Chapter 5 - Civil Society Organisations and Partnerships

  1. Civil Society Organisations and Partnerships

Overview

5.1Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have an important role to play in supporting a thriving democracy. CSOs amplify the voices of local people on specific issues and recommend solutions to government for a range of topics including important public policy issues.

5.2CSOs create relationships and networks locally, nationally and internationally and provide valuable access for sharing information and allowing citizens to have their say on particular topics that affect them. CSOs raise awareness and advocate for certain groups including children and young people, women, LGBTI+, disability, human rights and faith-based organisations.

5.3The Australian Government recognises the valuable contribution that CSOs play alongside the private and public sector within Australia and internationally. CSOs deliver Australia’s aid and development program internationally and work in partnership with multi-lateral partners in the region to develop the capacity, capability and prosperity of the people in neighbouring countries.

5.4Australia provides support for development partnerships in the region through its Official Development Assistance worth $4.77 billion in the 2023-24 budget. This funding is for humanitarian and development and approximately 11 per cent of this funding goes to CSOs to deliver programs and projects in the region.[1]

5.5This chapter discusses the work carried out by CSOs in the region. It looks at the value of CSOs and their role in supporting democracy and the rule of law in the region. Partnerships are critical for providing development assistance and this chapter discusses Australia’s bi-lateral and multi-lateral development partnerships. Lastly, the chapter addresses human rights and a discussion on targeted sanctions.

The value of civil society organisations

5.6Investment in CSOs in our region helps Australia generate strong and enduring relationships with populations in neighbouring countries. Extensive research and experience shows that gender equality and social inclusion are requirements for good governance and democracy and ultimately shared prosperity.

5.7Oxfam advocated for the promotion and protection of civil society as a key feature in the Australian Government foreign policy. Oxfam outlined the importance of relationship building within Australia’s foreign policy.

Supporting civil society builds people-to-people links between Australia and the Asia-Pacific region, essential to regional security and cooperation, mutually beneficial trade, and strengthened economic and diplomatic ties.[2]

5.8The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) pointed out the value of connections and work being done by diaspora, labour, youth, and faith-based groups across Australia in partnership with the region to support development outcomes.[3]

5.9The Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue (AP4D) commented that a policy approach focusing on civil society collaborations will enable Australia to more effectively engage in the region. For example:

Australia-based diasporas are conduits in creating linkages of development and business collaborations while significant numbers of Australians work within civil society organisations alongside local civil society counterparts. They have established long-lasting and trusted relationships with current and emerging social and political leaders.[4]

5.10Another important consideration that AP4D raised with the Committee was that human rights need to be communicated with sensitivity when CSOs are working in countries in our region.

Given that civil society actors can be viewed as critics and opponents by regional governments, it is important that Australia's commitment to democratic and human rights values be communicated with sensitivity and diplomacy when engaging such actors in defence, diplomatic and development programs.[5]

Establish a CSO hub

5.11Several stakeholders, including ACFID suggested the Australian Government establish a central coordination point for work on civil society strengthening within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). This hub would have the resourcing and profile to influence and promote civil society engagement across DFAT and more broadly across the Australian Government, and with partners in the region.[6]

5.12In addition ACFID believed there should be an increased strategic focus on civic space and civil society within Australia’s development program.[7]

Women and gender

5.13Many stakeholders called for more funding to be provided to CSOs to allow women to receive better education and leadership training to promote women’s equality and participation in society. Support to increase women’s political participation and representation in government was another issue raised by stakeholders to promote democracies in the region.

5.14The International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) informed the Committee that a growing number of countries around the world are adopting a feminist foreign policy approach to guide their international engagement. These countries include France, Canada, Luxembourg, Mexico, Spain, Libya, Chile, Germany, the Netherlands, Liberia, and Colombia.[8]

5.15The Asia Foundation (TAF) agreed it was important to support marginalised communities to be active participants in governance and decision making. TAF stated:

Support for women peacebuilders and civil society leaders is vital for working towards more-inclusive societies, in line with Australia's commitment to the Women, Peace and Security agenda.[9]

5.16Academics who work in the Asia-Pacific region commented that the Pacific region fares poorly in terms of political representation of diverse groups, with women notably under-represented.[10]

5.17Oxfam suggested that more funding was needed to improve the participation of women in society including:

… better support for childcare, aged care and education to relieve the burden on women to undertake these responsibilities, thus enabling them to achieve equal participation in the workforce and in democratic institutions across the region.[11]

Disability and democracy

5.18Prioritising the needs of people with disabilities in development not only upholds Australia’s values-based commitments, but it maximises value in achieving the priorities of Australia’s development assistance.

