Preliminary Pages

Foreword

The road to nuclear hell is paved with defensive intentions. The United States developed nuclear weapons after it was attacked during the Second World War by Japan, and both the United States and Russia developed nuclear weapons as a defensive strategy during the Cold War.

Because they had nuclear weapons China, which at various times during the nuclear age has had poor relations with both America and Russia, developed nuclear weapons as well. Because China had nuclear weapons, India felt threatened and developed nuclear weapons. Because India developed nuclear weapons, Pakistan felt threatened and developed nuclear weapons. And the strength of religious fundamentalist terrorist groups in Pakistan has created an ever present and alarming risk that nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of non-state actors— terrorist groups who have no respect for human life and will take no notice of doctrines of ‘deterrence’ and ‘mutually assured destruction’ in the way governments might reasonably be expected to.

We must do all that we can to try to break every link in this dangerous nuclear chain. Every one of us has a responsibility to help re-energise the international political debate, against a background of really a decade or more in which the international community has been sleepwalking when it comes to both non-proliferation and especially disarmament.

While concern about nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament has existed for as long as nuclear weapons themselves, the Committee’s inquiry has come at a particularly opportune time. It is clear that in 2009 the world has again engaged with this issue and reaffirmed the importance of the abolition of nuclear weapons. Significantly, world leaders such as President Obama have set out a vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Others too share this vision. In the last few months we have seen more progress on these issues than has been witnessed in many years.

Nevertheless, threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime are more pressing than ever: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea claims to have withdrawn from the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and in May this year detonated a second nuclear device; and Iran remains non compliant with United Nations Security Council resolutions and hinders full inspections access by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The focus of this inquiry—the treaties that underpin the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime—is critically important. Much emphasis has been placed upon not only strengthening the NPT, but also bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force and negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. For some people, a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would bring together many of the elements of other treaties, is the best way forward.

What is clear is that we are at a point where concrete action must be taken.

The Committee has focussed upon the 2010 NPT Review Conference as one international milestone in this process. We must do all we can to break down the divisions between the ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in the nuclear world. This Conference presents an ideal opportunity for the world to reaffirm its support for the abolition of nuclear weapons and recommit to the undertakings given as parties to the NPT and in previous NPT Review Conferences. It is important to remember that in 2000, the nuclear weapons states committed to an ‘unequivocal undertaking’ to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. Many countries now consider that it is time to make good on that commitment.

It is also time to build confidence between nations by de-emphasising the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. Rather than modernising and replacing these weapons, states need to reduce their role and salience in nuclear doctrine.

The steps that need to be taken are clear and have been on the table for some time. What is needed now is the political will to make them a reality. While the Committee does not underestimate the challenges presented by countries’ security concerns and their varying geopolitical contexts, it sees no reason why action cannot be taken.

There is an existing moratorium on nuclear testing being observed by the nuclear weapon states. It is time to turn that moratorium into a legally binding commitment through the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The NPT nuclear weapon states are no longer producing fissile materials. We now need to convince the few states that are engaged in production to agree to progress a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Like the CTBT, this Treaty is a critical mechanism to bring those countries that are not part of the NPT into the non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

Discussions between the United States and Russia on a replacement nuclear weapons reduction treaty for START are welcome progress on disarmament. It is America and Russia who have the vast majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, so other countries can hardly be expected to disarm if there is no leadership coming from these countries. But the efforts of America and Russia alone will not make the world safe from nuclear attack, far from it. They must be complemented by steps taken by the other nuclear powers to also disarm.

We need to reinforce our support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, particularly if it is to be the verification agency for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Its responsibilities are enormous, yet it struggles with a budget inadequate for the task. We must support the IAEA to implement the best possible verification and safeguards regime that can be achieved.

We should also look at ways to ensure that peaceful uses of nuclear energy do not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and this report examines fuel cycle multilateralisation as one of these mechanisms.

And we need to address non-compliance issues that are undermining the NPT.

The Committee expresses its strong support for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The opportunity is right for the Commission’s work to be taken up and promoted by Governments.

The Committee also sees that there is an important contribution that parliamentarians can make as well. Parliamentarians occupy a unique position that can be utilised to build political will and a commitment to a global approach to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues.

I want to thank my fellow Committee members, not just for the hard work involved in producing a 230 plus page report, but for the attitude of cooperation and determination to say something significant and worthwhile with which they approached this task.

The Treaties Committee has members from the Labor Party, Liberal Party, Nationals and Greens, with very different perspectives on a range of nuclear and foreign policy questions. But each member of the Committee has wanted to play their part in protecting people from the nuclear threat. Each member of the Committee has wanted to ensure that Australia’s voice is heard loud and clear around the world on these matters. And so we have worked through the issues until we achieved an agreed outcome, a platform for progress.

For, borrowing a little from the late, great, Edward Kennedy, the dream of a world without nuclear weapons is a dream that must never die. We must never accept that it is alright to live in a world where some people have the power to kill tens of millions of their fellow human beings, and make the planet uninhabitable, in a heart beat. That must never be acceptable.

I wish to place on the record my great appreciation for the mighty work done by the Committee Secretariat, in particular Inquiry Secretary Julia Searle and Committee Secretary Jerome Brown, in enabling this Report to happen. I urge my colleagues here in Australia and in other Parliaments, and ordinary Australians and citizens of other countries, to read it, think about it, and make a world free of nuclear weapons a reality.

Kelvin Thomson MP

Chair

Membership of the Committee

Committee Secretariat

Terms of reference

The Committee is to inquire into and report on:

• The international treaties involving Australia which relate to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
• How these treaties advance Australia's objectives in this field.
• How the treaties might be made more comprehensive or effective.
• How inter-parliamentary action can assist in strengthening treaty-based aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.
• How the Committee and the Parliament can contribute to the work of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.

List of abbreviations

List of recommendations

2     Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government promotes and supports efforts to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the United States Senate, including by making clear that United States ratification of the CTBT would be positively received by Australia and other countries, and that Australia seeks a world without nuclear weapons.

Recommendation 2

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government pursue diplomatic efforts to encourage ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the remaining Annex II states whose ratification is required to achieve entry into force of the Treaty, and seek undertakings from these countries that they will not be the impediment to the CTBT entering into force.

3     Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty

Recommendation 3

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to pursue vigorous diplomatic efforts to promote negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as well as measures for safeguarding the vast existing stockpiles of weapons usable fissile materials.

Recommendation 4

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government ensure that adequate resourcing is made available to diplomatic staff in Geneva and, where appropriate, in other missions to enable Australia to take an active and involved role in negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

4     The NPT and IAEA safeguards

Recommendation 5

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government encourage all other uranium exporting countries to require that the countries to whom they export uranium have an Additional Protocol in place.

Recommendation 6

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government abandon its zero real growth policy on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) budget and work with other states to strengthen the IAEA’s funding base.

5     Fuel cycle multilateralisation

Recommendation 7

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government investigate further the potential merits and risks of fuel cycle multilateralisation proposals, including through: