Chapter 5 Criminality and aviation security

Airport criminality and aviation security
The case for distinguishing criminality from security
The case for linking criminality with security
Committee comment
Concerns of inadequate policing arrangements at airports
Variability of policing arrangements and poor coordination
Cost imposts of policing airports
Limitations on law enforcement powers
Training of private security personnel
Airport Police Commands
Staffing Airport Police Commands
Committee comment
Regional Rapid Deployment Teams
Effectiveness and functionality of Regional Rapid Deployment Teams
On going funding
Committee comment
Inspector of Transport Security
Committee comment
Closed Circuit Television monitoring
Coordination of CCTV monitoring
Monitoring standards
Regional airports
Committee comment
Australian concerns at overseas airports
Air Security Officers
Committee comment

5.1	The Committee reopened its inquiry into aviation security in a climate of pubic concern regarding the presence of organised criminal elements within sectors of the aviation industry in Australia.

5.2

The Committee adopted an additional term of reference, relating to the procedures for and security of baggage handling procedures at international and domestic airports, to explore the adequacy of security against crime in the aviation industry.

 

Airport criminality and aviation security

5.3

Two distinct views on the relation between criminality and aviation security threats were enunciated by industry participants, their peak bodies and Commonwealth agencies responsible for regulation and law enforcement.

The case for distinguishing criminality from security

5.4

Criminality at airports and border security incidents were viewed by some aviation industry participants as having little or nothing to do with aviation security.

5.5

REX typified appeals to understand aviation security in a narrowly defined frame of reference:

the true meaning of aviation security … is “to prevent unlawful interference with aviation” … and [should not be confused with] … certain criminal acts with no direct or indirect threat to aviation [that] may be included under Aviation Security simply because they occur at an airport.¹

5.6

Confusion of criminal acts with security breaches was attributed to media reporting that was presented as driving, at times, inappropriate responses.

5.7

Thus REX claimed:

the media (and thus the general public) have made a number of claims regarding events which they label as “aviation security” matters. These discussions in the public forum have lead to a number of measures being introduced in short time periods which have had and will continue to have a detrimental effect on airlines.²

5.8

More dramatically, RAAA referred to:

an atmosphere of hysteria, misinformation and total confusion between law enforcement and border control on the one hand and aviation security on the other.³

5.9

Aviation industry participants argued that the detrimental effects of inappropriately expanding the ambit of aviation security to include instances of criminality could result in the implementation of measures that provided ineffective security outcomes and thus dilute resources available to producing sound security outcomes.

5.10

WAC stated:

Measures hastily conceived and based on a perception of risk engendered by a media beat up of isolated incidents or a misunderstanding of airport airline operations by the public have the potential to be costly to implement with questionable security outcomes.⁴

5.11

Qantas referred to:

an apparent wish by the Australian Government to redefine aviation security to have a broader application than that provided by ICAO. An unintended consequence has been to dilute the application of resources to those risks which bear directly on the security of aircraft, passengers and staff … DoTaRS continues to justify some Regulations, on the basis of “community expectations” rather than any stated security outcome.⁵

5.12

Gold Coast Airport Limited called for the distinction between security issues and criminal matters to be reflected in clearly delineated portfolio responsibilities:

DoTaRS handles its responsibilities as regulator of aviation security well; they should not also be responsible for criminal and community policing.⁶

5.13

Australian Federal Police (AFP) maintained that this distinction exists:

In terms of aviation security, the role of DoTaRS is to provide the framework for preventative aviation security measures, while the AFP’s role focuses on the provision of certain protective security-related services, incident response and incident management.⁷

5.14

DoTaRS confirmed:

It is important to recognise that there are a range of agencies involved with policing at airports … and that DoTaRS does not have a direct role in relation to community policing at airports.⁸

5.15

The demarcation did not, however, preclude:

DoTaRS and AFP shar[ing] the objective of strengthening the links between the preventative security, incident management and incident response elements of the overall aviation security system.⁹

 

The case for linking criminality with security

5.16

Criminal elements operating within the aviation industry were understood by some participants as constituting potential threats to security.

5.17

SACL suggested a link between criminality and aviation security:

while there is criminal activity … there is a potential terrorism threat, if there are some avenues that show potential to be used for criminal activities on airports, those same things could potentially be applied by people seeking to undertake threats against aircraft.¹⁰

5.18

One witness suggested:

If 4kg of marijuana could be inserted into luggage, there is no reason why 4kg of high explosive could be inserted.¹¹

5.19

REX agreed that criminal activity could indicate a vulnerability in security:

The introduction of drugs into baggage … indicates a possibility to introduce an explosive device into baggage.¹²

5.20

While this is a popular view and naturally c auses concern, it defies the fact that screening requirements for baggage, passengers and their carry on luggage entering secure airside areas specifically target metal and explosive items.

5.21

To this end, AAL rejected propositions that vulnerability to criminal activity such as the introduction of illicit substances, indicated potential security vulnerabilities such as the introduction of explosive devices or weapons:

While some enterprising radio talkback hosts may try to gain mileage from alleging “if you can get drugs on board an aircraft you can get a bomb on board” gives no credence to the past 20 years or so of initiatives introduced to deter and detect explosives and weapons – drug running is another issue and one which does not directly impact on the safe and secure operations of aircraft.¹³

5.22

In response to claims that public perception was misinformed by media treatment SACL affirmed the importance for aviation security not only to be effective but to be seen to be effective:

Without an effective crime prevention unit operating with the necessary resources and powers of State and Federal law enforcement agencies, organised to specifically address criminal activity at airports, passengers, staff, members of the public and other users will translate the alleged weakness in preventing criminal activity to an overall lack of aviation security in its broadest definition.¹⁴

5.23

DoTaRS maintained that public perception was an important aspect of aviation security:

All acts of unlawful interference against aviation, whether minor or major, are considered significant due to the potential for loss of life, financial loss and need to maintain public confidence in the aviation industry.¹⁵

5.24

To this end, DoTaRS stated that aviation industry participants should consider threats of criminality, including acts of vandalism, public or insider interference and criminality as well as terrorism, in developing risk assessments and TSPs.¹⁶

5.25

While maintaining that its primary concerns and core functions went to border control rather than aviation security narrowly defined, Customs confirmed points of overlap where:

general airport security with good access control is essential for both aviation and border security.¹⁷

 

Committee comment

5.26

The Committee accepts that isolated and opportunistic incidents of criminal activity may not reveal vulnerabilities in aviation security systems.

5.27

The suggestion that the possible introduction of illicit substances reflects a vulnerability to explosives and weapons into a secure area ignores the specificity of screening measures such as subjecting checked baggage to Explosive Trace Detection and passengers to metal detection and x-rays of carry on luggage.

5.28

Furthermore, the upgrading of background checks and requirements to screen access and egress of aviation industry personnel have significantly hardened the aviation industry against being targeted by criminal activity.

5.29

However, the tightened background checking and screening regimes do not establish a case for complacency concerning criminality in the aviation industry. As noted by the Wheeler review, terrorism and crime are distinct, but potentially overlap; a culture of lax security or petty criminality can provide opportunities for terrorists to exploit weaknesses in airport security.¹⁸

5.30

The primary objective of aviation security is the protection of life and property. However, perhaps the greatest current threat to aviation security, terrorism (as opposed to hijacking or other activity), does not confine its target to life and property. Terrorism is an attempt to terrorise, to destroy a public’s sense of security and confidence.