5.19CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium highlighted that Australia has made commitments to leave no one behind by 2030. This ensures people with disabilities, along with other marginalised groups, will no longer experience barriers in accessing education, employment, infrastructure, health, or gender equality.[12]

5.20Disability inclusion cuts across all programs, sectors and contexts of Australian development assistance. CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium stated that partnering with CSOs to overcome barriers to inclusion is a key means through which Australian can support stability and good governance in our region.[13]

Addressing the preconditions means laying the foundations for people with disabilities to be included in mainstream services and all aspects of community life, such as the provision of assistive devices (e.g., a wheelchair, walking cane), access to information and communication in accessible formats, and accessible health and transport infrastructure.[14]

5.21The negative impacts of inaccessible information became clear at a broader social level during the COVID-19 pandemic when a lack of accessible public health information led to a proliferation of dangerous anti-vaccine messaging and misinformation.

People with disabilities are regularly faced with the challenges created by a lack of accessible information, within and beyond the context of a public health crisis.[15]

5.22CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium suggested the Australian Government consider:

  • targeted CSO capacity building programming
  • using trusted partners such as INGOs or specific intermediaries to mentor local partners, build capacity and strengthen the organisation’s policies and alignment
  • creating pooled funding arrangements and by investing in funding good practice (multi-year and flexible funding).[16]

Youth

5.23The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing a significant ‘youth bulge’. Over half the region’s total population of 10 million is under the age of 25.[17]

5.24The Oaktree Foundation commented on the importance of engaging youth in democracy:

Effectively engaging with youth is critical to ensuring a strong civil society, stability and democracy within the region. Our research demonstrated that there are many young people throughout the Asia-Pacific region who are actively engaging in civil society; investing in their activities and the young people themselves is crucial to democracy.[18]

5.25Further, the Oaktree Foundation referred to the need to increased support for financial training and capacity building for youth run organisations to maximise their engagement and leadership.

There is a high demand from youth-led organisations across the Asia-Pacific Region for flexible support and funding to continue their critical grassroots work. Increasing financial and training support to allow youth-run organisations to continue their work independently presents a propitious opportunity to maximise the societal benefits of their work.[19]

5.26Save the Children suggested that Australia should focus on ‘providing building the social infrastructure, by making sure that children have access to education so they're not going to miss out on those better paying jobs that they could have had if only they had been able to stay at school—those things are really part of what Australian strategy discussions should really be focusing on.’[20]

5.27International IDEA informed the Committee of the positive work that youth organisations were doing in the region.

I think there are several Pacific countries—from Tuvalu to Fiji and the Solomon Islands, as far as Kiribati—where civil society youth groups have really come up with very creative alliances with their own governments to advocate at international forums.[21]

Good governance

5.28Several submitters referred to civil society playing an essential role in all countries to hold government to account and to give a voice to the people on specific issues and well as combatting corruption.

5.29Transparency International Australia (TIA) informed the Committee that more support is needed to address corruption and promote good governance in the region.

Corruption is a barrier to economic growth and reduces people’s faith in democracy. The Indo- Pacific region consistently scores poorly on the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. The average score of countries in Asia-Pacific of 45/100 shows increased effort is needed to address corruption and promote good governance.[22]

5.30DFAT commented that Australia’s technical support and assistance to democracy in our region largely falls under the ‘governance’ umbrella. Governance accounts for around a quarter of Australia’s total official development assistance. In 2021-2022, around half of this was spent in the Pacific, around one third in Southeast Asia and the remainder on global and other country programs.[23]

5.31The Asia Foundation (TAF) emphasised the importance of good governance at a local level and said a lot of good work has been done in this area over the last decade. TAF suggested that Australia should continue to invest in these local governance programs going forward.[24]

5.32Susannah Patton commented that in Southeast Asia, governance is becoming an increasingly important constraint on development because new economic pathways are only possible if political reform occurs. Ms Patton suggested that Australia should focus on expanding its governance assistance to Southeast Asia as a priority over coming years.[25]

5.33ACFID made the following suggestions to the inquiry to restore a focus on governance and building state resilience in Australia’s development policy, and target investments towards supporting development partners to build effective, accountable, and resilient states, by:

