Chapter 3 Construction of a new post-entry quarantine facility at
Mickleham, Victoria
3.1
The Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) and
Department of Finance and Deregulation (DoFD) propose to construct a new
post-entry quarantine (PEQ) facility at Mickleham, Victoria. Both agencies acted
as proponent agencies for this inquiry.
3.2
The purpose of the project is to replace five existing facilities in
four states that have reached the end of their useful life. The new facility
will consolidate all the existing functions on a single site.
3.3
The cost of the project is $293.1 million.
3.4
The project was referred to the Committee on 7 February 2013.
Conduct of the inquiry
3.5
Following referral to the Committee, the inquiry was advertised on the
Committee’s website, by media release and in the Hume Leader and Hume
Weekly newspapers.
3.6
The Committee received one submission and seven supplementary submissions
from the proponent agencies. The Committee also received submissions from various
organisations and individuals. The list of submissions can be found at
Appendix A.
3.7
The Committee received a private briefing and conducted a site
inspection, a public hearing and an in-camera hearing on 27 March 2013 in Melbourne.
3.8
A transcript of the public hearing and the submissions to the inquiry
are available on the Committee’s website.[1]
Need for the works
3.9
DAFF currently leases and operates five PEQ facilities in Australia for
imported live animals and plants. These leases are due to expire between 2015
and 2018 and are not able to be renewed for the medium to long term. The expiry
of the current leases means that DAFF must develop an alternative facility for
the future PEQ services. The present leases include:
- Eastern Creek,
Sydney, Australia’s largest Commonwealth operated post entry quarantine station
(dogs, cats, bees, horses, ruminants and plant material)
- Knoxfield, east of Melbourne
(plant material)
- Spotswood, inner Melbourne
(dogs, cats, ruminants and live birds)
- Torrens Island, near
Adelaide (fertile avian eggs)
- Byford, south-west of
Perth: (cats and dogs).
3.10
The dispersed nature of current operations across the country is a historical
legacy of the development of sites delivering these functions over a long
period of time. This is also reflected in the fact that sites are generally
specialised to the delivery of single, or a limited number of, import species.
3.11
The existing facilities at each of the five sites are over 25 years old
and have reached the end of their useful life. Maintenance and refurbishment
has been undertaken since 2012 to sustain the existing facilities to ensure
they meet required biosecurity, quarantine, occupational health and safety, and
animal welfare standards while new facilities are constructed.[2]
3.12
The Committee is satisfied that there is a need for the works.
Scope of the works
3.13
The works will include the following facilities:
- administration
facilities
- car parking for staff
and visitors
- cat and dog compounds
suitable for 240 cats and 400 dogs
- plant compound of
some 2,000m2 of greenhouse capacity distributed over multiple
separate greenhouses, a further four shade houses totalling some 1,200 square
metres, and a plant diagnostic laboratory
- avian compound with
separate facilities for live bird and fertile egg imports. The two live bird
facilities will hold some 150 live pigeons each, while the fertile egg
facilities will be capable of holding up to 11,500 fertile chicken eggs
- bee compound including
six flight rooms
- ruminant compound
including open paddocks for animals such as alpacas
- two horse compounds
including stables for 80 horses.[3]
3.14
The works will be delivered in two stages:
- Stage 1: Commence
operation of the quarantine facilities for plants, horses and bees together
with the administrative and general facilities and approximately 50 per cent of
cat (120 cats) and dog (200 dogs) quarantine facilities by October 2015.
- Stage 2: Commence
operation of the remaining cat (total 240 cats) and dog (total 400 dogs)
facilities, ruminants and the avian facilities by October 2018.[4]
3.15
Subject to Parliamentary approval, construction for Stage 1 is planned
to commence in late 2013 and be completed by October 2015. Construction for
stage 2 is planned to commence in July 2016 and be completed by October 2018.[5]
3.16
The Committee finds that the proposed scope of works is suitable to meet
the need.
Cost of the works
3.17
The project cost is $293.1 million. The Committee received a
confidential supplementary submission detailing the project costs and held an
in-camera hearing with the proponent agencies on these costs.
3.18
The Committee is satisfied that the costings for the project provided to
it have been adequately assessed by the proponent agencies.