5.31

An important consideration in implementing an aviation security regime, therefore, is not only the effectiveness of security outcomes but public confidence that the regime is effective.

5.32

The Committee concludes that criminality at airports should be of concern both in itself and as showing possible vulnerabilities in aviation security systems.

 

Concerns of inadequate policing arrangements at airports

5.33

Major aviation industry participants raised concerns in relation to the policing arrangements at airports including:

• variability of policing arrangements across major airports and poor coordination of law enforcement personnel;
• funding of CTFR and community policing functions at airports;
• limitations on powers of law enforcement officers at airports; and
• training of airport security staff.

 

Variability of policing arrangements and poor coordination

5.34

The Police Federation of Australia (PFA) referred to a lack of uniformity in the security and policing roles shared by the Commonwealth, states and territories law enforcement agencies:

State Governments currently have a varying role in respect to security and policing both within and around airports. This differs from airport to airport and adds to the complexity and uncertainty surrounding these issues.¹⁹

5.35

AFP stated that the CTFR function at airports was designed to provide a nationally consistent base for policing arrangements for major airports across the country:

The aviation industry has agreed to the application of the new CTFR model nationally, noting its ability to be appropriately modified to meet local conditions and each airport’s Transport Security Plan.²⁰

5.36

SACL stated that the relationship between law enforcement agencies was characterised by a lack of coordination and communication:

there is confusion between the responsibilities of state and national bodies, a lack of coordination at operational levels…²¹

5.37

WAC specified:

There is a very robust process through the National Terrorism Committee to establish protocols and procedures for dealing with incidents, but the reality is that the rank and file people that often turn up, the first respondents to the airport, are not fully aware of their jurisdictional responsibilities. So we view any controller or commander on the airport that would help to coordinate that function as being a positive step.²²

5.38

Some operators of major airports expressed high levels of satisfaction in communication with state police and AFP forces.²³

5.39

SACL referred to a lack of communication between enforcement authorities and industry participants:

At the moment, we are not part of that law enforcement system. We receive intelligence updates from the OTS from time to time. We are not involved with intelligence with the state police. Therefore we believe that there are a lot of operations at the airport that we do not become aware of.²⁴

5.40

AFP responded to claims that lines of communication between law enforcement agencies and industry participants required improvement by citing the presence of Protective Security Liaison Officers:

The PSLO Network … currently has 18 AFP Federal Agents at the 11 CTFR Airports to facilitate national security information and intelligence sharing between agencies and to ensure that operational functions relating to Australian Government national security responsibilities at airports are integrated as effectively and efficiently as possible…

In addition to the facilitation of intelligence sharing, the PSLO Network also monitors national security related activities at airports, provides advice to aviation security stakeholders and is the AFP’s point of contact for industry participants and airport tenants that may come into possession of information concerning aviation security.²⁵

5.41

CAPEC identified cargo crime as a further issue arising in the limitation of policing over several jurisdictions:

if a shipment leaves Singapore and is bound for Melbourne, it may come through a couple of destinations – maybe even Sydney and then Melbourne. If a shipment does not arrive in Melbourne and it is deemed as lost or stolen, the issue with reporting that is a national policing issue in Australia. We may attend or deal with the Victoria Police to report the item missing. They may turn around and say, “Where was the item lost?” At that stage it may be that the item was lost in Singapore or Sydney. It is difficult to actually make that report in Melbourne because the Victoria Police may say, “We don’t know the shipment was lost here – we won’t take responsibility for that report.” That is the issue of the national reporting problem within our industry.²⁶

5.42

PFA suggested that:

Ultimate responsibility for the safe aerial carriage of people, property and the protection of all Australians from the misuse of aviation assets rests with the Commonwealth. It is therefore incumbent on the Commonwealth to provide a clear hierarchy of responsibilities for agencies at airports.²⁷

5.43

The Tasmanian Government suggested a single law enforcement command structure would assist in the policing function at airports:

This would enable a seamless provision of police services across landside and airside areas of airports. The single entity could be responsible for all aspects of law enforcement from community policing and organised/serious crime to terrorist incidents.²⁸

 

Cost imposts of policing airports

5.44

Aviation industry participants raised on-going concerns regarding the cost of policing airports.

5.45

AAA stated that where aviation security was in the interest of the wider community, the broader community should cover the cost:

We feel that, where it is a cost of doing business, our industry is more than happy to meet that cost. But, where the cost of aviation security – or community policing, for that matter – is in the community interest, that cost needs to be shared across the broader community and not left to the travelling public.²⁹

5.46

AAL expanded upon this point arguing, that as key parts of the public infrastructure, major airports should be treated no differently to other communities:

All areas of the Australian community expect a certain level of police activity to deter and respond to criminal acts – why should airports be different? Police have a clear community policing role at a range of public places, for example major shopping centres and railway stations. It would appear unusual to expect one sector of Australian industry to pay and be responsible for community policing simply because the role is delivered at an airport.³⁰

5.47

SACL stated that:

the notion that passengers should pay extra for such improved protection, normally provided as part of government arrangements, is a major policy issue which does need further deliberation by both state and federal governments and industry participants.³¹

5.48

AAA raised concerns about the nature of the funding:

some funds have been made available by government for the introduction of a police presence at airports. That is an initial up-front allocation of moneys. What we do not know is whether that will continue and, if it does not, who is going to have to pay. We would expect that in the application of a police presence at airports, which are communities – of varying size – in their own right, the community at large should pick that up. It is, in our view, part of national security and the fighting of crime for the benefit of the nation, not just for the odd few people who travel through airports.³²

 

Limitations on law enforcement powers

5.49

Concerns were raised at limitations on the powers of Australian Federal Police Protective Service (AFP-PS) officers responsible for providing the CTFR function at major airports.

5.50

DoTaRS stated that the AFP-PS presence:

provides deterrence measures designed to deny information to terrorists and deter acts of terrorism, and if an act is threatened or prospective, to deter or prevent it. AFP Protective Service Officers are specially trained for the CTFR role and, under current government policy, are directed to maintain an undivided focus on this central national security task to ensure that resources are always available immediately to address a terrorist incident.³³

5.51

SACL stated AFP-PS personnel at airports were under utilised.³⁴

5.52

PFA explained that AFP-PS officers had only limited powers of arrest and detention. AFP-PS:

are trained to do a certain limited role, and that is a Counter Terrorist First Response. If someone was to be running out of the newsagency having stolen money from the cashier, the only powers [AFP-PS] have are the powers of a citizen’s arrest. [AFP-PS] have no policing powers to stop a person.³⁵

5.53

SACL suggested the problem of airport policing could be addressed through increasing the scope and responsibilities of Australian Protective Service officers at airports.³⁶

5.54

Virgin Blue concurred:

[AFP-PS] have no community policing role and they have no other role within the airport precinct. It is something that we have spoken about with a number of personnel within the Australian Federal Police, the Government and the Department of Transport … they should be doing constant patrols within the airport precinct, both airside and landside. Their role should not be specific to general public areas. They should be allowed to go in all areas that staff are involved in within the terminal so they can look and wander through.³⁷

