Introductory Info
Date introduced: 28 March 2018
House: House of Representatives
Portfolio: Indigenous Affairs
Commencement: The main Bill commences on the earlier of the day the Act is proclaimed, or six months after the Act receives Royal Assent. Most of the Consequential Amendments Bill commences when the main Bill commences. See page 5 of this digest for details.
The Bills Digest
at a glance
The Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund Bill 2018 (the Bill) will
replace the existing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Account,
established under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005, by
creating a new investment fund, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land
and Sea Future Fund (ATSILSFF), for the purpose of funding the activities of
the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC). The ATSILSFF will be managed by the
Future Fund Board of Guardians through the Future Fund Management Agency
(FFMA). The current Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Account has
suffered from poor financial returns due to its restricted investment mandate,
potentially leading to erosion of its capital which was intended to be
perpetual in nature.
The general policy to reform the Land Account’s investment
strategy has been called for by the ILC and its stakeholders for some years.
Key Issues
The Bill has been broadly welcomed by the ILC and
Indigenous stakeholders who have, however, raised concerns that the Bill:
- makes
no allowance for existing Indigenous governance mechanisms to be continued or
new ones to be established
- has
no preamble commemorating the compensatory and perpetual nature of the fund and
- has
provisions that may allow relevant ministers (the Finance Minister and
Treasurer) to deplete the capital of the fund by making transfers to the ILC
against the advice of the Future Fund Board of Guardians.
These concerns were echoed by Labor and Greens members of
the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee. The Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills suggested that a ten-year review
provided for by the Bill be made public, and the ATSILSFF’s Investment Mandate,
under the Bill a non-disallowable, non-sunsetting legislative instrument, be
made disallowable and/or subject to sunsetting.
Context of the Bill
The Bill is part of a package of three Bills concerning
the ILC which are currently before the House of Representatives. The other two
Bills are:
This Bills Digest also covers parts of the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund (Consequential Amendments) Bill
2018. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Amendment (Indigenous Land
Corporation) Bill 2018 is discussed in a separate Bills Digest.
Purpose of
the Bills
The purpose of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Land and Sea Future Fund Bill 2018 (the Bill) is to establish a dedicated financial
asset fund in a Special Account, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land
and Sea Future Fund (ATSILSFF or ‘the fund’), to support making annual and
discretionary payments to the Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC).[1]
The ATSILSFF replaces the current Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land
Account (the Land Account), which has suffered from declining returns and
consequently an eroding capital base. The ATSILSFF will be managed by the
Future Fund Board of Guardians through the Future Fund Management Agency (FFMA)
with a view to maximising its returns over the long term, subject to
international best practice and an Investment Mandate to be set by the
Treasurer and the Finance Minister, with input from the Indigenous Affairs
Minister.[2]
The purpose of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Land and Sea Future Fund (Consequential Amendments) Bill 2018 (the
Consequential Amendments Bill) is to make consequential amendments to other
Acts which are affected by the creation of the ATSILSFF, including repealing
the sections of the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 which create the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Land Account (the Land Account), amending the legislation
governing the Future Fund and other funds managed by the FFMA, and changing
references to the Indigenous Land Corporation to refer to the Indigenous Land
and Sea Corporation, contingent on passage of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Amendment (Indigenous Land Corporation) Bill 2018.[3]
According to the Consequential Amendments Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum, having
a separate Bill for these consequential amendments ‘conforms to the
Commonwealth practice to reduce the complexity of principal Acts’.[4]
Structure
of the Bills
This Bill is presented in six parts:
- Part
1, clauses 1–7, deals with preliminary matters such as definitions
and commencement dates
- Part
2, clauses 8–18, establishes the ATSILSFF and an associated Special
Account
- Part
3, clauses 19–27, establishes an Indigenous Land Corporation Funding
Special Account, into which are paid annual and discretionary payments from the
ATSILSFF and out of which are drawn the ILC’s annual and discretionary payments
- Part
4, clauses 28–46, lays out how the funds in the ATSILSFF will be
invested and managed by the Future Fund Board, according to an Investment
Mandate determined by the Treasurer and Finance Minister, with input from the
Indigenous Affairs Minister
- Part
5, clauses 47–50, lays out the Future Fund Board’s obligations to
report to the Finance Minister and
- Part
6, clauses 51–56, enables delegations by the relevant ministers, and
provides for a review of the Act within ten years of its commencement.
The Consequential Amendments Bill contains five Schedules:
- Schedule
1 abolishes the Land Account and makes a number of amendments incorporating
references to the ATSILSFF into other Acts which concern the operation of the
Future Fund Board. Schedule 1 commences at the same time as the main Bill
- Schedule
2 amends the Nation-building
Funds Act 2008 to ensure that the Building Australia Fund Special
Account and the Education Investment Fund Special Account are not used to pay
expenses incurred in the management of the ATSILSFF. Schedule 2 commences at
the same time as the main Bill, but will not commence at all if Part 1 of
Schedule 1 to the Nation-building
Funds Repeal (National Disability Insurance Scheme Funding) Bill 2017 commences
before the main Bill
- conversely,
Schedule 3 removes references to these funds in the Bill in the event that the Nation-building
Funds Act 2008 is repealed, as is the Government’s intent. Schedule 3 will
commence at the later of the commencement of the main Bill or the commencement
of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Nation-building
Funds Repeal (National Disability Insurance Scheme Funding) Bill 2017.
However, it will not commence at all unless both these Bills commence
- Schedule
4 changes references to the Indigenous Land Corporation to refer to the
Indigenous Land and Sea Corporation in the event that the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Amendment (Indigenous Land Corporation) Bill 2018 is passed and
- Schedule
5 corrects errors in the Medical Research
Future Fund Act 2015. Schedule 5 commences the day after Royal Assent.
