2. Common themes and issues
   1. This section considers common themes and issues in Defence’s project management and governance of Major Projects arising from the 2020–21 and 2021–22 Major Project Reports (MPRs). These are:

• the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic
• Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest
• Risk Management, including contingency funding and Lessons Learned
• capability forecasting, and
• caveats and deficiencies.
  2. Some of these issues, such as Defence’s processes for Projects of Concern, were also identified in previous MPRs and JCPAA inquiries.[1]

Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

2.3The 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs considered the impacts related to the COVID‑19 pandemic on the selected Major Projects, noting the ongoing global supply chain and travel restriction challenges.[2] In the 2020–21 MPR, six Major Projects reported an impact on budget and 16 reported an impact on scheduling as a result of COVID-19. In the 2021–22 MPR, five projects reported an impact on budget and 15 reported an impact on scheduling due to COVID-19.[3]

2.4Unlike in the 2019–20 MPR where Defence halted assurance processes, such as the Independent Assurance Reviews (IARs), in the 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs these processes were once again occurring.

2.5At the Committee’s public hearing Defence advised:

The COVID impact is still with [Defence], on supply chains. COVID has exacerbated a number of other factors, inflationary factors and otherwise, in regard to supply chains. The effect is still being felt in many projects.[4]

2.6In its written response to the Committee’s question of if any of the projects included in the 2020–21 MPR had been impacted by COVID-19 in a significant and ongoing way, Defence advised:

No 2020-21 Major Projects Report projects reported adjustments to scope or requirements due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 impacts were related to project schedules…. The common COVID-19 schedule impacts resulted from supplier disruption (supplier production and/or shipping delays); workforce limitations relating to travel (specialists and crew were due to travel both interstate and from other countries to work with/on the projects or to deliver/undertake training) and social distancing restrictions; and/or contractordelays (scope, delivery and certification delays).[5]

2.7Defence also stated in a written response to the Committee’s question on support to Defence industry during COVID-19:

Defence industry remained strong and responsive during the pandemic, minimising impacts to projects. Ongoing genuine partnership and cooperation between Defence and industry occurred to safely continue to equip and sustain the ADF.[6]

2.8Defence advised these initiatives included:

• increased engagement with Defence industry
• establishing a COVID-19 Industry Support Cell to respond quickly to urgent issues affecting Defence industry
• accelerated payment of supplier invoices and ensuring this flowed from Defence primes to Australian small businesses, and
• instating a recovery deed from March 2020 to December 2020 focused on contractors’ performance.[7]
  9. On the lessons it learnt from COVID-19 and initiatives it has implemented, Defence stated:

Defence continues to review its industry policy and contractual mechanisms consistent with its and industry’s pandemic experiences. Lessons learned during the pandemic – such as the early engagement of Defence Primes; Defence’s accelerated payment of supplier invoices; the introduction of industry recovery deeds; and the facilitation of ongoing advice and guidance on safe business practices, including assistance in negotiating travel restrictions – demonstrated Defence’s commitment to proactively responding to and managing future crises.[8]

Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest

2.10Defence’s Projects of Concern process aims to focus the attention of the of the highest levels of government, Defence and industry on remediating problem projects. This involves increased senior management and ministerial oversight and implementing a plan to resolve significant commercial, technical, cost and/or schedule issues.[9] Changes to the Projects of Concern list are publicly announced and reported in Defence’s annual report and are often subject to Parliamentary and media interest.[10]

2.11Defence advised that the oversight and scrutiny applied to Projects of Concern is intensive and tailored to the project delivery model and contract arrangements. Defence also advised remediation is usually monitored through governance boards, and monthly performance reporting to the Minister for Defence Industry focused on the achievement of remediation activities and progress towards exit criteria.[11]

2.12In addition to Projects of Concern, Defence also has a Projects of Interest process for projects that Defence management considers to be underperforming and in need of monitoring and senior management attention to avoid becoming a Project of Concern. These projects are not publicly reported by Defence.[12]

2.13Defence advised the Committee it provides additional resources to Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest, including working with the projects on remediation plans, as well as independent assurance processes.[13]