  • reinstating and building the capability of a ‘Fragile States and Governance’ team within DFAT including technically experienced personnel
  • ensuring that any provision of direct budget support to partner governments is accompanied by matched funding to local civil society organisations to enable them to play a role in accountability and transparency on public spending
  • investing in programs that build the skills and capabilities of the next generation of leaders in the region
  • increasing development and humanitarian assistance that supports people and communities in conflict affected and fragile environments based on a tiered risk framework.[26]

The future of CSOs

5.34Many stakeholders noted the trends of rapidly shrinking civic space in our region and suggested that the Australian Government boost resources and supports for CSOs in the region to safeguard civic space and fulfill their important role in effective and accountable governance.[27]

5.35The Indo-Pacific Studies Center [sic] agreed Australia should prioritise support for CSOs suggested that engage in youth civic education, women’s’ rights, and rights of marginalised groups, to increase civic participation in socio-political life, to address issues impacting democracy and democratic processes.’[28]

5.36ACFID called for an increase in resourcing for CSOs by increasing the proportion of ODA channelled to local civil society to 25 per cent across humanitarian and development funding.[29]

Flexible and core funding is especially important to support the essential functions and day-to-day business of civil society organisations. CSOs tend to receive fragmented funding which is tied to specific projects or program outcomes. This restricts their ability to grow and develop their capabilities and resilience, invest in their staff, and meet their ongoing core costs.[30]

5.37Several stakeholders suggested the Australian Government should ‘Increase funding to support civil society organisations and initiatives, including research on corruption and governance, and recognise their essential role in supporting democracy and ensuring accountability in governments and businesses.’[31]

5.38Oxfam suggested several recommendations including:

  • ensure there is capacity for workers, particularly women and other marginalised groups, in the formal and informal economies to have a voice at the workplace and in the wider workplace relations and public policy processes.
  • Official development assistance preferences delivery via grants not loans and supports debt relief and restructuring.[32]
    1. Union Aid Abroad - APHEDA urged the Australia Government to consider the following:

Introduce a new thematic area of trade union development into the Australian aid and development program in line with other OECD nations of Europe, the US and Japan. Build the capacity of DFAT in this new area, drawing on the expertise of European donor countries and the international trade union movement.[33]

5.40The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA) provided the Committee with an example of effective CSO voices and the need to provide long term funding.

… there are a number of countries where there's a space and history for civil society actions—Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Mongolia—and they have been a source of resistance to democratic decline. We saw that in Indonesia it was really the civil society that mobilised to resist any constitutional amendment to extend presidential terms. I guess our message is that support in these contexts should go on well beyond the immediate years of democratic transition.[34]

5.41Save the Children highlighted the need for the Australian Government to recognise the valuable asset that many Australian and international CSOs have developed across several decades and to invest more seriously in CSO in the future. Save the Children commented:

Collaborative outreach to the region with and by Australian CSOs should be prioritised. With diverse and highly skilled staff profiles and wide, usually permanent, Indo-Pacific footprints and networks, Australian CSOs hold an important stock of Australia’s regional knowledge as well as key policy and advocacy skills. They are also operational powerhouses, running social businesses and delivering development programs all around the region.[35]

5.42Human Rights Watch suggested ‘To strengthen rule of law, transparency, and accountability in the Asia-Pacific in the face of growing Chinese Government influence, we urge the Australian Government to reinvest in development aid, especially strengthening civil society groups and independent journalists across the region.

The Australian Government should put the protection of civil society groups at the forefront of its approach in the region and denounce laws that violate international law and restrict freedom of expression, assembly, and association.’[36]

5.43VOICE suggested Australia should use free trade agreements as leverage to ensure that our trade partners are committed to improving human rights and promoting the rule of law.[37]

Partnerships

5.44Many stakeholders including The Asia Foundation (TAF) agreed that sustaining long term partnerships between Australia and countries in the region were critically important for supporting better development outcomes.[38]

5.45Mr Michael Willson commented that extending our aid, interests and partnerships with other democracies in our region gives strength to Australia and strengthens the likelihood of continued peace in our region.[39]

5.46Me Bula Ko Viti (To Save Fiji) highlighted the important value of partnerships between Australia and Fiji:

Australia can partner with island states, with NGO's and sharing its democratic values, ie .... the rule of law, freedom, an independent media, an impartial and independent judicial system and a market economy constitute the fabric of Australian democracy. They support our national strength and high-income economy, providing an enduring basis for social and economic progress.[40]