Project issues
A single, consolidated facility
3.19
The proponent agencies stated that a single, consolidated facility was
the best option for the project, as it provides operational and biosecurity
efficiencies:
… operating one facility has a focus of precisely that: one
facility. Managing five in five separate locations requires five
administrations, five sets of security management and five sets of operating
practices. Over time and separated by many thousands of kilometres in some
cases, some of these practices have drifted apart from each other. What we are
keen to do is to manage all of the facility to one high standard, so that is
actually where we are taking this. That is not to say that biosecurity is in
any way compromised currently. It is just that we believe we will gain greater
efficiencies, greater economies of scale and greater cost effectiveness by
being in one facility.[6]
3.20
Regarding concerns about having multiple species in a single location, two
of the existing facilities have multiple species on the one site.[7]
Further, various engineering and biosecurity redundancies will be built into
the proposed site:
… we have separated the individual facilities on this large
site by many metres—in some cases, hundreds of metres—and that is part of the
biosecurity separation exercise; there is physical separation within that
construct … Horses are provided for in biosecurity by two facilities separated
in distance. The cross contamination of species disease spread is very rare and
has not been recorded here in Australia in all the years we have been
operating. In that sense, there is no reason that in the event that, even if in
one of those facilities in the same building envelope in the avian facility
there was a problem, the others would be necessarily affected. If it is a horse
problem we have another horse facility. Horse facilities are treated as
individual entities, not unlike the avian facilities. For example, all the
horses going into one facility are all in there together. They do not come out
except together. So we have redundancies within the site; we have separation of
different elements of the facility between species; and we have separation of
units within the species. It is a nested environment, if you will.[8]
3.21
The proponent agencies confirmed that the site will be independently
certified to ensure that it meets all standard requirements, before it
commences operation.[9]
Committee comment
3.22
The Committee is satisfied that the proponent agencies will ensure that
the facility meets all relevant biosecurity standards prior to commencing
operation.
Co-location of avian facilities (live birds and fertile eggs)
3.23
Significant concerns were raised by the avian industry regarding the
co-location of live birds and fertile eggs in the same building. The key
concern was that the proposal had insufficient isolation between units in the
avian facility, thus enabling cross-contamination and compromising biosecurity.[10]
3.24
The proponent agencies clarified that although the avian facility would
be a single building, it would contain five separate units:
The avian building is designed to provide effective
biological separation between consignments of birds of different origin and
health status. Five separate units will be built and maintained at a negative
pressure of QC3 [Quarantine Containment Level 3] standard, including HEPA
[High-efficiency particulate air] filtration of incoming and outgoing air. The
QC3 standard utilises equipment to maintain a biological barrier such as steam
autoclaves, personal showers, disinfection dunk tanks, gaseous fumigation, and
high-efficiency particulate air filtration, which is HEPA filtration, that
captures particles and viruses as small as 0.3 microns—that is, one-third of
one-millionth of a metre.[11]
3.25
The proponent agencies stated that the CSIRO[12]
has maintained co-located facilities at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory
(AAHL) for nearly 30 years, without any cross-contamination.[13]
3.26
The proponent agencies quoted correspondence from the microbiological
security manager of the AAHL facility, which states that AAHL provides a
world-best practice facility:
AAHL has 26 co-located PC3 [Physical Containment Level 3] animal
facilities and has been operating a variety of experiments with a range of
different animal pathogens in side-by-side PC3 facilities for almost 30 years
with no recorded cross-contamination occurring between adjacent rooms.[14]
3.27
Similarly, the Elizabeth Macarthur Agricultural Institute (EMAI) at
Camden in Western Sydney maintains various facilities in a single building and
considers this to be best practice. There are also international examples of
avian facilities located within a single building.[15]
3.28
Such facilities require containment for each quarantine cohort (physical
separation from other animals or items), and strict personnel operating
procedures to ensure that contamination does not occur through human movement:
We can provide both of those within the one [building] envelope.
The issue is the actual facility in which the organism is held and, as both
CSIRO and EMAI indicate, this can be achieved, and is achieved, concurrently in
Australia—modern standards—and is being done all over the world. We can do that
side by side and the operating practices for those treat each of those
individual holding facilities as a separate operating entity. They will only be
accessed through air vents and showering in and out facility. There will be no
connection with the adjacent facility, which will also have to have in and out
showering and management. So they are, effectively, separated. They are in one
envelope only.[16]
3.29
These structural and operational standards prevent an exotic disease
outbreak or other contamination issue from spreading to other cohorts in the
building or facility:
You can deal with that on a structural basis—that is, from an
engineering perspective, which this design is a large part of. So the avian
facility is designed and engineered to ensure the biocontainment of those goods
inside each individual unit within that avian facility. What we do in respect
of that is that, from an engineering perspective, we have multiple levels of
redundancy in the event of systems failure or an outbreak of an exotic disease.
Then we back that up with our operational procedures, and our operational
procedures then provide another level of security in what we are trying to
achieve from a biosecurity perspective. So the design of the avian facility is
based on the assumption that any individual unit that we have put forward in
our concept design could be harbouring an exotic disease at any given time. So
it is engineered to ensure that, if there is a disease outbreak there, it
cannot spread to another consignment that might be operating next door—but, I
emphasise, in a very separate engineered and biosecure area.[17]
Committee comment
3.30
The Committee appreciates submissions from industry representatives
regarding the avian facility and thanks the public for its involvement in the
inquiry.