Projects of Interest in the 2020–21 and 2021–22 Major Project Reports

2.14There were a total of nine projects identified as Projects of Interest across the two MPRs under consideration:

• New Air Combat Capability (Joint Strike Fighter)
• Future Frigates/Hunter Class Frigates[14]
• MQ-4C Triton Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (MQ-4C Triton)
• Protected Mobility Vehicle – Light (Hawkei)
• Battlefield Airlift – Caribou Replacement (Light Tactical Fixed Wing)
• Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN Upgrade)
• Civil Military Air Management System (CMATS, which was upgraded to a Project of Concern during 2022 and is discussed below)
• Battlefield Communication System, and
• Indian Ocean Region UHF SATCOM (which had exited the MPR in 2021–22 as it had delivered the majority of its required scope).[15]
  15. These projects were included as Projects of Interest for a range of reasons including impacts of COVID-19 pandemic, project size, complexity and risk profile, scope revisions, and developmental and reliability concerns.[16]
  16. While outside the scope of the MPRs under consideration in this inquiry, Defence advised the Committee in June 2023 there were 11 Projects of Interest.[17]

Projects of Concern in the 2020–21 and 2021–22 Major Project Reports

2.17The Multi Role Helicopter (MRH90 Helicopters) project was the only continuing Project of Concern in the 2020–21 MPR. For the 2021–22 MPR, both the MRH90 Helicopters and CMATS were identified as Projects of Concern.[18]

MRH90 Helicopters

2.18The MRH90 Helicopters project was placed on the Projects of Concern list in 2011 due to significant technical issues preventing the achievement of milestones, and as at 30 June 2022 had a total of 104 months of schedule slippage. Defence also noted the MRH90 Helicopter fleet has not met contracted availability requirements or the expected cost of ownership.[19]

2.19Defence advised that the issues that contributed to the MRH90 Helicopters becoming a Project of Concern included ‘a high cost of ownership, poor supply chain performance, and inadequate fleet serviceability and availability.’[20] When asked to provide information on progress made to remediate the issues, Defenceadvised ‘the outstanding technical issues associated with the MRH90system were unable to be fully remediated.’[21]

2.20As a result, in December 2021 the previous Government formally requested advice from the United States Government on the acquisition of up to 40 Black Hawk Helicopters to potentially replace the MRH90 Helicopters.[22] The US State Department approved the sale in August 2022 for an estimated cost of US$1.95 billion.[23] In January 2023 the Government announced the acquisition of Black Hawk Helicopters to replace the MRH90 Helicopters, with the expected withdrawal of the MRH90 Helicopter fleet 13 years earlier than planned.[24] Defence advised ‘Navy has since ceased MRH90 flying operations.’[25]

Civil Military Air Management System (CMATS) project

2.21The CMATS project was originally a Project of Concern between August 2017 and May 2018 due to delays in entering the contract. Once the contract was signed, CMATS was then managed as a Project of Interest. In September 2021, the Minister for Defence directed that CMATS return to the Projects of Concern list. However, CMATS was not announced as a Project of Concern, or updated in Defence’s internal reporting until October 2022, 13 months after the decision was made.[26]

2.22In a written response to the Committee’s request for a timeline of the actions taken by Defence to list CMATS as a project of concern, Defence advised:

• between September 2021 and October 2022, Defence and Airservices Australia increased the frequency of the CMATS project’s reporting to senior governance committees from quarterly to monthly
• from October 2021, Defence undertook consultation with Airservices Australia, and the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications
• in March 2022 and August 2022, Defence provided a Ministerial update including the elevation of the CMATS project to a Project of Concern, and
• in April 2022, the government of the day entered the caretaker period.[27]
  23. Defence advised the Committee that the 13-month delay in actioning CMATS as a Project of Concern was due to Defence having to negotiate with other departments and the prime contractor on how to make the announcement, ‘given the commercial sensitivities of placing a project on the list’.[28] The ANAO did note in their report that Airservices Australia is the lead procurement agency for the CMATS project and delivers to Defence via an On-Supply Agreement.
  24. In a written response to the Committee’s question on how the Department communicates when projects are added to the Projects of Concern list, Defence advised that stakeholder identification and engagement is adjusted depending on the commercial arrangements for the relevant project. Defence advised ‘a media release follows a decision by the Minister for Defence Industry to list a project as a Project of Concern’ and this is also reported in Defence’s Annual Report. Defence’s response did not include advice on timeframes for which these activities should occur.[29]