5.47ASPI contributors stated that CSOs and academia groups are more agile in their approach to bringing resources together and connecting with others in the region and often are viewed less cynically by regional communities.[41]

To build partnerships across Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, the government should provide opportunities for journalists, academics, activists, and think tankers in the form of fellowships, research grants, and scholarships. These initiatives could focus on research subjects and programs that help build democratic resilience. These partnerships would be based on speaking with, and not to, the region.[42]

5.48The Department of Political and Social Change, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, Australian National University (ANU) proposed the Australian Government consider an on-going initiative that could be called a ‘Network for Democratic Governance’ focusing on how Australia can forge effective partnerships in Southeast Asia to advance both democracy and the international rules-based order.

The historical foundations of such an effort can be traced to what was formerly the Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI), supported by the Australian Government and based for many years at the Australian National University. CDI engaged in the training of parliamentarians and party officials as well as the promotion of women’s political participation (with a particular geographic focus on Indonesia and Melanesia). Unlike CDI, the proposed initiative would be oriented less to training and more to forging common paths with partners throughout Southeast Asia.[43]

5.49Professor Benjamin Reilly provided the Committee with some positive examples of work that the former CDI had undertaken in providing democracy building support for some countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

… assisting with the construction of new institutions such as the political party registrar in PNG, the upper house (DPD) in Indonesia, and electoral system reform in several countries; to expose a generation of emerging Asian and Pacific politicians to their peers, helping to build networks across the region; and to engage Australian political parties and politicians directly in this effort. Some of our political party trainees also went on to serve in parliament in PNG, Malaysia, Myanmar and a number of Pacific Islands.[44]

5.50ASPI contributors noted that Australian Universities have had its research funding for Southeast Asia and the Pacific drawn down over the last decade. It suggested:

Recent cutbacks to budgets across humanities and social science departments have negatively impacted not only area studies research but also their abilities to organise research partnerships and events (like conferences and seminars) to discuss issues in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. The government must continue to invest in area studies research, particularly concerning Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and provide opportunities to train Australia’s next generation of area studies specialists and support research partnerships and fellowships that engage with other experts in the region.[45]

Leadership programs and exchanges

5.51Academics from the University of Adelaide suggested Australia should invest in Pacific education and research partnerships, to increase the capacity of Pacific peoples to understand and participate in their governments.[46]

5.52The Sydney Policy and Analysis Centre (SPAC) suggested the Australian Government introduce a leadership program similar to the US government’s International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) for countries in our region.

Under this program, the US embassies select emerging leaders from various professional fields for a several-weeks long tour of the US to meet policy makers, politicians and civil society organisations. The alumni of this program includes presidents, prime ministers, and opposition leaders of many countries. Such a program would expand Australian networks deep into the foreign societies, and pay dividend over decades. These fellowships would be particularly effective in countries with authoritarian and hybrid regimes.[47]

Bi-lateral

5.53DFAT stated that since the establishment of the Colombo Plan in 1951 to the current Australia Awards program, education has been central to Australia’s partnerships with the region. DFAT commented:

Australia’s international scholarships have enabled more than 100,000 leaders to study in Australia or the Pacific and are a foundational feature of our bilateral relationships. Australia Awards will continue to contribute to development outcomes by investing in the education of a new generation of local leaders with strong links to Australia.[48]

5.54Following pandemic disruptions, DFAT is rebuilding the Australia Awards program to ensure it remains competitive to attract future leaders. DFAT discussed expanding the mix of short and long-term study options as well as professional placements and leadership initiatives. Alongside the New Colombo Plan, this will help deepen individual and institution connections with our region.[49]

Multi-lateral

5.55The Asia Pacific Forum discussed the importance of multilateral partnerships supporting democracy in our region.

Partners can be national, regional and global. National governmental institutions and agencies are key partners but so too are civil society organisations and particularly NHRIs. United Nations agencies, including the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Development Programme, UN Women and UNICEF, should be important partners. The Pacific Islands Forum is a significant multilateral partner in the Pacific region and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the south-east Asia region.[50]

5.56Mr Henry Heritage made the comment that Australia’s involvement in the recently announced Partners in the Blue Pacific initiative (PBP) is prime example of a contemporary, well-suited policy approach to the Pacific.[51]

5.57Mr Heritage reinforced that the independence and agency of Pacific states must be recognised and protected in regional development and multilateral partnerships that Australia pursues.

Whilst Australia is the largest foreign aid donor to the Pacific region, it’s regional activity, both through membership in groups such as the Pacific Island Forum and through diplomatic missions regarding Pacific affairs, has historically been characterised by a directed, imperialist approach which has prioritised the utilisation of the Pacific’s developing geostrategic value to bolster its regional standing.[52]

5.58The Asia Foundation stated that where democratic backsliding has already occurred, Australia should draw on all forms of statecraft in both bi-lateral and multi-lateral settings in pursuing a deliberate strategy of engagement to influence governments to reconsider authoritarian tactics.[53]

This can occur through the facilitation of more regional networks (both governmental and non-governmental), more ambitious engagement by Australia in multilateral forums, and support to the foreign policy capacities of neighbouring countries to heighten their influence in regional dialogue.[54]

5.59RAND suggested that soft-power initiatives funded by Australia and targeted towards particular areas may best be structured for delivery through associations, particularly multilateral institutions.[55]

5.60ASPI contributors suggested Australia should look to strengthen greater partnerships with similar values to focus on economic development in the region.

Australia should identify partners to provide alternative infrastructure projects that are focused on the region’s needs. The Trilateral Infrastructure Partnership between Australia, the US and Japan is an example and should be better utilised. In addition, Australia should continue its recent reset with France by making regional infrastructure a top priority and identifying those Pacific countries in which France – as a regional power – has most interest. Australia should also push New Zealand to invest in this area while the European Union should be encouraged to use the economic weight of its Global gateway Initiative to invest in the region.[56]

Promoting Science in the Indo-Pacific

5.61The Australian Academy of Science is hosting a new initiative from 2023 which ‘will increase the International Science Council (ISC) Regional Presence for the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific Regional Presence will strengthen the voice of scientists and social scientists from countries in the region and support targeted action to address regional needs and priorities.’[57]

… international science diplomacy is the most effective method of engaging regional entities in the democratic processes that the international scientific industry fosters. By building science capacity and science advice mechanisms, Australia can support evidence informed policy development that is self-determined by the civil and scientific leaders of each nation, directly contributing to the advancement of our neighbours' social and economic prosperity and to regional sovereignty on the world stage.[58]

Human rights

5.62The Asia Pacific Forum commented that ‘Human rights are the legal provisions that make democracy possible. Protecting and promoting human rights is therefore an essential component and the surest way of supporting democracy in our region.’[59]

5.63Save the Children emphasised that in order to uphold human rights, ranging from dialogue and diplomacy to targeted human rights sanctions, it is important that it is done in a principled and consistent manner. Failure to do so will lead to accusations of the use of such measures as an ideological wedge and risk alienating our immediate partners in the region.

Australia’s responses will be undermined if we are unwilling to speak up to support norms, standards, and rules, whether that refers to the right to self-determination, respect for the views of children, or the right to survival and development, among other rights.[60]

5.64Save the Children acknowledged that many multi-lateral institutions which support human rights values are under increasing strain from strategic competition, with consistent debates on how they should operate and the norms which underpin their activities.

Australia has an important role to play in helping to ensure that these institutions can uphold their mandates and are provided with appropriate resources to undertake their activities.[61]

5.65Oxfam commented achieving sustainable and resilient development, with alignment to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on climate change and the human rights framework of internationally agreed legal instruments, is a crucial element in supporting democracy in our region.

Australia’s international development and humanitarian work must therefore be at the heart of Australia’s foreign policy and delivered primarily in the interests of addressing poverty, inequality and enhancing human rights.[62]

5.66Human Rights Watch advocated for the Australian Government to strongly promote human rights in the region:

As governments from across Asia are increasingly suppressing the work of human rights defenders, journalists, and bloggers, the Australian government should strongly promote the rights to freedom of expression, media freedom, and freedoms of association, religion, and assembly, and stand with Asia-Pacific civil society leaders.[63]

5.67Human Rights Watch commented that the Australian Government needs to consistently raise human rights concerns with governments in the region in order to make it clear that Australia values the promotion of democracy in the region.