Background
Origin of the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Land Account
Need for a Land Fund
The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Account (originally
called the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund) was created by the
Keating Government in November 1993. This was the second component of an
intended three-pronged response to the High Court's decision in Mabo v
Queensland [No. 2] (Mabo).[5]
The other components were the Native Title Act
1993 and a social justice package, which was not fully implemented
before the Keating Government lost office.[6]
This was not the first Aboriginal Land Fund; a previous
fund was established by the Whitlam Government in May 1975 in response to the
1974 recommendation by Justice Woodward that the Commonwealth establish a fund
to buy land for Aboriginal groups in all parts of Australia.[7]
This fund was abolished in 1980, and its functions of providing land, housing
and business assistance to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people were
taken over by the Aboriginal Development Corporation and then by the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC).[8]
The Keating Government believed a land fund was necessary
because, whilst the Mabo case recognised the existence of native title,
the Court said native title only survived if the traditional owners had
maintained their connection with the land, and if no inconsistent title had
been granted. This meant that most Aboriginal people outside remote areas of
Australia would not benefit from the Mabo decision because they had been
previously dispossessed.[9]
The Government established the National Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Land Fund under section 201 of the Native Title Act.[10]
The detail of the fund's operations was to be left to Regulation.
In his second reading speech to the Native Title Act,
Prime Minister Keating said:
While these communities remain dispossessed of land their
economic marginalisation and their sense of injury continues. As a first step,
we are establishing a land fund. It will enable Indigenous people to acquire
land and to manage and maintain it in a sustainable way in order to provide
economic, social and cultural benefits for future generations.[11]
Land Fund in the form of a trust
The 1994 budget allocated $200 million to the fund for the
1994–95 financial year.[12]
Subsequently the Government wanted to refine the fund's operation and, on 30
June 1994, introduced the ATSIC Amendment (Indigenous Land Corporation and Land
Fund) Bill 1994 into the House of Representatives.[13]
That Bill met resistance in the Senate, and was eventually replaced by the Land
Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation (ATSIC Amendment) Bill 1994, which passed
in 1995.
The Land Fund and
Indigenous Land Corporation (ATSIC Amendment) Act 1995 (1995
Amendment Act) established the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land
Fund, which took over the money allocated to the land fund established by the Native
Title Act. The 1995 Amendment Act established the Land Fund as a government
trust account, with the ILC as trustee for the account.
An indexed amount of $121 million was allocated annually
from Consolidated Revenue from the 1995–96 financial year to the 2003–04
financial year.[14]
The return on land fund investment entered Consolidated Revenue, but was
returned to the fund by way of a standing appropriation. By 2004, the fund would
have sufficient capital to make payments to the ILC from the interest generated
by its investments.[15]
The land fund itself was to remain the property of the Commonwealth.[16]
Previous performance of the Land Account
Under the Public Governance,
Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (the PGPA Act) and
predecessor legislation, investment by the Land Fund (which was converted to
the Land Account, a special account, by the Financial
Management Legislation Amendment Act 1999) was, and is, restricted to
cash accounts and investment-grade (usually Government) bonds and securities.[17]
Investments are made by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
advised by a Consultative Forum including at least two directors of the ILC.[18]
Meanwhile, regular annual payments from the Land Account
to the ILC increase annually in line with an index calculated from the Consumer
Price Index (CPI).[19]
Additional payments are made to the ILC whenever the returns on the Land
Account exceed the CPI-linked index.[20]
The rationale for these additional payments is that disbursements enabling
transfers of land to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander groups (who could
then use these for their own economic purposes) should take precedence over
accumulating financial assets in the Land Account.[21]
Changes to the economic and investment environment between
1995 and now provide the context to the proposed changes to this investment
framework. At the time the Land Fund was created in 1995, the return on
long-term (ten-year) Australian Government bonds had rarely been below ten per
cent since 1975, and had been several points above the CPI since 1980. Between
the beginning of 1995 and the end of 1998, the return on Australian Government
bonds declined from ten per cent to approximately five per cent, and then
remained in the five to six per cent range until the onset of the global
financial crisis (GFC), after which it again declined and has not been above three
per cent since 2014. Bank interest rates on deposits have similarly declined
over this period. While inflation has also declined over this period, the
decrease in the CPI has not been of the same magnitude as the decline in return
on cash and investment-grade bonds since the GFC.[22]
Meanwhile the automatic payments whenever the returns on the Land Account
exceeded the CPI‑linked index have meant that the capital in the Land
Account has not increased during previous years of higher returns, which would
have provided a cushion against the current low‑return investment
environment. Consequently, in the last four financial years the Land Account
has not met its target rate of return, leading to erosion of the capital
through mandated payments to the ILC, and the potential for the Land Account
balance to be exhausted if current low returns continue.[23]
Reforming the Land Account
Given these economic circumstances the ILC Board has, for
some years, lobbied the Government for the investment policy to be changed. In
2016 the ILC engaged a ‘Land Account Expert Advisory Panel’ headed by Mr David
Murray AO (the former and inaugural Chair of the Future Fund Management Agency
(FFMA)) to provide advice to the ILC on options for change to ensure the
sustainability of the Land Account.[24]
The Expert Advisory Panel’s recommendations can be summarised as:
- a
new investment mandate for the Land Account which, while managing risk, targets
a rate of return of 3.1% over CPI (a return of 2.5% over CPI is the minimum
necessary to sustain perpetual annual payments of $45 million (2010 dollars) to
the ILC, assuming no further appropriations to the Special Account)
- additional
payments from the Land Account should be suspended
- the
investment mandate should be drawn up by the Finance Minister in consultation
with a Land Account Investment Committee (a reconstituted Consultative Forum)
consisting of two directors of the ILC, a representative of the Finance
Minister, and two independent investment experts, one of whom will chair the
Committee
- the
Land Account’s investment should be managed by the FFMA, with a monitoring and
compliance role for the Land Account Investment Committee; or by another
tendered-for investment agency selected according to Indigenous Investment
Principles, in the event that the FFMA is unable or unwilling to manage the
Land Account and[25]
- legislative
changes to enable the above, including an external review every five years.[26]
ILC consultation with stakeholders
In response to these recommendations, the ILC consulted
with Aboriginal groups and communities between July and September 2017 on the
recommendations of the Advisory Panel. Over 85 per cent of
face-to-face consultations and all written submissions that mentioned the issue
were in favour of reforming the Land Account to improve its sustainability,
including suspending additional payments.[27]
Participants were ‘conditionally’ in favour of the FFMA
managing the Land Account, given the absence of alternatives. There was
consistent concern that the Land Account should have Indigenous control and
oversight of the investment framework, and that the Land Account should be
invested in ways that would benefit and not negatively affect Indigenous
communities. Some consultations raised concerns about ethical investment more
generally and potential impacts of investment on indigenous communities
overseas.[28]
For simplicity, these concerns about Indigenous control, oversight, and
Indigenous-sensitive investment are referred to as ‘Indigenous governance’
issues in this Bills Digest.
