Posted 06/10/2021 by Geoff Wade
The repercussions of the withdrawal of allied forces from Afghanistan and establishment of a Taliban administration in Kabul in August will long continue to affect Eurasian and global politics. Observers have been closely watching China’s response to the events, trying to assess its aims and agendas in the new Afghanistan.
In late July, nine senior Taliban representatives, including political chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, visited China and met with Foreign Minister Wang Yi in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. The widely publicised visit was a signal of the PRC’s recognition of the incoming administration of Afghanistan. Earlier, China, along with other states, had been involved in efforts to broker talks between the warring Afghan parties, and was part of the ‘extended troika’ which had held talks in Doha with the Taliban and Afghan Government. Like Russia and Pakistan, the PRC has kept its embassy in Kabul open. China advises that it has been maintaining ‘smooth and effective communication and consultation’ with the Taliban, and the Chinese ambassador met with representatives of the new administration in Kabul on 24 August. In early September, a Taliban spokesman referred to China as its ‘closest partner’.
China’s intimate ties with Pakistan, claimed by some observers (and recently confirmed by Pakistan’s Interior Minister Sheikh Rashid) to be a long-term funder and backer of the Taliban, has also been a key factor in China’s policy decisions in Afghanistan. Utilisation of the strategic China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), into which massive PRC investment has been funnelled, and which allows China an overland route from Xinjiang to the Arabian Sea, will require a peaceful regional environment. But China faces some of its own problems in Pakistan, with various China-linked projects being subject to stepped-up violence by separatists in Balochistan and Sindh, and further attacks being launched by Pakistan’s Tehrik-e-Taliban.
China’s desire to help guide Afghanistan’s future trajectory have determined that China be closely engaged with the Taliban administration. It is also highly likely that, as in Syria and Iraq, PRC enterprises will participate in the reconstruction of the country. Taliban representatives have stated that Chinese investment is welcome in Afghanistan’s economic development.
To the northeast of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the bordering Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang remains a key test of the PRC’s integrity, with the state’s treatment of the majority Muslim Uyghurs becoming a source of international tension, and Uyghur disaffection being manifested globally. China remains concerned about Afghanistan as a site of Uyghur militancy, particularly given the statement issued by the Syrian branch of the anti-China jihadist Turkestan Islamic Party congratulating the Taliban and Afghans for the establishment of an ‘Islamic Emirate’ in Afghanistan. Clerics such as Abu Zar al-Burmi also remain a key concern. Significantly, during the Tianjin talks, Wang Yi urged the Taliban to act against the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), noting that ‘We hope the Afghan Taliban will make a clean break with all terrorist organizations including the ETIM’. The Taliban representative reportedly agreed to work against ‘acts detrimental to China’ in Afghanistan.
As Turkic-speaking people, Xinjiang Uyghurs have often sought refuge in the NATO member state of Turkey. Until recently, Turkey had been regarded as something of a haven for Uyghur exiles, but China has been making efforts to exert greater influence on the country and its policies towards the Uyghurs within its borders. An extradition treaty between the two countries is awaiting ratification by Ankara’s parliament.
The PRC has been active with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) economic programs in Turkey, and has also provided Ankara with much of its COVID-19 vaccine supplies. For its part, Turkey is hoping that Chinese economic engagement will help salvage the troubled Turkish economy, and assist Turkey’s ‘Middle Corridor’ initiative, a trans-Caspian logistics link that is intended to tie with the BRI. Chinese investment in Turkey now extends to a port, power stations, railways, and industrial parks. Turkey also hosts the second-largest overseas Huawei R&D centre.
The importance of this entire region for China is underlined by a number of PRC initiatives pursued this year. In March 2021, PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi travelled to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman. Then in July, Wang visited Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, to discuss the Afghan situation, security and energy supplies, and to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation foreign ministers’ meeting.
China’s recent creation of a new dialogue mechanism with the Central Asian states (C+ C5, including China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is also likely aimed at bolstering Western China’s strategic security. This is in addition to the existing security arrangement, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which has developed its own SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. It is quite possible that China will push for Taliban-led Afghanistan to become a member of the body.
Bordering the region to the west is Iran. Widely recognised as a close ally of Russia, Iran signed a 25-year strategic agreement with China in early 2021—a ‘road map’ for trade and cooperation in the economic and transportation spheres. In order to secure ongoing supply of Iranian oil, it is reported that China has promised investment of $280 billion in Iran’s energy sector and $120 billion in its infrastructure development. China also continues to cooperate with Iran in the defence realm, but needs to balance its links with Iran (p. 5) against those it is expanding with Iran’s competitors, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel. How Iran’s impending membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will change the power dynamics within that body remains to be seen.
Despite their many rivalries, earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin characterised Moscow-Beijing relations as having reached their ‘highest level in history’. In a June virtual summit the two sides referred to each other as ‘priority partners’ and the joint statement noted ‘The more turbulent the world, the more it is necessary for China and Russia to strengthen strategic cooperation’. While the West was leaving Afghanistan, Chinese and Russian forces were involved in joint war games in China. Subsequently, in discussions with Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin is reported to have advised that ‘Russia and China share similar positions and common interests on the Afghanistan issue’ and that Russia is ‘willing to work with China to push for a smooth transition of the situation in Afghanistan’.