5.68Human Rights Watch suggested:

The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), should draft a public policy document on human rights that is updated regularly, setting out DFAT's vision and goals on human rights, targeting particular countries and issues for action, and giving guidance to embassies on effective strategies to advance human rights and promote democracy. Countries such as the United Kingdom and United States already do this.[64]

5.69Similarly, the Diplomacy Training Program (DTP) suggested ‘Australia’s diplomatic missions (Embassies and High Commissions) should clearly and consistently promote Australia’s commitment to democracy, human rights and the rights of Indigenous peoples, including through the home pages of its Embassy/High Commission websites and the role of its Ambassador for First Nations People and its Human Rights Ambassador.’[65]

5.70SPAC offered the view that the Australian Government should ‘Clearly state in all formal settings – in websites, speeches and articles by Australian ministers and officials – that defending and protecting human rights, freedom of speech, and regular, free, and fair elections are core Australian values.’[66]

5.71APF recommended that ‘DFAT develop and the Australian Government adopt an international human rights policy and strategy as the basis for Australian diplomacy, development assistance and action in relation to human rights.’[67]

Sanctions

5.72Sanctions impose restrictions on activities that relate to particular countries, themes of conduct, goods and services or persons and entities.[68]

5.73Dr Htwe Htwe Thein and Associate Professor Michael Gillan stated that ‘Sanctions are an imperfect instrument and can lead to ‘collateral damage’ in an economy, but they provide a clear political signal as to the values and principles of the nation that deploys them.’[69]

5.74AP4D suggested Australia should expand the use of its updated autonomous sanctions regime, which provides avenues to promote good governance and disincentivise democratic backsliding regionally by targeting regime figures guilty of corruption and human rights abuses while sparing citizens from the negative impacts of uniform sanctions.

This could involve greater cooperative partnerships with civil society organisations across the region, helping to maintain human security partnerships with peoples across the region especially in countries where governments are not representative of their citizens.[70]

Targeted sanctions

5.75Human Rights Watch provided evidence that the Magnitsky-style amendment enables targeted sanctions for serious human rights abuses, serious violations of international humanitarian law, activities undermining good governance and the rule of law, and serious corruption. Human Rights Watch stated:

People who commit serious abuses or corruption with impunity should not be able to travel to Australia or hide their assets in Australian bank accounts. Targeted sanctions raise the cost of serious human rights violations.[71]

5.76The Australian Centre for International Justice (ACIJ) commented that ‘Australia can promote stability, democracy and good governance in the region by being a leader in combatting impunity for grave human rights abuses, through the consistent application of international criminal law and targeted sanctions.’ [72]

5.77Human Rights Watch shared the following information with the Committee in relation to targeted sanctions:

Over the past 12 months, the Australian Government has only applied targeted sanctions under the Magnitsky-style amendment against 39 Russian individuals implicated in the death of Sergei Magnitsky. This stands in stark contrast to the governments of Canada, the EU, the UK, and the US, all of whom have sanctioned numerous individuals and entities from a range of countries implicated in abuses. Targeted sanctions need to be coordinated if they are to be effective.[73]

5.78Human Rights Watch suggested the Australian Government should examine individuals and entities already sanctioned by other likeminded governments and implement its own targeted sanctions, particularly on individuals and entities in this region, given there is a stronger likelihood of assets in Australia or travel to Australia.[74]

5.79VOICE Australia suggested Australia should apply targeted sanctions on any individual involved in a human rights violation.

The sanctions include freezing assets, non-admission into Australia and restriction of trade. A clear guideline should be published to assist CSOs, NGOs and individuals in nominating individuals or/and entities to be sanctioned.[75]

Myanmar

5.80The Committee received information from stakeholders who called on the Australia Government to continue support towards democracy for Myanmar.

5.81The CRHP NUG Support Australia encouraged the Committee to consider investing in the people of Myanmar and their legitimate representative organisations such as the NUG, not the military.[76]

5.82The CRHP NUG Support Australia suggested that Myanmar must be allowed to transition to a genuine federal democracy. The Myanmar military must be removed from their position of dominance over politics and the economy and thoroughly reformed and placed under civilian control. A key strategy for doing this is through targeted sanctions and refraining from affording the military any form of legitimisation.[77]

5.83Several stakeholders commented that the Australian Government should impose targeted sanctions against senior officials and entities in the Myanmar military responsible for abuses, as well as against military linked companies and other entities.[78]

5.84The Uniting Church in Australia called on the Australian Government to support the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. It suggested the following:

  • Apply sanctions on Myanmar targeted at the military regime and its business interests;
  • Recognise the National Unity Government as the legitimate representative of the people of Myanmar until genuine democratic elections can be held;
  • Support and participate in a comprehensive global arms embargo against the regime;
  • Support civil society organisations working on restoring democracy in Myanmar;
  • Work with other governments in the region and across the globe to seek the creation of genuine democracy in Myanmar; and
  • Support efforts to refer the military dictatorship to the International Criminal Court.[79]
    1. Dr Tun Shwe commented that a sustainable solution for Myanmar required cooperation between the US and its allies, China and the NUG. Dr Shwe stated:

Establishing a genuine federal democracy in Myanmar will be a win-win-win solution for all stakeholders, Myanmar’s legitimate government the NUG, the US and its allies, China, and the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Australia and the international community must work hand in hand with key stakeholders and look beyond the military junta.[80]

Committee comment

5.86Countries that have well-functioning governments, low corruption and strong connections between government and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have higher resilience to disruption and instability.