The ILC’s preferred model involved a Land Account
Investment Committee with a role in setting the Investment Mandate, monitoring,
and oversight. However, advice provided to it by the Department of Finance and
the Treasury was that such a model was not compatible with the FFMA’s structure
and operations. In consequence the ILC revised its position to supporting a
Land Account Consultative Forum as a more passive observer, receiving quarterly
reports on the ATSILFF’s performance in a ‘watching brief’ role.[29]
The Government has been closely involved in these
consultations and introduced the package of Bills on 28 March 2018 as a
response to the consultation and recommendations.[30]
However, the Bill does not incorporate any of the Indigenous governance
recommendations put forward by the ILC or Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
stakeholders. This is discussed in more detail below.
Committee
consideration
Senate
Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee
The Bill was referred to the Senate Finance and Public
Administration Legislation Committee for inquiry and report by 8 May 2018. The
inquiry also covered the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Amendment
(Indigenous Land Corporation) Bill 2018 and the Consequential Amendments Bill.[31]
The majority report of the Committee recommended that the
Bills be passed.[32]
It noted concerns by the ILC and other stakeholders (expressed in submissions
to the Committee) that reporting and accountability to Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander peoples (such as the Consultative Forum mechanism) should be
maintained, that the Treasurer and Finance Minister could order an additional
payment from the ATSILSFF to the ILC even if the FFMA advised against such an
action (clauses 25–27), and that the Bill did not include a preamble
setting out the purpose of the ATSILSFF.[33]
The majority expressed confidence that the FFMA’s reporting requirements to the
Finance Minister (Part 5, clauses 47–50) adequately covered
governance issues, and that ‘future additional payments would only occur in
circumstances where the sustainability of the Fund is not compromised’.[34]
The majority also considered a preamble was not required, as a preamble
establishing the purpose of the ILC and the Land Account already existed in the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (the ATSI Act) and
the Bill’s changes were administrative in nature.
Australian Labor Party (Labor) and Australian Greens (Greens)
members of the Committee made additional, partially dissenting comments which
generally supported the requests of the ILC in its submission to the Committee.
Labor members called for a statement of the ATSILSFF’s purpose and the Government’s
fiduciary obligation to maintain the fund in perpetuity to be incorporated into
the legislation, and for an Indigenous oversight body to be established to
monitor the operation of the fund, but did not dissent from the overall
recommendation that the Bills be passed.[35]
Australian Greens Committee member Senator Siewert called
for additional regular public reporting requirements on the performance of the
ATSILSFF, a preamble, and limits on additional payments being made from the
ATSILSFF so as to provide for community consultation, preserve the capital base
of the ATSILSFF and prevent payments being made against the advice of the FFMA.[36]
The Greens recommended that the Bill be passed if the concerns they had raised were
addressed by amendments.
The Committee made no separate comments on the
Consequential Amendments Bill, other than recommending it be passed.
Senate Standing Committee for the
Scrutiny of Bills
The Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills
considered the Bill and the Consequential Amendments Bill in Scrutiny Digest
5 of 2018.[37]
The Committee requested the Minister’s advice on why the
ATSILSFF’s Investment Mandate (established by clause 32 and its
subclauses), though a legislative instrument, was not subject to disallowance
or sunsetting. The Committee noted that, while this is also the case for
Investment Mandates for other funds managed by the FFMA, there is no underlying
explanation given for why Investment Mandates, as ‘significant concepts
relating to a legislative scheme’, should not be subject to parliamentary
disallowance or sunsetting.[38]
The Committee also noted that, while clause 55 of
the Bill mandates a ten-year review of the legislation in order to consider
whether the legislation is providing expected outcomes, there is no requirement
that the review be tabled or made public, and considered that it may be
appropriate to add requirements to table and publish the review to the
legislation.[39]
The Committee considered the Consequential Amendments Bill
and made no comment.
Minister’s response
The Minister for Indigenous Affairs responded to the
Committee on 14 June 2018.[40]
The Minister stated that the Investment Mandate, as a
direction from Ministers to a body, was exempt from disallowance and sunsetting
under subsection 11(3) of the Legislation (Exemptions
and other Matters) Regulation 2015. The Government considers this
exemption is appropriate as it is consistent with other Investment Mandates to
the FFMA and provides certainty to the Future Fund Board of Guardians in
pursuing their investments. The Minister also noted that the Bill requires that
before issuing the Investment Mandate, the relevant minister must consult both
the Minister for Indigenous Affairs and the Board, and if the Board makes any
submission regarding the draft Investment Mandate, this submission must be
tabled in Parliament. Exemption from sunsetting is also considered appropriate
by the Government as the Investment Mandate is intended to remain relevant over
the long term.