5.55

PFA stated:

Subordinate security roles, including passenger screening and baggage screening, domestic and international, should be undertaken by appropriately trained AFP Protective Service officers. To ensure that there is a nationally consistent standard of coordination of training, accountability and collection and exploitation of intelligence, including criminal intelligence, the function should be undertaken by AFP Protective Service officers.³⁸

5.56

The Liquor, Hospitality and Miscellaneous Union suggested a more limited function for AFP-PS officers in screening operations:

In the instances when patrons or clients cannot be cleared through the screening machines, it is the position of the Union and our members that the Australian [Protective] Service Guards should be responsible for undertaking the necessary searches to clear the person.³⁹

 

Training of private security personnel

5.57

Some aviation industry participants expressed their confidence in the current training requirements and certification for security personnel. AAL stated:

Certificate II Security Guarding is based on national competencies and there is an airport competency that adds on to that. So here in South Australia they do the Tertiary and Further Education Certificate II Security (Guarding Airports). That should have – and we are assured that it does have – national competencies.⁴⁰

5.58

However, unions with members working in the aviation industry and aviation industry participants identified the need for accredited and standardised training for private security personnel, including personnel responsible for screening, at airports.

5.59

PFA stated that:

currently there are a number of different private security firms across Australia with no formal linkages, no public accountability, with disparity in levels of training and differing standard operating procedures.⁴¹

5.60

One aviation industry participant claimed that no adequate training standard existed for checked baggage screeners:

Screening is not a certifiable training scheme in itself. You do a Certificate II in general security training, which means that you could be a guard at a hotel … To become a security screener is an on the job learning exercise, so it is dependent largely on the skills and abilities of the person who supervises…

5.61

Claims were made that:

there is no formalised training for Threat Image Projections … each screening device has its own software program that identifies what may or may not be a suspect item. You move from one piece of equipment to another and there is a variation in the type of software being used. There is no accepted standard. There is no threshold of what is expected.⁴²

5.62

SNP Security stated that:

In every one of 200 bags, with a 20 percent diversification ratio either way, the x-ray monitor is presented with the image of a weapon or an IED in the bag…⁴³

5.63

LHMU stated that in relation to operations for screening passengers:

What has become clear is that there is no one position being promoted amongst security firms at the moment with respect to the problems being experienced when clients and patrons cannot be cleared by the screening equipment … guards are being required to take patrons into secure rooms and physically search them … this is a completely unacceptable position. Guards have not been properly trained to undertake extensive physical searches and are in more of a risk in this situation without handheld scanners.⁴⁴

5.64

LHMU identified a further difficulty in maintaining an appropriately trained personnel:

the high level of casual employees and high turnover of staff is a major barrier to improved security arrangements at airports…⁴⁵

5.65

Unions and aviation industry participants proposed several solutions to the problem of inadequate training of private security personnel.

5.66

LHMU reiterated its call for:

formally accredited training standards for security officers to be developed by the Government … and au dits regularly conducted to ensure training is being implemented … There needs to be a national system of accreditation…⁴⁶

5.67

APAM stated that:

Additional training for security screeners and making sure that they are continually up to speed with the requirements of the position is very important. The security regime is increasing; therefore the training needs to increase…⁴⁷

5.68

DoTaRS identified the development of a new paradigm in the training of airport security personnel:

The challenge for us is that we are moving from a system that in the past has been what I would call input driven – the number of hours of training – to one with a more outcome based approach, which is: what competency does the person have? We have also got the huge scale of the industry to deal with: to get out across the core part of the regular passenger transport industry we are talking in the order of 100,000 people…

The Government has recently allocated us $4 million and we have commenced work with the industry on a competency based approach … .⁴⁸

5.69

WAC confirmed:

The Industry Consultative Group, that the Department of Transport has set up … has established a sub-working group that has been looking at training of screening staff for some period of time and they are working currently to establish a whole new training regime. We believe that the current training regime is appropriate but it can always be improved, so we would support any additional training or any advancement in training for screening staff.⁴⁹

Security personnel at regional airports

5.70

Some regional aviation industry participants referred to additional difficulties that accompanied additional training requirements.

5.71

Albury City was unsure if the powers of airport personnel were extensive enough to cope with the increased security procedures such as the introduction of hand wand screening for regional airports:

it is unclear to what extent airport or airline personnel have the authority to undertake these processes.⁵⁰

5.72

Nhulunbuy Corporation Limited referred to difficulties in meeting costs to provide staff with the necessary security officer training:

It appears from the legislation that the airport operator/owner has no powers to challenge, remove or issue infringement notices unless they are “airport security guards” or employ one. This puts an extensive cost on airports such as Gove where remoteness is a key issue requiring high wages and the provision of accommodation for an employee.⁵¹

5.73

Shire of Carnarvon stated:

For this town, currently we have five people who are trained with wands…

Down the track, how do we maintain those people financially? We have nothing in place to pay for that. These people need to maintain jobs too. They have to exist and survive. Down the line there has been absolutely nothing. How do we keep it going? How do we pay for it?⁵²

5.74

Kangaroo Island Council referred to the difficulties of training part time personnel:

the Commonwealth is providing money for … a six-day training course and it does not cover the wages of people who will be undertaking that training. We have five employees at the airport who will need to undergo such a training course and their wages have to be covered. Not all of them work for the organisation all of the time, so we cannot expect them to give up their normal day job to take up a training course on our behalf and not refund them.⁵³

5.75

Shire of Exmouth, identified issues with retaining staff who were trained in the required security procedures:

We seem to be having a problem in training and retaining staff. There is a constant turnover at the moment because we cannot offer them regular hours. At the moment it is only six hours a week and during the tourist season we will need screening staff for 15 hours a week.⁵⁴

5.76

DoTaRS stated:

There are already existing training requirements in the national aviation security program and in all of the security programs of airports and airlines. We have been very active in training, particularly at the smaller end, where there was very little out there by way of training.⁵⁵

Committee comment

5.77

The Committee supports the initiative of DoTaRS and aviation industry participants to generate a nationally uniform screening standard for training private security guards.

5.78

Recommendation 14

That the Department of Transport and Regional Services, in consultation with aviation industry participants, develop a security training standard specific to the aviation industry required of all security and screening personnel working at security controlled airports across Australia.

5.79

The Committee is concerned that training requirements may be particularly difficult to meet for regional aviation industry participants.

5.80

Recommendation 15

That the Department of Transport and Regional Services take responsibility for on-going security training in regional airports that have a high turnover of part-time staff.