5.87Promoting gender equality is a human rights issue and is a means to social and economic empowerment. It is critical that women in the Indo-Pacific region are provided with equal opportunities to actively participate in community and society as a whole. The Committee recognises that gender equality is critical in leadership and decision-making levels in all areas of society, including Parliament.

5.88The Committee supports the CSOs’ request for a minimum allocation of Australia’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding to ensure long term continuation of programs and support for local communities in our region. This should include funding to allow for a full evaluations of the programs at regular intervals. The Committee strongly believes that CSOs play a critical role in supporting the inclusion of women, people with disabilities, youth and other marginalised groups across the Indo-Pacific region. The Committee recognises the value of CSOs working on the ground in country, as they often have the ability to respond rapidly to issues that may arise. The Committee notes that boosting funding for Australian based CSOs in the region is important in order for these sustainable partnerships to be effective and to thrive.

5.89The Committee believes that the pre-conditions for the inclusion and participation of people with disabilities are important for a strong and functioning democracy. The Committee recommends the Australian Government provide increased targeted funding through the ODA for building partnerships with Australian disability advocates and civil society organisations in the Indo-Pacific region.

5.90Recognising that there is a significant youth bulge in the Indo-Pacific the Committee was impressed to receive evidence demonstrating that young people are key agents of change in the region and are engaged in promoting democratic values. The Committee believes the Australian Government should provide increased targeted funding to youth-led organisations which promote democracy in the region.

5.91Consideration should be given to the establishment of a central Civil Society Organisational hub within DFAT. This hub would allow for more strategic coordination of CSO delivery in our region. The Committee notes the current portion of funding to CSOs out of the Official Development Assistance fund is 11 per cent. The Committee considers the Australian Government should set an annual base-line target for humanitarian and development funding in the ODA.

5.92Australia should continue to build support for democratic institutions across the Indo-Pacific via collaboration not only between governments, but through civil society organisations, academia and between parliaments. The Committee believes collaboration should focus on improving the engagement with Indo-Pacific parliaments on women in parliament, good governance, public accountability and budget scrutiny. The Committee is particularly interested in supporting countries to strengthen good governance as it combats corruption and allows a society to prosper under a rules-based society.

5.93The Committee believes it is important that Australia continues to provide support for its current bi-lateral and multi-lateral partnerships that focus on democracy building and support for an international rules-based order. It recognises that these relationships require ongoing support at this point in time as democracy is seen to be declining in the region.

5.94Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and free elections, without interference, are essential elements for democracies. Several witnesses referred to these values contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Australia is a party.

5.95The Committee understands that it is essential for the Australian Government to ensure human rights are respected within our own country as well as within our region. The Committee believes the Australian Government should continue to protect and promote human rights in Australia as a way of demonstrating the important values that Australia wishes to uphold. This includes ensuring that corruption is not tolerated in Australia.

Recommendation 6

5.96The Committee recommends theAustralian Government reinstate funding for a Women in Parliament program within the Australian Parliament. This program should provide support for building and strengthening partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. The program would focus on supporting leadership skills for girls and women and should include:

  • promoting women and girls’ voices in all levels of society such as schools, community organisations, public and private sphere at provincial and national levels
  • building connections with feminist civil society groups already in the region
  • ensuring women and girls’ have improved access to quality health care services, including reproductive health
  • improving women and girls’ safety, especially for protecting women and girls’ from gender violence and ensuring services are readily available
  • promoting gender mainstreaming within all aspects of society in the Indo-Pacific including intergovernmental policies that are agreed to and delivered.

Recommendation 7

5.97The Committee recommends the Australian Government establish a central Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Hub within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to support the coordination of CSO development delivery in the region.

Recommendation 8

5.98The Committee recommends the Australian Government set an annual base-line funding target for the delivery of humanitarian and development programs, through Civil Society Organisations, in the Official Development Assistance budget.

