capricorn Space Agency (CAPSA), Submission 1, p. [2].

[15]Canberra Airport, Submission 7, p. 3.

[16]Mr Joel Lisk, Jeff Bleich Centre for Democracy and Disruptive Technology (JBC), Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 20.

[17]Mr Jeremy Hallett, Space Industry Association of Australia (SIAA), Committee Hansard,13 May 2024, p. 13.

[18]Mr Anthony Weymouth, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[19]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[20]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[21]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[22]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[23]Gilmour Space, Submission 10, p. 2.

[24]Gilmour Space, Submission 10, p. 1.

[25]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[26]Canberra Airport, Submission 7, p. 3.

[27]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[28]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[29]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[30]JBC, Submission 2, p. 4.

[31]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[32]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[33]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[34]Piston Labs, Submission 9, p. [2].

[35]CAPSA, Submission 1, p. [1].

[36]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[37]Mr Joel Lisk, JBC, Flinders University, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 20.

[38]Mr Michael Jones, Equatorial Launch Australia (ELA), Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 15.

[39]Gilmour Space, Submission 10, p. 3.

[40]Piston Labs, Submission 9, p. [2].

[41]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[42]Southern Launch, Submission 6, p. [2].

[43]Southern Launch, Submission 6, p. [2].

[44]JBC, Flinders University, Submission 2, p. 2.

[45]Mr Scott Schneider, International Aerospace Law and Policy Group (IALPG), Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 19.

[46]Mr Scott Schneider, IALPG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 19.

[47]Mr Jeremy Hallett, SIAA, Committee Hansard,13 May 2024, p. 13.

[48]Mr Michael Jones, ELA, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 15.

[49]Mr Michael Jones, ELA, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 15.

[50]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 2.

[51]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[52]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[53]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[54]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[55]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[56]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[57]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 4.

[58]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[59]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[60]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[61]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[62]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[63]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 3.

[64]Mr Duncan Blake, IALPG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 21.

[65]Mr Duncan Blake, IALPG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 21.

[66]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[67]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[68]SIAA, Submission 5, p. [4].

[69]Australian Centre for Space Governance (ACSG), Submission 3, p. 1.

[70]JBC, Submission 2, p. 2.

[71]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 11.

[72]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 11.

[73]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 11.

[74]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 11.

[75]ELA, Submission 8, p. 5.

[76]ELA, Submission 8, p. 6.

[77]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[78]Professor Melissa de Zwart, ACSG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 23.

[79]Professor Melissa de Zwart, ACSG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 23.

[80]Professor Melissa de Zwart, ACSG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 23.

[81]ACSG, Submission 3, p. 5.

[82]IALPG, Submission 4, p. 2.

[83]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 6.

[84]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 6.

[85]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 6.

[86]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 6.

[87]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 6.

[88]ASA, Response to Questions on Notice, p. [4].

[89]ASA, Response to Questions on Notice, p. [4].

[90]SIAA, Submission 5, p. [4].

[91]Mr Joel Lisk, JBC, Flinders University, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 20.

[92]Mr Joel Lisk, JBC, Flinders University, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 20.

[93]Mr Duncan Blake, IALPG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 22.

[94]Mr Duncan Blake, IALPG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 22.

[95]SIAA, Submission 5, p. [4].

[96]IALPG, Submission 4, p. 5.

[97]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[98]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[99]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 9.

[100]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 9.

[101]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 9.

[102]ELA, Submission 8, p. 6.

[103]ELA, Submission 8, p. 6.

[104]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 7.

[105]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 7.

[106]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 7.

[107]Mr Christopher De Luis, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 7.

[108]ACSG, Submission 3, p. 1.

[109]ACSG, Submission 3, p. 1.

[110]Professor Melissa de Zwart, ACSG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 19.

[111]Professor Melissa de Zwart, ACSG, Committee Hansard, 13 May 2024, p. 23.

[112]Mr Jeremy Hallett, SIAA, Committee Hansard,13 May 2024, p. 13.

[113]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 12.

[114]CAPSA, Submission 1, p. [3].

[115]CAPSA, Submission 1, p. [3].

[116]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[117]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[118]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[119]Southern Launch, Submission 6, p. [2].

[120]IALPG, Response to Questions on Notice, p. 3.

[121]Piston Labs, Submission 9, p. [1].

[122]Mr Jeremy Hallett, SIAA, Committee Hansard,13 May 2024, p. 13.

[123]Mr Christopher Hewett, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 10.

[124]JBC, Submission 2, p. 2.

[125]IALPG, Response to Questions on Notice, p. 4.

[126]IALPG, Response to Questions on Notice, p. 2.

[127]IALPG, Response to Questions on Notice, p. 2.

[128]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[129]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 5.

[130]ASA, Response to Questions on Notice, p. [5].

[131]IALPG, Submission 4, p. 3.

[132]IALPG, Submission 4, p. 3.

[133]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[134]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[135]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.

[136]Dr Antony Robinson, ASA, DISR, Committee Hansard, Canberra 13 May 2024, p. 8.