 

Airport Police Commands

5.81

On 25 July 2005, the Australian Government announced that an Airport Security Controller would be established at each CTFR airport:

The controllers will be senior AFP officers and will co-ordinate the work of all the Australian Government law enforcement and border control agencies at each airport.⁵⁶

5.82

The Wheeler review recommended that:

• the position of Airport Security Controller be renamed Airport Police Commander and include responsibility for all the police functions at the airport;⁵⁷ and
• that the arrangements for State or Territory Police to take over from airport AFPPS CTFR personnel in the event of a terrorist incident, along with arrangements for potential broader Commonwealth involvement, be reviewed and simplified by a senior Commonwealth / State working group under the supervision of the Secretaries’ Committee on National Security. The Wheeler review urged that the changes incorporate the role of the Airport Police Commander and ensure clear and consistent lines of responsibility, command, and control.⁵⁸

5.83

As part of the Commonwealth Government’s in principle acceptance of the Wheeler recommendations, the Prime Minister announced additional funds for policing airports including:

• $40.9 million for the establishment of five new Joint Airport Investigation Teams at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth airports to address serious and organised crime;
• $48.7 million for increased air-side Customs border patrols at Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide, Perth, Darwin and Cairns airports to provide a more visible presence to deter and respond to criminal activity;
• $43.9 million for improved security and crime information exchange arrangements for aviation; and
• $3.8 million to introduce a new national aviation security training framework to support the aviation industry.⁵⁹

5.84

On 27 September 2005 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) supported the Wheeler report, in particular the concept of a single command structure at Australian Airports and specified that :

The Commonwealth will fund under the unified model a full-time community policing presence of Australian Federal Police officers wearing AFP uniforms under AFP command, at all 11 CTFR airports.⁶⁰

5.85

On 9 May 2006 the Australian Government announced further funding of $242 million over four years to provide for:

• a uniformed community policing at designated airports;
• the development of an AFP National Operations Centre;
• the establishment of a Canine Training Centre; and
• the fit out of Darwin and Perth Airport Uniformed Police Offices.⁶¹

5.86

AFP outlined the evolution of the function of the centralised airport command from Security Controller to Police Commander:

The role of [Airport Security Controller] was initially considered … as being more … facilitative … between agencies at the airport. It was considered a coordination role to draw information together. As a result of the Wheeler report those position titles were changed to Airport Police Commanders … they are there to provide a stronger role around law enforcement and security related activities at the airport than was originally considered.⁶²

5.87

AFP stated that Airport Police Commands would provide for:

the establishment of permanent and dedicated community policing at each of the 11 CTFR airports and the maintenance of the existing CTFR capability and … the Protective Security Liaison Officer network…

A subcommittee of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee … has been established to facilitate arrangements for the delivery of community policing by the states and territories under AFP command … We anticipate having [arrangements] in place during December 2005. The AFP and Customs components of the joint airport investigation teams are now in place, with negotiations continuing with the respective state police agencies on the secondment of two officers to each of those schemes.⁶³

5.88

The AFP explained that:

the Airport Police Commander does have a role in coordinating the overall aviation security related activities of Commonwealth Government agencies. This will be effected through the Australian Government Agencies Aviation Security Committees already in place at airports. MOUs will be put in place as required.⁶⁴

5.89

AFP described the interaction of Airport Police Commands with local state or territory forces in the event of a security incident:

the airport police commander would hand over to the police force commander when they arrive at the airport and, if the incident is large enough to call upon state and territory resources, they would then work in cooperation with that police force commander at the incident until such time as that incident is resolved.⁶⁵

5.90

AFP stated that pending the development of Airport Police Commands the Wheeler review’s recommendation to extend the policing powers of AFP-PS officers was under reconsideration:

The AFP is reviewing the requirement [that all AFP-PS and Customs officers deployed to an airport be given clear unambiguous powers, including to stop search detain and arrest] to broaden PSO powers at airports noting that the deployment of uniformed police to airports may reduce this requirement.⁶⁶

5.91

The Committee expects that the establishing of Airport Police Commands will not only improve information exchange and coordination of operations between agencies charged with law enforcement at airports but also facilitate better communication in these areas between enforcement agencies and airport operators.

 

Staffing Airport Police Commands

5.92

One concern raised in relation to the establishment of Airport Police Commands referred to the use of state and territory police officers.

5.93

The AFP stated:

The CTFR capability at airports is being staffed by the existing AFP Protective Service Officers previously deployed for this role. The Airport Uniformed Police (AUP) presence agreed to by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) … will be provided by each jurisdiction. Negotiations with each State/Territory are progressing with an expectation that approximately half the total of the AUP will be deployed by the end of 2006, with the remainder deploying during 2007. Tasmania Police to staff Hobart International Airport will commence training on 18 April 2006 and will be the first to deploy when they commence in late May 2006. Joint Airport Investigation Teams (JAITs) will be staffed by AFP, Australian Customs Service officers and State Police and have commenced operations at Sydney, Melbourne, Perth, Brisbane and Adelaide airports with the full complement of AFP investigators and Customs staff. State Police have commenced in Perth and the remainder are expected in the near term.⁶⁷

5.94

PFA questioned drawing personnel from state and territory police forces:

between 350 and 500 police Australia-wide will now be required to be provided by the respective state and Northern Territory police forces. Whilst that decision was taken by the Prime Minister and all state and territory leaders, it will place significant strain on the state and Northern Territory police forces to meet that demand…

Bearing in mind that Queensland has the largest number of airports – they have three airports that fit into the 11 Counter-Terrorism First Response – and the smallest jurisdiction in Australia has two. That is the Northern Territory. Certainly the burden that is going to be placed on the Northern Territory is going to be extreme.⁶⁸

5.95

However, AFP referred to the advantages of drawing on state and territory police forces to establish the community policing function of Airport Police Commands. Officers responsible for community policing:

will be required to actually look at state and territory legislation as well as the Commonwealth legislation, and many of the crimes they will investigate in the airport precinct will be under state law – we consider that a unified policing model – that is, having the states and territories come on board under AFP command working side-by-side – is the most preferable way to go.

They would be sworn in as special constables in the Australian Federal Police, thereby giving them access to the powers at a Commonwealth level, and they would come under AFP command. But, again, they would remain officers under their state command and be available to apply both sets of powers and legislation. ⁶⁹

 

Committee comment

5.96

The Committee strongly supports the Australian Government’s lead role in providing a unified and complete policing function for Australia’s major airports.

5.97

The Committee believes that the provision of a uniformed police presence at airports will allow AFP-PS to retain its discrete counter terrorism first response function.

5.98

However, during its inspections of airports with a CTFR function, the Committee noted that AFP-PS officers were rarely observed in public areas. The Committee believes that AFP-PS providing CTFR function should be required to have a greater public profile, at least for the period taken to establish Airport Police Commands.

5.99

The Committee supports the populating of the community policing function of Airport Police Commands with AFP officers some of whom will be drawn from state and territory forces and placed under AFP command.

5.100

The Committee is concerned to ensure that the AFP has adequate personnel to effectively meet its expanded role at a time of increased threat, and if necessary is provided with additional funds in order to conduct a recruitment campaign for officers.

 

Regional Rapid Deployment Teams

5.101

Four Regional Rapid Deployment Teams (RRDTs) were announced under the Securing Our Regional Skies program:

Teams consist of eight AFP-PS officers and include an Explosive Detection Canine team and a Bomb Appraisal Officer.

RRDT deployments will occur on both a threat response basis and as routine pre-planned exercise deployments. The former will occur as short notice deployments triggered by intelligence indicating an increased threat to a regional airport or airports, and the latter designed to practice deployment protocols, familiarise other stakeholders (including state/territory police and airport operators) with the RRDT capability and provide an active deterrence against terrorist threats to regional aviation.⁷⁰

5.102

The first RRDT, located in Melbourne, became operational in January 2005. As of 1 July 2005, the other three RRDTs were in place and are located in Sydney, Perth and Brisbane .⁷¹

5.103

The AFP expanded on the detail of RRDT activities:

The time spent at each airport varies due to travel time, size of the airport precinct and duties undertaken at the airport. When on site the RRDT undertakes a site survey, liaises with airport operators and staff, conducts training and provide a … CTFR capability when required.⁷²

 

Effectiveness and functionality of Regional Rapid Deployment Teams

5.104

A range of views on the functionality and effectiveness of RRDTs were expressed by regional aviation industry participants.