Footnotes

[1]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 4.

[2]Oxfam, Submission 23, p. 2.

[4]AP4D, Submission 4, p. 2.

[5]AP4D, Submission 4, p. 2.

[6]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 1; TIA, Submission 39, p.4.

[7]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 1.

[8]IWDA, Submission 27, p. 1.

[9]The Asia Foundation, Submission 13, p. 4.

[10]Barbara and Baker, Submission 40, p. 3.

[11]Oxfam, Submission 23, p. 3.

[12]CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium, Submission 5, p. 1.

[13]CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium, Submission 5, p. 1.

[14]CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium, Submission 5, p. 1.

[15]CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium, Submission 5, p. 1.

[16]CBM Australia and the Australian Disability and Development Consortium, Submission 5, p. 4.

[17]The Oaktree Foundation Australia, Submission 26, p. 1.

[18]Oaktree Foundation Australia, Submission 26, p. 2.

[19]Oaktree Foundation Australia, Submission 26, p. 2.

[20]Dr Mahli, Save the Children, Canberra, 10 March 2023, p. 26.

[21]Ms Leena Rikkila Tamang, International IDEA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 1 December 2022, p. 5.

[22]TIA, Submission 39, p. 6.

[23]DFAT, Submission 11, p. 5.

[24]The Asia Foundation, Submission 13, p. 5.

[25]Susannah Patton, Submission 18, p. 4.

[26]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 2.

[27]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 1.; Oxfam, Submission 23, pages 1-2.

[28]Indo-Pacific Studies Centre, Submission 53, p. 2.

[29]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 2.

[30]ACFID, Submission 37, p. 4.

[31]Transparency International Australia, Submission 39, p. 4; Academics from University of Adelaide, Submission 51, p. 2.

[32]Oxfam, Submission 23, p.3.

[33]APHEDA, Submission 33, p. 3.

[34]Ms Leena Rikkila Tamang, International IDEA, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 1 December 2022, p. 3.

[35]Save the Children, Submission 43, p. 6.

[36]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 4.

[37]VOICE Australia, Submission 21, p. 3.

[38]The Asia Foundation, Submission 13, p. 3.

[39]Mr Michael Willson, Submission 55, p.2.

[40]Me Bula Ko Viti, Submission 35, p. 3.

[41]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 4.

[42]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 5.

[43]Coral Bell School, ANU, Submission 7, p. 2.

[44]Professor Benjamin Reilly, Submission 22, p. 2.

[45]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p . 4.

[46]Academics from University of Adelaide, Submission 51, p. 2.

[47]SPAC, Submission 34, p. 2.

[50]Asia Pacific Forum, Submission 25, p. 5.

[51]Mr Henry Heritage, Submission 3, p. 5.

[52]Mr Henry Heritage, Submission 3, p. 5.

[53]The Asia Foundation, Submission 13, p. 4.

[54]The Asia Foundation, Submission 13, p. 4.

[55]RAND, Submission 32, p. 5.

[56]ASPI contributors, Submission 45, p. 6.

[57]Australian Academy of Science, Submission 44, p. 1.

[58]Professor Frances Separovic, Australian Academy of Science, Committee Hansard, Canberra, 10 March 2023, p. 36.

[59]Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights, Submission 25, p. 1.

[60]Save the Children, Submission 43, p. 10.

[61]Save the Children, Submission 43, p. 10.

[62]Oxfam, Submission 23, p. 2.

[63]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 1.

[64]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 2.

[65]Diplomacy Training Program, Submission 47, p. 2.

[66]SPAC, Submission 34, p. 2.

[67]Asia Pacific Forum of National Human Rights, Submission 25, p. 4.

[69]Dr Htwe Htwe Thein and Associate Professor Michael Gillan, Submission 46, p. 5.

[70]AP4D, Submission 4, p. 4.

[71]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 3.

[72]ACIJ, Submission 31, p. 5.

[73]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 3.

[74]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 3.

[75]VOICE Australia, Submission 21, p. 3.

[76]CRPH NUG Support Australia, Submission 14, p. 3.

[77]CRPH NUG Support Australia, Submission 14, p. 6.

[78]Human Rights Watch, Submission 16, p. 6; Australian Chin Federation, Submission 48, p. 2.

[79]Uniting Church in Australia, Submission 29, p. 4.

[80]Dr Tun Shwe, Submission 36, p. 1.