On tabling the ten-year review, the Minister stated that
the requirement for a review is consistent with other funds managed by the FFMA
including the DisabilityCare Australia Fund Act 2013 and the Medical
Research Future Fund Act 2015, neither of which require their review be
tabled or made public, and that there is nothing preventing the responsible
Ministers tabling the report of the review in Parliament.
The Committee asked for the information provided by the
Minister to be included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill.[41]
In relation to the Investment Mandate, the Committee drew its concerns to the
attention of the Senate as a whole.[42]
In relation to the tabling of the review, the Committee considered that it
would be appropriate to amend clause 55 of the Bill to include a legislative
requirement for the review report to be tabled in Parliament within 15 sitting
days, and published on the internet within 30 days, of receipt by the
responsible Ministers.[43]
Policy
position of non-government parties/independents
Labor and Australian Greens Senators made comments on the
Bill in their additional comments in the Senate Finance and Public
Administration Legislation Committee’s report on the Bill. These are covered
above.[44]
No other parties or independents have yet expressed
positions on the Bill which, at the time of writing this Bills Digest, had not
been debated in the House or Senate.
Position of
major interest groups
The ILC, as principal stakeholder, made a submission to
the Senate Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee inquiry
which ‘supports the general intent’ of the Bill which, with the other related Bills,
‘broadly meets the policy objectives of the ILC’.[45]
The ILC suggested some specific changes, including:
- limiting
the ability of the relevant Ministers to make additional discretionary payments
from the ATSILSFF that would erode its capital or were against the advice of
the FFMA, either by forbidding any such payments or obliging the relevant
Ministers to document their rationale for the decision
- publicly
available quarterly reports on the ATSILSFF’s performance (as is the case for
the Disability Care Australia Fund, also managed by the FFMA, under section 44
of the DisabilityCare
Australia Fund Act 2013) in recognition of stakeholder support for the
fund to report and be accountable to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people due to its compensatory and perpetual nature and
- incorporating
a preamble similar to that of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act
2005 which gives the history and purpose of the fund (and the previous Land
Fund, Land Account) and gives a context for its effect and interpretation. The
ILC provided a draft text of a suggested preamble:
This preamble sets out considerations taken into account by
the Parliament of Australia in enacting the law that follows.
The people whose descendants are now known as Aboriginal
peoples and Torres Strait Islanders were the inhabitants of Australia before
European settlement.
In 1993 the Australian Parliament originally established an
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Fund as a component of the Native
Title Act 1993. The Land Fund was given a separate legislative basis in the
Land Fund and Indigenous Land Corporation (ATSIC Amendment) Act 1995,
which also established the ILC. The Fund became the Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Land Account in consequence of 1999 amendments to the Financial
Management and Accountability Act 1997, and was re-established through
legislation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 at the
abolition of ATSIC.
As with its predecessors, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Land and Sea Future Fund established in this Act:
(a) acknowledges
the special relationship that Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders
have with their lands and waters (both inland and offshore);
(b) acknowledges
that land and waters have economic, cultural, social and environmental value
for Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders;
(c) acknowledges
the past injustices suffered by Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders,
arising from the dispossession of their land and waters;
(d) ensures
that Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders receive the recognition
within the Australian nation to which their prior rights and interests in their
traditional lands and waters and their rich and diverse culture entitle them to
aspire;
(e) provides
a compensatory mechanism for Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders
that addresses their ongoing land and water needs.[46]
The ILC’s CEO has also stated in Senate Estimates hearings
that the ILC Board and management believe the upside of this legislation being
passed outweighs any downsides of these concerns not being specifically addressed.[47]
Other Indigenous stakeholders made submissions to the
inquiry. Of these, the Torres Strait Regional Authority and Indigenous Business
Australia expressed support for the Bill.[48] The New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council
expressed support but wanted mechanisms established that provided Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander people with information on and input into investment
and distribution by the ATSILSFF.[49]
The Goldfields Land and Sea Council (GLSC) expressed support but wished to see
any additional payments from the ATSILSFF dispensed with ‘other than on
periodic review at times of real growth in the [Land Fund] balance’, suggesting
that if the ILC faced unusual demand for funds in any period it could request
an additional appropriation from the Government instead.[50]
The GLSC expressed concern that discretionary additional payments could
undermine the intended perpetual nature of the fund, and ‘good intentions are
not enough’ to guard against this possibility.
Financial
implications
The initial balance of the ATSILSFF is established by
crediting it with funds equal to those in the Land Account (clauses 10-11
of the Bill and Schedule 1, items 1–3 of the Consequential
Amendments Bill, which closes the Land Account), which has no impact on the Government’s
financial position as all Special Account funds remain government funds.
Earnings of the ATSILSFF and expenses occurred by the FFMA in managing the
ATSILSFF impact the underlying cash and fiscal balances in as much as the
ATSILSFF, while a special account is still part of the Consolidated Revenue
Fund.[51]
Annual payments to the ILC are expenses to the Government; other than the
changes to additional payments, which become discretionary instead of automatic,
these payments are not changed from previous arrangements and so are already
accounted for in government budgeting and forward estimates.
Statement of Compatibility with Human Rights
As required under Part 3 of the Human Rights
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011, the Government has assessed the Bill’s,
and the Consequential Amendments Bill’s, compatibility with the human rights
and freedoms recognised or declared in the international instruments listed in
section 3 of that Act. The Government considers that the Bills are compatible.[52]
Parliamentary Joint Committee on
Human Rights
The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights examined
the Bills in its Report 4 of 2018 and considered that they did not raise
human rights concerns.[53]
Key issues
and provisions
Reporting requirements
The Bill provides for the Finance Minister to require
reports from the Future Fund Board (clauses 47–50). There is no
obligation to table or publish the reports.
These reports are separate from, and additional to, the
annual reporting requirements imposed by the Future Fund Act on the
Future Fund Board. Item 18 of Schedule 1 to the Consequential Amendments
Bill inserts proposed subsection 81(1F) into the Future Fund Act
so that the annual report of the ATSILSFF must specify:
-
the performance of the investments of the ATSILSFF
-
the total amount debited from the ATSILSFF Special Account for
paying or discharging the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the
Future Fund Board under a contract between the Board and an investment manager
(paragraph 15(d) of the ATSILSFF Act)
-
the total amount debited from the ATSILSFF Special Account for
paying remuneration and allowances of Future Fund Board members
(paragraph 16(d) of the ATSILSFF Act)
-
the total amount debited from the ATSILSFF Special Account for
paying remunerations, and other employment-related costs and expenses, in
respect of members of the staff of the Future Fund Management Agency (paragraph 16(e)
of the ATSILSFF Act)
-
the total amount debited from the ATSILSFF Special Account for
paying or discharging the costs, expenses and other obligations incurred by the
Commonwealth or the Future Fund Board in specified circumstances
(paragraph 16(f) of the ATSILSFF Act).
The annual report is required to be tabled in the
Parliament.[54]
The Land Account Expert Advisory Panel (EAP), the Senate
Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills and the ILC sought additional or more
regular reporting. The EAP recommended regular reporting to an independent Land
Account Investment Committee with Indigenous representation and an external
review by the Finance Minister and Investment Committee every five years.[55]
The ILC subsequently scaled back this request to requesting public reporting on
the ATSILSFF’s performance every quarter.[56]
Statutory
review
Clause 55 of the Bill requires the responsible
Ministers to conduct a review of the operation of the Act after ten years.
However, as with the reports to the Ministers from the Future Fund Board, there
is no requirement to table the outcome of the review in the Parliament. The
Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills recommended that clause 55
be amended to include a legislative requirement for the review report to be
tabled in Parliament within 15 sitting days, and published on the internet
within 30 days, of receipt by the responsible Ministers.[57] This issue and the
Minister’s response to the Committee’s concerns are discussed in more detail
above.
Discretionary Payments
Stakeholders including the ILC and the Goldfields Land and
Sea Council raised concerns with the Senate Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee that the Bill enables the Finance Minister and Indigenous
Affairs Minister to make discretionary payments of any amount to the ILC,
potentially depleting or exhausting the ATSILSFF in contravention of its policy
purpose as a perpetual compensatory fund.[58]
Currently, (mandatory) additional payments can only be made in years where the
Land Account’s return on investment exceeds the mandatory annual payment, and
can only be made up to the level of the additional return on investment, so the
real value of the capital is not depleted.[59]
The Bill places a limit on the number, but not the amount,
of additional debits from the Special Account. Only one additional
payment/debit per financial year may be made to the ILC (clause 25) by
means of a ministerial determination.[60]
The determination is a notifiable instrument, which must be made by both the
Finance Minister and the Indigenous Affairs Minister. A copy of the
determination must be given to the Future Fund Board (the Board) at least 30
days before it is due to take effect. Before making any determination, the Ministers
must give notice to the Board, including a draft of the determination, and must
require the Board to provide advice to the Ministers on the impact of the
determination on the sustainability of regular payments to the ILC (and on
other matters the Minister might request advice on).The Board must be given at
least 90 days to provide the advice, and the Ministers must ‘have regard to’
advice given by the Future Fund Board, and to any other matters they consider
relevant.[61]
This is not a particularly constraining structure, as it
is up to the Ministers to decide what ‘other matters’ they consider relevant to
the decision (proposed paragraph 25(2)(b)). In any case, while they must
‘have regard to’ the advice from the Board and to ‘other matters’ as they see
fit, the Ministers are not bound by that advice and are not answerable to
Parliament (except that they must notify Parliament of the determination) if
they choose to overrule the Board’s advice, which is not necessarily made
public.[62]
Thus there is no legislative prohibition on Ministers making debits from the ATSILSFF
Special Account to the ILC Special Account in amounts that would threaten the
sustainability of the Special Account, or cause it to be closed entirely, even
if the Board and/or the ILC advised against such a course of action. Such a
course of action may, however, be open to challenge on administrative law
grounds.
Removal of Indigenous governance
The existing Land Account has a consultative committee
with Indigenous representation from the ILC to manage its investments.[63]
During the ILC’s consultation process, the ILC, the Expert Advisory Panel
headed by David Murray, and the broader Indigenous stakeholder community all
expressed the view that Indigenous oversight of the ATSILSFF’s investments
should be maintained or strengthened.[64]
However, the Bill has no provisions for Indigenous
governance, for example for Indigenous consultation, representation or
oversight, or for ensuring that investments by the FFMA are made in the best
interests of Indigenous people or conform to the Indigenous Investment Principles.