3.31
The Committee remains concerned that the proponent agencies have not
convinced industry that co-locating avian quarantine facilities in a single building
is appropriate from a biosecurity standpoint.
3.32
At the Committee’s request, DAFF established an expert advisory group to
provide independent advice on this matter. The report of the expert advisory
group concluded that biocontainment level 3 is ‘suitable for the containment of
avian pathogens and that the design of the government’s proposed avian
quarantine building has the necessary features to ensure biocontainment of an
exotic disease outbreak within any of the building’s biosecure subunits.’[18]
3.33
The findings of the expert advisory group should provide the basis for
better consultation with industry stakeholders.
On-site accommodation
3.34
Many submissions called for the provision of on-site accommodation for
the horse and live egg facilities, to enable owners or support staff to reside
at the facility during the quarantine period.[19]
3.35
The proponent agencies explained that the design provides a rest area
for industry representatives, which would include a tea point, toilet
facilities, and a shower.[20]
3.36
The proponent agencies explained that support staff must be awake to
monitor the quarantined animals or items, so there is limited benefit in having
people sleeping on-site. However, the proponent agencies confirmed that 24-hour
access to the site will be available, so that support staff can remain on-site
to monitor their animals.[21]
3.37
Some existing sites do provide on-site accommodation.[22]
However, the proponent agencies quoted from recent correspondence with the
Executive Director of Biosecurity Victoria regarding this issue:
Experience has shown that housing grooms and other industry
personnel within a quarantine facility actually adds to the risks associated
with personnel entry, particularly out of hours. With appropriate monitoring
technology installed and the proposal to have DAFF staff present at the
facility 24 hours a day there is no justification for the construction of
housing accommodation for grooms and other visiting industry personnel within
the facility.[23]
Committee comment
3.38
The Committee accepts that the provision of on-site accommodation has
been appropriately considered by the proponent agencies.
Training track
3.39
Harness Racing Australia called for the inclusion of a training track at
the PEQ facility.[24]
3.40
The proponent agencies indicated that there is some land on the
Mickleham site that is currently earmarked for future expansion. Using that
land for items that prohibit future expansion (such as a training track) may
compromise the longevity of the site.[25]
3.41
The proposed design incorporates basic exercise needs for horses. Moving
horses either individually or in cohorts to and from a training track would
have implications for biosecurity.[26] Furthermore, a dedicated
training track would have other implications for the PEQ facility:
… the government’s primary objective here in designing this
new quarantine facility is to meet the biosecurity needs of these animals and
other commodities being imported. Other exercise or training options of a
non-quarantine nature are, at the moment, not part of our plans for a
government-run facility. A training track … would involve an increased movement
of people into and out of the complex. DAFF officers would certainly need to be
involved whenever the training track was in use to ensure that biosecurity
controls continued to be met. [The facility would] need to be redesigned to
ensure that the minimum 100-metre separation is achieved if such a facility
were to be incorporated in the design. Infrastructure beyond just the
construction of the track would be required. This would include double fencing,
laneways, equipment storage and decontamination facilities. As also identified
in the evidence put forward, we would also have to be mindful of the native
grassland in any consideration if this were to be contemplated in the future.[27]
3.42
The proponent agencies indicated that they would investigate exercise
options as the project design is progressed.[28]
Committee comment
3.43
The Committee acknowledges that the proponent agencies have considered
the feasibility of a training track on the site, and provided valid reasons for
not including one in the project.
Final Committee comment
3.44
The Committee conducted an inspection at the existing Spotswood facility
and observed the dated features and close proximity of different species. The
Committee thanks the staff at the Spotswood site for their enthusiastic and
informative responses to questions.
3.45
The Committee remains concerned that the proponent agencies have not
been able to satisfy stakeholder concerns regarding the biosecurity of the
avian facility. The Committee expects better consultation with industry
stakeholders during the life of the project.
3.46
The Committee was satisfied with the evidence provided by the proponent
agencies regarding the proposed construction of a new post-entry quarantine
facility at Mickleham, Victoria. The Committee is satisfied that the project
has merit in terms of need, scope and cost.
3.47
Proponent agencies must notify the Committee of any changes to the
project scope, time and cost. The Committee requires that a post-implementation
report be provided on completion of the project. A template for the report can
be found on the Committee’s website.
3.48
Having regard to its role and responsibilities contained in the Public
Works Committee Act 1969, the Committee is of the view that this project
signifies value for money for the Commonwealth and constitutes a project which
is fit for purpose, having regard to the established need.
Recommendation 1 |
|
The Committee recommends that the House of Representatives
resolve, pursuant to Section 18(7) of the Public Works Committee Act 1969,
that it is expedient to carry out the following proposed work: Construction
of a new post-entry quarantine facility at Mickleham, Victoria. |