5.105

RAAA expressed scepticism at RRDTs delivering any aviation security outcomes:

The security outcomes to be achieved by these expensive teams are far from clear. If the real problems are in the major gateway ports the funds devoted to these teams would have better been spent there.⁷³

5.106

AAA questioned the effectiveness of the rapid deployment function of RRDTs:

if the Government receives information that airport A out in the middle of New South Wales has a heightened level of threat or an incident is unfolding at airport A, the Rapid Response Team will deploy from Sydney and head out to that airport to assist in the remedy of the incident…

for some of the remoter airports in South Australia it is going to take the deployment team more than four hours to get from Melbourne to anywhere near the airport.⁷⁴

5.107

AFP specified the character of the RRDTs’ activities:

These teams are not designed to deploy after an incident has occurred – it is a pre-emptive capability designed to deter terrorism and resolution of a terrorist incident remains the responsibility of the state/territory police in accordance with the National Counter Terrorism Plan.⁷⁵

5.108

AFP noted that:

The RRDTs have not conducted any threat based deployments in response to intelligence indicating an increased threat to a regional airport.⁷⁶

5.109

Shire of Greenough supported visits by RRDTs as establishing a knowledge of security controlled facilities:

It is very useful for them to just be known to us and to see what our facilities are. If in the event they are required to operate here, they know the infrastructure.⁷⁷

5.110

However, both Shire of Roebourne and Town of Port Hedland stated that they had negligible contact with RRDTs during scheduled visits:

I am aware that the Rapid Response group are able to attend our airport in an incident, but I have had no contact with them…

We have only had one visit from the Regional Rapid Response Team and it was brief. They were in Karratha, drove to Port Hedland, spent an hour at our airport and went back to Karratha.⁷⁸

5.111

Shire of Northampton stated:

They let me know when they are coming and all I do is tell my ranger …They tell us purely so we know that there will be people snooping around and running around out in the bush or something. At the airport I do not know what they do … They have been up here twice.⁷⁹

 

On going funding

5.112

The New South Wales Government stated:

Notwithstanding Commonwealth funding assistance … some local councils still have concerns about the longer term financial implications of the new regional airport security requirements. Any additional measures that may be required following further risk assessments have the potential to place additional demands on resources. Police services in particular generally become a key preventative and response component of any security plan.⁸⁰

5.113

AAA reiterated these concerns:

The long-term funding arrangements for the Rapid Response Deployment Teams needs to be addressed, particularly post 2008, when we assume the regional aviation industry will probably be expected to meet the costs.⁸¹

5.114

AFP stated:

The Government has provided funding of the RRDTs until 2007-08 and the continuation of the program will be considered closer to that time.⁸²

 

Committee comment

5.115

The Committee welcomes the introduction of Regional Rapid Deployment Teams (RRDTs).

5.116

In evidence and during inspections the Committee encountered a wide range of views on the effectiveness of RRDTs.

5.117

In some instances RRDTs visited airports for brief periods of time and without making contact with Airport Managers or personnel.

5.118

While such visits may serve to familiarise RRDT personnel with the facilities they may be required to attend, a more extended period of time would allow RRDTs to establish and strengthen working relationships with airport operators.

5.119

The Committee believes that the AFP should consider expanding contact between RRDTs and operators of regional airports, for instance the possibility of providing basic security training for regional airport personnel. AFP should ensure that RRDTs provide particular attention to establishing working relations with operators of transitioning airports.

5.120

Recommendation 16

The Committee welcomes the introduction of four Regional Rapid Deployment Teams (RRDTs) and recommends that:

• the Australian Federal Police (AFP) explore and report to the Committee on the feasibility of establishing one RRDT per state and territory in terms of cost and the size required to cover each jurisdiction;
• the AFP, in consultation with state and territory police forces and regional aviation industry participants, explore ways in which the function of RRDTs may be expanded during visits to regional airports;
• the AFP review the effectiveness of RRDT activities against an outcomes framework that sets overall expectation, outcome statements and bench marks for the successful establishment of an ongoing aviation security culture; and
• the provision of RRDTs be made cost neutral to owners or operators of regional airports.

 

Inspector of Transport Security

5.121

On 18 October 2006, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services introduced to the House the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006.

5.122

Among other things the Bill provides for the Inspector:

to undertake an inquiry, when required by the Minister for Transport and Regional Services (the Minister), into a major transport security incident, a major offshore facility security incident, or a pattern or series of incidents that point to a systemic failure or possible weakness of the security regulatory systems for aviation or maritime transport or offshore facilities .⁸³

5.123

The Inspector is established as an office that is independent of direction from Minister or Secretary:

While the Minister for Transport and Regional Services tasks the inspector with an inquiry, the inspector is not subject to direction from the Minister for Transport and Regional Services in the conduct of that inquiry. Nor is the inspector subject to direction from the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional service or any other public servant.⁸⁴

5.124

The information gathering, as opposed to regulatory or enforcement, function of the Inspector is emphasised in the ‘no blame’ character of inquiries undertaken. Information provided to the Inspector cannot be used in inquiries to establish culpability, and officers of the Inspector cannot be compelled to provide evidence taken in their inquiries except to coronial inquiries.

5.125

Further emphasising the intelligence nature of the Inspector, all information provided to the Inspector’s inquiries is exempt from Freedom of Information requests.

Committee comment

5.126

The Committee welcomes the establishment of the Inspector Transport Security as an office to investigate possible security vulnerabilities arising out of major transport security events and to identify other systemic weaknesses and possible vulnerabilities in transport security systems.

 

Closed Circuit Television monitoring

5.127

CCTV monitoring is used by various organisations in and associated with the aviation industry for an array of purposes including identifying blockages in baggage conveyor systems, controlling crowd flow, monitoring of access points to security controlled areas, deterrence of criminal behaviour by aviation industry personnel, tracking persons of interest and monitoring perimeter security.

5.128

The Committee observed and was briefed on CCTV operations by Customs at Adelaide and Perth International Airports and the operators of various airports that were inspected during the course of the inquiry.

Coordination of CCTV monitoring

5.129

Authorities and airline and airport operators referred to two difficulties in coordinating CCTV monitoring:

• the different purposes for which each party used CCTV; and
• the different technologies in use.

