Posted 26/04/2023 by Vu Lam
Australia and Vietnam have fostered a strong relationship over the past 50 years that has garnered benefits across areas of strategic and mutual interest, from trade and investment, defence and security, knowledge and innovation transfer, to development assistance. This solid base has led to the 2 nations discussing the upgrade of their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).
This discussion was initiated by the foreign ministers of the 2 countries in November 2020. Then in January 2021, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison suggested an elevation of the formal ties during a telephone conversation with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Xuan Phuc. In May 2021, Mr Morrison repeated the suggestion in his first phone call with newly elected Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. In November 2022, during a visit to Australia by Vuong Dinh Hue, the Chairperson of Vietnam’s National Assembly, the same commitment was confirmed by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and echoed by the Governor-General, Foreign Minister, and Leader of the Opposition. Vietnam’s leadership has responded in kind on various occasions.
The CSP discussion may appear sudden, but it is not unexpected given the global and regional context. Over the past 10 years, in response to the growing US-China rivalry, regional states have sought to diversify and intensify their networks of partners with similar economic and security interests. For national security purposes, Australia has joined its long-term allies and trusted partners in establishing or strengthening security and intelligence pacts like the Quad, the Five Eyes and, most recently, AUKUS. But Australia has also concurrently tried to strengthen its ties with ASEAN countries, as this region is equally crucial to Australia’s economic and security interests.
Australia has entered into CSPs with Singapore (2015), Indonesia (2018), India (2020), Papua New Guinea (2020), Malaysia (2021), the Republic of Korea (2021), and ASEAN (2021). Vietnam has been more reserved, and most recently formed a CSP with the Republic of Korea (2022). Australia would be only the fifth country to attain the highest status of diplomatic relations Vietnam has to offer, after China (2008), Russia (2012), India (2016) and the Republic of Korea.
CSPs formed under the previous Coalition Government might be seen as evidence of a preference for bilateralism. But while CSPs are in themselves bilateral, it is best to understand them in the context of multilateralism as a means of ‘widening the net’. For example, Australia’s existing CSPs have created a multi-layered network of partnerships.
While the form and content of CSPs vary among partners, a CSP represents a deeper level of political and strategic trust. As Foreign Minister Penny Wong puts it, Vietnam and Australia have ‘a genuine partnership that is grounded in trust’. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and Vietnam are ‘strong partners with shared strategic interests in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region based on international law’. Frequently grouped under the same category of ‘middle powers’, Australia and Vietnam each have a vested interest in securing a stable Indo-Pacific, and ‘widening the net’ is a popular approach among players with fewer material resources.
Yet, unlike Australia, which has security alliances, Vietnam has to balance its non-alignment principle with an increasingly precarious regional stage, where China has been playing the role of disrupter. Vietnam and several ASEAN states have been wary of Australia’s participation in AUKUS, a response some may interpret as publicly negative, but privately positive. That is why even with the language of ‘strategic trust’, ASEAN countries are careful to avoid the notion of alliance for fear of promoting an arms race. Some observers think the CSP status creates a new level of dialogue between partners that allows them to discuss greater strategic alignments.
How the potential Australia-Vietnam CSP progresses will depend on the foundation on which it is built. For Australia and Vietnam, the interests they share at the strategic partnership level will guide the way. The Plan of Action for the Strategic Partnership for the period 2020–23, signed in 2019, focuses on 3 core interests: economic engagement, defence and security cooperation, and knowledge and innovation partnerships. As Vietnam’s ambassador to Australia, Nguyen Tat Thanh, notes, these core interests translate into 8 areas of priority – education and training; natural resources and energy; agroforestry and fishery; manufacturing; tourism; science and technology; digital economy; and services. Given the existing long-term relationship, a CSP is perhaps a logical development.
While progression to a CSP can signal a normative elevation of cooperation and importance, ties with some of Vietnam’s diplomatic partners have strengthened without a CSP. Since 2014, Japan and Vietnam, for example, have only signed an ‘extensive strategic partnership’, which denotes progress beyond the strategic level, yet is not part of the conventional 3-tier partnership continuum, namely ‘comprehensive’, ‘strategic’ and ‘comprehensive strategic’. Nonetheless, Japan is Vietnam’s largest provider of aid, its third largest investor, the third biggest source of tourists, and its fourth trade partner. The US, after repeatedly seeking a strategic upgrade to Vietnam ties, only has a comprehensive partnership – the most basic level. But the US is Vietnam’s second largest trade partner (Vietnam is the US’s 10th), and both countries are engaged in extensive collaboration with one another.
Even without a CSP, Australia-Vietnam bilateral relations will most likely continue to grow. Over the past 30 years, 2-way trade has consistently increased, even in the face of COVID-19. The 2021 Australia-Vietnam Enhanced Economic Engagement Strategy aimed to make Australia and Vietnam ‘top 10 trade partners, double two-way investment and support economic recovery of both countries following COVID-19’. In 2022, Vietnam became Australia’s 10th largest trade partner, and Australia, Vietnam’s seventh, meaning that one of the strategy’s major targets was met within just 2 years.
Besides trade and investment, there are other avenues for further cooperation being discussed to which both sides have committed in principle. In 2021, both sides made a joint statement to address climate change, expressing commitment to the timely adoption of renewables and meeting net-zero targets. Vietnam and Australia have also agreed to expand defence cooperation, including enhancing the exchange of all-level delegations, and maintaining the Deputy Ministerial Defence Policy Dialogue and other consultation mechanisms.
However, while both sides share the same vision of a peaceful and stable region, they do not necessarily share the same approach or policy. Vietnam wants to enhance its defence capabilities, but not at the cost of provoking China or joining an arms race, as it is in a more vulnerable geopolitical position than Australia. And while its approach to foreign policy, national defence and security has largely been consistent over the decades, Australia’s has been somewhat less so, with multiple changes of government over the last decade.
A strong partnership notwithstanding, sections of the Australian public and businesses are still concerned about Vietnam’s business environment and human rights. But the growing convergence of interests in the current context of the Indo-Pacific means it is unlikely that Vietnam and Australia will back away from taking the relationship to the next level, with or without a new normative status.