As the Investment Mandate of the ATSILSFF has not yet been set, it is possible
that Indigenous governance considerations could be incorporated in the
Investment Mandate, but there is no Indigenous input, other than the
involvement of the Indigenous Affairs Minister by proposed subsection
32(7), into setting the Investment Mandate, nor does Parliament have any
significant oversight over it due to its non-disallowable, non-sunsetting
nature.[65]
The Government has not flagged that any Indigenous governance considerations
would be included, beyond the requirement that the Mandate be ‘consistent with
international best practice for institutional investment’ (proposed
paragraph 32(2)(a)).[66]
In addition, the Indigenous governance mechanism (the
Consultative Forum) which is currently in place is removed without replacement
by Schedule 1, item 3 of the Consequential Amendments Bill. This
could be considered a limitation of the right to self-determination, although
it was not noted as such by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights. A
commentary article by Michael Dillon, a former CEO of the ILC who assisted in
drafting the original Land Fund legislation, argued that this removal of an
Indigenous governance mechanism ‘reinforces the original physical dispossession
with institutional dispossession’.[67]
While the Treasury and Ministry of Finance have been
reported as saying that Indigenous governance mechanisms would be incompatible
with the FFMA’s structure and operations, no detail has been given on the
nature of this incompatibility, or why the FFMA’s structure and operations
cannot be changed to accommodate additional oversight.[68]
It seems implausible that David Murray, an experienced former chair of the Future
Fund, would put forward governance recommendations that the FFMA is not capable
of following.[69]
Nor has the Government accepted the ILC’s revised position of a passive oversight
role enabled by more frequent (quarterly) public reporting of the ATSILSFF’s
performance.[70]
The Government’s position is consistent with previous
rejections of attempts to impose non‑financial investment standards on
the Future Fund beyond certain minimum levels.[71]
However, rejection of Indigenous governance may be viewed as sitting poorly
with the Government’s stated commitments to greater Indigenous economic
independence through Indigenous-oriented government investment (in particular
the Indigenous Procurement Policy), and with former Prime Minister Turnbull’s,
and some government departments’, endorsement of the Indigenous Investment
Principles.[72]
Not incorporating Indigenous governance mechanisms creates
a risk of conflict between the FFMA, the ILC, and the broader Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander community, if the ATSILSFF were found to have been
invested in some entity (for example, a mining, forestry or other resource
extraction company) which was in conflict with or not acting in the interests
of Indigenous peoples, either in Australia or overseas.[73]
It should also be remembered that for much of the last
century, funds allegedly held in trust for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander people by Australian state and territory governments and other
agencies (such as missions) were systematically defrauded and mismanaged,
leading to ongoing claims for compensation for ‘stolen wages’ and other lost
monies in many jurisdictions.[74]
Thus Indigenous communities may have particular sensitivities to money being
managed on their behalf by government without Indigenous governance mechanisms
in place, even though the risk of fraud and mismanagement comparable to the
‘stolen wages’ era occurring in future is very low.
Preambles, perpetual funds, and
binding the future
Many submissions and comments on the Bill (discussed
above) reflect concern that a future government might not recognise or respect
the intended compensatory and perpetual nature of the ATSILSFF and might
therefore deplete or redeploy the capital, for example by ordering
discretionary payments to the ILC in excess of what is sustainable.[75]
Michael Dillon has argued that the Bill transforms the Land Account into
‘merely another financial account within government’ which would lack the clear
context and moral intent of the original Land Account.[76]
This concern has led to calls for a preamble to the Bill that would
specifically enshrine the ATSILSFF’s history and purpose in addressing
dispossession, which could conceivably be taken into account by the courts if
there were any future legal challenge to a Minister’s actions in managing the
fund.[77]
This concern also underlies the proposals by various stakeholders to limit the
relevant Ministers’ ability to make discretionary payments, and to provide for
Indigenous governance or more frequent reports on the ATSILSFF’s performance
and governance.
While no suggestions have been made that the current
government or opposition has any such intent, there are previous examples of governments
eroding and diverting funds from intended and legislated-for perpetual
endowments. One, which is incidentally referred to in Schedule 3 of the
Consequential Amendments Bill, is the Education Investment Fund (EIF), formerly
the Higher Education Endowment Fund (HEEF), which the current Government is
attempting to close by repealing the Nation-building
Funds Act 2008 and transferring the funds in the EIF (currently around
$3.5 billion) to the NDIS Savings Fund Special Account.[78]
The HEEF was announced by the Howard Government in the
2007–08 Budget as a $5 billion perpetual fund ‘that will provide an additional
guaranteed source of funding for Australia's universities forever’ and was also
intended to attract philanthropic donations and endowments for grants to
universities.[79]
The HEEF’s purposes, management by the Future Fund Board, and perpetual nature,
in that the capital of the fund could not be depleted by grants, were enshrined
in legislation in the Higher Education
Endowment Fund Act 2007. Then-Prime Minister Howard wrote of the
HEEF that ‘The Fund cannot be spent on anything other than its purpose –
lasting assets like better libraries and first class research institutes
equipped with world leading technology. The Australian public, let alone the
Australian Government, will not tolerate any attempt to raid this Fund for
political purposes’.[80]
Subsequently, seeking to stimulate the economy through capital
and infrastructure spending, the Rudd Government closed the HEEF and
transferred its balance to the Education Investment Fund (EIF) in the Nation-building
Funds Act 2008.[81]
The principal difference was that while the EIF was still intended to promote
higher education spending, the capital as well as the dividends of the EIF
could now be distributed in grants. Subsequent grants to universities and other
education institutions saw the EIF’s capital balance diminish to $3.5 billion.[82]
In 2013 the incoming Abbott Government froze all further
grants from the fund and then sought to close the EIF and transfer its capital
to an Asset Recycling Fund (ARF), intended to promote investment in
infrastructure, with the Asset
Recycling Fund Bill 2014. This Bill lapsed with the prorogation of
Parliament in 2016, and the Turnbull Government announced that the ARF would
not proceed.[83]
Instead, the EIF’s funds would now be transferred to the ‘National Disability
Insurance Scheme Special Account and used to reduce the Commonwealth's debt and
future borrowing requirements’.[84]
This is to be effected by the repeal of the Nation-building Funds Act 2008,
which is to be accomplished by the Nation-building
Funds Repeal (National Disability Insurance Scheme Funding) Bill 2017,
currently before the Parliament.[85]
Despite vigorous objections from the higher education sector, Government Senators
have argued that as universities have many other sources of government and
non-government support, an additional, guaranteed, perpetual source of funding
is no longer required.[86]
The HEEF/EIF case illustrates both the rationale and the
weakness of proposals for a preamble, Indigenous governance, restrictions on
withdrawals, and so on as protections for the perpetual nature of the fund.
While tighter restrictions on discretionary withdrawals from the fund, or the
presence in the governance structure of Indigenous stakeholders, or a preamble
(if it were held to be justiciable) might limit the actions of a future
Minister, who is bound by legislation, they cannot limit the power of a future
Parliament to pass, change or repeal legislation as it sees fit, potentially including
closing the ATSILSFF and redirecting its funds to other purposes. At most they
can raise the ‘symbolic’ stakes of such a change by drawing the attention of a
future Parliament to the meaning and purpose of current legislation. The only
way any such fund could be protected from any potential action (short of
expropriation) by a future Parliament would be if the funds hypothecated to the
Special Account were transferred out of government funds entirely, for example
as a block grant to the ILC or some trustee body investing on its behalf.
Consequences of not passing the
legislation
While failure to pass the legislation would not have any
immediate effects, if this or similar legislation were not passed in future it
seems likely that the capital of the Land Account would be eroded over time. Without
further appropriations, this could lead to the ILC being unable to fulfil its
mandate of obtaining land (and water) resources for dispossessed Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander people, owing to lack of funds.
Other
Provisions
Establishing the Fund
Clause 9 of the Bill establishes the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund (ATSILSFF). It consists of:
- the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund Special Account
and
- the
investments of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future
Fund.
At the time of its establishment the balance of the Land
Account will be credited to the ATSILSFF.[87]
In addition, any financial asset of the Land Account is deemed to be a
financial asset of the ATSILSFF.[88]
The Treasurer or the Finance Minister must transfer such assets to the Future
Fund Board.[89]
About
special accounts
A special account is a limited special
appropriation that notionally sets aside an amount that can only be
expended for listed purposes. The amount of appropriation that may
be drawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) by means of a special account
is limited to the balance of each special account at any given time. Special
accounts are not bank accounts. Amounts forming part of the balance of a
special account may be held in various ways, such as in the Official Public
Account, an entity's official bank account, or partly in both.[90]
Establishing
the special accounts
A special account can be established either by the Finance
Minister making a determination under section 78 of the PGPA Act,
or by legislation as recognised under section 80 of the PGPA Act.[91]
Both a determination (for a section 78 special account) and legislation (for a
section 80 special account) are considered by Parliament before becoming law.
The appropriation authority to draw money from the CRF is section 78 or 80 of
the PGPA Act, as relevant—rather than the determination or the
legislation.[92]
This Bill establishes two special accounts in accordance
with section 80 of the PGPA Act.
Clause 12 of the Bill establishes the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund Special Account (ATSILSFF
Special Account) as a special account for the purposes of the PGPA Act.
Clause 20 of the Bill establishes the Indigenous
Land Corporation Funding Special Account (ILC Funding Special Account) as a
special account for the purposes of the PGPA Act.
Special accounts may be established when it is clear that
other types of appropriations are not suitable. For example, there may be a
need for specific transparency. The Act that establishes a special account
specifies both the purposes for which the special account may be debited
and the types of receipts that may be credited to increase the balance
of the special account.[93]
Depending on its purpose, a special account may be credited with amounts from
annual appropriations, special appropriations, from third parties, by direct
legislative provision, or in limited circumstances with investment income.[94]
Accordingly, the Bill sets out the main purposes of the
two special accounts. Amounts credited to a special account can only be spent
for the specified purposes.
Main purposes—
ATSILSFF Special Account
The main purposes of the ATSILSFF Special Account are:
-
to transfer amounts to the ILC Funding Special Account so that annual
payments can be made to the ILC and
-
to transfer amounts to the ILC Funding Special Account so that additional
payments can be made to the ILC.[95]
Clause 15 sets out the approved purposes of the
ATSILSFF Special Account, being:
-
paying the costs of, or incidental to, the acquisition of
financial assets
-
paying expenses of an investment of the ATSILSFF
-
paying the costs of, or incidental to, the acquisition of
derivatives
-
paying or discharging the costs, expenses and other obligations
incurred by the Future Fund Board under a contract between the Board and an
investment manager
-
paying or discharging the costs, expenses and other obligations
incurred in connection with the establishment, maintenance or operation of a
bank account of the Future Fund Board, if the bank account relates exclusively
to the ATSILSFF
-
paying a premium in respect of a contract of insurance entered
into by the Future Fund Board exclusively in connection with the ATSILSFF
-
paying or discharging any other costs, expenses, obligations or
liabilities incurred by the Future Fund Board exclusively in connection with
the ATSILSFF
-
paying expenses of an investment of an amount standing to the
credit of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land Account, where the
expenses were incurred before the commencement of this section.
Clause 16 of the Bill also sets out other
purposes for which the funds in the ATSILSFF Special Account may be used.
Main purposes—
ILC Funding Special Account
The ILC Funding Special Account has two main purposes:
-
to make annual payments to the ILC and
-
to make additional payments to the ILC.[96]
Clause 22 of the Bill sets out the rules for making
annual payments to the ILC. The first payment is to be made on
the first business day in October 2018.[97]
The amount to be paid by the Indigenous Affairs Minister is an amount equal to
the amount that would have been paid under subsection 193(2) of the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Act if that section had not been repealed.[98] Subsequent
payments are to be made on the first business day in October 2019 or on
that date in a later financial year. The amount of the subsequent payment is
subject to a formula which includes an indexation factor based on, amongst
other things, the All Groups Consumer Price Index.[99]
Clause 25 of the Bill sets out the rules for making
additional payments to the ILC. The Finance Minister and the Indigenous
Affairs Minister may determine that, on a specified day, the Indigenous
Affairs Minister is to pay a specified amount to the ILC.[100] Only one such
determination may be made in each financial year.[101]
In making such a determination the Finance Minister and
the Indigenous Affairs Minister must have regard to advice given by the Future
Fund Board and any other relevant matters.[102]
Clause 27 of the Bill requires that the Finance
Minister and the Indigenous Affairs Minister must give the Future Fund Board:
-
a draft of the determination
-
a formal request that the Future Fund Board provide advice about
the impact of the making of the determination on the sustainability of annual
payments to the ILC within the period specified, being not less than 90 days
and
-
require the Future Fund Board, in giving that advice, to have
regard to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Land and Sea Future Fund
Investment Mandate and any other specified matters.