5.130

DoTaRS stated:

Part of the challenge is that, if you are in Customs and you are doing covert surveillance, you do not necessarily want anybody else to see it. A lot of the equipment is old. It is analog. If you need to search for something quickly – this is again something we learned from [the] London [bombings of 7 July 2005 ] – you need digital, you need to keep it for a month and you need to be able to recall it and index it very quickly. Some of the cameras are static, some are motion activated and some are infrared. It is trying to get that picture right across the airport and between the various agencies. It is to the point where one agency may install a camera and turn your camera away so it is looking at the ceiling. The management of cameras is a big issue.⁸⁵

5.131

Customs expanded on the uncoordinated state of CCTV monitoring at airports:

coverage is fragmented; that there are multiple people collecting data for different purposes; and that all of the systems that have been installed operate to address the owner’s perception of risk rather than the overall risk. Most of the cameras are recorded but how long the images are kept varies between seven and 28 days. There is a mixture of digital and analog equipment. Very few organisations have off-site storage so that, if there were a catastrophic event at the terminal, you would be likely to lose all the previous images at the same time. In a similar vein, there is no ability to look at images in real time off-site. So if you are closing down part of the airport bec ause there is a specific threat, unless you are able to leave somebody there in the control room you have also lost your vision from all those cameras. These are certainly issues that need to be developed and, when we have synthesised this, we will be providing a report back to government about what we think the next steps should be and how we can help address them.⁸⁶

5.132

AAL stated:

We have a matrix … whereby you could probably access them together, but Customs want their own. We have another reason. The airlines also want some of ours and want to feed into them. There is specific reason that Customs want to have separation … some are for general observation and some are more discrete…

Customs … are looking for contraband drugs et cetera. We are looking for illegal activity, I suppose, in its broadest form. We also have a building management system with cameras that we use to assist us in ensuring that doors remain locked on areas that are not occupied. There is a security process through the cameras to ensure that no-one is in those areas when they are not occupied and to assist us in managing the building better in dimming lights and turning off air conditioning and so forth. General safety compliance issues and so forth.⁸⁷

5.133

DoTaRS stated:

We will certainly offer legislative and regulatory support to ensure that evidence that is collected can be used, to ensure that there is a good governance structure working with Customs around the issue and to ensure that there is some sort of industry code around the management of CCTV.⁸⁸

5.134

APAC stated that:

Additional CCTV monitoring has been provided and an agreement with Customs has been reached to address CCTV planning and further system enhancement as well as the sharing of CCTV resources.⁸⁹

5.135

SACL stated:

The issue is about standardising the technology so we can share the information CCTVs can give us. Customs have written to us. We have written back agreeing to the study proceeding, and Customs are about to embark on that within days at Sydney airport.⁹⁰

5.136

Customs stated:

Following on from the Wheeler report, the Government has charged the Australian Customs Service with taking an integrated approach to making sure that we can bring together all the available information from those CCTVs. We have now embarked on a path whereby the first step is working with all the various agencies and organisations that have CCTVs and understanding their distribution, bec au se until now it has not been our responsibility.

The objective is to come forward with a proposal that would enable us to take a lead role in taking feeds from the various cameras, ensuring first of all that there is coverage, and being able to store the feeds and access them readily into the future. So up until recently there were separate organisations with their CCTVs for their own purposes. We have been given responsibility to work out how we integrate that and make sure there is a single source available for airport security issues.⁹¹

5.137

On 21 September 2005 the Australian Government announced:

$19.8 million to further upgrade the Customs closed circuit television capabilities, including assistance for airport operators and additional cameras at major airports.⁹²

 

Monitoring standards

5.138

During inspections of security measures at the CTFR airports the Committee observed the conditions under which monitoring of CCTV was carried out. The conditions faced by security staff at Sydney International Airport appeared particularly onerous.

5.139

SACL qualified that staff:

are not meant to look at all the cameras all the time. As you grow CCTV networks, we will need intelligent software to support cameras, so that the software does the work and the operator intervenes when he has to. They are there to support alarms that occur. The system notifies an alarm and the camera is used to support that. It is not always just about looking at the camera all the time; it is also used to look back at incidents to find out what happened.⁹³

5.140

SACL stated:

There are no established standards for CCTV. One of the things that came out of both Wheeler and COAG was that a review of CCTV standards has been established under the Victorian police. Customs is doing a review and Standards Australia are currently undertaking a number of reviews of protective security standards, one of which is CCTV. So we have three groups working, and they will work together.⁹⁴

5.141

DoTaRS stated:

There is an informal standard, which is basically derived from how screening occurs, which is about 20 minutes on a machine. One of Wheeler’s recommendations that we vigorously support is the development of an industry code. There is no code about this issue in Australia .⁹⁵

 

Regional airports

5.142

DoTaRS referred to the benefits that CCTV monitoring had for regional airports particularly in monitoring perimeter security:

in order to increase the effectiveness of a fence, it should be kept under surveillance, and be monitored and alarmed. However, a number of regional security controlled airports are limited by their lack of resources, such as access to funds, to implement and maintain equipment, their lack of access to people with the right skills or qualifications and, in some cases, their lack of access to power.⁹⁶

5.143

Under the Securing Our Regional Skies program, a:

$3.3 million CCTV trial was introduced to provide broad recommendations to the Australian Government as to any further consideration of CCTV for security enhancement to regional airports…

The cameras will initially provide 24-hour a day surveillance, monitoring all key aspects of an airport’s operations. The surveillance feed will be made available to the local police, airport management and the Office of Transport Security Operations Centre and will support responses to any activity of interest or concern.⁹⁷

5.144

DoTaRS provided an update of the progress of the trial:

Four airports are participating in the CCTV trial - Dubbo, Geraldton, Gladstone and Moorabbin. These airports were selected for their diverse locations and the unique security considerations identified in their transport security programs.

The one year trial will conclude in November 2006. This trial has already provided valuable insights into developing this kind of preventive security measure for regional airports across Australia. After the trial period, DoTaRS will assess the research data and make a recommendation to Government as to the best use of CCTV at regional airports, considering on-going costs and the effectiveness of CCTV systems…

A number of other airports have also accessed funding through the RAFP to install CCTV.⁹⁸

5.145

Shire of Greenough, which operates Geraldton Airport and is participating in the CCTV trial, expressed support for the trial and stated:

For the security system that we are using, they laid optical fibre cable from the main gates at the entrance of the airport right up into the terminal here. With the upgrading of the CCTV system, which has 30-odd cameras, it is all very fast. The monitoring system from there on in is very slow because we are still using a telephone line to do it…

Telstra have been promising that we would have a broadband connection here by the middle of February, but that is just ongoing. If you ask anyone, it does not happen. But we now have a wireless broadband connection down to our works depot, which is part of the Shire as well – that is just down at the entrance – and that is working effectively. This system could be upgraded. It hasn’t been, but it could be and should be upgraded to a broadband system, whether microwave or whatever.⁹⁹

5.146

Shire of Derby – West Kimberley described the operation of CCTV at Derby Airport:

We have a program so that it [the CCTV] is able to pick up movement only, so you do not have to go through 24 hours of camera. First thing in the morning, the reporting officers would go in there and check for movement and it just au tomatically flicks on to the movement that has occurred in the last 24 hours. So you can pick up what planes have come in or gone out. If there is any plane that we do not recognise the call sign for and where it is not a charter from this area, we will check out who it is.¹⁰⁰

5.147

One unforeseen benefit that has flowed to Derby – West Kimberley was an additional $4,000 to $5,000 per annum in landing fees that without the CCTV monitoring would have been evaded.¹⁰¹

 

Committee comment

5.148

The Committee strongly supports CCTV monitoring as an integral security measure in the aviation industry.

5.149

While acknowledging that various organisations operating at airports require CCTV for a diverse range of reasons, there are undoubted advantages to improving coordination of monitoring.