Governance

2.25In 2019 the ANAO conducted a performance audit of the Projects of Concern process, which also considered Projects of Interest. The ANAO found Defence’s Projects of Concern process was appropriate for escalating troubled projects for attention but that Defence was not able to demonstrate the effectiveness in managing the recovery of underperforming projects. The report recommended Defence introduce a consistent process for managing entry and exit from the Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest lists.[30] The ANAO advised the Committee that ‘governance is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for success’.[31]

2.26In July 2020, Defence closed this recommendation, however a later ANAO performance audit into Defence’s implementation of recommendations in 2021 concluded Defence had not implemented the recommendation. Consequently, the JCPAA inquiry into the 2019-20 MPR also recommended that Defence revisit its effort to provide criteria for projects to enter and exit the Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest lists and create processes for their consistent application (recommendation two).[32] The 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs both identified unresolved issues with the entry and exit processes for Projects of Interest and Projects of Concern.[33]

2.27In October 2022, the Minister for Defence announced the Government would strengthen the Projects of Concern process and, in March 2023, Defence released the ‘Delivery Group Performance Management and Reporting, and Management of Projects of Interest and Concern Policy’ in direct response to this announcement. This policy provides guidance on the identification of, and response to, underperformance, through a tiered system of elevation, enabling timely advice to the relevant decision makers, and the prompt remediation planning for projects and products.[34]

2.28Defence commented on how the new policy would improve consistency in these processes that:

The policy [for the management of Projects of Interest and Projects of Concern] introduces a consistent Defence approach for the management and coordination of performance monitoring and reporting for acquisition, sustainment and support activities. It provides specific guidance on the identification of, and response to, underperformance, through a tiered system of elevation, enabling timely advice to the relevant decision makers, and the prompt remediation planning for projects and products. There has been noticeable impact on the level and vigilance of senior management’s attention to projects and sustainment products that are experiencing performance issues and challenges.[35]

2.29At the public hearing, Defence confirmed that this new policy framework formalised the entry and exit criteria for Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest. Defence also noted that the entry and exit points may need to change given the capability requirements from the Defence Strategic Review.[36]

2.30A Defence submission to the inquiry on the implementation of recommendation two from JCPAA Report 489 discussed above, stated Defence considered no further action was required to implement the recommendation due to the revised Projects of Concern policy.[37]

Risk management

2.31Defence’s risk management has been a focus of the MPR since its inception. Major Projects risks and issues identified in the Project Data Summary Sheets (PDSSs) are excluded from the Auditor-General’s limited assurance review, as discussed in Chapter 1, however the governance arrangements in relation to risk are considered by the ANAO.

2.32A key concern of both the Committee and the ANAO has been to see Major Projects’ transition from spreadsheets and other uncontrolled risk management tools to a more robust toolkit. In 2018, due to the Committee’s concerns with Defence’s risk management processes, the JCPAA recommended that Defence plan and report a methodology showing how acquisition projects can transition from using spreadsheets to tools with better version control.[38]

2.33In October 2021, Defence advised the ANAO it had released tools to standardise risk practices across Defence’s Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG), including mandating the use of Predict! as the risk management system.[39]

2.34The 2021–22 MPR found that, although 19 of the 21 MPR projects used Predict!, fiveprojects either or alternatively still used other risk documentation, including Excel spreadsheets.[40] The use of Excel spreadsheets to manage risk has been a consistent and high risk issue identified in multiple MPRs.[41]

2.35The ANAO also identified issues in both the 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs with Defence’s risk management practices including:

• variable compliance with corporate guidance
• variable quality of risk management logs and supporting evidence
• infrequent of risk and issue log reviews, and
• lack of quality control.[42]
  36. These issues had also been identified in previous MPRs.[43]
  37. In its written response to the Committee’s question on how Defence was addressing ANAO’s risk management findings in the 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs, Defence stated:

Defence continues to mature and uplift its risk management practices, following the completion of the Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) Risk Reform Program, by focusing on improvements in policy as well as training and support for risk managers and practitioners. These include planned updates to the CASG Risk Management Policy and the associated Practical Guide, which applies to Major Projects Report (MPR) projects.[44]

2.38Defence advised the Committee ‘an area [Defence] needs to work more on is risk appetite and risk assessment and how that gets considered in the value for money context [of Major Projects]’.[45] This is particularly important, as the previous planning assumption of a 10-year warning period is no longer reliable. There is a resulting need to deliver capability faster as was outlined in the Defence Strategic Review..[46]

Contingency funding and risk

2.39Each Major Project has a contingency as part of the total project budget approved by government which is set aside for if risks eventuate, resulting in unforeseen work within the delivery of the planned scope of work. Defence’s PDSSs in the MPR include if contingency funds were used and, if so, the risks those funds mitigated.[47]

2.40The 2020–21 MPR found five projects (Hunter Class Frigates, Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles, Offshore Patrol Vessel, Replacement Replenishment Ships, and Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement) did not explicitly align their contingency funding log with their risk log as required by Defence guidance,[48] while the 2021–22 MPR found three projects (Hunter Class Frigates, Joint Strike Fighter and MRH90 Helicopters) did not. One of these projects, the MRH90 Helicopters, applied for contingency funding in 2021–22 to manage supportability and performance risks but, as at June 2022, did not maintain a log which met Defence policy.[49]

2.41As with other issues related to Defence’s risk management, this is an ongoing issue that has been identified in MPRs for several years.[50]

2.42Defence stated the lack of alignment in the projects identified in the 2021–22 MPR is being addressed by specific projects as part of their risk management processes, and advised Defence is assessing projects outside of the MPR for this alignment as part of its project assurance activities.[51]

Lessons Learned

2.43Previous JCPAA inquiries, MPRs and ANAO performance audits of Defence projects have found areas for improvement in Defence’s procurement and management of Major Projects. This highlights the need for Defence to share and understand the lessons from current and previous Major Projects to better identify and mitigate risks for future Major Projects. The changes from the Defence Strategic Review further highlight the importance of implementing lessons learnt from previous Major Projects, as the risks of these are higher as procurements need to happen more quickly.

2.44In February 2022 CASG released a revised Lessons Program Policy requiring all Defence leaders to participate in and record the outcomes of Lessons Learned activities. The ANAO observed nine of the 21 projects in the 2021–22 MPR did not have Lessons Learned in the required location, and seven projects did not maintain a log at all.[52]

2.45In Defence’s written response to the Committee’s question on compliance with its lessons learnt policy Defence advised the Independent Assurance Review (IAR) process facilitates lessons learned across Defence. Defence advised:

As a part of the IAR process, observations on good practice or where improvements could be made for projects are shared with the Independent Program and Portfolio Management Office, the CASG Board and the CASG Lessons Program.[53]

Capability forecasting

2.46As discussed in Chapter 1, the ANAO has consistently found that Defence’s capability forecasting and method of measuring capability performance is subjective and can be overly optimistic.

2.47Since the 2009–10 MPR, capability reporting has been based on Defence’s prediction of the final capability that would be achieved based on the deliverables and/or activities completed. In practice, a combination of methods are used including an assessment based on the percentage the milestone represents with respect to the delivery of the overall capability. The ANAO found this to be a subjective approach and that Defence does not have a standard methodology for assessing the capability delivery performance.[54]

2.48Defence made a submission to the JCPAA in March 2018 which advised that it would conduct a schedule baseline validation activity, which should support it to investigate a more robust approach to measuring capability estimates. As at November 2021, Defence had not updated its methodology for capability forecasting for the MPR.[55]

2.49Defence noted Final Operating Capability reporting gives government confidence that the capability will deliver the operational needs, but also noted that there is complexity in how the capability will be delivered and there are often delays.[56]

Caveats and deficiencies

2.50Defence uses caveats or deficiencies where a key milestone (Initial Materiel Release, Initial Operational Capability, Final Materiel Release, or Final Operational Capability) has been achieved in principle, with outstanding actions to be rectified or mitigated.[57] The ANAO observed Defence declaring major milestones with caveats since the 2013–14 MPR and, prior to 2022, Defence had not defined what these terms relating to the caveats against major milestones meant.[58]

2.51In its review of the 2019–20 MPR, JCPAA recommended that Defence provide clear definitions for any term used in the MPR associated with a delta or deviation from project milestones being achieved.[59] Defence advised in June 2023 that it considered the recommendation implemented following updates to its internal guidance in October 2022 to define the terms ‘caveat’ and ‘deficiency’ as they relate to the declaration of capability milestones.[60]

2.52However, these are only two of the terms used by Defence to indicate potential limitations on capability or milestone requirements. Over successive MPRs, the ANAO found Defence also used the following terms which are not defined:

• challenge
• concession
• condition
• exception
• impact
• issue, and
• risk.[61]
  53. The 2020–21 MPR, which was published prior to Defence’s new definitions, found Defence declared limitations in three projects in meeting major milestones (Joint Strike Fighter, Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles and the ANZAC Air Search Radar Replacement). Defence declared these limitations are deficiencies, exceptions, and caveats respectively.[62]
  54. For the 2021–22 MPR, Defence declared caveats or deficiencies in three projects included in the MPR in meeting major milestones (Replacement Replenishment Ships, Maritime Communications and Combat Reconnaissance Vehicles). These limitations were described as a caveat, minor exceptions, and issues for resolution respectively.[63]
  55. Defence’s definition of the two terms does not meet the intention of the Committee’s recommendation to clarify any term relating to a deviation from project milestones being achieved. The declared deficiencies in the 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs show that these new definitions only covered three of the six (50 per cent) reported deviations from project milestones.

Committee comment

2.56The MPR is a mechanism for transparency and accountability in the otherwise opaque area of Defence Major Projects. The new priorities for Defence in the Defence Strategic Review, including the need for fast acquisition processes makes this even more important as the risk of something going wrong is higher and the consequence could have more of an impact not only on budget, but on whether Defence has the capability it needs to defend Australia in this new environment.

2.57The Committee appreciated the opportunities to examine both the 2020–21 and 2021–22 MPRs to identify commonalities in the findings of MPRs year on year. This will be a useful context for the next phase of the Committee’s inquiry into the scope and guidelines of the MPR. Noting the MPR will continue in its current form, with the MPR guidelines approved by the JCPAA, until any recommendation to the contrary, the recommendations from this report focused on issues raised by the MPR, rather than improvements to the MPR itself.

2.58The Committee appreciated Defence’s updates on the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on the projects included in the MPR, given border closures and other measures impacting staffing and supply chains were in effect during this time. Noting the impact of other factors, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on the international supply chain, the Committee is interested in Defence and the ANAO’s assessment of the continued impact of COVID-19 in the 2022–23 MPR.

2.59In relation to the Projects of Concern and Projects of Interest, the Committee was encouraged by Defence’s actions to clarify the entry and exit requirements given the challenges from the new expectations for faster moving Major Project acquisitions from the Defence Strategic Review. The Committee is aware that there can be a perception in Defence industry that the Projects of Concern is a ‘shame list’ to be avoided at all costs, which can create a cultural problem of not raising issues as early as possible. This reinforces the importance that all parties have confidence that the entry and exit criteria would be applied fairly, impartially, and transparently.

2.60Defence’s delay in actioning the Minister for Defence’s decision to make the CMATS project a Project of Concern presents a significant issue. The Committee has not been advised of any cogent reason for the 13-month delay in both the internal treatment of this project by Defence and its public announcement. The Committee deems Defence’s reasons for the delay unacceptable. Projects of Concern are allocated increased resources to support the project get back on track, but are also subject to senior level, Parliamentary and public scrutiny which can encourage government and industry partners to collaborate and remediate difficult projects. Delays in actioning these decisions can prolong issues unnecessarily.

2.61The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence updates internal governance to require decisions for projects to enter the Projects of Interest or Projects of Concern list be actioned in a timely manner, taking no more than three months between decision and implementation.

2.62In relation to risk management, the Committee recognises the progress Defence has made in transitioning the majority of projects from Excel spreadsheets to using the approved risk management tool, but notes progress can still be made. Despite Defence’s reform in this area there are still inconsistent risk management practices and the Committee encourages Defence to consistently apply its policy in all Major Projects.

2.63As with the use of risk management tools, contingency funding and Defence’s approach to Lessons Learned have been consistent issues across previous MPRs and persist to this day.

2.64Defence’s processes for Lessons Learned are particularly important to capture centrally for new projects to consider as Defence aims to accelerate its capability acquisition process and needs to learn from past challenges to make this a success. The Committee understands there can be a delay in implementing processes, but it is important for Defence to learn from previous experiences and consider these throughout the acquisition and management of future Major Projects.

2.65The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence provide a detailed update on the implementation of and compliance with internal policies for contingency funding and Lessons Learned for Major Projects.

2.66Finally, in relation to Defence’s use of caveats and deficiencies, the Committee does not consider that Defence has met the intent of the previous recommendation to properly define terms that are used in relation to a delta or deviation from project milestones being achieved. Defence continues to use a variety of terms with no clear definitions to limit Major Project’s achievement of major milestones. This continues the same issue the Committee identified in its review of the 2019–20 MPR, that these undefined terms can undermine the validity of the milestone being achieved and the ability of readers to clearly understand what is meant.

2.67The Committee notes the ANAO’s previous findings that Defence considered recommendations as implemented, which the ANAO assessed were not implemented. The Committee accepts that Defence has defined two of the terms and requests further advice on this issue noting that Defence may choose to define additional terms, or stop using undefined terms in relation to project milestones that are not fully achieved.

2.68The Committee recommends that the Department of Defence provide an update on the requirements and consideration process to close recommendations from the Australian National Audit Office and the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, including an explanation as to why Recommendation 4 of Report 489: Defence Major Projects Report 2019-20 has been closed without meeting its intended purpose.

2.69The MPR is a large and complicated document involving significant input from many project teams and areas at Defence, review and analysis by the ANAO, and guidelines from and consideration by the Committee. The two reports considered by the Committee in this inquiry totalled over 700 pages together, including a significant amount of technical and Defence specific information and language.

2.70As part of its regular review of the MPRs, the Committee has made a range of recommendations and modifications to the MPR Guidelines over the years to attempt to improve the readability and usefulness of the report. As outlined in Chapter 1, the Committee is examining the scope and guidelines of the MPR in the next phase of the inquiry to ensure that it continues to provide appropriate transparency and accountability to the Parliament in relation to Defence's capability acquisition expenditure and remains fit for purpose into the future.

2.71The Committee invites submissions from interested parties and users of the MPR to help guide this review and anticipates tabling its final report towards the end of this calendar year. This timing means significant changes to the 2023–24 MPR are unlikely as it is acknowledged that Defence and the ANAO will require a lead time to implement any significant recommended and agreed changes to future MPRs. However, the Committee takes the opportunity to restate its view that ANAO and Defence should continue to work together to make the MPR as useful and understandable to non-specialists as possible.

Mr Julian Hill MP

Chair

22 June 2023

Footnotes

[1]Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Report 489: Defence Major Projects Report 2019-20, p. 12; Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Report 473: Defence Major Projects Report (2016-17), p. 14; Auditor-General Report No. 14 2014-15, 2013-14 Major Projects Report, p. 92.

[2]2020–21 Major Projects Report, pages 48 and 57, 2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 60.

[3]2020–21 Major Projects Report, p. 18, 2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 18.

[4]Mr Chris Deeble, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, p. 15.

[5]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [8].

[6]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [11].

[7]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [12].

[8]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [14].

[9]Department of Defence, 2021–22 Annual Report, p. 158.

[10]Auditor-General Report No. 31 2018‑19, Defence’s Management of its Projects of Concern, p. 20.

[11]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [16].

[12]Auditor-General Report No. 31 2018‑19, Defence’s Management of its Projects of Concern, p. 20.

[13]Mr Chris Deeble, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, p. 5.

[14]This project was renamed to Hunter Class Frigates in 2021–22 and is referred to as such through the rest of this Chapter.

[15]2020–21 Major Projects Report, pages 24‑25; 2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 30. Note: The 2021–22 MPR did not include a full list of Projects of Interest.

[16]2020–21 Major Projects Report, pages 24‑25.

[17]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [4].

[18]2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 24.

[19]Department of Defence, Strengthening Army's helicopter capability, 10 December 2021, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2021-12-10/strengthening-armys-helicopter-capability, viewed 31 May 2023.

[20]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [17].

[21]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [16].

[22]The Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Defence, media release, Strengthening Army's helicopter capability, 10 December 2021, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2021-12-10/strengthening-armys-helicopter-capability, accessed 20 June 2023.

[23]Defence Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, United States Government, Australia – UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters, 25 August 2022, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters, accessed 20 June 2023.

[24]2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 24‑25, Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [16].

[25]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [17].

[26]2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 25.

[27]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [6].

[28]Air Vice-Marshal David Schuel, Head Air Defence and Space Systems Division, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, pages 6‑8.

[29]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [16].

[30]Auditor-General Report No. 31 2018-19: Defence’s Management of its Projects of Concern, p. 10.

[31]Mr Tom Ioannou, Group Executive Director Performance Audit Services Group, Australian National Audit Office, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, pages 6-7.

[32]Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Report 489: Defence Major Projects Report 2019‑20, pages12‑14, 25.

[33]2020–21 Major Projects Report, p. 22; 2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 25.

[34]The Hon Richard Marles MP, Minister for Defence, media release, Quality of Defence spending top priority for Albanese Government, 10 October 2022, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2022-10-10/quality-defence-spending-top-priority-albanese-government, accessed 1 June 2023; Department of Defence, Submission, p. 2.

[35]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [16].

[36]Mr Chris Deeble, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, p. 6.

[37]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.1, p. 1.

[38]JCPAA Report 473: Defence Major Projects Report (2016-17), p.7.

[39]2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 37-39.

[40]2020–21 Major Projects Report, pages 31-33, 2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 37-39.

[41]Auditor-General Report No. 40 of 2016‑17, 2015-16 Major Projects Report, p. 25; Auditor-General Report No. 26 2017‑18, 2016—17 Major Projects Report, p. 26; Auditor-General Report No. 20 2018‑19, 2017‑18 Major Projects Report, p. 30.

[42]2020–21 Major Projects Report, p. 32-33, 2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 38-39.

[43]Auditor-General Report No. 40 of 2016‑17, 2015-16 Major Projects Report, p. 25; Auditor-General Report No. 26 2017‑18, 2016—17 Major Projects Report, p. 26; Auditor-General Report No. 20 2018‑19, 2017‑18 Major Projects Report, p. 30.

[44]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [20].

[45]Mr Chris Deeble, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Department of Defence, 19 May 2023, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, p. 6.

[46]Major General Anthony Rawlins, Head Force Design, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, p. 13.

[47]2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 34-35.

[48]2020–21 Major Projects Report, p. 30.

[49]2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 35.

[50]Auditor-General Report No. 40 of 2016‑17, 2015-16 Major Projects Report, p. 24; Auditor-General Report No. 26 2017‑18, 2016—17 Major Projects Report, p. 24; Auditor-General Report No. 20 2018‑19, 2017‑18 Major Projects Report, p. 27.

[51]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [20].

[52]2021–22 Major Projects Report, p. 39.

[53]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.4 (responses to questions on notice and written questions), p. [20].

[54]2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 71-72.

[55]Department of Defence, Submission 1 to the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Inquiry into the

2016–17 Defence Major Projects Report, pages 1-2; 2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 72-73.

[56]Mr Chris Deeble, Deputy Secretary Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group, Department of Defence, Committee Hansard, 19 May 2023, p. 11.

[57]2021–22 Major Projects Report, p.41.

[58]2020–21 Major Projects Report, p.35.

[59]Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, Report 489: Defence Major Projects Report 2019-20, pages19 and 26.

[60]Department of Defence, Supplementary Submission 1.1, p. 1.

[61]2021–22 Major Projects Report, pages 41-42.

[62]2020–21 Major Projects Report, pages 35‑36.

[63]2021–22 Major Projects Report, p.42.