Comment
The Bill sets up a transparent mechanism for monies to be
debited from the ATSILSFF Special Account. These funds will primarily be
directed into the ILC Funding Special Account and thence to the ILC annually.
In addition the funds from the ATSILSFF Special Account can be used to pay
specified costs of the Future Fund Board, incurred in connection with the ATSILSFF
Special Account. By establishing this system of two special accounts, the Bill
ensures that the ATSILSFF is spent only for the requisite purposes.
In addition, the Bill provides a mechanism for other
amounts to be credited to the ATSILSFF Special Account.[103]
Investments
of the Fund
The Future Fund Board[104]
is responsible for deciding how to invest the ATSILSFF.[105] The Bill empowers the
Future Fund Board to invest amounts standing to the credit of the ATSILSFF in
any financial assets.[106]
(Some restrictions are placed on the use of derivatives, which must not be
acquired for speculative or leverage purposes).[107] Any income derived from an
investment of the ATSILSFF is to be credited to the ATSILSFF Special Account.[108]
ATSILSFF
Investment Mandate
Establishing
the Investment Mandate
Clause 32 of the Bill empowers the Treasurer and
the Finance Minister (referred to as ‘the responsible Ministers’[109]
to give the Future Fund Board written directions about the performance of its
ATSILSFF investment functions, and must give at least one such direction. These
directions are to be known as the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Land and Sea Future Fund Investment Mandate.[110] Each fund that the Future
Fund Board manages has an individual investment mandate.[111]
In giving such a direction the responsible Ministers must
have regard to:
-
the need to maximise the return earned on the ATSILSFF over the
long term, consistent with international best practice for institutional
investment
-
the annual payments required to be made to the ILC and
-
such other matters as the responsible Ministers consider
relevant.[112]
Limitations on
the Investment Mandate
However, the Bill inserts a limitation on the powers of
the responsible Ministers in making the Investment Mandate. The responsible
Ministers must not give a direction under subsection 32(1) that has the
purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of directly or indirectly requiring
the Future Fund Board to:
-
invest an amount standing to the credit of the ATSILSFF Special
Account in a particular financial asset
-
acquire a particular derivative[113] or
-
allocate financial assets to a particular business entity, a
particular activity or a particular business.[114]
Obligation to
comply with Investment Mandate
Clause 36 of the Bill requires the Future Fund
Board to take all reasonable steps to comply with the Investment Mandate. If
the Future Fund Board becomes aware that it has not done so it must, as soon as
practicable after becoming so aware, give the responsible Ministers a written
statement:
-
advising of the failure to comply with the Investment Mandate and
-
setting out the action that it proposes to take in order to
comply with the Investment Mandate.
Alternatively, if the responsible Ministers are satisfied
that the Future Fund Board has failed to comply with the Investment Mandate,
they may direct the Board, in writing:
-
to give the responsible Ministers, within a specified period, a
written explanation for the failure to comply with the Investment Mandate and
-
to take action in the time specified in the notice, in order to
comply with the Investment Mandate.[115]
Formulating
investment policies
Clause 39 of the Bill requires the Future Fund
Board to formulate (and periodically review) written policies in relation to
the ATSILSFF including the relevant investment strategy, benchmarks and
standards for assessing the performance and risk management for the Fund. These
policies must be consistent with the Investment Mandate and be published on the
internet.[116]
Can a Special Account run out of
money?
The justification given for the legislation is that the
capital of the Land Account, a Special Account under section 80 of the
PGPA Act, is in danger of being eroded and potentially exhausted at
some point in the future due to its low rate of return, rendering it unable to
make payments to the ILC.
A Special Account is a nominal hypothecation allowing for
appropriation from the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF) for a specific purpose
without annual budgetary renewal by parliament, not a separate fund or ‘bank
account’.[117]
Despite its separate accounting identity, it remains part of the CRF under section
81 of the Constitution.
While the ATSILSFF has a different mandate from the existing Land Account,
which is expected to generate higher returns on investment, the monies in both
the existing Land Account and the proposed ATSILSFF remain part of government
consolidated revenue and are not the property of the ILC. Whenever a payment is
made to the ILC, from either the current or the proposed special accounts,
consolidated revenue is appropriated to do so.[118]
The amount of expenditure from a Special Account is
limited by the legal requirements of section 80 of the PGPA Act,
which states ‘the CRF is appropriated for expenditure for those [special account]
purposes, up to the balance for the time being of the special account’
(emphasis added). If a Special Account had a nominal balance of zero, the Government
would always have the option of legislating a new appropriation of the CRF to
meet any payment requirements, so the limits on its expenditure are not
financial in the same sense that would apply to an account with a private bank.
In the case of the current Bill, clause 13 allows responsible Ministers
to credit additional amounts to the ATSILSFF via a non-disallowable legislative
instrument, so any future shortfall could be met through this mechanism.
Thus, if the current Land Account Special Account had a
nominal balance of zero at some point in the future, section 80 would forbid
the CRF being appropriated to pay the ILC. In this circumstance, the Government
would have no money legally appropriated to pay to the ILC, but could always seek
a new Budget appropriation in order to meet the payment obligations of section 193
of the ATSI Act. The limitation of the Special Account’s balance is
really a self-imposed limit by government on how much they are willing to
appropriate for the Special Account’s stated purposes. As such, the ILC’s
funding from special accounts, whether the Land Account or the ATSILSFF,
ultimately depends upon appropriations rather than account balances, and so is
ultimately a political rather than a financial decision.