5.150

The advantages lie in achieved efficiencies in avoiding duplication and in ensuring that any blind spots in Security Restricted Areas are covered.

5.151

The Committee supports the tasking of Customs to upgrade, standardise and coordinate CCTV monitoring at major Australian airports.

5.152

The Committee believes that in supporting the upgrade, standardisation and coordination of CCTV monitoring Customs should be mindful of the value of CCTV surveillance in deterring criminal activities among aviation industry employees and explore the value of covert monitoring.

5.153

In discharging its responsibility as the lead agency in CCTV at CTFR airports, Customs should take a comprehensive approach ensuring the development and adherence to standards governing the conditions under which CCTV is monitored.

5.154

Recommendation 17

That as part of its responsibilities as the lead agency for coordination of Closed Circuit Television at Counter Terrorism First Response airports, the Australian Customs Service ensure the development of an enforceable industry code applicable to monitoring CCTV including:

• the need for Occupational Health and Safety standards to be met;
• designation of line of vision requirements between monitors and operators (for example, eliminating awkward angles);
• designation of maximum length of shifts; and
• maximum numbers of monitors per operator.

5.155

The Committee believes that CCTV is a vital component in gaining the maximum benefit from upgrades to perimeter security at regional airports.

5.156

Recommendation 18

The Committee believes that as a matter of urgency, the Australian Government ought to ensure that reliable, high-speed internet services are available to security classified airports that do not possess such services.

5.157

The Committee is concerned that some operators of regional airports with transitioning security programs with no CCTV, such as Shire of Roebourne, or insufficient CCTV coverage, such as Shire of Wyndham-East Kimberley, were not eligible for funding support to upgrade their facilities under the Regional Airports Funding Program.

5.158

The Committee has dealt with funding arrangements for security at regional airports in greater detail at Chapter Six.

 

Australian concerns at overseas airports

5.159

Aviation industry participants consistently drew attention to lower aviation standards at some high risk countries as presenting a major vulnerability in Australian aviation security.

5.160

AAL stated:

we feel that [the high level of security risk facing Australian aviation from international flights] is probably one of the weakest links in the [aviation security] chain. With the introduction of the additional measures and the existing measures in aviation security in this country, anybody who gets on an aeroplane to fly within the country or to depart this country can be reasonably assured that every deterrence factor is in place and is worked to the maximum of its ability. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same about aircraft coming into the country.¹⁰²

5.161

AAA stated that incoming aircraft from overseas points of origin:

is perhaps … the greatest opportunity for compromise of Australian aviation security…¹⁰³

5.162

Gold Coast Airport Limited expressed:

considerable concern with the aviation security practices of our northern neighbours.¹⁰⁴

5.163

From the perspective of an operator of international flights, Qantas stated:

it remains a matter of continuing concern that Qantas is required by regulation to commit increasing resources to aviation security measures within Australia, an area of relatively lower threat, effectively at the expense of overseas locations, particularly in South East Asia, that are of greater concern.¹⁰⁵

5.164

BARA stated that:

Some states … do not have the resources or expertise to devise and deliver security systems to a world standard. In such environments, airline operators may put in place their own additional security measures to enhance the safety and security of airline passengers, employees and aircraft. The Australian security system also takes account of assessed security standards at last ports of call before arrival in Australia. Special security measures may be adopted for those flights, eg additional screening of baggage and passengers before on-carriage to further Australian ports on either international or domestic flights.¹⁰⁶

5.165

Qantas stated that it:

has formed strategic partnerships with the screening au thorities of Jakarta , Denpasar and Manila airports to share information about passenger screening. Although in their formative stages, these arrangements in the longer term will provide local au thorities with a source of information and constructive advice so as to enhance the performance of passenger screening at their airports. The possibility exists for Qantas to extend this program also to the screening au thorities of other airports in South East Asia .

Regardless of the success of any strategic initiative, tactical security measures are employed to manage specific risks as they are identified. For example, Qantas has introduced CBS using Explosive Trace Detection at several ports in the region bec au se of perceived deficiencies in the existing, airport-supplied systems…

In Manila , for example, despite substantial improvements in the quality of passenger screening observed over the last twelve months, Qantas continues to re-screen all of its passengers at the departure gate…

Such measures have been applied not only in South East Asia . In 2003, to overcome a design deficiency that permitted the mixing of arriving and departing passengers at Auckland ’s International Terminal, Qantas introduced Gate Lounge Screening until infrastructure changes were completed. ¹⁰⁷

5.166

DoTaRS identified:

aviation links with a number of countries in our near region, which also impact on our national security. This raises a number of challenges including:

• ensuring the security of aircraft and passengers flying from and to Australia…
• monitoring security at last ports of call…
• further developing Australia’s capacity to gather intelligence relevant to the transport security task.

… the Office of Transport Security is concerned by the low compliance with ICAO standards and other aviation security measures in a number of countries where flights into Australia originate, specifically areas of south east Asia.¹⁰⁸

5.167

Various Commonwealth Departments stated that they have personnel at some overseas airports.

5.168

The Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs stated:

its Airline Liaison Officer network [of] seventeen [officers], located at twelve key hub international airports with direct flights to Australia and/or last ports of embarkation…

deters the activities of people smugglers and persons of concern.¹⁰⁹

5.169

DoTaRS stated:

We have been funded both directly and through AusAID to work with Pacific island nations and South-East Asian nations to improve the basic standards of aviation security, so we can have a little bit more confidence. We actually have a person on the ground at Jackson Field in Port Moresby who is working very closely with the Papua New Guinea Government to run security at the airport. We have a deal now of engagement with those countries to help build capability … We also have officers based in the Philippines, and we are working there in both aviation and maritime security.¹¹⁰

 

Air Security Officers

5.170

Air Security Officers (ASOs), often called ‘sky marshals’ after their counterparts operating in the United States of America, are AFP-PS officers who travel covertly aboard Australian commercial aircraft on certain domestic and international routes. These officers may be armed.

5.171

The air security program for Australian domestic flights commenced on 31 December 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001.¹¹¹

5.172

AFP provided an update of the ASO program:

International operations commenced in late December 2003, … between Australia and Singapore. Deployments between Australia and the US commenced in May 2004 … [Commonwealth agencies] are continuing to explore options for further extending international ASO deployments with a number of other priority countries.¹¹²

5.173

AFP specified that:

Air security officers actually fly only on Australian registered aircraft…¹¹³

5.174

In regard to the extension of the ASO program into high priority countries, AGD stated:

ASO negotiations are underway with countries in South-East Asia assessed as priority countries from a threat perspective. Preliminary responses from these countries have been positive, although there are significant legal and operational issues that will need to be resolved before ASO deployments can commence.¹¹⁴

 

Committee comment

5.175

The Committee believes there is merit in supporting security capability programs in South East Asia and the West Pacific where levels of airport security are below international standards or where there is a heightened level of threat to Australian interests.

5.176

The Committee believes that the Government, through regional forums, should continue to explore ways of encouraging higher security standards at some overseas airports that are last ports of call for flights arriving in Australia.

5.177

The Committee encourages the Commonwealth Government’s efforts to extend the ASO program to include flights departing from neighbouring countries in South East Asia .

---

Footnotes

1	REX, Submission No. 39, p. 2; also AAA, Submission No. 33, p. 3. Back
2	REX, Submission No. 39, p. 2. Back
3	RAAA, Submission No. 28, p. 1; also SACL, Submission No. 44, p. 2. Back
4	WAC, Submission No. 43, p. 1. Back
5	Qantas, Submission No. 61, p. 32. Back
6	Gold Coast Airport Limited, Submission No. 35, p. 1. Back
7	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 2. Back
8	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, p. 33. Back
9	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 2. Back
10	SACL, Transcript, 23 November 2005, p. 16. Back
11	L. Oates, Submission No. 11, p. 1. Back
12	REX, Submission No. 39, p. 7. Back
13	Adelaide Airport Limited, Submission No. 29, p. 2. Back
14	SACL, Submission No. 44, p. 2. Back
15	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, p. 58. Back
16	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, p. 65. Back
17	Customs, Submission No. 42, p. 3 Back
18	J. Wheeler, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australi a , p. ix. Back
19	PFA, Submission No. 67, p. 1. Back
20	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 3 Back
21	SACL, Submission No. 44, p. 2. Back
22	WAC, Transcript, 22 September 2005, p. 5. Back
23	AAL, Transcript, 21 September 2005, pp. 5-6; APAC, Submission No. 25, p. 7. Back
24	SACL, Transcript, 23 November 2005, p. 18. Back
25	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 4. Back
26	CAPEC, Transcript, 21 July 2005, p. 28. Back
27	PFA, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 1. Back
28	Tasmanian Government, Submission No. 74, p. 8. Back
29	AAA, Transcript, 24 November 2005, p. 2. Back
30	AAL, Submission No. 29, p. 2. Back
31	SACL, Transcript, 21 July, 2005, p. 2. Back
32	AAA, Transcript, 24 November 2005, p. 68. Back
33	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, p. 156. Back
34	SACL, Submission No. 44, p. 2. Back
35	PFA, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 7. Back
36	SACL, Transcript, 21 July 2005, p. 2. Back
37	Virgin Blue, Transcript, 24 August 2005, p.9 Back
38	PFA, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 2. Back
39	LHMU, Submission No. 37, p. 2. Back
40	AAL, Transcript, 21 September 2005, p. 19. Back
41	Police Federation of Australia , Submission No. 67, p. 4. Back
42	Name withheld, Transcript, 21 September 2005, pp. 2-3. Back
43	SNP Security, Submission No. 64, p. 3. Back
44	LHMU, Submission No. 37, p. 2. Back
45	LHMU, Submission No. 37, p. 1. Back
46	LHMU. Submission No. 37, p. 2. Back
47	APAC, Transcript, 24 November 2005, p. 14. Back
48	DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 3. Back
49	WAC, Transcript, 22 September 2005, p. 5. Back
50	Albury City, Submission No. 62, p. 5. Back
51	Nhulunbuy Corporation Ltd, Submission No. 22, p. 2. Back
52	Shire of Carnarvon, Transcript, 7 March 2006, p. 12. Back
53	Kangaroo Island Council, Transcript 21 September 2005, p. 25. Back
54	The Shire of Exmouth, Transcript, 7 March 2006, p. 3. Back
55	DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 3. Back
56	Minister for Transport and Regional Services, Attorney General, Minister for Justice and Customs, Joint Media Statement: Securing and policing Australia ’s major airports , 7 June 2005 . The 11 CTFR designated airports are Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, Hobart, Adelaide, Perth, Darwin, Alice Springs, Cairns, Gold Coast and Brisbane Back
57	J. Wheeler, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia, Recommendation 6. Back
58	J. Wheeler, An Independent Review of Airport Security and Policing for the Government of Australia, Recommendation 17. Back
59	Prime Minister, Securing and Policing Australia’s Airports, 21 September 2005. Back
60	COAG, Special Meeting on Counter-Terrorism, 27 September 2005, p. 4. Back
61	Minister for Justice and Customs, ‘Budget includes Significant Boost to Airport Security’, Budget Media Release, 9 May 2006 . Back
62	AFP, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 25. Back
63	AFP, Transcript, 28 November 2005, pp. 17-18. Back
64	AFP, Submission No. 40.1, p. 5. Back
65	AFP, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 22. Back
66	AFP, Submission No. 40.1, p. 6. Back
67	AFP, Submission No. 40.1, p. 5. Back
68	PFA, Transcript, 28 November 2005, pp. 2-4. Back
69	AFP, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 18. Back
70	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 4. Back
71	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 4. Back
72	AFP, Submission No. 40.1, p. 3. Back
73	RAAA, Submission No. 28, p. 1. Back
74	AAA, Transcript, 24 November 2005, p. 72. Back
75	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 4. Back
76	AFP, Submission No. 40.1, p. 4. Back
77	Shire of Greenough, Transcript, 7 March 2006, p. 4. Back
78	Shire of Roebourne & Town of Port Hedland, Transcript, 9 March 2006, p. 25. Back
79	Shire of Northampton, Transcript, 7 March 2006, p. 10. Back
80	NSW Government, Submission No. 70, p. 3. Back
81	AAA, Submission No. 33, p. 2; also AAL, Submission No. 29, p. 3; Kangaroo Island Council, Transcript, 21 September 2005, p. 25; District Council of Grant, Submission No. 41, p. 2. Back
82	AFP, Submission No. 40.1, p. 5. Back
83	House of Representatives, Inspector Transport Security Bill 2006, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 2 Back
84	House of Representatives, Hansard, 18 October 2006, p. 5. Back
85	DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 26. Back
86	Customs, Transcript, 27 February 2006, p. 24. Back
87	AAL, Transcript, 21 September 2005, p. 4-5. Back
88	DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 26. Back
89	APAC, Submission No. 24, p. 3. Back
90	SACL, Transcript, 23 November 2005, p. 20. Back
91	Customs, Transcript, 27 February 2006, pp. 22-3. Back
92	Prime Minister, Securing and Policing Australia’s Airports, 21 September 2005. Back
93	SACL, Transcript, 23 November 2005, p. 21. Back
94	SACL, Transcript, 23 November 2005, pp. 20-1. Back
95	DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 27. Back
96	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, p. 29. Back
97	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, Annexure Q, p. 122. Back
98	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52.2, p. 2. Back
99	Shire of Greenough, Transcript, 7 March 2006, p. 8. Back
100	Shire of Derby – West Kimberley , Transcript, 8 March 2006 , p. 5. Back
101	Shire of Derby – West Kimberley, Transcript, 8 March 2006, pp. 5-6. Back
102	AAL, Transcript, 21 September 2005, pp. 6-7. Back
103	AAA, Submission No. 33, p. 2. Back
104	Gold Coast Airport Limited, Submission No. 35, p. 1. Back
105	Qantas, Submission No. 61, p. 27. Back
106	BARA, Submission No. 57, p. 3. Back
107	Qantas, Submission No. 61, pp. 28-9. Back
108	DoTaRS, Submission No. 52, p. 32 Back
109	DIMA, Submission No. 45, p. 4. Back
110	DoTaRS, Transcript, 5 December 2005, p. 22. Back
111	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 2. Back
112	AFP, Submission No. 40, p. 2. Back
113	AFP, Transcript, 28 November 2005, p. 20. Back
114	AGD, Submission No. 63, p. 5. Back

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